Internal displacement in the context of organized criminal activity

In the present report, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Paula Gaviria Betancur, provides information on the activities she conducted from August 2024 to April 2025 and discusses internal displacement in the context of organized criminal activity.

To inform the report, the Special Rapporteur conducted a desk review, issued a call for input and held consultations with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Internal Displacement Research Programme of the Refugee Law Initiative at the University of London, and representatives of other international organizations, civil society and academia. She thanks all partners and stakeholders who participated in the consultations and provided written submissions.¹

1. Submissions will be available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-input-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-internally-displaced-persons. ↩

The Special Rapporteur carried out an official visit to the Marshall Islands from 5 to 15 October 2024.² She expresses her gratitude to the Governments of Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Vanuatu for their invitations to conduct a country visit.

2. A/HRC/59/46/Add.1. ↩

As a co-lead of the IDP Protection Expert Group, the Special Rapporteur led a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in November 2024 at the invitation of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Special Rapporteur convened a cross-regional forum in Dakar in September 2024, co-organized with UNHCR, the IDP Protection Expert Group and the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, to engage with African Union policymakers on discussions related to implementing the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. That same month, the Special Rapporteur gave a master class on internal displacement at the Inter-American Course on Migration and Protection in Washington, D.C., for member States of the Organization of American States. In December 2024, along with UNHCR, the IDP Protection Expert Group and McGill University, the Special Rapporteur organized a workshop on strengthening participation of internally displaced persons, which had been co-developed with leaders from internally displaced communities. She delivered opening remarks at courses on internal displacement convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law throughout the year.

The Special Rapporteur continued to actively participate as a Principal of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, including on revising its Policy on the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons and on implementation of the Independent Review of the Humanitarian Response to Internal Displacement, also serving as a panellist during the launch of the Review’s final report. She participated in key global events to discuss internal displacement, including thematic consultations for the Cartagena+40 process in May 2024, the high-level political forum on sustainable development in July 2024, and the World Urban Forum, the World Health Innovation Summit and the twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in November 2024.

The Special Rapporteur expresses her gratitude to the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Solutions to Internal Displacement for his catalytic efforts and close collaboration during the conclusion of his mandate in December 2024. Since then, she has continued to engage with the follow-up structures established in that regard, including the Hub for Coordination of Solutions to Internal Displacement and the IDP Advisory Group, and as a member of the Solutions Champions Group. 1 Submissions will be available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-input-reportspecial-rapporteur-human-rights-internally-displaced-persons. 2 A/HRC/59/46/Add.1. GE.25-06613

The Special Rapporteur is gravely concerned about the elimination of funding that provides a lifeline for millions of internally displaced persons around the world, which was spearheaded by the United States of America and followed by funding cuts from other donors. Those restrictions have led key agencies involved in the protection of internally displaced persons, such as the International Organization for Migration, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNHCR, to massively curtail their staff and programmes. She issued a call for input³ in that regard and intends to continue studying the broader impacts of those funding cuts on the rights of internally displaced persons and report thereon.

3. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/supplementary-call-inputs-impact-us-funding-reduction-human-rights-idps-and. ↩

Crime is an increasingly prevalent global driver of violence, displacement and violations of the rights of internally displaced persons. In 2024, at least 1.2 million people were displaced by crime-related violence globally, more than double the figure for 2023.⁴ Those are likely underestimates, as only a few countries systematically collect data on internal displacement and fewer still track crime as a driver of displacement.

4. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2025 (2025), p. 8. ↩

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines an organized criminal group as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Organized criminal activity generally entails the provision of illicit goods and services and/or the infiltration of legitimate business or Government. Associated violence may arise during disputes regarding the sale of illicit goods and services, as a means to enable these illicit economies or exercise control over legitimate businesses or Government, due to armed confrontations between rival groups or between such groups and the State.⁵

5. UNODC, “Activities, organization and composition of organized criminal groups”. ↩

Contexts of violence linked to organized criminality involve a proliferation of armed actors with diverse motivations. Those include organized criminal groups the primary aims of which are economic in nature, political armed groups or violent extremist groups that primarily aim to contest or supplant the State’s authority and may engage in criminal activity to further their political aims and self-defence groups that aim to protect their communities from the predations of other armed actors in the absence of effective State protection.⁶ Many groups engaged in organized criminal activity are also part of larger regional or transnational criminal structures, from which they may derive ideological and tactical direction or resources. Private actors, including security companies and developers, may also profit by providing security in the absence of effective State control or by colluding with criminal groups and/or the State to implement development or extractive projects on expropriated lands. The distinctions between those groups may be blurred in many contexts as their tactics and objectives may overlap, although they all drive displacement and affect internally displaced persons similarly.

6. UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime on stability and development in the Sahel” (New York, 2024), pp. 18 and 19. ↩

While the State is the primary duty bearer for preventing and addressing criminal activity and internal displacement, the emergence of significant criminal activity is often indicative of the State’s inability or unwillingness to effectively enforce the rule of law. Indeed, groups engaged in crime generally require the State’s active or passive acquiescence to avoid accountability for their criminal activities. They may seek and obtain the active collusion of State authorities through coercion or infiltration.⁷ Corrupt State agents may engage in or facilitate crimes for personal gain and some States may engage organized criminal groups for political repression while maintaining plausible deniability. Militarized State responses against crime may engender further displacement and adverse impacts on the human rights of internally displaced persons, which may be further restricted during crime-related states of emergency declared by authorities.

7. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence” (London, 2025). ↩

Displacement linked to organized criminal activity is a global phenomenon. Notable regional hotspots include Central America, the Sahel, South-East Asia and parts of South America and the Caribbean. Areas affected by such violence, which may be rural or urban, tend to be characterized by a weak or contested presence of the State, poverty and marginalization, the presence of illicit economies and/or extractable resources, and proximity to international borders, which facilitates the commission of transnational crime by providing a route to traffic contraband or persons and to evade law enforcement by crossing jurisdictions.

