Role of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and security companies in the exploitation of natural resources

The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 51/13 and Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/2 of 7 April 2005. These resolutions mandate the Working Group to monitor and study the effects of mercenaries and mercenary-related activities, as well as the impact of the activities of private military and security companies on human rights, particularly on the right of peoples to self-determination.

In the present report, the Working Group seeks to explore and analyse the actors, channels and means involved in the exploitation of natural resources, particularly as relates to mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and security companies, and their impact on human rights. The report was informed by more than 15 virtual consultations with experts and stakeholders from various regions, as well as written submissions received in response to the Working Group’s call for input.¹

1. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-inputs-role-mercenaries-mercenary-related-actors-and-private-military. ↩

During the period under review, the Working Group held its fifty-third and fifty-fourth sessions, from 18 to 22 November 2024 and from 7 to 11 April 2025. At the sessions, the Working Group met with representatives of Member States, international and non-governmental organizations, United Nations officials and other relevant interlocutors. On 1 November 2024, Andres Macias Tolosa of Colombia was appointed as a new member to replace Carlos Salazar Couto of Peru.

The Working Group conducted an official visit to Cyprus from 16 to 26 January 2025. The Working Group thanks Colombia, Guatemala, South Africa and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for responding positively to its visit requests.

Given their diversity, mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and security companies play complex roles in the exploitation of natural resources, and their connections to resources and the focus of activities also vary. Their operations often involve other State and non-State actors, who help them in transporting and distributing the raw minerals and materials. Their presence can exert undue pressure on local communities, undermine the rule of law as well as cause an imbalance in power dynamics and development among local populations.

Recent research by the Institute of Development Studies found that there were over 36,000 mineral mining conflict events related to mineral mining across 4,293 locations worldwide between 2015 and 2022, up to seven times higher than previously recorded.² When local populations oppose and resist such activities to defend their land, natural resources and environmental rights, they are often subjected to gross human rights violations, including violations of the rights to life, to self-determination, to racial equality and freedom from discrimination, to health and a healthy environment, to water, to freedom of speech and assembly, to participate in political life and to just and favourable conditions of work.

2. Anabel Marín and Gabriel Palazzo, Civic Power in Just Transitions: Blocking the Way or Transforming the Future? (Brighton, Institute of Development Studies, 2024). ↩

Further to its 2019 report on the relationship between private military and security companies and the extractive industry from a human rights perspective³ and to the various communications addressed to States and stakeholders, the Working Group notes that the extractive industry constitutes an important client base for private military and security companies and has been associated with allegations of serious human rights abuses and violations for many years. In the coming decades, the global race for raw materials, energy and agricultural land will cause additional pressure and risks in relation to land use for natural resource extraction for industrial and business purposes.

3. A/HRC/42/42. ↩

In the context of the exploitation of natural resources, obligations can appear somewhat distorted owing to the sometimes complex web of mercenaries and mercenary-related actors involved and to the relationships between governments and the private sector. International human rights law, which applies in peacetime and in armed conflicts, requires States to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including in relation to the activities of third parties, such as business enterprises. Private actors have an independent responsibility to respect and refrain from infringing upon human rights. Victims of human rights violations have a right to effective remedies, including judicial and non-judicial remedies.

By its very nature, the exploitation of natural resources touches upon core elements of the right of peoples to self-determination, one of the fundamental tenets of the international system. The principle of self-determination is afforded equal recognition under Articles 1, 2 and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations as the principles of international peace and security. It is further recognized as a rule of international customary law.

Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that all peoples have the right to self-determination. In order for peoples to exercise that right, they should have the freedom to pursue economic, social and cultural development, and to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

Under article 26 of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. States must give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition must be conducted with due respect for the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the Indigenous Peoples concerned.

In the context of armed conflict, international humanitarian law protects the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.⁴ It is also prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.⁵ In the conduct of military operations, the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must be applied by parties to the conflict to avoid and minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects and the environment.

4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), arts. 35 (3) and 55. ↩
5. Ibid., art. 54 (2); and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 14. ↩

Several frameworks set out voluntary human rights and international obligations for businesses, including their subsidiaries. These frameworks include the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the United Nations Global Compact, the principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts of the International Law Commission, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, and the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. A notable shortcoming of voluntary obligations for corporations is that they do not go far enough in ensuring that both States and businesses are held accountable for any failures to comply, nor do they encourage robust government oversight of actions by businesses that may violate human rights. In this regard, the Working Group has consistently called for an international legally binding instrument to regulate the activities of private military and security companies.

