Best practices to protect human rights while using administrative measures to prevent terrorism

The activities of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Saul, from March 2025 to July 2025 are summarized in annex I to the present report.¹ In his previous report (A/HRC/58/47), submitted to the Human Rights Council in March 2025, he detailed his activities from August 2024 to February 2025.

1. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/reports/srct-report-best-practises-terrorism-annex-1.pdf. ↩

Coercive administrative measures to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, distinct from criminal justice, have expanded in many States. The plethora of measures cannot be covered in one report. Four key preventive measures are addressed in the present report: restrictive orders, terrorist designations, security detention and compulsory interventions. The Special Rapporteur recommends best practices to respect human rights while countering terrorism, consistent with his mandate.² Best practices refer not only to what international law minimally requires, but to more progressive principles.³ A sequel report to the Human Rights Council will address border security, migration and refugees and citizenship, expanding on the content of earlier reports.⁴

2. Human Rights Council resolution 15/15, para. 2 (d). ↩
3. A/HRC/16/51, para. 10. ↩
4. See A/62/263; A/71/384; https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Deprivation-of-Citizenship.docx; and https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Terrorism/ SR/Submissions26Oct2020.pdf. ↩

Many other administrative measures have been, and continue to be, of concern to the mandate holder,⁵ and concerns were also raised in many of the 44 submissions received in response to the call for input to the present report.⁶ These measures include: terrorist financing measures and regulation of non-profit, civil society and humanitarian organizations; limits on religious belief and practices; restrictions on public space, assembly and association; regulation of expression, the media and social media, online content and the Internet; physical and digital surveillance; administrative search and seizure; restrictions on legal professionals;⁷ dismissal from public employment; withdrawal of social benefits; interference in corporations; and exclusion from civil registry services.

5. See reports at https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/index-thematic-issues-2005-present. ↩
6. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-inputs-human-rights-impacts-administrative-measures-counter-terrorism-and. ↩
7. Submission from International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (China, Tunisia and Türkiye). ↩

Administrative measures can profoundly affect the spectrum of human rights and often have fewer procedural protections and judicial safeguards in place than criminal law measures. While it is possible to design administrative measures in a human rights-compliant manner, measures in many States lack sufficient safeguards. Even where the law is formally compliant, its application may violate human rights due to repressive abuses or deficiencies in the rule of law, such as the lack of an independent judiciary or access to justice or legal aid, or pervasive discrimination. Worse, stakeholders reported that some authorities apply measures in an entirely extralegal and arbitrary manner. Given the reality that administrative measures are especially prone to abuse, they should be enacted and applied exceptionally and 1 See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/reports/srct-reportbest-practises-terrorism-annex-1.pdf. 2 Human Rights Council resolution 15/15, para. 2 (d). 3 A/HRC/16/51, para. 10. 4 See A/62/263; A/71/384; https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Deprivation-ofCitizenship.docx; and https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Terrorism/ SR/Submissions26Oct2020.pdf. 5 See reports at https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/index-thematic-issues2005-present. 6 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-inputs-human-rights-impactsadministrative-measures-counter-terrorism-and. 7 Submission from International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (China, Tunisia and Türkiye). 4/23 sparingly. Measures that may be appropriate in one State due to the terrorist threat and legal culture may be unjustified in another. Their abuse can also counterproductively undermine security, where intimidation, stigmatization and exclusion corrode trust, undermine public cooperation with authorities and fuel grievances.⁸

8. See A/HRC/57/29, para. 34; and Cyprien Fluzin, Administrative Measures, Human Rights, and Democracy in Turbulent Times, ICCT Policy Brief (2024). ↩

Existing guidance and research on administrative measures have identified general principles to ensure their human rights-compliant use.⁹ These are important starting points, and the present report provides more tailored guidance on specific measures. Expanding on earlier guidance, some general best practices for administrative measures are outlined below.

9. See A/HRC/57/29; Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Glion recommendations on the use of rule of law-based administrative measures in a counterterrorism context”, 2019; Tanya Mehra, Matthew Wentworth and Bibi van Ginkel, The Expanding Use of Administrative Measures in a Counter-Terrorism Context: Part 1 – In Need of Rule of Law Safeguards, ICCT Policy Brief (2021); and Bérénice Boutin, “Administrative measures in counter-terrorism and the protection of human rights”, Security and Human Rights, vol. 27, Nos. 1–2 (2016), p. 128. ↩

Best practices concerning the grounds and safeguards for administrative measures generally include:
(a) Proposed laws should be assessed for their human rights impacts;¹⁰
(b) A measure should be preventive and not de jure or de facto punitive, and it should not pursue criminal investigation. The cumulative impacts of any administrative, criminal and social measures must be holistically addressed, mitigated and coordinated;
(c) A measure must be clearly authorized by law and not arbitrary. Vague and overbroad definitions of terrorism, extremism, radicalization and associated terms must be avoided. The definition of terrorism must be consistent with best practice international standards, including legality;¹¹
(d) A measure must be strictly necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate counter-terrorism aim; it must be the least invasive means, for example, where alternative voluntary, social and rehabilitative measures would not be effective; and it must be applied individually. A high standard of proof must be applied (preferably the balance of probabilities, which is a higher standard than reasonable suspicion, belief or grounds). In assessing proportionality, any adverse impacts on protective factors against terrorism should be considered, including disruption of family, social, professional and religious ties and social stigma, particularly on younger individuals;
(e) Criminal conduct, including preparatory offences, should normally be prosecuted. Where prosecutorial discretion allows and if appropriate, a less invasive administrative measure may instead be imposed, particularly to divert young people from the criminal justice system.¹² Measures must not be used to circumvent fair trial and criminal law safeguards;
(f) A person’s risk of engaging in terrorism must be individually, qualitatively objectively and assessed, including with regard to his or her intent and capacity to commit terrorism and its likelihood and gravity. Risk assessment and “behavioural insights” tools must be empirically validated and not given undue weight as probative of a person’s risk or the need for a measure. Doubts about a tool’s validity should be disclosed to the individual and the court. “Expert” evidence in the nascent and problematic field of terrorist and extremist risk assessment must be forensically scrutinized. All relevant factors should be considered, including mitigating circumstances, such as evidence of remorse, renunciation or disengagement, deradicalization and rehabilitation, and whether the person has a support network. Criminal history, particularly distant conduct, is not determinative of risk. Mental ill-health is a poor predictor, and referral to treatment should be prioritized. Risk tools must comply with data protection and privacy laws;
(g) Measures must not directly or indirectly discriminate on prohibited grounds, including religion, nationality, ethnicity, political opinion or minority status. They should not be selectively non-applied, for political or ideological reasons, to other actors who equally meet the criteria for application of the measure;
(h) Children should be subject to administrative measures as a last resort and should be dealt with by alternative means, such as child protection and juvenile justice authorities. Where a State permits orders against children, they must not be imposed upon persons aged under 16 years; the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration, and child protection authorities must monitor the impacts of those orders. Children associated with terrorist groups should be regarded as victims;
(i) The gendered impacts of measures must be assessed and addressed;
(j) The special needs of vulnerable groups must be taken into account, including persons with disabilities or mental health conditions and neurodivergent persons;
(k) Measures must have clear and proportionate maximum time limits, including for any permissible renewal periods, and their duration must not be de facto punitive;
(l) Any administrative or criminal penalty for non-compliance with a measure must be proportionate to the severity of the breach, take into account the non -criminal nature of the measure and consider reasonable excuses. Any maximum term of imprisonment should be relatively short (e.g. one year, and no more than three years).