Displacement in contexts of organized criminal activity can occur in several ways. Individuals and families may flee targeted threats or crimes against them or flee an atmosphere of generalized violence resulting from armed confrontations between rival groups engaged in criminal activity, between such groups and the State or during militarized State security operations. In other situations, groups engaged in criminal activity may order the displacement of certain communities as a means of expropriating their housing, land and property or ensuring territorial control, or on the basis of those communities’ perceived affiliation with rival groups.⁸

8. Ibid. ↩

Organized criminal activity can intersect with other drivers of displacement. In armed conflicts, crime may finance the political aims of belligerents. Organized criminal groups benefit from the security vacuum created by armed conflicts and may profit by providing illicit goods and services to conflict parties; demand for the services these groups provide, including arms trafficking for the conflict parties and people smuggling for those seeking to flee the conflict across borders, often increases during conflicts. Those dynamics can prolong conflict and displacement, as criminal actors may act as spoilers to peace processes to preserve the rents that they derive from conflict-related criminal activities.⁹

9. James Cockayne, “Strengthening mediation to deal with criminal agendas”, Oslo Forum Papers, No. 2 (Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013). ↩

Disasters exacerbated by climate change can be profitable for criminal groups. Disasters increase competition over dwindling natural resources, leading to intercommunal conflicts that may increase demand for trafficked arms. The loss of natural resources necessary for traditional livelihoods can incentivize those affected to shift to crime as an alternative or seek people-smuggling services in search of economic opportunities. Illegal extraction may increase environmental degradation and loss of natural resources, which can then exacerbate the effects of disasters, climate change and related displacement.¹⁰ 10 Organized criminal activity also reduces the ability of affected communities to respond to disasters. Criminal actors may impede mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk reduction measures and prevent affected communities from accessing protection and assistance during disasters.¹¹ 11 Regarding development-induced displacement, organized criminal groups are often engaged by private actors or the State to force communities from their lands.12 7 Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence” (London, 2025). 8 Ibid. 9 James Cockayne, “Strengthening mediation to deal with criminal agendas”, Oslo Forum Papers, No. 2 (Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013). 10 UNODC, “Impact of transnational organised crime”, pp. 17, 26 and 31. 11 Submission from the Latin American Network on Internal Displacement. 12 Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 12. GE.25-06613

10. UNODC, “Impact of transnational organised crime”, pp. 17, 26 and 31. ↩
11. Submission from the Latin American Network on Internal Displacement. ↩

Internal displacement in the context of organized criminal activity presents unique legal considerations. Although no singular legal regime comprehensively governs displacement in that context, a combination of complementary legal instruments affords protection to internally displaced persons in such settings.

International human rights and humanitarian law

International human rights law applies in all contexts of violence and displacement associated with organized criminal activity. Human rights frameworks provide core protections in relation to internally displaced persons and other civilians, including the rights to life, liberty, security, dignity, health, education, livelihoods, development, freedom of movement, equality and non-discrimination and freedom from torture or inhuman treatment. While there is debate as to whether human rights obligations apply to non-State actors, including groups engaged in organized criminal activity, special procedure mandate holders have previously upheld that, as a minimum, non-State actors exercising either government-like functions or de facto control over territory and population must respect and protect the human rights of individuals and groups.¹³

13. OHCHR, “Joint statement by independent United Nations human rights experts on human rights responsibilities of armed non-State actors”, 25 February 2021. ↩

International human rights law places restrictions on the use of lethal force, which may only legitimately be deployed by State agents and under specific conditions.¹⁴ Relevant human rights frameworks specify that the use of firearms is permissible only when necessary to counter an imminent or grave threat to life or physical integrity, and only when less harmful alternatives are unavailable or would be ineffective. The application of force must be strictly proportionate, employing the minimum level necessary to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.¹⁵

14. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 15. ↩
15. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. ↩

International humanitarian law applies when a situation of violence meets the established threshold criteria for armed conflict. If the conflict is between two States, there is no minimum threshold aside from the use of armed force by two States to classify the situation as an armed conflict. In non-international conflicts, threshold criteria related to the intensity of violence and the existence of two or more organized entities as belligerents determine whether the situation constitutes a non-international armed conflict.¹⁶ Many groups engaged in criminal activity meet the criteria for an organization given their clear internal structures and hierarchies and contribute to violence at a scale and intensity that surpasses that of recognized armed conflicts. Many situations of criminal violence thus meet the threshold criteria for non-international armed conflicts.¹⁷

16. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Commentary of 2020 on article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War”, para. 455. ↩
17. Robert Muggah, “Organized crime in armed conflicts and other situations of violence”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 105, No. 923 (June 2023). ↩

In situations in which humanitarian law is invoked, it may provide additional protections for internally displaced persons, as it encompasses explicit prohibitions on forced displacement,¹⁸ obliges parties to the conflict to accept impartial humanitarian assistance and raises the international profile of a crisis. Humanitarian law is also more universally recognized as applicable to both State and non-State actors than human rights law. However, humanitarian law expands the scope of permissible violence to include acts perpetrated by both State and non-State actors, allows for the use of lethal force even in situations in which there is no imminent threat and permits civilian casualties in contexts in which civilians are “collateral damage” during combat operations, provided that such casualties are not “excessive”. States may consequently use the invocation of humanitarian law and recognition of an armed conflict to justify militarized operations against criminal activity that can have adverse consequences, including displacement, on the rights of internally displaced persons and other civilians. Similarly, recognition of an armed conflict may lead States to declare a public emergency, under which they may justify derogating from standard human rights obligations.¹⁹

18. A/76/169, para. 12. ↩
19. OHCHR, International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict (Geneva, 2011), p. 47. ↩

In principle, international humanitarian and human rights law are complementary and mutually reinforcing during armed conflicts; however, practical tensions persist when both legal frameworks are applied concurrently, particularly in relation to the acceptable use of force. There are differing interpretations of how such tensions should be resolved and the subsequent implications for the human rights of internally displaced persons.

On the one hand, some posit that invoking humanitarian law in situations of organized criminal activity is detrimental to the rights of internally displaced persons, as the more limited restrictions on the use of force under humanitarian law will take precedence over the more robust protections of human rights law.²⁰ That interpretation stems from the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali, under which a more specific rule takes precedence over general standards; as humanitarian law is more precise – relevant only to armed conflicts – it would constitute the lex specialis. However, other analyses differ. Certain issues, while occurring during conflicts, may not be related to hostilities and therefore best addressed through human rights law. In other cases, the degree of effective territorial control may determine which framework is most relevant; the greater one party’s effective control is over a certain territory, the more appropriate it would be to use human rights law as the prevalent framework in that territory.²¹

20. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”. ↩
21. OHCHR, International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, pp. 59 and 62. ↩

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement restate the principles of international humanitarian and human rights law most applicable to internally displaced persons. They apply in situations of generalized violence, armed conflict and human rights violations, including those linked to organized criminal activity. Relevant provisions include protection against arbitrary displacement, the obligation of authorities to take measures to minimize displacement and provide specific guarantees to internally displaced persons and ensure that displacement does not violate the rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those affected, a ban on forced recruitment, particularly of children, the right to freedom of movement, the right to an adequate standard of living, with access to food, drinking water, shelter, basic services and health, the right to documentation, and the right to education. National authorities should provide, without discrimination, humanitarian assistance in accordance with the principles of humanity and impartiality and allow the free passage of humanitarian aid.

