Role of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies as proxies, enablers and facilitators

The present report is submitted to the General Assembly by the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination in accordance with Assembly resolution 79/162 and Human Rights Council resolution 51/13. In pursuance of its mandate, the Working Group is mandated to monitor mercenaries and mercenary-related activities in all their forms and manifestations, both offline and online, in all parts of the world, including instances of protection and financing provided by Governments to individuals involved in mercenary activities, and the impact that their activities may have on human rights, in particular, the right to self-determination.

The present report was prepared based on extensive desk research, bilateral and multi-stakeholder expert consultations and written submissions received in response to a call for inputs issued by the Working Group.¹ The Working Group expresses its appreciation to those who shared information and their expertise. Due to the liquidity crisis, the word count of the present report has been reduced, thus limiting the depth and breadth of coverage and analysis.

1. See the call for inputs for the present report and selected inputs received, available at www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-inputs-use-mercenaries-mercenary-related-actors-and-private-military. Several written submissions remain confidential and are not publicly available. ↩

In recent years, the Working Group has received information from various stakeholders about States, non-State actors and other actors who are hiring mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies as proxies, to enable and facilitate operations and activities in different regions across the world. The Working Group, in its previous thematic reports, highlighted the use of proxies in the cyberdomain, asymmetric conflicts and counter-terrorist campaigns, as well as in relation to predatory recruitment, arms trafficking and illicit financing.² In the present report, the Working Group collates and develops these observations to comprehensively demonstrate the myriad ways in which mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are tied to proxy, enabling and facilitation networks.

2. See A/79/305, A/76/151, A/75/259 and A/HRC/54/29. ↩

There is no legally actionable definition of proxies in international law. For the purposes of the present report, the term proxy refers to an individual, group of individuals and/or an entity, who acts on behalf of another party, be this a State or non-State party. Proxy action may take the form of: (a) direct delegation, whereby operational command and control over the proxy exists; (b) orchestration, whereby support or facilitation is offered but the proxy demonstrates greater autonomy; or (c) sanctioning, whereby the proxy benefits from an enabling environment of a party or parties that “turn a blind eye”.³ In the submissions received,⁴ it is clear that there is wide variation in the degree of delegation to mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies.

3. Tim Maurer, Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018). ↩
4. See call for inputs, including the submission from Naman Agarwal, Kartik Bhasker and Disha Puri. ↩

Proxy actors may receive diplomatic, logistical, financial, military and/or technical support from the States in which they operate, from the States from which they originate and/or from “third-party” States which serve as a conduit or hub for their assembly, transit, activity and operation. Proxy action may occur online or offline and may be defensive or offensive, or for the purpose of supporting, augmenting or securing the influence of the sponsoring party, without the direct intervention or attribution of the sponsoring party. The use of proxies, among whom mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies increasingly feature, allows States, in particular, to avoid direct confrontation with other States, while pursuing and/or competing for resources, military gains and/or geostrategic outcomes.

Mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are themselves increasingly engaging others, including States, non-State actors and other actors, to facilitate and enable their operations and activities in regions across the world. Facilitation and enablement manifests in a variety of ways, including the following: transportation, transhipment and logistics; recruitment platforms and agencies; regulatory and due diligence processes and documentation; registration and registries of “shell” or “front” companies; the procurement of, and trafficking in, weapons and arms; the sale of illicit natural resources, stolen assets, petroleum and/or equipment; and concealment, money-laundering and illicit financing. Understanding how mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies engage others to act on their behalf is integral to understanding their evolving and new manifestations, and thus essential in finding ways to stem the tide and highlighting interconnections to other crimes such as transnational organized crime, financial crime and crimes against humanity.

The context in which mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies operate continues to evolve rapidly, driven by the pace of changes in the international and regional conflict and security environments, namely: (a) an uptick in international and non-international armed conflict;⁵ (b) an upsurge in the number of military coups d’état and military regimes;⁶ (c) the lack of support for, and the closure of, multilateral peacekeeping, humanitarian and stabilization missions;⁷ (d) shifts in bilateral alliances of military and security partners;⁸ (e) the proliferation of transnational insurgencies;⁹ and (f) the widening and deepening of transnational organized crime on a global scale.¹⁰ These changing dynamics provide the conditions for resorting to the use of private violence to fill security voids, specifically towards engaging mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies.

5. A/HRC/57/45, paras. 15–17. ↩
6. Adeoye O. Akinola and Ratidzo Makombe, “Rethinking the resurgence of military coups in Africa”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 60, No. 5 (2024). ↩
7. United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial 2025, session on the topic “The future of peacekeeping”. See also Walter Kemp, “Peacekeeping in retreat: rethinking how to deal with organized crime in conflict settings”, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2025). ↩
8. Confidential submission and submission from Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens and Marcel Plichta. ↩
9. Folashadé Soulé, “Responding to security threats from the Sahel: what role for external security partnerships in coastal West African States?”, Megatrends Policy Brief, No. 25 (2024). ↩
10. Open debate of the Security Council on the theme “Transnational organized crime, growing challenges and new threats” in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, 7 December 2023 (see S/PV.9497). ↩