10. Submission from United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. ↩
11. Including Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), the model definition of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (A/HRC/16/51, paras. 26–28), and the exclusion clauses in para. 24 of the present report. ↩
12. Submission from United Kingdom, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. ↩

Best practices concerning procedural rights and remedies relating to administrative measures generally include:
(a) A person must be afforded due process, including notice and written reasons, sufficient disclosure of evidence, an opportunity to be heard and be present at a hearing, adequate time and facilities to prepare his or her defence, legal representation and legal aid, and interpretation. Exceptionally, as where necessary to prevent absconding or thwart an imminent terrorist act, a measure may be imposed without prior notice and ex parte, at the discretion of a court, subject to a prompt, full judicial hearing ex post facto;
(b) Administrative measures should normally be issued by a court, not an executive authority that may be susceptible to political considerations. Security detention must always be ordered by a court. Where an executive authority is empowered to impose a measure, the decision maker should be a high authority (e.g. a minister or attorney general) or a body (e.g. police) acting with the approval of such authority, and the decision should be promptly judicially confirmed;
(c) There must be a right to effective, independent and impartial judicial review on the merits and the law, and to be informed of such right. The standard of review must be sufficiently protective of the individual’s rights. While recognizing the security expertise of the executive and the separation of powers, a court must not excessively defer to the executive. Appeals must be determined promptly, as soon as possible after the measure is imposed;
(d) The authorities may withhold sensitive information where it would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security, not merely where there is a risk or possibility of prejudice. The definition of “national security” should not be too vague or overbroad (such as by extending to “international relations”, “law enforcement” or ordinary economic interests). An individual must receive sufficiently detailed information to enable them to effectively know and challenge the case against them and instruct his or her lawyer. Such a summary is additional to whatever further disclosure is permitted through exceptional procedures such as the appointment of a third-party “special advocate”. A special advocate should be permitted to communicate with the individual and his or her lawyer, under judicial supervision. The origin and veracity of intelligence reports (such as notes blanches)¹³ must be subject to effective independent review. Minimum disclosure should be provided in relation to all restrictive orders, not only those engaging the right to liberty;
(e) A court should retain discretion to determine: (i) whether a hearing must be held in a closed session or the individual or his or her lawyer must be temporarily excluded on security grounds; (ii) the weight to give to the adverse impact of disclosure on security and of non-disclosure on a fair hearing; and (iii) whether security clearance requirements may be imposed on a lawyer;
(f) There must be a right to prompt and effective remedies, including the termination or adjustment of a measure, compensation and rehabilitation.

13. Communications FRA 2/2022, and FRA 3/2025; and A/HRC/40/52/Add.4, para. 27. ↩

Best practices concerning oversight and accountability regarding administrative measures generally include:
(a) Administrative measures should be subject to effective, independent oversight, monitoring and accountability,¹⁴ including through complaints procedures, national human rights institutions, parliaments and independent national security monitors, and by engaging with civil society;
(b) The operation of laws should be independently reviewed annually for compliance with international and domestic law, and the results publicly reported, including data on the number and type of measures and measures refused or overturned by the courts;
(c) The continuing need for laws should be subject to periodic independent review, in the light of changing terrorist threats and circumstances. Sunset clauses should be used to intensify scrutiny of any continuing necessity of laws.

14. For guidance, see A/HRC/14/46; and Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Brussels memorandum on good practices for oversight and accountability mechanisms in counterterrorism”, September 2024. ↩

States, the United Nations and regional organizations should not promote particular administrative measures through technical assistance, capacity-building or standard-setting where: (a) they are not human rights-compliant; or (b) the receiving State does not have effective human rights safeguards, including due process, independent judicial review, effective remedies and a rule of law culture, to prevent their abuse in practice. Cross-border information-sharing must entail stringent and effective data protection, privacy and non-discrimination safeguards.

An increasing number of States authorize restrictions on individual rights to prevent terrorism, such as “terrorism prevention and investigative measures” (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), “control orders” (Australia), “individual measures of administrative control and surveillance” (including “assigned residence”) (France), “administrative measures” (Somalia) and “restriction orders” (Sri Lanka). Orders may entail varied and intrusive restrictions, including on: (a) movement (such as domestic or international travel bans, residency requirements, curfews and home detention, and bans on attending specific places); (b) association (e.g. meeting with particular individuals or groups); (c) communication (e.g. on the use of the telephone, the Internet, computers, social media, messaging and websites, on speaking to the media or at public events, and on contacting particular people); (d) privacy (e.g. surveillance and monitoring, biometric data collection, search and seizure and reporting to police); (e) property (e.g. financial restrictions and bans on possessing items, such as weapons or certain publications); and (f) particular types of work and education. Orders may also require attendance at rehabilitation or re-education programmes.¹⁵

15. For example, Australia and United Kingdom. ↩

In principle, restrictive orders can comply with human rights law where they are preventive not punitive,¹⁶ involve necessary and proportionate limitations on rights, and provide due process, judicial safeguards and effective remedies. They may complement the criminal law where a person’s conduct could not be proved to the criminal standard, including where it is not possible to securely admit secret evidence at trial or the person presents a serious future risk. Some independent reviews have found them to be effective,¹⁷ and the European Court of Human Rights has found them to be rights-compliant in some cases.¹⁸ However, orders must be used exceptionally given the uncertainties inherent in predictive assessments of risk and the clear danger of their abuse in real-world conditions.¹⁹ The European Court of Human Rights has found violations in some cases.²⁰ One official independent reviewer queried their necessity and effectiveness, warned of quasi-punitive effects and emphasized that criminal law and surveillance are usually adequate.²¹

16. A/HRC/4/26/Add.3, para. 40. ↩
17. United Kingdom, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2014 (2015), p. 9. ↩
18. European Court of Human Rights, M.B. v. France, Application No. 31913/21, Judgment, 5 December 2024; Domenjoud v. France, Applications Nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, Judgment, 16 May 2024 (first applicant); and Pagerie v. France, Application No. 24203/16, Judgment, 19 January 2023. ↩
19. See, for example, communications FRA 3/2025, FRA 15/2023, FRA 9/2023, FRA 5/2021, ISR 6/2023, USA 1/2022, CHE 2/2023, GBR 7/2020, RUS 26/2023 and CHN 14/2020; and A/HRC/40/52/Add.4. See also submission from World Organisation against Torture, and research by Geneva Graduate Institute. ↩
20. European Court of Human Rights, Domenjoud v. France, Applications Nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, Judgment, 16 May 2024 (second applicant). ↩
21. Australia, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Declassified Annual Report (2012), pp. 38, 33 and 43. ↩

A restrictive order should be imposed, on the balance of probabilities, only where:
(a) A person is presently engaged in terrorist offences, including preparatory offences, as properly defined by law;
(b) The person presents a credible and serious risk of continuing to engage in terrorist offences;
(c) The order and its specific restrictions are necessary to substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act (intentional death or serious personal injury for a terrorist purpose);
(d) The order is proportionate in the individual circumstances.