The protection of natural resources by mercenary-related actors and private military and security companies involves direct and indirect contracting, payments in cash or kind (concessions) and the use of direct and indirect violence, with or without government consent and control. Services and activities provided by actors range from offensive and defensive military activities to training, advice, video monitoring, interactions with logistics (resource transportation) and static security.

Mercenary-related actors typically engage with Governments through memorandums of understanding or bilateral agreements (occasionally together with national armed forces) and are involved in the seizure of areas over which the Government does not exercise sovereign control; as compensation, they may be offered access to the exploitation of natural resources. In these situations, the chain of command, arms supply and rules of engagement are not public or transparent.

When mercenary-related actors are not recruited by States but operate within them, Governments often consider them as being part of rebel groups. Irrespective of the context of their deployment, the consequences on the local population's human rights can be devastating.

Protection of mining sites by private military and security companies usually involves the mining company contracting their services directly. The guards are typically unarmed, conduct video surveillance and patrols, provide support for transport of minerals and work closely with local security forces. There are some regional differences in how private military and security companies collaborate with State authorities and local communities. Collaboration may involve the contracting of external private military and security companies combined with the use of mining companies’ in-house security. At times, both may operate under different mandates; for example, one may be responsible for on-site patrolling and the other for video surveillance. Their operations are often closely connected to local communities, which, before the commercialization of mining sites, relied on these mines as their main livelihood. The loss of livelihood due to mining activities often causes conflict between local communities and the mining companies.

In addition to their use to ensure the security of mining sites, private military and security companies are also employed to displace local communities as part of their responsibilities to facilitate operations related to the legal and illegal mining and exportation of minerals and ore.

The Working Group observed that in cases where private military and security companies are legally registered, they may be implicated in illicit activities and organized crime through their operations with their clients. These activities include the facilitation of transport and logistics and the introduction of illegal mining output into regular supply chains. The Working Group was informed of the problematic relationships with State security actors involved in these contexts. There are instances where local police and private military and security companies contracted by mining companies are connected.⁶ In these cases, private security officers do not engage in direct violence; rather, they instigate violence by local police officers against local communities in the vicinity of or on the mining sites. Their involvement in human rights abuses is indirect but intentional, as they are aware that the local police might engage in direct physical aggression. In other situations, private military and security companies may not be directly involved in conflict in local communities but may work closely with the local police, whose actions can result in violent incidents. The Working Group was aware of situations where mining companies were supposed to invest in local communities, but the corrupt practices of State officials and mining businesses prevented the funds from reaching their intended beneficiaries.

6. See submission from EarthRights International, Programa Amazonía. ↩

In various regions, State security forces hire so-called private police or employ a police officer to work for them in addition to their regular police duties and working hours. These personnel are paid by the mining company in cash incentives, food, water or accommodation and may receive vehicles from the mining company.⁷ This raises obvious issues in terms of conflicts of interest. There are other instances where States allow military and police personnel to enter into private arrangements with companies, thus linking the public sector with companies and incentivizing the growth of extractive activities, even when these activities may lead to human rights violations.⁸

7. Ibid. ↩
8. Ibid. ↩

The Working Group received reports that in certain instances, when protests were held in front of mines, the police collaborated with the private military and security companies to safeguard the mines, leading to widespread violence and the firing of weapons at demonstrators. The mining company reportedly compensated the aforementioned police officers and provided them with accommodation, vehicles and other resources to enable them to continue their activities in this context. Several of these cases were reportedly taken to court, where they were dismissed by the presiding judge.

A trend that has been observed in the context of the exploitation of natural resources is the use of a combination of contracts between serving or former members of foreign armed forces and mercenary-related actors, State-owned security companies or private military and security companies. For example, joint public-private units engage in efforts to gain control of territories, as well as in training and consulting services in conflict-related scenarios. In these situations, it was noted that the responsibilities of the various actors were challenging to ascertain or were blurred, particularly when activities were coordinated or joint. It was frequently observed that there were no investigations into crimes or situations of violations, evidence collection or prosecutions.