The Guiding Principles outline the obligation of authorities to facilitate durable solutions for internally displaced persons, including return to their areas of origin, local integration or settlement elsewhere. Those obligations are further elaborated in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, which contains criteria that determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved, including: long-term safety and security; enjoyment of an adequate standard of living without discrimination; access to livelihoods and employment; effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property; access to personal and other documentation without discrimination; family reunification; participation in public affairs without discrimination; and access to effective remedies and justice.

Relevant regional instruments include the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, which incorporates and expands upon the protections of the Guiding Principles. It includes provisions that obligate States Parties to ensure the accountability of non-State actors for acts of arbitrary displacement and, in contexts of armed conflict, prohibits armed groups from carrying out arbitrary displacement, preventing internally displaced persons from obtaining an adequate standard of living, restricting freedom of movement, forcibly recruiting anyone, including children, and trafficking persons. The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, governing displacement in Latin America and the Caribbean, is revised every 10 years to expand protections for displaced persons; transnational organized crime was recognized for the first time as a principal driver of displacement in the Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, which was adopted at the Cartagena+30 meeting in 2014.

Specific international legal frameworks deal with the rights of groups. Indigenous Peoples and peasants are often displaced due to expropriation of their lands by groups engaged in criminal activity. Such acts are prohibited, respectively, by article 10 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and article 17 of the Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas. Children and youth face heightened risks of trafficking for forced recruitment, forced labour and sexual exploitation. Such acts represent violations of relevant instruments protecting children’s rights, including the International Labour Organization Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. The Convention is supplemented by three Protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking in Persons Protocol); the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. States Parties commit to criminalize relevant offences under domestic law, introduce measures to ensure effective international cooperation related to law enforcement and invest in capacity-building.

Although there is no explicit reference to internal displacement in the Convention, it can be used to address issues stemming from organized crime that can lead to displacement, inter alia, by criminalizing related acts that cause displacement and protecting victims and witnesses, including internally displaced persons in certain contexts. However, implementation varies, as States develop their own frameworks at national and regional levels.

The Trafficking in Persons Protocol is particularly relevant to internally displaced persons in contexts of organized criminal activity. The Protocol defines, in article 3, trafficking in persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation includes, inter alia, sexual exploitation, forced labour and services, slavery and practices similar to slavery, and servitude.

In contexts of organized criminal activity, civilians, including internally displaced persons, are subject to trafficking in persons, including for forced recruitment and association, forced labour and sexual exploitation. That entitles internally displaced persons in such situations to protection and assistance under multiple frameworks, including those for internally displaced persons and those envisaged under the Trafficking in Persons Protocol for victims of trafficking in persons, which include provision of housing, medical and psychosocial support, physical safety, employment, education and compensation.²² However, those protections are not always duly emphasized, as domestic frameworks may be focused on criminalization and prevention rather than protection of victims.

22. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, pp. 19 and 20. ↩

Moreover, some manifestations of trafficking, particularly forced criminality, may not be recognized as such. Victims may consequently face criminalization. Under the non-punishment principle, a fundamental axiom reflected in multiple international and regional anti-trafficking instruments, trafficked persons should not be subject to arrest, charge, detention or prosecution, or be penalized or otherwise punished for illegal conduct that they committed as a direct consequence of being trafficked.²³ However, that principle is not always systematically applied, as practices such as forced recruitment and association are not always recognized as forms of trafficking in persons by the authorities.

23. Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons, “Issue brief: non-punishment of victims of trafficking” (2020). ↩

Displacement linked to organized criminal activity violates the right to protection from arbitrary displacement.²⁴ Displacement may be considered arbitrary depending on the grounds for displacement, the application of due process and safeguards during displacement and the duration of displacement.²⁵ The grounds for displacement are generally the threat of generalized or targeted violence affecting civilians or the desire of criminal groups to control territory, resources and illicit economies or alter the demographic composition of the population under their control, none of which constitute permissible grounds for displacement. Due process and safeguards include necessity, proportionality, lawfulness, participation and free and informed consent, the manner in which displacement takes place and access to remedy.²⁶ Few if any of those safeguards apply in contexts of organized criminality; displacement is inherently unlawful, not carried out by appropriate authorities, does not entail the consent of displaced populations, takes place under conditions that do not uphold the safety of those displaced and access to remedy is highly constrained. Displacement is indefinite and may be permanent in some cases.

24. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, principles 5–8, and related international standards (see Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations (Washington, D.C., American Society of International Law, 2008)). ↩
25. A/76/169, para. 9. ↩
26. Ibid., para. 15. ↩

Organized criminal activity adversely affects other human rights, a situation that is exacerbated by generalized and targeted violence, the inability or unwillingness of the State to fulfil its role as primary duty bearer regarding human rights, a climate of impunity and constrained access to justice for victims in such contexts.

Rights to life, dignity, liberty and security

Groups engaged in criminal activity use violence to maintain and enforce their control over civilians and illicit economies. Internally displaced persons in those contexts face the threat of murder, violent assault, sexual and gender-based violence, hate crimes, kidnapping and other threats to their life, dignity and security from groups engaged in criminal activity. They may face indiscriminate violence during confrontations between rival criminal groups, including risks from explosive weaponry, drones and heavy artillery,²⁷ and indiscriminate violence during militarized State operations against criminal activity.²⁸ Internally displaced persons may be subjected to arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, torture and widespread enforced disappearances either by groups engaged in criminal activity or by the State when civil liberties are suspended during states of emergency.²⁹ Such violence creates a climate of fear and intimidation, and may be the principal driver of displacement and affect people who are already displaced or both. Civilians may face further violence, intimidation and displacement when investigating, drawing attention to or seeking accountability for such abuses, for example when searching for disappeared relatives or associates.

27. Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. ↩
28. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 15, and submission from Desaparecidos de la Costa y Feminicidios de Michoacán. ↩
29. Submission from Human Rights Watch. ↩

Internally displaced persons face the risk of being subjected to contemporary forms of slavery, including forced labour and recruitment, sexual and criminal exploitation and the worst forms of child labour, in contexts of organized criminal activity, reflecting an overall commodification of people wherein they are no longer treated as human beings and rights holders but rather as commercial assets to be manipulated for political and economic gain. Trafficking in persons is a primary activity of many organized criminal groups and internally displaced persons are particularly vulnerable, as displacement may deprive them of resources, networks and access to essential services and result in the separation of children from their families. Internally displaced persons may be targeted at transit points while seeking safety or may be trafficked when they seek the services of organized criminal groups to be smuggled out of conflict zones.³⁰

30. Global Protection Cluster, An Introductory Guide to Anti-Trafficking Action in Internal Displacement Contexts (2020), pp. 7–9. ↩

Criminal groups target youth for forced recruitment and association; fleeing the threat of forced recruitment is one of the most frequently cited reasons for displacement in contexts of organized criminal activity. Boys and men face forced recruitment for participation in criminal activities, while women and girls may be forced to partner with members of criminal groups or participate in criminal activities or be subjected to commercial sexual exploitation.³¹ Refusal of recruitment results in violent reprisals, including cruel, inhuman and degrading practices and death threats. Illegal extraction is another major source of revenue for criminal groups, and youth are often recruited or forced to work in mining, an industry with significant risks to their health and safety.³²

31. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 10. ↩
32. UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 22. ↩

Children are particularly susceptible to forced recruitment and association, given economic hardship, loss of parental or caregiver support, and the perception by criminal groups that children will enjoy greater prosecutorial leniency for criminal activity. Those risks are particularly acute for unaccompanied and separated minors. In situations in which forced recruitment results in children being subjected to slavery, trafficking, sexual exploitation, work as drug dealers or other forms of hazardous work, these practices constitute serious violations of international legal standards.

The confinement of civilians is another frequent consequence of organized criminal activity. Confinement may be a protective strategy to avoid exposure to violence, forced recruitment, sexual and gender-based violence or other crimes and, in its extreme manifestations, may result in people not leaving their homes for weeks. In other instances, criminal actors may impose curfews, establish illegal checkpoints, monopolize transport routes and networks, limit movement within and to specific areas, including “invisible borders” demarcating lines of control between rival criminal actors, and enforce movement restrictions through threats, extortion, surveillance and physical coercion. State responses, including militarized security operations and arbitrary controls, can further impede freedom of movement. Those responses may involve discriminatory profiling, documentation requirements and movement restrictions that disproportionately affect displaced populations, particularly those from marginalized communities. Confinement prevents those affected from seeking protection, accessing humanitarian and essential services, reuniting with family members, opting for displacement as a protective strategy, engaging in livelihoods and participating in public affairs.

Economic, social and cultural rights

Property crimes, including robbery, extortion, illegal taxation and the expropriation of lands, territories and resources, are a core revenue stream for groups engaged in criminal activity.³³ Violations of housing, land and property rights or threats thereof by groups engaged in criminal activity can be both a cause and a consequence of internal displacement in contexts of criminal violence. When perpetrated against Indigenous Peoples and peasants, those crimes – in particular, land expropriation – may represent violations of specific protections against the removal of Indigenous Peoples from their lands, territories and resources without their free, prior and informed consent and agreement on just and fair compensation, and on the unlawful displacement of peasants and other people working in rural areas from their land and natural resources necessary for the enjoyment of adequate living conditions.³⁴

33. Submissions from Centro Morelos and the Latin American Network on Internal Displacement. ↩
34. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 10; and United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, art. 17. ↩

Organized criminal activity disrupts livelihoods. Confinement prevents individuals and communities from accessing markets, resources and their workplaces. The expropriation of lands, territories and resources by groups engaged in criminal activity deprives those with land-based livelihoods, particularly Indigenous Peoples and peasants, of their means of subsistence. The ubiquitous threat of extortion, illegal taxation and robbery stifles commercial activity. Certain professional profiles may be disproportionately targeted, including transport workers, small business owners, street vendors and schoolteachers.³⁵ However, it is important to recognize that, in many contexts, particularly those characterized by pre-existing poverty and marginalization, criminal actors may provide income in the absence of alternatives, which helps them successfully recruit members and workers. Although working conditions under those groups are often abusive, exploitative and dangerous, and any profits tend to be concentrated in the hands of criminal actors rather than redistributed among workers, it may be difficult to dislodge those groups in such contexts without providing alternative livelihoods.³⁶

35. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 11. ↩
36. UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 8. ↩

Organized criminal activity threatens the right to health. Incidents of physical violence and indiscriminate attacks by State or criminal actors against internally displaced persons, exposure and addiction to drugs due to increased drug trafficking and exposure to pollutants from illegal mining all have detrimental impacts on the physical health of internally displaced persons. The trauma of repeated exposure to violence, crime, trafficking in persons and threats carries significant mental health consequences, particularly for children.³⁷ Civilians may struggle to access healthcare due to displacement or confinement. Health systems may be compromised by attacks on health facilities,³⁸ trafficking in medical products³⁹ or the extortion of medical services from doctors and nurses.⁴⁰

37. Ibid., p. 10. ↩
38. Submission from the National Human Rights Defense Network (Haiti). ↩
39. UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 10. ↩
40. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 11. ↩

Access to education may be disrupted by children being forcibly recruited, trafficked, confined or displaced, or by attacks on schools and educational personnel. Children may be denied access to education or face stigmatization and harassment due to a lack of documentation and/or their presumed affiliation with armed groups.⁴¹ Moreover, displaced children frequently encounter additional impediments, including linguistic exclusion, psychological trauma and socioeconomic pressures that render continued education unattainable. Lack of access to education can fuel criminality, as children and youth may join criminal groups without viable alternatives.⁴² That creates a vicious cycle, in which lack of access to education opportunities gives rise to violence and criminality, which further restricts educational opportunities.