It is preferable to also require a prior terrorist conviction.²² However, a prior conviction or acquittal for a terrorist offence or other indications of previous terrorist offences are not sufficient to impose an order, particularly when the conduct occurred long ago or a group was not proscribed at the time. Where a person has completed a criminal sentence, it should be presumed that the person has discharged his or her responsibility and has been rehabilitated, absent compelling contrary evidence. Evidence of renunciation of terrorism should be considered. The bare existence of other administrative measures should not circularly justify imposing a restrictive order. Orders should not be imposed on the basis of irrelevant considerations, such as innocent associations with accused terrorists, including family members, friends, colleagues or detainees.

22. Ibid., p. 37. ↩

Orders must be necessary and proportionate and should be imposed only where less invasive alternatives would not be effective, including surveillance, monitoring and post-custody reporting. Orders should normally be imposed only where prosecution is not realistic,²³ including by allowing lawful interception of evidence. However, since orders can be less invasive and briefer than criminal punishment, they should be considered as alternatives where prosecutorial discretion permits and their preventive purpose is met.

23. United Kingdom, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Fifth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14 (3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (2010), p. 1. ↩

The law must exhaustively enumerate the restrictions available. Each restriction must be necessary and proportionate in the individual circumstances and not automatic. Anticipated hardships must be given due weight, including the impacts on the right to family life and the best interests of dependent children, and the rights to work, an adequate standard of living, health and education. The combined effects of measures and any criminal proceedings must be assessed. In relation to specific measures:
(a) Curfews must not exceed 10 to 12 hours daily and should be timed overnight to enable a relatively normal life, and the maximum should be the exception. Longer periods, or shorter periods combined with other restrictions, could violate the right to liberty;
(b) Forced relocation should be prohibited. If allowed, individuals must not be relocated to areas where they have no connections and the location should not be unreasonably distant from family, healthcare, work and education;
(c) Measures excluding individuals from certain areas must concern specific places or facilities (e.g. airports or train stations) not wide geographical areas;
(d) Communications devices must not be totally banned. It must be permitted to use an approved telephone and computer with Internet access, subject to monitoring;
(e) Restrictions on association must identify specific individuals or identifiable, finite classes of persons and not impede effective legal representation;
(f) Financial restrictions must allow access to approved banking services to enable the transactions needed for daily life;
(g) Compulsory counselling or re-education must respect the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and opinion and expression.

An order should expire after six (preferably three) months, to account for changes in risk and context. Orders may be renewed upon a fresh application, for a total of 12 months, to avoid indefinite “warehousing” of individuals; such period is normally adequate to degrade the risk. Any subsequent orders should be based on new evidence. Where a State imposes orders on children, their duration should be three months, renewable once. The authority that issues the order should review every three months its legality, necessity and proportionality, and vary or terminate the order, as required.

Various States have enacted laws to designate individuals and organizations as terrorist for different purposes, such as to impose financial restrictions, travel bans and an arms embargo; trigger criminal offences relating to a listed organization; dissolve an entity’s legal personality; ban political participation, holding events, media comment and publications; facilitate police checks, search and seizure; and enable civil restrictions (e.g. on employment, business, licences, notarization, power of attorney, and identity and travel documents).

National lists often implement Security Council financial, travel and arms sanctions on Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh) and associated individuals and entities.²⁴ 24 In addition, some States have established unilateral lists to implement paragraph 1 (c) of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), to freeze the assets of persons involved in terrorism and their associates,²⁵ 25 although listing is not required and freezing may occur through the criminal process.²⁶ 26 In doing so, States apply national terrorism definitions. Furthermore, some States 24 See https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list. 25 See also S/2019/998, para. 51. 26 Ibid., para. 55. 10/23 have unilaterally listed individuals and organizations for other purposes, especially to trigger criminal offences for engaging with the group.

24. See https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list. ↩
25. See also S/2019/998, para. 51. ↩
26. Ibid., para. 55. ↩

When listing terrorist groups, States must comply with international law. The mandate holder has frequently documented the abuse of terrorist or “extremist” designations to unjustifiably suppress human rights²⁷ and many stakeholders have raised such concerns.²⁸ Key rights affected include freedoms of thought, conscience and religion; opinion and expression; assembly and association; political participation; non-discrimination; liberty; privacy; reputation; work; health; education; minority cultural rights; Indigenous rights; and self-determination. The best practices in the present report build on the best practices on terrorist listings set out previously by the mandate holder.²⁹

27. See, for example, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/un-experts-urge-united-kingdom-not-misuse-terrorism-laws-against-protest; communications USA 14/2025, EGY 5/2023, VNM 4/2024, IND 10/2024, RUS 28/2023, ISR 6/2022, PHL 4/2020, PHL 4/2023, and NGA 5/2020. ↩
28. Submissions from Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre (Russian Federation); Amnesty International (Egypt, Georgia and South Sudan); Coming Out (Russian Federation); Dignity (Belarus and Myanmar); CSO Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism (Canada); Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (Egypt); MENA Rights Group (United Arab Emirates); Solidarity with OTHERS (Egypt and Türkiye); Front Line Defenders (Pakistan); South Asia Justice Campaign (India); Ambika Satkunanathan (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka); International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (Algeria, Belarus, Egypt and Israel); Justicia and Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (Algeria); and World Organisation against Torture (Tunisia); and confidential submissions Nos. 1 (Russian Federation and Türkiye), 4 (United States of America) and 6 (Türkiye). See also research by Geneva Graduate Institute (India, Nigeria and Pakistan); and Fordham Law School (China, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Türkiye and United Arab Emirates). ↩
29. A/HRC/16/51, para. 35. ↩

The criteria for listing must be clearly established by law and publicized. There must be reasonable grounds to believe, based on credible and convincing evidence, that the individual or entity: (a) has knowingly carried out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist act; (b) intends to engage further in terrorism; and (c) is capable of so engaging. A higher standard of proof, such as the balance of probabilities, is recommended.

The definition of terrorism must be limited to conduct that is genuinely terrorist in accordance with best practice international standards. Mere property damage, without intentionally causing death or serious personal injury, is not sufficient, especially when it occurs in the course of protest in a democratic society. Individuals and organizations must not be listed for engaging in peaceful advocacy or activities in defence of human rights; or for lawful humanitarian and protection activities by impartial organizations under international humanitarian law. Family members should not be listed by mere association.

Where a listing is based on statements allegedly inciting terrorism, the law on incitement must: be precisely prescribed by law and avoid vague concepts, such as glorification or apologie; be based on a precise definition of terrorism; be necessary and proportionate to counter terrorism; and include both an intent to incite terrorism and an objective risk that it will occur.³⁰

30. Ibid. ↩

To list an organization, it must have the substantial purpose of engaging in terrorist offences. It is not enough that some individuals commit isolated acts of terrorism while acting outside the organization’s legitimate purposes and leadership. 27 See, for example, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/un-experts-urge-unitedkingdom-not-misuse-terrorism-laws-against-protest; communications USA 14/2025, EGY 5/2023, VNM 4/2024, IND 10/2024, RUS 28/2023, ISR 6/2022, PHL 4/2020, PHL 4/2023, and NGA 5/2020. 28 Submissions from Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre (Russian Federation); Amnesty International (Egypt, Georgia and South Sudan); Coming Out (Russian Federation); Dignity (Belarus and Myanmar); CSO Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism (Canada); Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (Egypt); MENA Rights Group (United Arab Emirates); Solidarity with OTHERS (Egypt and Türkiye); Front Line Defenders (Pakistan); South Asia Justice Campaign (India); Ambika Satkunanathan (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka); International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (Algeria, Belarus, Egypt and Israel); Justicia and Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (Algeria); and World Organisation against Torture (Tunisia); and confidential submissions Nos. 1 (Russian Federation and Türkiye), 4 (United States of America) and 6 (Türkiye). See also research by Geneva Graduate Institute (India, Nigeria and Pakistan); and Fordham Law School (China, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Türkiye and United Arab Emirates). 29 A/HRC/16/51, para. 35. 30 Ibid. In such cases, those involved in terrorist activity should be prosecuted or considered for restrictive measures in their own right.