In expert consultations, concerns were repeatedly raised regarding the limitations of international and regional missions and the decline in the number of peacekeeping and security assistance programmes, coupled with the intervention by individual States or groups of States, without the authorization of the Security Council, as key drivers fuelling the reliance on mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies.¹¹ Experts emphasized that greater consideration of local security needs should underpin multilateral and bilateral partnerships, whereby the local perspective is prioritized over external ideological prerogatives and competition for power, in order to stem the phenomenon of resorting to the use of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies. Many States are trapped between the threat of internal instability or coups d’état and the threat posed by extremist groups, militias and criminal cartels.¹² The resultant decisions to prioritize the short-term “plugging of security gaps” with private actors over the need to invest in long-term peace, security and stabilization planning will undoubtedly have consequences for many years to come.¹³ Many situations are complex security crises that demand more than a military solution.¹⁴

11. Expert consultation, December 2024; experts emphasized the need to look beyond a “Western lens”. See also the submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. ↩
12. Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. ↩
13. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩
14. Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. ↩

In parallel with this development, there is a growing trend of States forming their own State-owned military and security companies and/or hiring “State-aligned” private military and/or security companies in order to promote their political, economic, ideological and/or geostrategic interests across the world. Such measures include the creation of “alternative structures of service”, “volunteer formations” or “irregular outfits” within, or attached to, State institutions, which are not part of regular armed forces and whose members perform duties beyond national borders.¹⁵ These arrangements are deliberately opaque and fluid in order to meet shifting operational requirements.¹⁶ Many ad hoc or alternative security structures are founded and directed by former military, police and/or intelligence officers. This close cooperation between States and security entities represents a shifting of operational responsibility to parallel security forces that, while ensuring alignment in ideological and operational objectives and facilitating and enabling strategic access and control, avoids direct State attribution.¹⁷ Such formations fall outside the traditional definitions and scope of mercenary actors, thus allowing for circumvention of international law.

15. Confidential submission. ↩
16. Confidential submission. ↩
17. Submissions from Human Rights Myanmar and Rights Defenders Initiative. ↩

Another trend that has been observed is that of States using laws and regulations to formalize and legitimize (rather than regulate and make accountable) their use of private military and/or security entities. Such laws grant emergency powers to the State for the deputizing of private military and security personnel for “military purposes”. Those laws also enact punitive provisions for exposing, informing or whistle-blowing on joint State-private security operations.¹⁸ In other settings, States enact special ordinances so as to grant the regime broad powers to achieve security through related actors and private military and/or security companies, including by curtailing civil and political rights and resorting to arbitrary detention and arrest.

18. Submission from Human Rights Myanmar. ↩

Of particular concern is the emerging practice of States using mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies in new ways: for fighting crime, cartels and gangs whose activities and operations transcend borders; for counter-terrorism purposes; or by using private actors in humanitarian operations in the absence of Security Council resolutions or multilateral backing and without regard for humanitarian law, humanitarian training and humanitarian 11 Expert consultation, December 2024; experts emphasized the need to look beyond a “Western lens”. See also the submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. 12 Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. 13 Expert consultation, December 2024. 14 Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. 15 Confidential submission. 16 Confidential submission. 17 Submissions from Human Rights Myanmar and Rights Defenders Initiative. 18 Submission from Human Rights Myanmar. 6/20 principles.¹⁹ These trends signal the emergence of authoritarian approaches to conflict management in the international system that are deliberately obscure and unaccountable and that undermine international law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and the international order.

19. Expert consultation, July 2025. ↩

In previous reports, the Working Group set out definitions of what constitutes a mercenary, a mercenary-related actor or a private military and/or security company, as well as the challenges regarding the scope and definitions contained within international and regional instruments and other regulatory mechanisms vis-à-vis such actors.²⁰

20. See A/78/535 and A/75/249. ↩

The evolving nature and use of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies, including proxies, demonstrates the limitations of existing international and regional instruments, particularly with regard to issues of nationality, residence, renumeration and hostilities.

Existing conventions do however contain important clauses on scoping mercenary activity whereby proxy action may be relevant if the activity is performed on behalf of another State or other actor. As outlined in article 1, paragraph 2 (a), of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, mercenary activity includes:
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at;
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State.

As set out in the present report, both of these clauses remain relevant in the ways mercenaries are used by States and non-State actors today.

State responsibility is further set out in article 5, whereby States Parties commit in the first instance not to recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries, and not to recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries for the purpose of opposing the legitimate exercise of the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination.

Meanwhile, as stated in article 1, paragraph 2, of the Organization of African Unity Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa, it is a crime for an
individual, group or association, representative of a State and the State itself who with the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination stability or the territorial integrity of another State, that practises any of the following acts:
(a) Shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any manner employs bands of mercenaries;
(b) Enlists, enrols or tries to enrol in the said bands;
(c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under its jurisdiction or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations of the above mentioned forces.

In addition, article 28 (h), introduced by the 2014 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, is broadly similar to both the international and regional conventions but it expands the scope of mercenary offences to include “assisting a government to maintain power” and “assisting a group of persons to obtain power”.