41. Submission from Human Rights Watch. ↩
42. Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. ↩

The entrenchment of criminal groups can impede the realization of the right to development. Organized criminal activity depends upon and perpetuates the passive acquiescence or active collusion of State institutions, undermining their ability to provide good governance, including the formulation of national development policies and the creation of conditions conducive to the right to development.⁴³ 43 Criminal activity also restricts access to essential services, including health and education, further threatening the right to development in affected societies. Crime deters investment, makes attracting skilled workers a challenge, deprives people of their access to the resources necessary for livelihoods, and deprives the State of tax revenue and other resources that could be used to 34 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 10; and United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, art. 17. 35 Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 11. 36 UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 8. 37 Ibid., p. 10. 38 Submission from the National Human Rights Defense Network (Haiti). 39 UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 10. 40 Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 11. 41 Submission from Human Rights Watch. 42 Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. 43 Declaration on the Right to Development, arts. 2–4. GE.25-06613 fund public services and development.⁴⁴ Militarized State responses to crime may further divert resources from development activities. Displacement and collateral damage from the violence perpetrated by criminal groups and militarized State operations may perpetuate poverty and underdevelopment, factors that in turn enable the rise of organized criminal activity in the absence of sustainable livelihoods and development.

43. Declaration on the Right to Development, arts. 2–4. ↩
44. UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 9. ↩

Organized criminal activity disrupts the cultural rights of affected communities. That is most starkly true for Indigenous Peoples, for whom land is a central aspect of their culture and identity. Expropriation and displacement deprive them of not only their livelihoods but their traditions, culture and places of worship. However, organized criminal activity also changes the culture of other affected populations by, inter alia, eroding trust within communities and creating a culture of fear, displacing traditional livelihoods in favour of criminal economies and shifting values towards greater tolerance of violence and valorization of materialism.

Equality and non-discrimination

Internally displaced persons in contexts of organized criminal violence may experience differentiated violations of their human rights depending on their identity and profession. As a group, internally displaced persons may face discrimination and stigmatization when fleeing areas controlled by criminal actors. Potential host communities may view internally displaced persons as affiliated with criminal groups or deny them the right to seek protection and assistance or integrate locally owing to the fear that criminal groups will pursue them or that they will contribute to a rise in criminality. In such contexts, documentation is a critical protection tool for internally displaced persons, as it can prove eligibility for essential services and, in some instances, attest to the bearer’s lack of criminal affiliation.

Stigmatization, fear of reprisal and lack of documentation prevent internally displaced persons from effectively exercising their right to participate equally in community, government and public affairs, including their ability to vote and hold public office, participate in decision-making processes that affect them and freely express their opinions. That is a critical missed opportunity. Displacement-affected individuals and communities possess a deep understanding of local dynamics, violence and peacebuilding strategies, and can play an instrumental role in preventing, addressing and resolving violence and displacement linked to criminality.⁴⁵

45. Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. ↩

Women and girls face distinct vulnerabilities during internal displacement caused by organized violence, stemming from structural gender inequalities, the breakdown of protection systems and the misogynist tactics of criminal actors. Gender-based violence is a key driver of displacement in those contexts. Displacement increases exposure to such violence during flight, in transit and in reception areas. Women and girls not only face a heightened risk of trafficking and sexual exploitation by members of criminal groups, but must also contend with the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war by groups engaged in criminal activity that seek to quell resistance from populations under their control.⁴⁶ Displacement disrupts access to sexual and reproductive healthcare, increasing the risk of maternal mortality and morbidity and impeding clinical care for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Girls are at heightened risk of early and forced marriage and dropping out of school due to insecurity, in addition to increased and disproportionate caregiving responsibilities.

46. Submission from Universidad El Bosque, Bogotá. ↩

Violence and hate crimes against LGBTQ+ persons tend to increase in contexts of criminality, often because of organized criminal groups imposing conservative and heteropatriarchal social structures on the territories that they control. Displaced LGBTQ+ persons face additional challenges in receiving protection and assistance, as public officials may not be sensitized to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity and there may be a lack of official policies in place to address violence against them.⁴⁷

47. Submission from Caribe Afirmativo. ↩

Groups engaged in criminal activity often target those with existing vulnerabilities for forced recruitment and exploitation, including internally displaced persons and refugees, migrants, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, and persons of African descent, groups that are often disproportionately affected by displacement.⁴⁸ Those populations face intersecting forms of discrimination and are often historically underserved, politically marginalized and underrepresented in decision-making processes. They may face additional barriers when seeking protection and assistance due to discrimination from host communities or service providers.

48. UNODC, “Conflict in Ukraine: key evidence on risks of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants” (2022), p. 1. ↩

Peasants and Indigenous Peoples face a heightened risk of expropriation of their lands by groups engaged in criminal activity for use as trafficking routes, to gain control over resources and cultivate illicit crops or for development projects in which those groups have financial interests.⁴⁹ Indigenous leaders and organizations, along with social and environmental leaders, human rights defenders and journalists, may be targeted by criminal groups for murder, displacement or intimidation if they oppose the activities of those groups.⁵⁰

49. Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. ↩
50. Submission from the Latin American Network on Internal Displacement. ↩

The situation of persons deported from other countries back to their countries of origin is also of concern. They may be effectively displaced upon their re-entry as long-time expatriates with limited ties to their country of origin, without any home to return to and unable to access livelihoods and basic services. They may be targeted for forced recruitment, robbery, extortion and other property crimes if they are perceived as wealthier and may be less able to avoid these crimes if they are unfamiliar with the local context. Deportation in the absence of appropriate programmes for the reintegration of deportees can also create a vicious cycle of criminality and displacement. In situations in which persons are deported for organized criminal activity, they may recreate criminal structures or be vulnerable to recruitment by different criminal groups upon their return if not provided with safety, access to essential services and sustainable livelihoods. Many current situations of large-scale organized criminal violence trace their origin back to previous waves of deportations.⁵¹

51. Christina Ambrosius, “Deportations and the transnational roots of gang violence in Central America”, World Development, vol. 140 (April 2021). ↩

Overlap with other displacement drivers

Organized criminal activity can increase displacement risks from disasters and climate change. Criminal activity threatens the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. A main revenue stream for groups engaged in criminal activity is illegal extraction, including of minerals, timber and fossil fuels. Criminal actors frequently engage in indiscriminate extraction, without safeguards to prevent environmental degradation due to deforestation, pollution, overconsumption of water or other unsustainable practices.⁵² Such environmental degradation not only contributes to climate change, but can amplify the impact of disasters, as natural hazards interacting with degraded environments may lead to larger scale destruction; for example, floods and erosion are more likely to be of greater magnitude in deforested areas. More intense disasters are likely to engender more displacement.