A number of States apply non-statutory policy criteria when listing an organization, in addition to legislative criteria. These address such factors as the nature, scale and extent of the organization’s activities, its capabilities, the threat to the State or its nationals or overseas interests, including to its “values”, the organization’s ideology and links to other terrorist groups, the need to support international cooperation or allies, the effectiveness of listing and consistency with international obligations. Such factors can usefully narrow eligibility and ensure that designation is necessary and proportionate. Such factors should be codified in law not policy to increase legal certainty and fair notice, reduce arbitrariness and enhance judicial review.

Even where an individual or entity meets the formal criteria, listing must still be necessary and proportionate in the circumstances, including by demonstrating that less invasive means, such as surveillance and criminal investigation, would be ineffective. Proportionality will also depend on the nature and scope of the restrictive measures that flow from designation, including whether they apply automatically or in a tailored manner, and whether any offences are overbroad. Special care is required when an organization has mixed purposes, as where it predominantly engages in legitimate commercial, charitable, political, social, educational, religious or media activities and these outweigh any minor terrorism element.

Listings must not directly or indirectly discriminate on prohibited grounds, including religion (including religious clothing), national or social origin, political or other opinion, minority or Indigenous status or sexual identity.

Any restriction of rights resulting from listing, including financial and criminal law measures, must be necessary and proportionate in pursuit of the counter-terrorism aim and be non-discriminatory. Measures must be applied individually and not automatically or en masse.

Financial restrictions must allow the exemption of funds necessary for basic expenses, including for food, housing, healthcare, taxes, insurance, utilities and professional and legal fees; and for extraordinary expenses.³¹ Exemptions should extend to the basic and extraordinary expenses of dependent family members,³² including to safeguard child rights and avoid indirect discrimination against women. Terrorist financing offences should also exclude the funding of essential expenses.

31. Security Council resolution 1452 (2002), para. 1. ↩
32. Submission from Erik Böhm and Patricia Wiater. ↩

A humanitarian exemption must apply to financial restrictions, whether Security Council sanctions or unilateral measures, and cover funds, assets, resources and goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs by impartial humanitarian organizations.³³

33. Security Council resolution 2761 (2024), para. 1, in conjunction with Security Council resolution 2664 (2022), para. 1 (concerning Security Council sanctions measures, albeit limited to provision by specified United Nations and related actors). ↩

A humanitarian exemption must further apply to terrorist organizations and other terrorist offences, such as providing support, services or assistance, association and financing. It should exclude the provision of exclusively humanitarian activities, 31 Security Council resolution 1452 (2002), para. 1. 32 Submission from Erik Böhm and Patricia Wiater. 33 Security Council resolution 2761 (2024), para. 1, in conjunction with Security Council resolution 2664 (2022), para. 1 (concerning Security Council sanctions measures, albeit limited to provision by specified United Nations and related actors). 12/23 including protection, by impartial humanitarian organizations carried out in accordance with international humanitarian law.³⁴

34. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Humanitarian exemptions in domestic counter-terrorism legislation”, June 2025, p. 4; and communication OTH 35/2025. ↩

Travel restrictions must take into account adverse effects on the rights to family life, work, health and education, and the best interest of dependent children.

The protracted or indefinite maintenance of restrictive measures, including asset freezes and travel bans, may become disproportionate and quasi-punitive over time.³⁵ Protracted listings should also be more intensively scrutinized because they will likely have reduced the threat over time.

35. A/HRC/58/47, para. 29. ↩

Compounding violations of human rights often arise from the complex structure of terrorist listings, as where a vague and overbroad definition of terrorism triggers a vague and overbroad category of “terrorist organization”, which in turn triggers vague and overbroad offences. Where listing activates criminal liabilities, the link between the organization and any offences must be articulated in a sufficiently narrow and precise manner to avoid unjustified liability.

First, the person’s conduct should materially and proximately contribute to the commission of a terrorist act by the group, namely, death or serious injury for a terrorist purpose. It is not sufficient that the person has made any, even innocent, contributions (such as providing medical care or training on human rights law or humanitarian law); or minor, remote or speculative contributions. Caution is warranted where most members of a hybrid group are engaged in legitimate activities.

Secondly, each type of offence must satisfy the requirements of legality and certainty under article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so that individuals may reasonably foresee what behaviour is criminal. There are particular risks of vagueness and overbreadth in such offences as membership, association, support, identification (e.g. by wearing clothing or displaying flags or symbols), glorification, praise or apologie, hosting meetings, training and financing. Legitimate interactions, including legal representation, humanitarian, medical, human rights and media activities, and family and work relationships, must not be criminalized. Mere use of encrypted messaging must not constitute an offence.³⁶

36. European Court of Human Rights, Akgün v. Turkey, Application No. 19699/18, Judgment, 20 July 2021; and Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, Application No. 15669/20, Judgment, 26 September 2023. ↩

Thirdly, as regards the mental element of offences, the person must have knowledge of the group’s terrorist purpose, in addition to intending to commit the physical conduct. Lower standards, such as constructive knowledge, recklessness or negligence, are not sufficient. Presumptions as to knowledge should be avoided. The bar to establish knowledge is heightened where the organization has not been previously designated as terrorist and there is no public evidence of prior terrorist activity. Leadership responsibility in a large, diverse group, or secret but legitimate activities aimed at avoiding unlawful repression, does not necessarily imply knowledge of any terrorist activities.

Terrorist listings must meet international requirements of due process, judicial safeguards and the right to effective remedies. Listings should be decided by a court on application by the executive. Where listings are made by the executive, the authority must be senior, such as the Cabinet, a minister or an expert body. It is good practice for executive listings to be affirmed by a parliament.³⁷ Listings must be published.³⁸

37. United Kingdom, Terrorism Act of 2000, sect. 3 (in relation to criminal proscription). ↩
38. See, for example, Security Council resolution 2462 (2019), para. 11. ↩

The following minimum due process rights should apply:
(a) A right to be promptly informed of the listing (ordinarily ex ante, exceptionally ex post facto) and its factual grounds, the consequences of listing and the procedural rights. There must be sufficient disclosure of the information supporting the listing to enable the person to effectively challenge it, instruct their lawyer and enjoy equality of arms in proceedings;
(b) A right to apply to the decision maker for delisting or non-implementation of the measures, and a subsequent right to re-apply for such relief where there is a material change of circumstances or new evidence;
(c) A right to judicial review of the listing, affording due process, legal assistance and legal aid as required. The court must have the power to suspend the listing pending final decision. Judicial review should be prompt and automatic, not only on application;
(d) The listing should be regularly reviewed, at least every six months,³⁹ to determine whether the listing and the measures are still lawful, necessary and proportionate;
(e) The listing should lapse automatically after 12 months, unless renewed afresh;
(f) Reparation, including compensation, must be available for wrongful listing, including for affected third parties.