Thus, there are some provisions that can be applied to certain situations in which mercenaries are used as proxies, however the scope does not extend to related actors or private military and/or security companies.

Further, the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries has a very low ratification rate (only 38 States, at the time of writing) and enforcement of the Convention is weak.²¹ There is no specific body at the international level that oversees its implementation and no permanent member of the Security Council is a Party to the Convention.²²

21. Submission from FIJC. ↩
22. See A/78/535. ↩

The Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa only applies to African member States and also suffers from the problem of low ratification and weak enforcement.

Although these conventions relating to mercenarism may not adequately address contemporary manifestations and interconnections raised in the present report with respect to proxies, there are sufficient obligations and prohibitions in international law and international humanitarian law that can be placed upon States, individuals and entities so as to ensure that they do not avoid accountability for their unlawful actions by entering into proxy, enabling and facilitation relationships.

In the first instance, Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations calls upon Member States to refrain in their international relations from using “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. The use of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies as proxies does not circumvent this fundamental jus cogens norm.²³

23. Submission from Brazil. ↩

Further, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations sets out the obligation whereby “every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State”.²⁴

24. Submission from Azerbaijan. ↩

States remain responsible for “internationally wrongful acts committed by persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority”.²⁵ According to the report of the International Law Commission on its fifty-third session, articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts provide guidance for violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by non-State actors, attributing responsibility to the State for private entities when they are “empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority” (art. 5) or are de facto acting on its instructions or under its direction and control (art. 8).26 21 Submission from FIJC. 22 See A/78/535. 23 Submission from Brazil. 24 Submission from Azerbaijan. 25 Submission from Brazil. 26 See A/56/10. 8/20

25. Submission from Brazil. ↩

However, the use of proxies by States, on the basis of existing legal criteria, is determined by the classification of armed conflict and whether the proxies’ acts are legally attributable to the State.

Responsibility for the perpetration of crimes can be individual, falling under the system of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or may fall under international criminal law or under domestic law, or the State to which the actions of individuals can be legally attributed can incur responsibility for their internationally wrongful acts. In this way, international humanitarian law binds all individuals whose activities are sufficiently connected to an armed conflict.

Individuals are also accountable for criminal acts under international law in accordance with article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that: “Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.”²⁷

27. Submission from Azerbaijan. ↩

Under article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, individuals can be held responsible for their actions whereby they act individually or jointly, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression. Many acts and activities in which mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are involved may amount to war crimes, including intentionally launching an attack, wanton destruction and pillage.

Private military and/or security companies are mainly bound by obligations imposed upon them by the domestic law of the State in which they are incorporated, that of the State in which they operate, or of the State that contracts them, if these States provide for corporate accountability. There is an ongoing debate about the need for an internationally legally binding instrument to regulate private military and/or security companies.²⁸ In the absence of such an instrument, existing frameworks such as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are valuable reference points for States and private companies with a view to preventing and addressing human rights abuses where they have occurred or are at risk of occurring.

28. See www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/pms-cs/igwg-index/6th-session-igwg-military. ↩

The status and obligations of private military and/or security companies under international law depend on whether they operate in an armed conflict or in times of peace. In armed conflicts, international humanitarian law applies with regard to resorting to armed force between States, or in cases of protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.²⁹ In international armed conflicts, individuals hired as private military and/or security companies can, depending on the circumstances, have the status of:
(a) Mercenaries;
(b) Combatants, if they are members of an armed force of a State (Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), art. 4.A (1));
(c) Members of a militia or volunteer corps belonging to a State party to the conflict (Third Geneva Convention, art. 4.A (2));
(d) Civilians accompanying armed forces (Third Geneva Convention, art. 4.A (4));
(e) Civilians.

29. Decision on the Defence Motion For Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, of 2 October 1995, para. 70, in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judicial Reports 1994–‍1995, vol. I. ↩

The engagement of individuals in hostilities and their status, as outlined above, determines the degree of protection they are entitled to if captured.

In non-international armed conflicts, there is no combatant privilege or prisoner of war status, but private military and/or security personnel are nevertheless bound by the national laws of the State in which they operate.

There are also several soft law instruments that are aimed at regulating private military and/or security companies, including the Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and/or security companies during armed conflict and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, both with varied levels of uptake, observance and implementation. Both are voluntary and non-binding. While the Montreux Document places specific obligations on home and contracting States of private military and/or security companies, the International Code of Conduct establishes standards, principles and responsibilities for private security service providers. The growing importance of the digital sphere and cybersphere, as well as new and emerging technologies, in addition to expanding security provision frontiers (maritime, migration, humanitarian and crime domains), further add to the difficulties in keeping pace with private security services that require regulation, monitoring and oversight.

In times of peace, different regimes apply to create obligations for States, for private military and security personnel and for private military and/or security companies themselves. States are bound by their international obligations under human rights treaties, under the so-called suppression conventions, which establish prohibition and suppression regimes (e.g. the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance), and other conventions dealing with specific issues, such as the Arms Trade Treaty or the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Whether States incur responsibility for failures to uphold their obligations under these conventions depends on whether the wrongful conduct can be attributed to them under the law of State responsibility.