52. Submission from Desaparecidos de la Costa y Feminicidios de Michoacán and UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 31. ↩

In parallel, organized criminal activity reduces the ability of affected communities to cope when disasters and displacement occur. State capture, diversion of resources, territorial restrictions imposed by criminal groups and the stifling of private sector activity 47 Submission from Caribe Afirmativo. 48 UNODC, “Conflict in Ukraine: key evidence on risks of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants” (2022), p. 1. 49 Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. 50 Submission from the Latin American Network on Internal Displacement. 51 Christina Ambrosius, “Deportations and the transnational roots of gang violence in Central America”, World Development, vol. 140 (April 2021). 52 Submission from Desaparecidos de la Costa y Feminicidios de Michoacán and UNODC, “Impact of transnational organized crime”, p. 31. GE.25-06613 prevent the implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, as well as disaster risk reduction efforts. Confinement and restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by groups engaged in criminal activity also prevent internally displaced persons and others affected by disasters from obtaining protection and assistance.

Organized criminal activity contributes to conflict and related displacement. Conflict and criminality are mutually reinforcing; conflict weakens the State, leading to instability that is conducive to the rise of organized criminal activity, and increases demand for services provided by criminal groups. The provision of those services by criminal groups can prolong the duration and intensity of the conflict, creating a vicious cycle as the services of organized criminal groups are then in further demand.

The dissolution of the social fabric also threatens long-term peace and stability. Organized criminal activity undermines social cohesion, creating an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Residents may avoid speaking out against criminal groups for fear of reprisal, yet this culture of silence breeds a climate in which community members cannot be sure who is affiliated with criminal groups within their communities, weakening community ties. Rivalries between criminal groups can impose themselves on society at large, creating perceptions that certain community members are affiliated with certain criminal groups, sowing further divisions. Displacement in contexts of organized criminal activity is often “atomized”:⁵³ rather than entire communities displacing together, individuals and households displace to different locations based on their specific threats and risks and where they may find relative safety. That can lead to the long-term dispersal of those communities and lay the groundwork for future conflicts if internally displaced persons are not supported to integrate elsewhere.

53. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 12. ↩

Protection, assistance and durable solutions

In situations in which organized criminal groups successfully contest the State’s monopoly on the use of force, the State can no longer ensure the physical protection of civilians within its territory. The depletion of State resources due to organized criminal groups capturing rents from illicit economies or State resources being redirected towards security responses can reduce funding for humanitarian assistance. States may also be unwilling for political reasons to recognize situations of violence linked to criminality as armed conflict in which humanitarian law would apply, preventing the delivery of humanitarian assistance by impartial actors.⁵⁴ Even in situations in which humanitarian assistance enters, persistent insecurity and direct attacks and threats stemming from the activities of criminal groups may impede efforts to deliver assistance to internally displaced persons.⁵⁵ In contexts in which organized criminal groups exercise effective territorial control, they may also control essential public services and the provision of humanitarian assistance, which they may wield in order to strengthen their hold over affected populations, demanding loyalty or services from the population in exchange for assistance.

54. Ibid., pp. 16 and 17. ↩
55. Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. ↩

Ensuring accountability for arbitrary displacement and other human rights violations is critical to prevent the recurrence of violence and forced displacement. While access to justice could address some of the protection challenges that internally displaced persons face, seeking justice poses protection risks. Internally displaced persons and victims of human rights violations can face reprisals for bringing charges or delivering testimony against criminal actors without effective State protection, which may disincentivize some from doing so and put others at risk.⁵⁶ Internally displaced persons and other civilians may be forcibly criminalized by being trafficked into forced recruitment and association with groups engaged in criminal activity. They may be forced to commit crimes, yet not formally recognized as victims of trafficking, to whom the non-punishment principle should be applied;⁵⁷ as such, they may face criminal prosecution when attempting to report violations of their rights, and the real or perceived threat thereof may disincentivize victims from reporting human rights violations and abuses.

56. Submission from Maat for Peace, Development and Human Rights Association. ↩
57. Refugee Law Initiative, “Internal displacement in the context of organised criminal violence”, p. 20. ↩

Corruption and ineffective judicial processes may limit investigations into crimes perpetrated by criminal actors,⁵⁸ while declared states of emergency may permit States to derogate from their human rights obligations, leaving victims of human rights violations at the hands of the State with few options for remedy.⁵⁹ Those dynamics can lead to an overall climate of impunity for violations of the rights of internally displaced persons. Moreover, the legal frameworks applied may focus only on criminal accountability and not on remedying violations of international humanitarian and human rights law experienced by populations subjected to criminal activity.

58. Submission from the National Human Rights Defense Network (Haiti). ↩
59. Submission from Human Rights Watch. ↩

The regional and transnational nature of organized criminal activity, wherein organized criminal groups in one context may be parts of larger criminal structures and networks that span multiple jurisdictions, also impedes accountability. Criminal actors may evade law enforcement by crossing into other jurisdictions in which affiliated criminal groups have influence. When a State is successful at suppressing criminality on its territory, criminal groups may shift their operations to a neighbouring State, leading to knock-on effects as new regions are destabilized. In such contexts, effective inter-State collaboration, including the engagement of regional justice mechanisms, becomes particularly relevant.

Organized criminal activity leads to persistent challenges in the realization of several core criteria for the achievement of durable solutions under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. Organized criminal activity generates persistent threats to safety and security, disrupts livelihoods due to illegal taxation, extortion, robbery and capital flight in high-crime contexts and creates complex challenges regarding housing, land and property restoration, especially in situations in which mass expropriation has taken place. State weakness and corruption that characterize contexts in which organized criminal activity is prevalent frustrates the search for effective remedies and justice. Unlike traditional armed conflicts in which a political settlement may put a definitive end to the parties’ desire for conflict, prolonged instability may be an end in itself, as such conditions facilitate the continuation of criminal activity.⁶⁰

60. Muggah, “Organized crime in armed conflicts and other situations of violence”, p. 571. ↩

Organized criminal activity is an increasingly relevant driver of internal displacement and presents unique threats to a broad range of human rights for internally displaced persons. Displacement in the context of organized criminal activity cuts across a broad range of legal issues, and existing legal and policy frameworks may not always effectively prevent and address displacement and human rights violations in these contexts, given overlap, contradictions and gaps within these frameworks. The pervasive nature of organized criminality leads to the fracturing of societies and a proliferation of adverse impacts on the human rights of affected civilians, particularly internally displaced persons.