39. See, for example, European Union, Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP), 27 December 2001, art. 1 (6). ↩

The Security Council encourages States to address foreign asset-freezing requests.⁴⁰ It also encourages asset freezing lists to be published to encourage transnational cooperation, including by enabling States to incorporate regional or foreign State lists.⁴¹ Given the well-documented abuse of terrorist listings, including through transnational repression,⁴² foreign States lists must not be automatically incorporated. They must be assessed for their consistency with international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, the best practices in this report, and the State’s own listing criteria and legal requirements. While members of a regional organization may be required to incorporate regional lists, they must do so consistently with their international obligations.⁴³

40. S/2019/998, para. 56. ↩
41. Security Council resolution 2462 (2019), para. 11; and S/2019/998, para. 56. ↩
42. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/activities/sr-ct-remarks-g7-transnational-repression.pdf. ↩
43. A/HRC/58/47, paras. 23–29. ↩

Administrative security detention in alleged counter-terrorism contexts has a troubled history, including internment in colonial counter-insurgencies (e.g. French Algeria, the Mau Mau in Kenya, nationalist struggles in Ireland and Northern Ireland, 37 United Kingdom, Terrorism Act of 2000, sect. 3 (in relation to criminal proscription). 38 See, for example, Security Council resolution 2462 (2019), para. 11. 39 See, for example, European Union, Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP), 27 December 2001, art. 1 (6). 40 S/2019/998, para. 56. 41 Security Council resolution 2462 (2019), para. 11; and S/2019/998, para. 56. 42 See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/activities/sr-ctremarks-g7-transnational-repression.pdf. 43 A/HRC/58/47, paras. 23–29. 14/23 the Malaya Emergency, and in Mandate Palestine, among others).⁴⁴ 44 The mandate holder has frequently identified arbitrary administrative detention in counterterrorism contexts, from Guantanamo Bay⁴⁵ 45 to the tens of thousands of individuals indefinitely detained by de facto authorities in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic in relation to the conflict with ISIL (Da’esh).⁴⁶ 46 The Human Rights Committee has accurately assessed that security detention “presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty”.⁴⁷ 47 It often correlates with other rights violations, including arbitrary killings, enforced disappearances, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, inadequate detention conditions, discrimination, arbitrary expulsion, including refoulement, and lack of due process and judicial safeguards. This mandate holder⁴⁸ and stakeholders49 have raised many human rights concerns about this practice.

44. See, for example, David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945–1967 (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 110–112. See also Martin Thomas and Gareth Curless, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Late Colonial Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (Oxford University Press, 2023). ↩
45. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/us-and-guantanamo-bay-detention-facility. ↩
46. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/detention-and-repatriations-north-east-syria. ↩
47. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 15. ↩
48. Communications ISR 12/2024, ARE 5/2021, ISR 9/2023, ISR 15/2022, LKA 7/2021, PAK 11/2015, ARE 3/2020, LKA 2/2024, PHL 4/2020 and CHN 12/2022. ↩

Administrative detention in relation to terrorism takes diverse forms, including in order to: (a) prevent a terrorist attack; (b) gather intelligence, distinct from criminal investigation; (c) manage terrorism risks after criminal imprisonment ends; (d) compel participation in deradicalization programmes (considered in section E below); and (e) expel a non-citizen allegedly involved in terrorism (to be addressed in a later report). Further types occur in other exceptional circumstances: (f) public emergencies where a State derogates from the right to liberty; (g) armed conflict; and (h) where authorized by the Security Council to restore international security.

Under international human rights law, security detention is permissible only in “the most exceptional circumstances” where a person poses a “present, direct and imperative threat” and alternative effective measures, including criminal proceedings, are unavailable.⁵⁰ Detention must not last longer than absolutely necessary, and the overall length of detention must be limited. The burden to justify detention increases with its length. States must fully respect the right to liberty under article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary law, including prompt and regular review by a court, access to legal advice, free choice of one’s legal representative and disclosure to the detainee of at least the essence of the evidence.

50. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 15. ↩

It is preferable to restrict security detention to public emergencies threatening the life of the nation, where a valid derogation from the right to liberty has been made under article 4 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. More 44 See, for example, David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945–1967 (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 110–112. See also Martin Thomas and Gareth Curless, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Late Colonial Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (Oxford University Press, 2023). 45 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/us-and-guantanamo-baydetention-facility. 46 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/detention-and-repatriations-northeast-syria. 47 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 15. 48 Communications ISR 12/2024, ARE 5/2021, ISR 9/2023, ISR 15/2022, LKA 7/2021, PAK 11/2015, ARE 3/2020, LKA 2/2024, PHL 4/2020 and CHN 12/2022. 49 Submissions from International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (Malaysia, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates); CSO Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism (China); Human Rights Defenders Fund (Israel); MENA Rights Group (Israel); South Asia Justice Campaign (India); Ambika Satkunanathan (Bangladesh); and Amnesty International (China, France, India, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and United States); and confidential submissions Nos. 2 (France) and 8 (Jordan). Research by Geneva Graduate Institute (Malaysia, Nigeria, Singapore and United Arab Emirates). See also CAT/C/DEU/CO/6, para. 41 (b). 50 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 15. isolated and sporadic terrorist threats beneath this high threshold may still present grave risks to life, exceptionally justifying detention. Administrative detention should not be used to punish “administrative offences” related to terrorism or extremism, and such penalties should not be circularly used to justify other administrative measures.⁵¹ 51 Practice 14: Preventing a terrorist act

51. Submission from Coming Out (Russian Federation). ↩

Detention to prevent a terrorist act should normally be effected by arresting the person on reasonable suspicion of a terrorist offence, given that criminal process also serves the legitimate purpose of preventing further crimes. The criminal law of attempt, extended modes of criminal liability, such as conspiracy, and preparatory offences that are committed at early stages in terrorist planning, including by lone individuals, will usually be sufficient to interdict imminent terrorist acts. Surveillance and other administrative measures, such as restrictive orders, may also be available to contain the threat. Even where there is insufficient admissible evidence to prosecute or secure a conviction at later stages, the comparatively lower standard of proof for arrest and criminal charge (e.g. “reasonable suspicion”) will often be satisfied and enable the person’s immediate incapacitation and longer pretrial investigative detention under judicial supervision.

In exceptional situations, a criminal arrest may not be feasible, for example, because there is no corresponding offence or the criminal standard of proof may not be met. In such cases, security detention should be permitted only where:
(a) It is prescribed by law;
(b) It is likely that the person will substantially participate in the commission of an imminent terrorist act intended to cause death or serious injury, as properly defined. Vague and overbroad thresholds must be avoided, such as protecting “national security” or preventing a “public danger” or “prejudicial act”. The standard of proof should be on the balance of probabilities;
(c) It is necessary and proportionate to detain the person to prevent their participation;
(d) Alternative means would be ineffective, including criminal arrest, surveillance, other law enforcement action or other restrictive measures;
(e) It is prospectively authorized by a judicial authority; urgent, ex parte hearings are permissible, where necessary. If detention may be authorized by the executive, it must be done at a senior level and be automatically and promptly judicially reviewed;
(f) The maximum duration of detention is seven days (or, exceptionally, 14 days). It may only be renewed if there is evidence of a new threat.