Thus, while there are articles of international law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law that may be applied to States, mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies with regard to their proxy, enabling and facilitation acts, activities and operations, there are many gaps and loopholes that allow for evasion of responsibility and thus the perpetuation of impunity.

Proxies have predominantly and historically been utilized in warfare, combat and situations of armed conflict. As noted previously by the Working Group,³⁰ and raised again during expert consultations,³¹ States are increasing their recruitment, training, equipping and financing of mercenaries and related actors to engage in offensive and defensive asymmetric warfare, online and offline, across the world. Such acts include: taking direct part in hostilities; planning military operations; identifying targets; operating drones and directing drone attacks; serving as trainers and/or pilots within armed forces; providing training to local State and non-State armed actors; and delivering weapons and military materials in defiance of embargoes and sanctions regimes under the guise of “military cooperation” or “bilateral cooperation”.³²

30. A/78/535, para. 5. ↩
31. Expert consultations, December 2024. ↩
32. Expert consultations, December 2024 and January 2025. ↩

In some instances, mercenaries and related actors are utilized as proxies to suppress and eliminate local opposition individuals, groups and communities.³³ States are also engaging mercenaries and related actors to apply “military solutions” to ethnic hostilities and do this with impunity, as it is State-sponsored and sanctioned violence.³⁴

33. Confidential submission. ↩
34. Confidential submission. ↩

Particular concern has been raised about mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies serving as a proxy of their home States in a variety of ways, including: deployment of the related actors/company to multiple conflict-affected regions in which the home State has vested foreign policy interests; using the related actors/company to transfer arms and personnel to these conflict-affected regions; and equipping the related actors/company to provide training to militias within these conflict-affected regions.³⁵ These proxy measures occur without the direct involvement of or attribution to the home State.³⁶ States seek to frame the activities of the related actors or private military and/or security company as private, though the entities are an extension and instrument of State power. These State-owned/state-aligned related actors or military and security companies are also commonly deployed to construction, mining or resource sites where there are personal, political or financial ties to the State or State elites.³⁷

35. Confidential submission and submissions from Rights Defenders Initiative and Human Rights Myanmar. ↩
36. Submission from FIJC. ↩
37. Submission from Human Rights Myanmar. ↩

Mercenaries and mercenary-related actors are also increasingly being used to provide “coup-proofing” or “regime preservation services”.³⁸ Such services entail providing close protection to certain political and military elites and protecting and guarding strategic sites and installations (such as airports, presidential palaces and government buildings). These practices, however, undermine the rule of law and limit the projection of security beyond the capital, thereby allowing insurgencies and extremist groups to flourish in remote, rural and hinterland areas. 39 30 A/78/535, para. 5. 31 Expert consultations, December 2024. 32 Expert consultations, December 2024 and January 2025. 33 Confidential submission. 34 Confidential submission. 35 Confidential submission and submissions from Rights Defenders Initiative and Human Rights Myanmar. 36 Submission from FIJC. 37 Submission from Human Rights Myanmar. 38 Confidential submission. 39 Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta.

38. Confidential submission. ↩

In the cyberdomain, mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are being used by States to conduct information and/or influence operations, as well as digital warfare (including hacking and espionage), cyberoperations and cyberattacks (including the targeting of infrastructure, “algorithmic warfare”, destruction, malware, disruption or theft of data, and interference with elections).⁴⁰ Delegation of such operations to private actors, who are remote and autonomous, disguises the origin and prevents direct attribution.⁴¹ States have also transferred advanced communication systems and technologies (ranging from jammers to deep packet inspection technology) to mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies (and vice versa), so as to enable these proxy operations, including mass surveillance, dataveillance and censorship.⁴²

40. Submissions from Rights Defenders Initiative, FIJC and Daniel Burland, Ori Swed and Donald Travis. See also Sorcha MacLeod and Daniel Wand “The human rights challenges of private military and security companies and mercenaries in cyberspace”, Marc Schack and Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, eds., International Law and Cyberspace: The Nordic Perspective (Leiden, Brill, 2025). ↩
41. Submission from Burland, Swed and Travis. ↩
42. Submission from Human Rights Myanmar. ↩

Mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are funded through a myriad of formal and informal ways to disguise the proxy relationship, including State banks, special budgets, defence budgets, private contracts, the sale of resources, materials and goods supplied by States, cryptocurrencies and through resource concessions.⁴³ Extractive concessions as payment for the rendering of private military and/or security services are being used as “conflict management” by a number of States. Payment continues to be offered in non-pecuniary forms such as the granting of residency or citizenship in exchange for service.⁴⁴

43. Confidential submission and submissions from Association of Reintegration of Crimea and Rights Defenders Initiative. ↩
44. Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. ↩

Mining and agribusiness companies, as well as some States, are active and complicit in using private security companies and private security guards who resort to violence against local communities in order to extend mining and agribusiness concession zones or to enact retribution against “intruders”, “trespassers”, “criminals”, artisanal miners and/or illegal miners. Mistreatment by private security personnel has taken the form of shooting, gassing, beating, hooding, breaking bones, detentions, torture, including being buried alive in mine shafts, killing, sexual violence and rape.⁴⁵ Women and children are disproportionately affected by sexual violence and rape.