In certain regions, the protection of mining sites means ongoing conflict with local criminal armed groups, making it difficult to hire private military and security companies. Reportedly, some mining companies resorted to recruiting security companies from abroad due to lack of trust in local private security companies or to concern about their questionable activities with local criminal cartels. These private security companies were also associated with local government security structures, which may be corrupt or under the influence or control of cartels and criminal groups.

The Working Group was informed that private military and security companies hired to safeguard mining activities on the ancestral lands of Indigenous populations were instructed to cease their use of violence against populations residing in the vicinity of the mining areas.⁹

9. See Asian Human Rights Commission, “Philippines: private security guards harass indigenous Lumads for land – urgent appeal case”, 12 July 2016. ↩

The concept of land-grabbing refers to the practice by businesses and individuals of unlawfully occupying public land or Indigenous territory with the goal of obtaining ownership. Land-grabbers may purchase, rent or claim land illegally, legally (as defined by local and regional laws) or in a legal grey area where traditional land rights and contemporary property rules may conflict. Typically, land-grabbing is done to extract resources, capitalize on an area's agricultural potential or implement green energy or forest conservation initiatives. As part of these practices, private military and security companies play a role in protecting the contested land. Armed militias may also carry out these duties in addition to private military and security companies. There are different forms of engagement of private military and security companies and private guards. They can be used to protect land and allow access to it for traditional settlers or for both sides claiming ownership of it.¹⁰ It has also been reported that local government security forces (i.e. land commissions and the police) can be weak, underresourced and sometimes complicit in conflict, which opens up the market for the employment of land guards or private security companies. Instances of corruption within the land commission and police force have been reported, with officers being either on the payroll of land guard employers or hesitant to act due to political interference. Furthermore, in exchange for providing campaign security or suppressing opposition, some land guards receive protection from politicians or the police.¹¹

10. Linda Darkwa and Philip Attuquayefio, “Killing to protect? Land guards, State subordination and human rights in Ghana”, Sur International Human Rights Journal, vol. 9, No. 17, December 2012, pp. 141–161. ↩
11. Ibid., pp. 152–155; and expert consultations. See also Richard Juvenile Ehwi and Divine Asafo Mawuli, “‘Landguardism’ in Ghana: Examining public perceptions about the driving factors”, Land Use Policy, vol. 109 (2021), available at https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/341225. ↩

Security officers frequently lack adequate training and registration. Excessive violence and confrontation with other guards are the norm, as often they are contracted as enforcers or disrupters of ownership. They disregard the laws and regulations that established businesses typically follow.¹² Community leaders reported that evictions were often accompanied by robbery and that individuals were not adequately compensated. In some cases, they were forced to sign settlements under threat of being shot.¹³

12. Expert consultations. ↩
13. See Nixon Segawa, “Victims of land grabbing decry rape, torture and assault by multinational companies”, 25 August 2020, available at https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/29811-victims-of-land-grabbing-decry-rape-torture-and-assault-by-multinational-companies. ↩

Agribusinesses are large corporations engaged in the production and distribution of food that typically operate in numerous regions and own or operate farms on a large scale. They frequently employ private military and security companies to safeguard their properties. Private military and security companies typically offer on-site security services to prevent the destruction of property, theft and trespassing. They primarily operate unarmed and patrol properties.

Agribusinesses acquire large tracts of land and disrupt the movement of local populations by closing existing roads and crossings. This results in the population having to make significant detours to reach hospitals, schools and stores. The use of existing trails by local populations to reach their habitual destinations is a contributing factor to the violation of human rights by private military and security company personnel. When attempting to pass, it is common for individuals to be severely beaten, sometimes to death. Women are particularly vulnerable and are often sexually assaulted.

The hiring of private military and security companies to supplement existing national or local forces has been a common practice in the context of green militarization, with the objective of conserving protected natural areas. The practice can involve the provision of training and consultancy or the physical protection of sites. Some of these protected areas have also been declared world heritage sites by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and are funded by various international conservation organizations and States, which should handle the responsible employment of private military and security companies.