Given the preventive purpose of security detention, interrogation for criminal investigation or intelligence purposes should be prohibited. Administrative detention merely to preserve evidence of a past terrorist act⁵² should not be permitted.

52. Australia, Criminal Code Act of 1995, sect. 105 (4) (6) (b). ↩

Intelligence services should not be authorized to deprive persons of liberty to collect intelligence about terrorism,⁵³ particularly those not suspected of terrorism in order to gather information about terrorism by other persons,⁵⁴ 54 such as a family 51 Submission from Coming Out (Russian Federation). 52 Australia, Criminal Code Act of 1995, sect. 105 (4) (6) (b). 53 A/HRC/14/46, practice 28. 54 Australia, Security Intelligence Organization Act, No. 113 of 1979, sect. 34, subdivision B. 16/23 member, friend or associate. If intelligence services have powers of arrest and detention, they must be restricted to performing law enforcement functions and be subject to the same level of oversight.⁵⁵ If national law permits detention to gather intelligence, the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination must be respected. States must not criminalize the refusal to answer a question, unless immunity from prosecution is guaranteed by law. Intelligence services should not operate their own places of detention, including secret, unacknowledged or privatized facilities.⁵⁶ Practice 16: Post-sentence continuing detention

53. A/HRC/14/46, practice 28. ↩
54. Australia, Security Intelligence Organization Act, No. 113 of 1979, sect. 34, subdivision B. ↩
55. A/HRC/14/46, practices 28 and 29. ↩
56. Ibid., practice 30. ↩

The criminal law presumes that imprisonment for a criminal offence discharges the convicted person’s legal responsibility. In addition to punishment and deterrence, an important criminological purpose of imprisonment is to rehabilitate an offender and facilitate his or her successful reintegration into society. In the case of terrorist offenders, the availability of measurably effective “disengagement” or “deradicalization” programmes, along with educational and vocational training opportunities and humane, dignified and human rights-compliant conditions of detention can contribute to rehabilitation and prevent recidivism, thus mitigating the need for post-release security measures. Regrettably, many States do not provide disengagement programmes for terrorist offenders, prioritize rehabilitation or meet international standards on detention conditions.

In exceptional cases, criminal punishment, rehabilitation and disengagement programmes may not mitigate the risk of terrorist reoffending. To manage the risk, a few States permit the continuing, non-criminal detention of a person who has served his or her prison sentence for a terrorist offence.⁵⁷ Such schemes are not encouraged, since they risk undermining the central corrective principles of criminal law outlined above. One official reviewer urged their repeal.⁵⁸ To avoid arbitrary detention, any continuing detention scheme “must be justified by compelling reasons arising from the gravity of the crimes committed and the likelihood of the detainee’s committing similar crimes in the future” and States “must exercise caution and provide appropriate guarantees in evaluating future dangers”.⁵⁹ States should use such detention only as a last resort, with regular independent reviews to decide whether continued detention is justified.⁶⁰

57. For example, Germany, Criminal Code of 1998, sect. 66; and CCPR/C/DEU/CO/7, para. 14 (c); and Australia, Criminal Code of 1995, division 105A. ↩
58. Australia, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Review into the Operation, Effectiveness and Implications of Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and Any Other Provision of That Code as Far as It Relates to That Division (2022). ↩
59. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 21. ↩
60. Ibid. ↩

Continuing detention should be permitted only where:
(a) It is clearly authorized by law and non-arbitrary;
(b) The person was convicted of a grave terrorist offence attracting a serious term of imprisonment (e.g. at least five years);
(c) The person poses a high risk of committing another serious terrorist offence, on the balance of probabilities;
(d) Alternative measures would be ineffective, including surveillance or post-sentence supervision orders⁶¹ allowing a court to require reporting to police, electronic monitoring, curfews, limits on communication and association, or counselling;
(e) The order is sought by responsible authorities with the approval of a senior official (e.g. an attorney general or minister); and the order is prospectively authorized by a court, according due process commensurate with the right to liberty at stake;
(f) Detention provides access to appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration programmes;
(g) The order is reviewed by a court after three months;
(h) The maximum duration of a single order is six months, renewable once.

61. For example, Australia, New South Wales, Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017, No. 68. ↩

Continuing detention orders must not be permitted after a person who was detained pending trial is acquitted of a terrorist offence. States must also not circumvent the prohibition on retroactively increasing a criminal sentence under articles 9 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by imposing nominally civil detention that is equivalent to penal imprisonment.⁶² Indicia of punitive detention may include the automatic prolongation of imprisonment without assessing future risk; assessing risk largely on the historical conduct that sustained the conviction; punitive or prejudicial statements from decision makers; and detention among convicted prisoners.

62. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 21. ↩

Any derogation from liberty must meet the high threshold of being made “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” under article 4 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Many terrorist threats will not meet this test, particularly where threats are isolated, sporadic and localized; a terrorist group is small and lacks capabilities; the authorities have extensive preventive capacities; and the situation does not meet the intensity and organization thresholds of a non-international armed conflict. Derogation must be evidence-based and not driven by speculative, unrealistic, politicized or fearful “worst case” scenarios. Courts must rigorously review the merits and legality of an emergency and the necessity of measures, without undue deference to executive security assessments.

While liberty under article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not non-derogable under article 4 of the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee has indicated that: (a) derogation must not exceed what is strictly required by the exigency of the situation; and (b) derogating measures must be consistent with other obligations, including under humanitarian law relating to deprivation of liberty, hostage-taking, abductions and unacknowledged detentions, and non-discrimination.⁶³ Freedom from arbitrary detention is considered non-derogable, since the requirement that derogating measures are necessary and proportionate excludes unreasonable or unnecessary detention.⁶⁴

63. Ibid., para. 65. ↩
64. Ibid., para. 66. ↩

Derogation involving security detention must be limited in duration and accompanied by procedures to prevent arbitrariness, including the same procedural protections applicable to security detention where there is no derogation.⁶⁵ These include review by a court or an independent and impartial tribunal; prompt and regular review by such body; access to and free choice of legal advice; and disclosure of evidence. Procedures may not be derogated from in a way that would circumvent 62 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 21. 63 Ibid., para. 65. 64 Ibid., para. 66. 65 Ibid., paras. 15 and 45. 18/23 non-derogable rights, including the right to life and freedom from torture and illtreatment; the right to prompt judicial review may not be derogated from.⁶⁶ 66

65. Ibid., paras. 15 and 45. ↩
66. Ibid., para. 67. ↩

Given the Human Rights Committee’s justifiably restrictive interpretation of derogation from article 9, there is not so much difference between derogating security detention and that achieved by a non-derogating limitation on liberty, which the Committee also accepts. Both types must be exceptional, necessary and proportionate in the individual case, non-discriminatory and subject to due process and judicial review. Derogating detention, depending on the emergency, may offer more leeway as regards the grounds and duration of detention and the procedure, such as the promptness and standard of review and level of disclosure. At the same time, ordinary limitations must not be stretched into covert derogations.⁶⁷