The weakness or complicity of the State that enables organized criminal activity to flourish also stymies effective protection, assistance and solutions for internally displaced persons. Displacement and violations of the rights of internally displaced persons may be compounded by militarized State responses to criminality. That approach is ultimately shortsighted, as it addresses only the superficial manifestations of organized criminal activity and redirects resources away from interventions that could address its root causes, including poverty, marginalization and underdevelopment. Militarized responses often engender further displacement and marginalization, which in turn strengthen the authority and appeal of criminal groups, creating a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, criminality, violence and displacement. Moreover, militarized responses are counterproductive, as they may promote the co-dependency of communities and criminal actors when the State is perceived as a mutual threat.

Effectively addressing internal displacement in the context of organized criminal activity requires a whole-of-society and multi-pronged approach that tackles the root causes of violence, criminality and displacement through long-term structural solutions and that provides protection, assistance, solutions, accountability and remedy to internally displaced persons and other civilians affected by violence and conflict. In line with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, and drawing upon case examples received during the preparation of the present report, the Special Rapporteur recommends that States: (a) Strengthen prevention and address the root causes of displacement by: (i) Ensuring that legal and policy frameworks recognize displacement linked to organized criminal activity as a distinct category warranting tailored protection approaches. That not only raises awareness but also ensures that response frameworks are in place, designates institutional responsibilities and coordination arrangements and can expedite the mobilization of resources when crises occur. The inclusion of organized crime as a recognized driver of displacement in the Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action has led to an increasing number of States in the Americas adopting frameworks that address displacement in the context of organized criminality; (ii) Investing in the systematic collection and use of disaggregated data on displacement linked to organized criminal activity. That is essential in understanding the scale and nature of the issue, mobilizing and allocating resources appropriately, improving targeted responses when crises occur and facilitating informed policymaking. Data disaggregated by gender, age, disability, socioeconomic condition and other relevant characteristics enable a more precise understanding of differentiated vulnerabilities. Although the systematic collection of data on displacement linked specifically to criminal activity is an emerging practice among States, 20 countries have taken the lead in this regard, including Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti and Nigeria;⁶¹ (iii) Strengthening the comprehensive presence of the State in the areas most vulnerable to organized criminal activity. While that can include strengthening the presence of security forces that can provide physical protection, the State’s presence should go beyond this to encompass the delivery of essential services and investment in local development, given that poverty and marginalization are underlying causes of criminality, violence and displacement. Such a process could be informed by tools such as the comprehensive territorial intervention model (Modelo de Intervención Territorial Integral) in Colombia that assess the development needs of municipalities vulnerable to conflict;⁶² (iv) Investing in formal job creation and promoting alternative livelihoods to those offered by illicit economies, particularly targeting youth, in areas vulnerable to organized criminality. That can help strengthen resilience to shocks such as displacement and reduce the ability of criminal groups to recruit members or cultivate the economic dependence of marginalized communities. Special support should be given to youth-led organizations that promote livelihood options for young people through art and culture. Formalization, living-wage guarantees and ensuring respect for labour standards help protect workers from the pressures of organized crime; (v) Promoting the use of early warning systems for displacement linked to organized criminal activity. That can help affected civilians access protection and assistance during outbreaks of violence that may lead to displacement. In 61 Submission from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 62 Submission from the Government of Colombia. GE.25-06613 Colombia and Mexico, national human rights institutions have been effective partners in identifying displacement risks related to organized criminality;⁶³ (vi) Enhancing vetting, accountability, training and oversight of law enforcement, including military personnel, that may be deployed to address criminality. That can reduce risks related to corruption and build capacity in relation to human rights-based approaches to law enforcement, including in relation to the proportionate use of force. Civilian protection and community policing models can be useful in that regard; (vii) Establishing a land registry system that can provide continuity and facilitate resolution of property disputes in instances of expropriation. Such a mechanism should be adapted to the needs of communities that face disproportionate impacts from expropriation, including Indigenous Peoples and peasants, and should ideally include measures to protect productive assets, land and property; (viii) Negotiating and establishing pathways for safe and legal migration. That can provide an alternative protection channel for some civilians and can reduce reliance on migrant smuggling services provided by criminal actors; (ix) Building a protective environment for children to reduce the risks of forced recruitment and association, through the development of public prevention and response policies that provide continuous care for every child and their families and communities, and ensuring that children have access to safe public spaces, through community participation, psychosocial and mental health support, and safe access to education, in accordance with the Paris Principles; (b) Ensure the centrality of protection in responses to criminal violence and displacement by: (i) Limiting militarized responses as means of addressing organized criminal activity and ensuring that states of emergency do not entail prolonged derogation from human rights obligations. While such actions may be required to address the most extreme situations, militarized approaches do not on their own address the root causes of violence and displacement and may lead to further displacement and entail adverse impacts on the rights of civilians who become collateral damage. In situations in which such responses are unavoidable, protection of civilians should be an organizing principle; (ii) Establishing clear humanitarian response mechanisms and protocols for displacement in the context of organized criminality and ensuring the continuity of access to basic services during crises. That should include appropriate allocation of resources for emergency response, the designation of shelters, prepositioning of supplies and targeted measures to ensure the availability of humanitarian aid in communities at risk of confinement, which may no longer be accessible once violence starts. Arrangements should be made to ensure access to essential services, particularly healthcare and education, during crises; (iii) Prioritizing protection during emergencies. That includes making commitments to always uphold human rights obligations, engaging with criminal actors in a humanitarian context to ensure continuity of essential services to affected populations and minimize the impact of violence on civilians, and prioritizing protection of civilians in anti-crime security operations; (iv) Addressing underlying inequalities and ensuring an intersectional lens in humanitarian and protection responses. Humanitarian responses should be tailored to meet the needs of populations that may have specific needs or face specific risks from criminal actors because of their characteristics or 63 Ibid. and submission from Pablo Kalmanovitz. GE.25-06613 professions. Women, girls, boys, LGBTQ+ persons, minorities, journalists and human rights defenders may face threats of trafficking or violence from criminal groups, older persons and persons with disabilities may require