In this context, foreign private military and security companies have been used to provide advice and support to local forces in direct combat operations targeting local communities and specific ethnic groups and tribes residing on ancestral lands that were partially confiscated and converted to national parks with the goal of securing tourist and protected sites. Alleged violations in this context include the burning of surrounding villages, shelling of villages with heavy military equipment, burning or killing of civilians, sexual violence against women, mutilation of corpses and starvation of local communities.¹⁴ As some of the sites are located in countries under arms embargoes, these collaborations also facilitate the violation of United Nations arms embargoes.¹⁵

14. See Minority Rights Group International, “To purge the forest by force: organized violence against Batwa in Kahuzi-Biega National Park”, 5 April 2022. ↩
15. Ibid. ↩

In addition to protecting mining sites, mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and private military and security companies are involved in mineral extraction and logging. This involvement can be direct, or indirect through access to the proceeds of the extractive endeavours.

There are numerous concerns regarding continuous conflict and its impact on the exploitation of natural resources. In inter-State conflicts, both State and non-State actors have been reported to employ the same mechanisms to finance conflicts. Using illicit transnational connections and the financial resources obtained from natural resource exploitation, they are able to purchase weapons and other supplies to exacerbate the conflict.¹⁶ For State actors, the issuance of exploitation permits to mercenary-related actors serves as a diplomatic connection to other States in support of their political stance.¹⁷ Ongoing conflicts have a catastrophic impact on civilians, not only through direct violence, but also through fuel shortages, price increases and general insecurity, as well as environmental damage caused by the targeting of oilfields and pipelines.¹⁸ Furthermore, environmental damage has been documented, where, in connection with the extraction of minerals, gas and oil, mercenary-related actors have burned down villages and contaminated water wells with cyanide to displace populations with minimal physical force.¹⁹

16. Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker and New Features Multimedia, “Fueling Sudan’s war: how gold exports and smuggling are prolonging Sudan’s war”, October 2024, p. 1; and see Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker and New Features Multimedia, “Fueling Sudan’s War: How Oil Exports, Imports, and Smuggling are Prolonging the Conflict”, July 2024. ↩
17. “Fueling Sudan’s war: how gold exports and smuggling are prolonging Sudan’s war”, pp. 5–7. ↩
18. “Fueling Sudan’s war: how oil exports, imports, and smuggling are prolonging the conflict”, p. 2. ↩
19. See A/79/305. ↩

The Working Group noted the varying degrees to which States have established bilateral agreements or memorandums of understanding with other States to provide them with military assistance to gain control of their own territory. State-owned military and security entities received compensation for carrying out tasks including the obtainment of permits to exploit natural resources. Although such partnerships have occasionally resulted in Governments regaining territory, the consequences for the local population, including human rights violations such as arbitrary detention, rape and infliction of blindness, are frequently catastrophic. It is challenging to ascertain the identities of those involved in such acts, as some do not wear uniforms associated with the employing entity, and their close collaboration on certain missions complicates the accountability process. The Working Group also noted that several State authorities do not conduct investigations, leaving the collection of evidence to civil society.²⁰

20. See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29698. ↩

Reports were received that, under a bilateral agreement or memorandum of understanding, a State has been supporting a sanctioned State's regime and territorial ambitions by sponsoring a military and security entity in the territory of the sponsoring State or another territory. In exchange for the contracted services, the sponsoring State and, through it, the military and security entity receive monetary compensation along with gifts of oil and gas that cannot be exported due to sanctions. The contracted entity receiving these gifts uses them to support its activities in other States in the region.

Reportedly, mercenary-related actors and State-owned military and security entities further engage in the exploitation of natural resources through the construction and operation of refineries. This entails smelting or the transformation of unprocessed minerals and ore and the facilitation of transportation. The Working Group received information according to which State-owned entities that provide military and security services have established refineries in the States where their exploitation activities under the contracts is sufficiently significant to justify the expense of transformation. Additionally, there have reportedly been instances of local organizations being involved in transformation, which obstructs the transparency of operations and the authorities’ access to information.²¹

21. S/2024/914, paras. 19 and 20. ↩

State-owned entities providing military services have built and operated refineries themselves, a trend that is visible in States with which they have bilateral agreements or memorandums of understanding and where part of their income flows from the exploitation of natural resources. Such operations have also been seen in sanctioned States, where these entities, together with intermediaries, play an important role in avoiding monitoring and enforcement of the sanctions regime.