67. A/HRC/37/52, para. 35. ↩

Terrorism-related detention may occur in international and non-international armed conflicts governed by international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is good practice to instead prosecute terrorist suspects for properly defined offences (including by excluding the activities of armed forces in armed conflict that are not unlawful under humanitarian law); and to consider voluntary disarmament, demobilization and reintegration not involving detention. Where detention of civilians for imperative security reasons⁶⁸ is permitted, it should:
(a) Be authorized by national law and non-arbitrary;
(b) Specifically and precisely define the security grounds of detention, including any category of “terrorism”, in accordance with the principle of legality;
(c) Be necessary and proportionate in the individual case in pursuit of a legitimate security aim, where less invasive means would be ineffective;
(d) Accord due process, prompt and effective independent review⁶⁹ (in the case of non-international conflicts by a court) and regular periodic review;
(e) Meet international standards on treatment and conditions in detention;
(f) Cease when the individual security reasons for it no longer exist.
The standards above are set out in detail in annex II.⁷⁰

68. ICRC, Commentary of 2020 on article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, para. 759. See also Jelena Pejic, “Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of violence”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 87, No. 858 (June 2005). ↩
69. ICRC, Commentary of 2020 on article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, paras. 761 and 762; and Jelena Pejic, “Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of violence”. ↩
70. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/reports/srct-report-best-practices-prevent-terrorism-annex-2.pdf. ↩

In exercising its international security powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has authorized Member States to undertake security detention in counter-terrorism contexts, such as by empowering the multinational force in Iraq to take “all necessary measures” including internment “for imperative reasons of security”.⁷¹ Security Council authorization of security detention should:
(a) Be limited to addressing threats to international security properly falling within Chapter VII;
(b) Precisely specify the grounds of detention, including by defining “terrorist” threats, and any special procedures governing it, in accordance with the principle of legality;
(c) Not mandate detention automatically, but require States in implementation to consider whether less invasive means would be effective;
(d) Require detention decisions to be made on an individual basis;
(e) Ensure that States have sufficient discretion in implementation to comply with their other obligations under international law;
(f) Specify that the overall authority to detain expires after 6 or 12 months, renewable.

71. For example, Security Council resolution 1546 (2004). ↩

Authorizations should be consistent with humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law; and should be interpreted consistently with international law, including so as not to permit interference with rights by implication.⁷² The Security Council may not override peremptory international norms, including non-derogable rights of jus cogens status (such as the right to life and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment);⁷³ and should not permit interference in other non-derogable rights, including arbitrary detention and judicial review of detention (except where permitted by humanitarian law in international conflict).

72. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 27021/08, Judgment, 7 July 2011, para. 102. ↩
73. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 29 (2001) on derogations from provisions of the Covenant during a state of emergency, para. 11. ↩

Administrative security detention is distinguishable from detention related to criminal investigations and proceedings, including pre-charge investigative detention and pretrial detention. The distinction can be blurred in practice where States abuse the criminal process to enable protracted pre-charge detention (including without ultimately laying charges) and protracted pretrial detention (without expeditiously prosecuting, or prosecuting at all),⁷⁴ thus operating as de facto preventive, and often also, punitive detention. The phenomenon of case “recycling” or “rotation” can also indefinitely prolong pretrial detention, by enmeshing individuals in multiple successive criminal cases related to the same alleged facts, with additional risks of unlawful double jeopardy.⁷⁵

74. Submissions from, for example, The London Story (India); South Asia Justice Campaign (India); Centre for Advanced Studies in International Humanitarian Law (India); Eastern Social Development Foundation (Sri Lanka); Front Line Defenders (India and Pakistan); and Ambika Satkunanathan (Sri Lanka). See also research by Geneva Graduate Institute (United Arab Emirates). ↩
75. Communications EGY 5/2021, EGY 7/2023, EGY 8/2024, ARE 1/2024 and ARE 3/2025; and submissions from Dignity (Egypt), Committee for Justice (Egypt), Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (Egypt) and CSO Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism (United Arab Emirates). ↩

While the criminal process prevents offending pending trial, States must not abuse it to enable de facto or disguised preventive (or punitive) detention unrelated to prosecuting in good faith. Safeguards applicable to criminal arrest and pretrial detention must be fully respected, including informing a person at the time of arrest of the reasons for arrest and promptly informing him or her of any charges,⁷⁶ promptly bringing him or her before a court⁷⁷ (usually within 48 hours)⁷⁸ with the power to review the lawfulness and necessity of detention, and bringing him or her to trial without undue delay.⁷⁹

76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9 (2). ↩
77. Ibid., art. 9 (3). ↩
78. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 33. ↩
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14 (3) (c); and Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 37. ↩

All forms of administrative security detention must comply with international standards on treatment in and conditions of detention, including freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, humane and dignified conditions of detention,⁸⁰ access to legal representation, regular family contact and visitation, and consular rights. The conditions of detention must be distinct from those for convicted prisoners and aim at rehabilitation and social reintegration.⁸¹

80. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment; and United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules). ↩
81. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 21. ↩

Under human rights law, States are encouraged to promote rehabilitation and social reintegration of prisoners, including through education, vocational training and counselling.⁸² Special programmes are encouraged for terrorist offenders.⁸³ While attendance is often voluntary, compulsory participation is accepted to manage, rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners.⁸⁴ Participation may be required by a court or corrections authorities. Refusal to participate may lead to loss of privileges, affect security classification or eligibility for parole or, exceptionally, result in disciplinary action. Participation may also be required after release from prison on parole.

82. Nelson Mandela Rules, rules 4, 91 and 104. ↩
83. Security Council resolution 2396 (2017), paras. 29 and 30; S/2019/998, para. 269 (f); and A/70/674, para. 50 (f). ↩
84. See, for example European Court of Human Rights, Third Section, Karalevičius v. Lithuania, Application No. 53254/99, Judgment, 7 April 2005. ↩

Some States have developed programmes for those who are not convicted prisoners but pose risks of terrorism, to pre-emptively disrupt radicalization. While programmes are often voluntary,⁸⁵ some are coercive (including as an element of a wider restrictive order) and can violate rights. Extraordinarily, some States have administratively detained people to compel their re-education. Serious concerns have been raised about the Munasaha (“counselling”) centres in the United Arab Emirates,⁸⁶ the “re-educational” Vocational Education and Training Centres in Xinjiang, China,⁸⁷ the “de-radicalization” centres in Saudi Arabia,⁸⁸ and the military’s rehabilitation programme for Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam fighters and later schemes in Sri Lanka.⁸⁹ Concerns have included lack of legal authority, vague and overbroad definitions, targeting of dissidents, discrimination against minorities and forced assimilation, enforced disappearance, denial of family contact, arbitrary and indefinite detention, lack of due process and judicial safeguards, and forced labour.