adapted assistance and Indigenous Peoples and peasants may need support accessing alternative livelihoods if their land is expropriated; (v) Strengthening awareness of trafficking in persons in contexts of organized criminality, ensuring anti-trafficking frameworks prioritize protection of victims and promoting the application of relevant protections for victims. That should include raising awareness of the ways in which groups engaged in organized criminal activity may force civilians, including internally displaced persons, into criminality, and ensuring respect of the non-punishment principle. The establishment of inter-agency anti-trafficking task forces in context of internal displacement linked to criminal activity is a good practice in that regard, and the Borno State Anti-Trafficking in Persons Task Force provides a model for such an approach;⁶⁴ (vi) Strengthening and promoting community-based protection mechanisms, including those led by or that include internally displaced persons. Such mechanisms benefit from a deep understanding of the local context and enjoy greater trust from internally displaced persons and other community members, as State institutions may be seen as complicit in contexts of organized criminality. However, such mechanisms must have guarantees of safety and security and material and technical support to succeed. Evidence from, for example, Guatemala and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela highlights the effectiveness of community members in collecting, verifying and analysing information on human rights violations and protection risks, serving as peer counsellors and advocating for internally displaced persons;⁶⁵ (c) Promote accountability and access to justice, remedy and durable solutions by: (i) Establishing trauma-informed, victim-centred approaches that expand access to justice but do not create additional protection risks. Victims and witnesses of human rights violations, including internally displaced persons, should be able to testify without fear of reprisal, have access to the legal assistance necessary to prepare their cases and not face retraumatization because of the judicial process. As examples, El Salvador provides legal assistance to internally displaced persons through the Office of the Attorney General, while in Mexico, the Supreme Court has ruled that the State should bear the burden of collecting the evidence necessary to determine reparations to victims of internal displacement, rather than victims themselves. In Colombia, victims of organized crime can, in some cases, be compensated for the crime of displacement; (ii) Ensuring accountability for perpetrators of criminal activity and remedy to their victims under all applicable frameworks. That includes frameworks related to internal displacement, organized crime, trafficking in persons, and human rights and humanitarian law. Accountability should extend not only to members of organized criminal groups, but also to corrupt State actors and officials who may have been complicit in their abuses. The non-punishment principle should continue to apply to victims of forced criminality; (iii) Carrying out meaningful reforms to reduce corruption, strengthen transparency and accountability and rebuild trust in the State. That is crucial in situations in which the State has been complicit in or unable to prevent displacement and human rights violations in the context of organized 64 Global Protection Culture, An Introductory Guide, annex 2. 65 Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. GE.25-06613 criminality and may still be partly compromised or beholden to criminal interests, or perceived as such; (iv) Centring and reinforcing the role of local and municipal authorities. They are uniquely positioned to assess needs, coordinate immediate responses and ensure that services are delivered in a timely, inclusive and context-specific manner. Their involvement in development of displacement-related policies enhances accountability, promotes participatory governance and strengthens community resilience. They are also able to maintain access to affected populations even in situations in which violence and insecurity may impede central Government responses; (v) Promoting the participation of internally displaced persons in processes that affect them, including early warning systems, in decision-making processes related to humanitarian protection and assistance, reconciliation and transitional justice processes and in planning for durable solutions. Participation should be enabled by specific measures to ensure safety and security; (vi) Providing a pathway for demobilization and reintegration of persons formerly affiliated with groups engaged in criminal activity. That could include both persons forcibly and voluntarily affiliated with such groups and may combine education and training with access to alternative livelihoods and creating mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution, community violence reduction and violence interruption interventions; (vii) Restoring physical environments affected by organized criminal activity. That includes removing explosive remnants of war and reversing environmental degradation from extraction; (viii) Establishing mechanisms for the restitution of housing, land, property and productive assets. Those may be introduced through the justice system or a parallel mechanism that can expeditiously resolve such claims, paving the way for durable solutions; (ix) Engaging organized criminal actors in mediation efforts following the end of armed conflicts, to the extent feasible. That is important to ensure that they do not act as spoilers to the peace process; it would also ensure the safety and security necessary to promote durable solutions for internally displaced persons;⁶⁶ (x) Developing or reinforcing policies and frameworks to strengthen social cohesion following displacement. That can include community-led reconstruction, trust-building programmes, peace and cultural education and psychosocial support. Efforts in that regard from organizations led by internally displaced persons should be supported; (xi) Strengthening cooperation with other States, regional organizations and the United Nations system to prevent and address transnational and regional manifestations of organized criminal activity and associated violence and displacement, including by establishing mechanisms that can provide justice, accountability and remedy to victims. Mechanisms such as the comprehensive regional protection and solutions framework (Marco Integral Regional para la Protección y Soluciones) in Central America have proven effective at responding to displacement in the context of transnational criminality. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has also tackled the issue, including by providing policy guidance to States on addressing internal displacement in contexts of organized criminality.67 66 Cockayne, “Strengthening mediation”, pp. 16 and 17. 67 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Guidelines for the formulation of public policies related to internal displacement”. GE.25-06613

61. Submission from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. ↩
62. Submission from the Government of Colombia. ↩
63. Ibid. and submission from Pablo Kalmanovitz. ↩
64. Global Protection Culture, An Introductory Guide, annex 2. ↩
65. Submission from Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsperson. ↩
66. Cockayne, “Strengthening mediation”, pp. 16 and 17. ↩

The Special Rapporteur recommends that, as appropriate, national human rights institutions, civil society and faith-based organizations, regional and international organizations and the United Nations system:
(a) Document and report on internal displacement in the context of organized criminality and advocate for expanded legal recognition of the issue;
(b) Monitor and report on State responses to internal displacement in the context of organized criminal activity;
(c) Provide training and capacity-building to States to more effectively address displacement and related human rights violations in the context of organized criminality;
(d) Document and report on human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by all actors in situations of organized criminal activity;
(e) Advocate for access to justice and remedy for victims of human rights violations in the context of organized criminality, including through international legal channels;
(f) Assist in the development of legal and protection frameworks covering displacement in the context of organized criminal activity;
(g) Support research and the use of technology to understand the dynamics of displacement linked to organized criminality and strengthen protection responses.