45. Submission from Leigh Day. ↩

From its analysis of multiple cases of human rights violations associated with private security providers, the Working Group notes with concern an emerging trend towards the “privatization of police”. Companies are turning to national police forces to guard sites and enforce order (and enact violence) against local communities, without risk of reprisal owing to their national public status.⁴⁶ The privatization of police services amounts to receiving “top-up” pay and other benefits, such as accommodation, food, vehicles and equipment.⁴⁷ Such methods have a detrimental impact on public State institutions by creating a parallel security structure, promoting competition within the public force and reallocating public services for private use.

46. Ibid. ↩
47. Expert consultation, January 2025. ↩

Many mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are deeply connected to, and embedded in, illicit networks and ecosystems that not only enable and facilitate their operations but also, vitally, secure their operational autonomy. Criminalization was raised by the Working Group in previous reports vis-à-vis arms trafficking and illicit financing.⁴⁸ These connections persist.

48. See A/79/305, A/HRC/57/45. ↩

During the expert consultations and in the submissions received, more worrying connections to illicit networks were highlighted. Organized criminal groups and cartels are using mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies for a variety of operations: (a) close protection and armed escorts of criminal elites; (b) transport of illicit substances; (c) surveillance;⁴⁹ and (d) the trafficking of gold, diamonds, drugs, chemicals and timber.⁵⁰ These complex and multilayered illicit proxy chains entail multiple intermediaries, which creates significant challenges for those seeking to verify attribution and accountability.⁵¹

49. Confidential submission. ↩
50. Expert consultation and submission from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. ↩
51. Submission from Brazil. ↩

At the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference held in Berlin in May 2025, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations noted that transnational organized crime and illicit activities would be the key driver of future conflicts. Of particular concern is the fact that “crime linkage” (i.e. the crime of mercenarism, financial crime, transnational crime and war crimes), is not treated as urgent by States when thinking about peace and security, meaning that peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations are ill-equipped to deal with illicit economies and private actors as part of conflict.⁵²

52. Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. ↩

Mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies use various States as conduits and/or hubs for their activities and operations. Some home, contracting and third-party States are used by mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies to enable and facilitate transhipment (e.g. use of airports, ports, cargo and bases) and logistical, asset and equipment support (such as planes, tanks, refineries and advanced communication systems), as well as for the provision of intelligence, information and/or personnel. Certain States serve as trafficking hubs for illicit resources and arms that fund the activities of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies, as well as providing a site and passage for the recruiting of personnel for mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies.

Some third-party States that struggle with post-conflict, conflict or violent dynamics, porous borders, weak governance and high rates of criminality may turn a blind eye to, or struggle to control, the passage and conduit of these actors. In one expert consultation, it was revealed that some third-party States control as little as 47 Expert consultation, January 2025. 48 See A/79/305, A/HRC/57/45. 49 Confidential submission. 50 Expert consultation and submission from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 51 Submission from Brazil. 52 Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. 6 per cent of their territory.⁵³ Such factors create contexts whereby proxy activities and operations by mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies occur with limited oversight or control by the State due to lack of capacity.

53. Expert consultation, January 2025. ↩

In expert consultations, the Working Group was informed that mercenaries and mercenary-related actors deployed in certain regions of the world equip, train and engage local non-State actors, such as militias, insurgents, rebels and foreign fighters, to carry out attacks and/or engage in fighting on their behalf.⁵⁴ In such instances, mercenaries and related actors provide these non-State actors with arms, including uncrewed aerial vehicles (drones). Indeed, a notable trend is the move towards the “localization” or “indigenization” of private military and security services by delegating operations to local actors who are trained, equipped and directed by mercenary-related actors and/or foreign private military and/or security companies.⁵⁵ Mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies subdelegate duties and tasks to these local military and security outfits, entities and companies, and/or register subsidiaries to conduct and facilitate their operations in order to avoid attribution and legal responsibility.⁵⁶

54. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩
55. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩
56. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩

Private military and/or security companies also engage local security actors to fight crime and robberies in instances where the private military and/or security companies are unarmed, as well as engaging local security actors along several different points in “supply and logistics chains” with respect to the protection and transportation of illicit resources, arms and looted goods.⁵⁷ This subcontracting provides a barrier to direct attribution of responsibility to the mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies, thus preventing attribution and legal responsibility.⁵⁸

57. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩
58. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩

Mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies engage a multitude of other actors to enable and facilitate their operations and activities around the world, such as bankers, owners of cryptocurrencies, unlicensed and licensed cryptoexchanges, legal firms and lawyers, accountants, customs officials, recruitment and labour agents, and front companies.⁵⁹ This complex transnational network, involving multiple actors, complicates efforts to pinpoint specific roles and responsibilities in the enablement and facilitation chain, thereby perpetuating cycles of impunity.⁶⁰