85. A/HRC/31/65, para. 17. ↩
86. Communications ARE 6/2020, ARE 3/2023 and ARE 1/2024. See also https://www.menarights.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/UAE_General_Allegation_Report_ 18062020.pdf. ↩
87. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “OHCHR assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, People’s Republic of China”, 31 August 2022, pp. 12–18 and 21–25; communication CHN 12/2022; and International Labour Organization, Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Observation, Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) – China, 2024. ↩
88. A/HRC/40/52/Add.2, para. 52; and communication SAU 12/2020. ↩
89. Submission from Ambika Satkunanathan. See also communication LKA 3/2021; and A/HRC/40/52/Add.3. ↩

Compulsory intervention must be permitted only where a person: (a) has been convicted of a terrorism offence, properly defined according to international standards, and is serving a custodial or non-custodial sentence; (b) has completed a prison sentence for a terrorist offence and is assessed as a high recidivism risk; or (c) is reasonably suspected of posing a risk of participating in a terrorist offence. In all situations, compulsory intervention, and the specific measures imposed, must be necessary and proportionate to prevent a criminal terrorist act. Less intrusive means, including consensual interventions, must be ineffective. Detention is never justified solely to compel a person to participate in counselling or re-education and refusal to participate should not be a crime.

Compulsory measures must be clearly authorized by law and not based on non-binding policy edicts or discretionary executive powers. The criteria for selecting individuals must be transparent, rigorously evidence-based and individually tailored. Discriminatory profiling must be prohibited. A prior terrorist conviction should not automatically trigger post-release compulsory interventions.

Participation should otherwise be voluntary and informed, including in relation to: (a) “rehabilitation and reintegration” of foreign fighters and their families or others suspected of involvement in terrorism, where the person has been acquitted, the charge(s) withdrawn, or the threshold for prosecution was not met;⁹⁰ and (b) members of “terrorist” armed groups in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes, which must not involve detention, and should entail individually targeted social and psychosocial support to disengage from violence and promote reconciliation and peacebuilding.⁹¹ Refusal to participate in or complete a voluntary programme must not result in adverse treatment.

90. S/2019/998, para. 264. ↩
91. Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, modules 2.10, 2.11, and 4.30 (on reintegration). Available at https://www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/. ↩

Compulsory interventions should be imposed by a criminal court in the case of convicted persons and in other cases by a civil court on a high standard of proof. Where executive authorities authorize interventions, they should be subject to prompt judicial review.

Programmes must be preventive, not punitive. Corrective rehabilitation measures for convicted prisoners should be distinguished from measures suitable for others.⁹² Criminal investigation and intelligence-gathering should not be permitted. Forced confessions must be prohibited and the privilege against self-incrimination respected. Where counselling involves privileged professional relationships, including with psychologists, psychiatrists and religious leaders, confidentiality must be respected, with any exceptions being in line with professional standards (such as any duty to disclose an imminent risk of harm).

92. Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 122. See also S/2019/998, para. 262. ↩

Compulsory interventions must respect dignity and human rights.⁹³ Programmes must not involve exploitation, including forced labour, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or discrimination. The rights to freedoms of opinion, thought and conscience are absolute under international law⁹⁴ and prohibit any effort to coerce or dictate the holding or not holding of any opinion or the changing of beliefs.⁹⁵ These rights thus prohibit requiring an individual to renounce their political, religious, ideological or other views or engage in humiliating “self-criticism”, or subjecting them to punishment, detention or other adverse treatment (including harassment, intimidation or stigmatization) for failure to conform to official narratives. It is also prohibited to detain a person for the opinion they may hold.⁹⁶

93. See A/70/674, para. 50 (g). ↩
94. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression (2011), para. 28; and general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, paras. 3 and 5. ↩
95. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 10; and European Court of Human Rights, Ivanova v. Bulgaria, Application No. 52435/99, Judgment, 12 April 2007, para. 79 (concerning European Convention of Human Rights, sect. I, art. 9 (1), on freedom of thought, conscience and religion). ↩
96. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 9. ↩

The rights to freedom of expression and religion may be limited where necessary and proportionate in pursuit of security, public order or to protect others’ rights.⁹⁷ Limitations may thus be imposed on expression that incites violence or crime, propagandizes for war, or advocates national, racial or religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence.⁹⁸ Interventions to suppress speech at a lower threshold, including “extreme” views that are not violent, and violent speech that is not intended or likely to incite violence, are not permitted where they involve adverse consequences for non-conformity. Furthermore, “no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”.⁹⁹ Measures must proceed from empirical evidence about terrorist radicalization and have clear, measurable objectives for disengagement.¹⁰⁰

97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19 (2) and (3) and 18 (1) and (2), respectively. ↩
98. Ibid., art. 20 (2). ↩
99. Ibid., art. 18 (2). ↩
100. S/2019/998, para. 269 (f). ↩

Care professionals, including those working in education, healthcare and social work, should not be compelled to report individuals believed vulnerable to terrorism, radicalization or extremism,¹⁰¹ unless there is reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, or intends to commit, a terrorist offence. Compelling such professionals to collect invasive security information for the State undermines those professional 92 Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 122. See also S/2019/998, para. 262. 93 See A/70/674, para. 50 (g). 94 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression (2011), para. 28; and general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, paras. 3 and 5. 95 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 10; and European Court of Human Rights, Ivanova v. Bulgaria, Application No. 52435/99, Judgment, 12 April 2007, para. 79 (concerning European Convention of Human Rights, sect. I, art. 9 (1), on freedom of thought, conscience and religion). 96 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 9. 97 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19 (2) and (3) and 18 (1) and (2), respectively. 98 Ibid., art. 20 (2). 99 Ibid., art. 18 (2). 100 S/2019/998, para. 269 (f). 101 As under the United Kingdom Prevent and Channel programmes: A/HRC/31/65, paras. 44–47; A/HRC/43/46, para. 32; submissions from Prevent Watch, Rights and Security International and Child Rights International Network; Prevent Watch, “The People’s Review of Prevent” (2022). See also A/HRC/55/48/Add.2, para. 49. relationships, effective pastoral care and public trust.¹⁰² 102 In practice, reporting requirements based on vague and overbroad criteria have led to drastic overreferral, bias and discrimination on ethno-religious grounds, and adverse impacts on the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and religion, education and health, and child rights. There has also been inadequate independent oversight. Such schemes can counterproductively reduce public cooperation with law enforcement authorities.

101. As under the United Kingdom Prevent and Channel programmes: A/HRC/31/65, paras. 44–47; A/HRC/43/46, para. 32; submissions from Prevent Watch, Rights and Security International and Child Rights International Network; Prevent Watch, “The People’s Review of Prevent” (2022). See also A/HRC/55/48/Add.2, para. 49. ↩
102. Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Abu Dhabi memorandum on good practices for education and countering violent extremism”, September 2014, good practice 15. ↩

Voluntary reporting, in accordance with professional ethics, should be enabled by the authorities through the provision of guidance and training and notice of government focal points.¹⁰³ Referrals should be based on clear, specific and human rights-compliant definitions of behaviour of concern, with a focus on unlawful violence and hate speech and avoiding ambiguous and loaded concepts, such as “extremism” and “radicalization”, coupled with a high standard of proof. Consequent decisions to offer consensual interventions should be grounded in empirically substantiated individual risk assessments. Discrimination must be stringently prevented.

103. Ibid. ↩

Personal data privacy, including regarding cross-agency data-sharing, must be protected. Any scheme for referrals and interventions must be subject to regular independent oversight, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, as regards its design and operation, information transparency, effective remedies and reparation.