In the context of logging, mercenary-related actors and State-owned security companies may establish a local legal entity to connect with existing brokers and supply chains, enabling them to arrange for logging equipment to be shipped from abroad before being sent to specific areas in the country. It has been observed that neighbouring countries collaborate and facilitate such endeavours. Timber from these operations is not declared, and its origin is obscured in trade records and bills of lading.

Close protection, anti-insurgency training and disinformation services are used to protect certain regimes where such exchanges have been more successful. Reported profits from these activities exceed $2 billion. Front companies and subsidiaries of known sanctioned entities have set up a gold mining and smuggling network, which has not only funded mercenary-related operations and generated profit, but has also served to mitigate the impact of international sanctions against the major actors involved.²²

22. See Center for Advanced Defense Studies, “Unearthed: how Wagner’s mining operations entangled with global systems”, 24 September 2024; United Kingdom Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, “Guns for Gold: The Wagner Network Exposed” (London, House of Commons, 2023); William Rampe, “What is Russia’s Wagner Group doing in Africa?”, Council on Foreign Relations, last updated 23 May 2023; Global Initiative, “Mercenaries and illicit markets: Russia’s Africa Corps and the business of conflict”, 14 February 2025; and Global Initiative, “After the fall: Russian influence on Africa’s illicit economies post-Wagner”, 3 February 2025. ↩

Mercenaries and mercenary-related actors, private military and security companies and State-owned entities providing military services are also involved in facilitating the export and transport of natural resources to which they have access in other regions. Trends show that their work is heavily backed by intermediaries, including government officials (or connections to powerful political figures), subsidiary companies (which are often merely fronts) and established international crime groups. Some States are known as points of origin and others as transfer facilitators, transformation hubs (i.e. from gold to jewellery) or facilitators for the introduction of various raw materials into legal, certified flows. At times, mercenaries and mercenary-related actors will use revenues from these sources to offset the decline in revenues from their primary activities.²³ These activities are prevalent in all regions but are not implemented by the same actors everywhere.

23. S/2023/93, para. 55. ↩

For example, gold is often extracted in regions where there is armed conflict, violence and instability. It is either transformed and processed in-country or moved to another country for transformation. This transformation allows the gold to be transported, traded and sold in and to other regions. Once the gold has been processed, it is smuggled to other regions. Mercenary-related actors and State-owned military and security entities use the public infrastructure, such as airports, of the States in which they operate or of neighbouring States that are not subject to sanctions regimes, as well as their own subsidiaries, to obscure their activities.²⁴

24. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI): Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain: Technical Report (Turin, Italy, 2016). ↩

Mercenary-related actors and State-owned military and security entities enable transportation from the State where minerals and other natural resources were originally mined (whether or not they have been transformed) by providing access through their infrastructure (such as airports and ports) to aircraft and vessels, without controlling the content of the shipments. Upon arrival of the shipments, they sell or buy the natural resources or facilitate their transfer between entities. They also engage in money-laundering associated with these activities, such as through the acquisition of military equipment.²⁵ International traders operate out of these hubs and benefit from the opportunity to operate with minimal or no oversight.²⁶

25. Expert consultations; and UNICRI, Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain. ↩
26. S/2024/65, para. 124. ↩

To hide the origin of local natural resources, they can be exported from smaller regional hubs after melting and mixing. To circumvent sanctions, these exports frequently occur between regions rather than within them. The Working Group has previously reported on these trends.²⁷

27. See A/79/305. ↩

Intermediaries are international corporations that establish regional legal entities in the State serving as a hub. Particularly when the State is subject to a sanctions regime, small mining companies use neighbouring countries to legitimate their exports. These mining companies are identifiable because, although they do not own the resources within the territory where they operate, they introduce the resources into legal operations. The intermediaries located in the hubs establish a substantial number of shell companies, associated with each segment of their activities, thus creating multiple layers to be identified. A permissive regulatory framework facilitates this, for instance when an individual’s name is not required to set up a legal entity.