59. See A/79/305. ↩
60. Submission from Rights Defenders Initiative. ↩

In the digital, cyber- and online sphere, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies make use of individuals, “influencers” and other private entities to conduct information campaigns that generate favourable news stories about those mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies Such campaigns are conducted in settings where the activities and operations of mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies have resulted in harm, destruction and the loss of civilian life. Such social media platforms as X (formerly Twitter), WhatsApp, Telegram, TikTok and Facebook provide rapid replicating mediums in the dissemination of these campaigns. Worryingly, these information campaigns distort facts, generating misinformation and disinformation, and at times contain hate speech, as well as ethnic, religious and 53 Expert consultation, January 2025. 54 Expert consultation, December 2024. 55 Expert consultation, December 2024. 56 Expert consultation, December 2024. 57 Expert consultation, December 2024. 58 Expert consultation, December 2024. 59 See A/79/305. 60 Submission from Rights Defenders Initiative. 14/20 ideological targeting and bias.⁶¹ Mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies also use digital platforms for the recruitment and digital payment of their personnel, as well as to transfer and receive digital payments to and from their enablers and facilitators.

61. Bilateral confidential consultation. ↩

By their nature, proxy actors, actions and operations occur in legal grey areas, bypassing international obligations and accountability mechanisms.⁶² Engaging mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies undermines international order, sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development in a number of detrimental ways, whereby such actors:
(a) Occupy territory;⁶³
(b) Undermine the constitutional order by upholding military and/or authoritarian regimes that have come to power through unconstitutional means;
(c) Destabilize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State by supporting, equipping, training and financing insurgent groups, militias and/or criminal groups who weaken governance and government;
(d) Undermine State institutions by taking over State functions (such as policing, arrest, detention, surveillance or combat) to such a degree that the State is no longer in control,⁶⁴ which leads to long-term instability;
(e) Interfere with and impede democratic processes and undermine elections through disinformation campaigns;
(f) Violate the principle of non-interference by conducting intelligence operations or remote operations in one territory, without the permission or knowledge of relevant authorities, at the behest of another State or non-State party;⁶⁵
(g) Prevent transparency, accountability and oversight when contracted under emergency, special or military decrees that remain beyond public purview, scrutiny and control;
(h) Undermine the international order through the activities and operations of transnational proxy networks, which mask traceability, allow for the evasion of accountability and justice, and serve as a barrier to sustainable development and democratic governance worldwide;
(i) Threaten the sovereignty and stability of the State by their wholesale and widespread use of violence.

62. Submission from FIBGAR. See also International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Building a Culture of Compliance for IHL to Protect Humanity in Today’s and Future Conflicts (Geneva, 2024). ↩
63. Submissions from Association of Reintegration of Crimea and Azerbaijan. ↩
64. Submission from FIJC. ↩
65. Submission from Brazil. ↩

Political interference and a lack of cooperation from States that use mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies further undermines respect for the international order.66 61 Bilateral confidential consultation. 62 Submission from FIBGAR. See also International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Building a Culture of Compliance for IHL to Protect Humanity in Today’s and Future Conflicts (Geneva, 2024). 63 Submissions from Association of Reintegration of Crimea and Azerbaijan. 64 Submission from FIJC. 65 Submission from Brazil. 66 Confidential submission and submission from Rights Defenders Initiative.

The use of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies as proxies has resulted in escalating levels of harm and violence against civilian populations, the commission of multiple violations of international law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including acts which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Such harm to civilians is especially prevalent in situations of armed conflict; combat; counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and military operations; privatized humanitarian operations; overseeing arrest, detention and surveillance; and in fighting crime, gangs and criminal cartels.

In situations of armed conflict, combat, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, the tactics employed by mercenaries and related actors have been labelled as “ruthless” and conducted “without concern” for local populations.⁶⁷ Such tactics include mass killing, summary executions, including beheadings, abduction, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, beatings and other forms of physical abuse.⁶⁸ Women, children and the elderly bear the brunt of such violence. The Working Group has received reports of extreme sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated against women by mercenaries and mercenary-related actors.⁶⁹ Survivors face stigma and a lack of medical services and psychological support, and are fearful of seeking justice for the crimes committed against them (see para. 63 below).

67. Confidential submission. ↩
68. Confidential submission. ↩
69. Confidential submission. ↩

In some regions of the world, such deliberate displays of “inhuman brutality” entail ethnic and/or religious targeting, thus exacerbating identity-based tensions and conflicts. These acts have furthered the large-scale displacement of civilian populations and the number of civilians who find themselves without legal status, thereby worsening security situations and deepening humanitarian crises.