The midstream portion of the supply chain is underexplored, particularly in relation to cryptosmuggling, concealment, embezzlement, misinvoicing and the use of mules at airports. However, the organizers and owners of the transformation, transfer, marketing or transport of natural resources are generally well explored and identified. Simplifying the registration process enables these companies to rename their enterprises while retaining their shareholders. Another method of concealing the true owner of an operation is to register mid- or high-level officials from the ministry responsible for minerals, who would not draw undue attention. In addition, these companies may infiltrate the internal operations of State institutions (such as national banks, national electric companies and national oil corporations) and exercise unprecedented influence. Corruption by the State officials enables their operations to continue without being fully exposed.²⁸

28. Expert consultations; UNICRI, Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain; and S/2024/914, para. 12. ↩

Furthermore, mercenary-related actors have been observed acting in an intermediary capacity establishing control over maritime routes, including commercial vessels. The primary forms of human rights abuses associated with this trend are trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling.

Various activities linked to the aforementioned trends result in a range of human rights abuses. In the context of protection of natural resources, the most common human rights violations include physical violence (assault, torture), killing, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, sexual assault (rape), use of tear gas and acoustic weapons, in particular affecting the health of women and children in surrounding communities, and violations of 24 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI): Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain: Technical Report (Turin, Italy, 2016). 25 Expert consultations; and UNICRI, Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain. 26 S/2024/65, para. 124. 27 See A/79/305. 28 Expert consultations; UNICRI, Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain; and S/2024/914, para. 12. GE.25-11182 the right to privacy through continuous video surveillance of local communities to protect mining sites and resources. It has been observed that companies seeking inexpensive solutions to protect their mining sites provide funding and weapons to individuals who turn out to be abusers and use the resources to violate the rights of local communities, including through gender-based violence and petty crime. Persons perceived as obstacles, including persons accessing waste material or simply living near mining sites, face generalized violence. Such cases are often characterized by impunity for the perpetrators and a lack of access to justice and redress for the harm caused.

Human rights violations found when examining land-grabbing practices include intimidation, assault, torture, rape and even murder to claim or protect land (e.g. documented killings of government employees and threats to residents) and obstacles to the ability of Indigenous Peoples and local communities to steward their land, protect its biodiversity, practise sustainable agriculture and achieve food sovereignty. In the case of agribusiness, abuses include assault, torture, rape and even murder for trespassing.

With regard to conservation practices, private military and security companies have been accused of involvement in the burning of surrounding villages, the shelling of villages with heavy military equipment, the killing of civilians, including by burning, the rape of women, mutilation of corpses and death by starvation of persons in hiding. Furthermore, these situations also entailed the violation of the rights, including cultural rights, of Indigenous populations and ethnic minorities.

In the context of exploitation of mining sites and gas and oil resources and logging, the transformation of these resources and payments to various actors, human rights violations include pillaging, destruction of properties, seizure of villages and displacement of local communities (who originally discovered the resource and used it themselves as a source of income), mass rape, summary executions, even the annihilation of entire communities, water and soil pollution leading to population displacement, and reprisals against defenders of human rights and environmental rights who denounce these violations (torture, killing, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention).²⁹

29. See submission from Bálint Pongrácz, King’s College London. ↩

The main forms of human rights abuses when private military and security companies and mercenary-related actors act as intermediaries and logistics facilitators are often human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

As observed through the aforementioned contexts, States can play multiple roles, as contractors of services provided by mercenary-related actors, State-owned military and security entities or private military and security companies, and as regulators, whereby they are responsible for the implementation of international agreements that they have signed and for monitoring and enforcement of respect for human rights in their territory. Practice shows that States are struggling to establish a regulatory framework to address private actors, owing to a lack of political will and technical know-how. Most Governments engage in internal regulation in response to significant challenges and external pressure, including from civil society and States, or when their public image is deteriorating. In this specific matter, it is also the responsibility of States to establish clear rules and regulations for the operations and licensing of private military and security companies, monitoring of human rights abuses and accountability measures, particularly when abuses have been repeatedly reported.³⁰

30. See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29698 and http://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29980. ↩

Regarding public-private partnerships, it is the responsibility of States to establish chain of command when multiple actors are involved, to decrease the probability of violations of human rights and to facilitate accountability where violations occur. The Working Group noted that States often do not take this approach and that particularly vulnerable regions, such as those exposed or prone to conflict, are not internally prepared and do not have regulatory mechanisms in place or support from courts and monitoring bodies.