In the submissions received, it was noted that the violent and “arrogant behaviour” of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies alienates local populations and may lend to greater support for transnational insurgent groups from civilians, in turn worsening the spread of insurgencies, violent extremism and terrorism.⁷⁰ It is also noted that the use of mercenary-related actors has done little to curb the tide of violent extremism in some regions.⁷¹

70. Confidential submission. ↩
71. Submission from Faulkner, Parens and Plichta. ↩

Other tactics that have resulted in irreparable civilian harm include the wanton destruction of homes, schools and cultural and religious sites, as well as essential civilian infrastructure and resources, such as wells, markets, agriculture and livestock.⁷² In some operations, the methods used by mercenaries and mercenary-related actors have led to the annihilation of entire villages and such actions may amount to atrocity crimes.⁷³ Looting, the theft of property, money and possessions, and the withholding of food occur in parallel to these violent campaigns. Furthermore, the indiscriminate use of booby traps and other indiscriminate munitions instils fear and continues to result in harm long after the ending of operations conducted by mercenaries and mercenary-related actors.⁷⁴

72. Confidential submission. ↩
73. Confidential submission. ↩
74. Confidential submission. ↩

In the submissions received, it is made clear that the frequency of such operations and the tactics employed represent a deliberate pattern of behaviour and strategy by mercenaries and mercenary-related actors that are aimed at persecuting and punishing local populations, enforcing compliance and instilling fear.⁷⁵ These actions by mercenaries and mercenary-related actors, who receive the backing and support of States and non-State actors, go unchecked, and the victims have limited recourse to justice. This lack of transparency and accountability perpetuates cycles of violence and the perpetration of multiple human rights violations.⁷⁶

75. Confidential submission. ↩
76. Submission from FIBGAR. ↩

The use of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies to protect, grab or exploit land for agribusiness or natural resources impedes local communities’ right to self-determination and may amount to violations of human rights. Mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are used by some States, local elites, corrupt officials and/or mining and agribusiness companies to displace and remove people from their land in pursuit of mining and extractive operations, thus impeding the right of people to self-determination and development.⁷⁷ In one of the submissions received, it was noted that the impact is particularly severe for Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities, whose cultural identity and survival are closely tied to the land.⁷⁸

77. Expert consultation, December 2024. See also the thematic report of the Working Group on the exploitation of natural resources by mercenaries and mercenary-related actors, to be published as document A/HRC/60/27. ↩
78. Submission from Brazil. ↩

Mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are overwhelmingly foreign in nationality, and hybridization between State actors and private actors, whereby some private actors wear the same uniforms as the national armed forces, generates the problem of identification and attribution, thus denying justice to victims.⁷⁹ Where the private actors are empowered by the State, any complaint or grievance received may result in further victimization, reprisals, detention, arrest and surveillance and in some cases, victims and human right defenders have been killed for reporting crimes committed by mercenaries and related actors. States also provide diplomatic immunity from prosecution, presenting an additional barrier to redress and justice.⁸⁰

79. See A/HRC/51/25. ↩
80. Ibid. ↩

Human rights abuses committed against individuals in the course of their recruitment as mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies personnel is also evident in the context of proxy action. From the information obtained during expert consultations and in the submissions received, it has been found that the predatory recruitment of convicts, prisoners and migrants into such operations and activities has occurred, which amounts to coercion, whereby non-pecuniary incentives of freedom or citizenship are offered, set against the prospect of continued detention, incarceration or death threats.⁸¹

81. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩

Documenting and investigating crimes committed by mercenaries, mercenaryrelated actors and private military and/or security companies in conflict, high crime or closed regime settings is particularly challenging due to the associated dangers, such as threats to safety and life, restrictions on access and the destruction of 75 Confidential submission. 76 Submission from FIBGAR. 77 Expert consultation, December 2024. See also the thematic report of the Working Group on the exploitation of natural resources by mercenaries and mercenary-related actors, to be published as document A/HRC/60/27. 78 Submission from Brazil. 79 See A/HRC/51/25. 80 Ibid. 81 Expert consultation, December 2024. evidence.⁸² More needs to be done to support local civil society organizations and human rights defenders who work in this space.

82. Submission from FIJC. ↩

The use of private violence in the form of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies is widening, deepening and evolving at a rapid rate, branching out into new terrains and interconnecting with other forms of violence, crime and illegality. It is of great concern to the Working Group that the use of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors, and private military and/or security companies as proxies, enablers and facilitators is extending beyond States, to non-State actors and other actors. Furthermore, the Working Group is concerned to note that mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies are being used beyond the battlefield, to plug security gaps, secure strategic sites, project power beyond borders, circumvent international law and target local populations and civilians. The range of proxy, enabling and facilitation manifestations raised in the present report serves as a cautionary warning: the use of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies increases the risk of conflict onset.⁸³

83. Submission from Ulrich Petersohn. ↩

The preamble of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries remains as true today as it did at its adoption, in 1989: “the [universal] adoption of a convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries [will] contribute to the eradication of these nefarious activities and thereby to the observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter”. The low level of ratification and weak enforcement of the Convention have resulted in widespread and flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, by a range of actors, including mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies, that continues to threaten international peace and security.

On the basis of its findings in the present report, the Working Group makes the recommendations set out below.

States should:
(a) Adopt, ratify, review and strengthen international and regional conventions such as the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and the Organization of African Unity Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa;
(b) Support the drafting of a binding international treaty that regulates private military and security companies, in line with the instrument being developed by the open-ended intergovernmental working group on private military and security companies;
(c) Develop, adopt and/or strengthen domestic regulation over private security and/or military companies, including clear provisions and procedures on the licensing, registration and training of personnel, weapons procurement and management, and the scoping of functions and activities. Updates should include controlling new manifestations and linkages as noted in the present report and other reports of the Working Group;
(d) Establish domestic regulatory oversight bodies or mechanisms over private security and/or military providers with accompanying complaint and grievance instruments for human rights reporting and accessing justice;
(e) Increase transparency regarding the hiring of mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies by disclosing contracts, compositions, command structures, the scope of their rules of engagement, operational procedures and grievance mechanisms;⁸⁴
(f) Hold States, non-State actors and other actors accountable in cases where the activities and operations of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies have resulted in abuses of human rights amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression, through initiating and supporting public judicial enquiries, special tribunals and investigative bodies;⁸⁵
(g) Apply and adopt coordinated measures (sanctions, prosecutions) against mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies that are implicated in the abuse of human rights, as well as against affiliated entities, structures and States that use them;⁸⁶
(h) Support civil society groups and human rights defenders in their work in collecting, documenting, preserving and preparing evidence against mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies implicated in abuses of human rights;
(i) Engage with the Working Group in dialogue towards improving the adoption, observance and implementation of conventions and regulations.

84. Submission from Brazil. ↩
85. Confidential submission. ↩
86. Submission from Christopher Mayer. ↩

The United Nations and its associated organs and bodies should take the following action:
(a) The Secretary-General should, in collaboration with the Working Group, commission a global study on evolving practices and concepts with respect to mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies, their interconnections and the nexus with other crimes, gaps in accountability, and the multiple impacts on human rights, with a view to strengthening the Convention;
(b) Renewals of United Nations peacekeeping mandates should, where relevant, include specific references to the protection of civilians from the presence, activities and operations of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies;
(c) United Nations entities and bodies should document, highlight and report abuses committed by mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies that they observe in the course of their work and share such findings with the Working Group on an ongoing basis;
(d) United Nations entities, relevant departments, bodies and investigative bodies should harmonize their scoping of concepts and language relating to mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and/or security companies with those used by the Working Group, which will facilitate the documenting and reporting of abuses;
(e) Greater coordination between United Nations bodies is needed to close the disconnect between human rights instruments and peace and security instruments, including regarding access to justice and to judicial remedy;
(f) The open-ended intergovernmental working group on private military and security companies should develop clear provisions and mechanisms on extraterritorial jurisdiction, oversight, monitoring and accountability of private military and/or security companies;
(g) The open-ended intergovernmental working group should also develop clear requirements on national reporting of human rights abuses and violations committed by private military and/or security companies, including on access to judicial remedy and to justice mechanisms for victims.

The Working Group notes a number of good initiatives that are under way by a consortium of stakeholders to improve access and accountability mechanisms for documenting, monitoring and reporting corporate international crimes linked to the use of private security providers.⁸⁷ To further strengthen these accountability initiatives, the Working Group recommends that stakeholders, such as the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association, the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, the Latin American Compliance Association and the International Stability Operations Association, should:
(a) Compile, update and share quarterly registries of private military and/or security companies that engage in criminality or are implicated in human rights violations;⁸⁸
(b) Compile, update and share quarterly registries of private military and/or security companies that are authorized and certified and that engage in business practices with strong human rights compliance and accountability mechanisms.

87. See, for example, the Corporate Accountability Initiative. ↩
88. Confidential submission. ↩

Other actors should take the following action:
(a) Regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the League of Arab States, should develop regional regulations, oversight and monitoring of private military and/or security companies;
(b) Shipping, logistics, transportation and chartering companies are called upon to increase their due diligence requirements with regard to the transportation and import of certain chemicals (e.g. sodium cyanide) to high-risk regions associated with conflict, instability, violence and the illegal exploitation of natural resources;⁸⁹
(c) Banking, shipping, logistics, transportation and chartering companies are called upon to increase their due diligence requirements with respect to corporate registries by reporting individuals and companies that demonstrate replicated identifiers;
(d) Mining and agribusiness entities should increase their human rights due diligence with regard to private security providers and make use of reputable private security companies that are registered with the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association, the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, the Latin American Compliance Association and the International Stability Operations Association and/or local regulation bodies, that demonstrate strong training, licensing and registration requirements for their staff, and that have human rights policies, as well as clear operational grievance mechanisms that are independently monitored;
(e) Mining and agribusiness entities should engage with local communities with respect to providing those communities with compensation, services, sustainable livelihood substitutes, passage and access to sacred or ancestral lands, water sources, paths, routes and roads;
(f) Technology companies should take measures to detect and stop the spread of harmful information, particularly in situations of armed conflict, and more specifically whereby the provision of services may amount to participation in hostilities;
(g) Private military and/or security companies should commit to human rights standards and humanitarian principles, conduct human rights impact assessments and international humanitarian law training, implement operational grievance mechanisms and provide meaningful remedies for human rights impacts and violations.

89. Expert consultation, December 2024. ↩