The Working Group received reports on the various ways in which private and public security providers may be integrated. These include situations where State security forces are assigned exclusively to an extractive concession for the duration of their deployment, alongside private and in-house security. In some cases, State security personnel are housed in the extractive concession or in company-provided accommodation. A police station may also be located within the extractive concession, with access controlled by the extractive company. In addition, State security forces may conduct patrols and operations jointly with private security personnel. In certain instances, State security forces use shared radio frequencies and receive directions from company-controlled surveillance, such as closed-circuit surveillance cameras. Extractive companies may also provide logistical support to State security forces, such as vehicles and fuel. Furthermore, State intelligence and specialist investigative units may coordinate with in-house and private security managers.³¹These public-private set-ups supporting extractive industry projects often prioritize the protection of extractive projects over citizens' rights.

31. See submissions from Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) and Brazil. ↩

The Working Group also noted States’ role as facilitators and enablers of mercenary and mercenary-related activities and their inaction when it comes to holding these actors accountable. Moreover, there is a trend whereby two States set up joint security companies to protect State assets and economic interests associated with foreign direct investments, such as railways, roads and oil and gas pipelines.³² The argument made by certain States that the presence of foreign soldiers in their territory would diminish sovereignty is addressed through the establishment of a commercial entity rather than the direct participation of troops from other States. In addition, as the registration of military companies is frequently prohibited, States from other regions will register these entities as security companies and provide military services regardless of their denomination. It has been noted that some States, to protect their economic interests and investments in other regions, will contract services of mercenary-related and State-owned entities providing military services to re-establish access to their extraction sites or secure the release of their employees held by rebels. The State is failing to fulfil its obligation to safeguard citizens from human rights abuses perpetrated by these corporations, and it has direct responsibility for their activities.

32. See Antonio Graceffo, “China’s Wagner? Beijing establishes private security company in Myanmar”, Geopolitical Monitor, 28 November 2024; and Max Markusen, “A stealth industry: the quiet expansion of Chinese private security companies”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 January 2022, p. 3. ↩

The constitutions of certain States prohibits contracting with mercenary-related or State-owned entities providing military services, as these services should be provided by State forces. In these instances, States actively pursue alternative relationships, such as bilateral agreements or memorandums of understanding, or they may provide a variety of licences associated with the exploitation of natural resources (e.g. for research) to circumvent public scrutiny. Internally, when States are constitutionally prohibited from registering an entity that exports these services, they provide exceptions for specific companies as a means of ensuring the security of their own operations. These clauses have been examined for the recruitment and use of mercenary-related services abroad under the sponsorship of States. Given that some States involved are signatories of the Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, this conduct is in direct opposition to the principles to which they have agreed.

States are responsible for stopping criminal, illegal and harmful activities in their territories, including those linked to private military and security companies, government-owned enterprises offering similar services and mercenaries and mercenary-related actors. The Working Group noted that States can participate in the facilitation of operations for those activities in both passive and active ways. The passive approach involves States facilitating the transport, logistics (access to seaports and airports), export or trade of the natural resources extracted in their or other regions by refraining from punishing such behaviour. The active approach involves directly contracting with such entities for operations, regardless of their lack of a proper regulatory and supervisory framework, willingness or capacity to investigate alleged human rights abuses or ability to hold perpetrators accountable for abuses.

States may violate United Nations sanctions regimes or assist others in doing so. In that context, some States actively pursue engagement with local companies as a front for their efforts to cover up money-laundering. The global trend of active involvement by States is to use certification processes to introduce natural resources into legal supply chains. Additionally, some States have been observed to be actively involved through company licensing permits, as the employees responsible are handpicked by the presidential administration to overcome the usual administrative hurdles that the company would face in registering activity.

The Working Group’s findings underscore the difficulties associated with ensuring accountability for mercenaries, mercenary-like actors and private military and security companies engaged in the exploitation of natural resources. The current accountability measures for addressing human rights violations in the aforementioned contexts are significantly limited and are typically pursued through extraterritorial means.³³ Victims often seek extraterritorial remedies due to an inability to assert their rights locally or to a fear of potential reprisals. Often, States are reluctant to investigate and prosecute entities involved, due to either a lack of technical capacity or to political decisions to refrain from doing so. In either case, local communities typically rely on collaboration with organizations from other States that pursue legal actions to obtain justice and compensation for these abuses. However, the Working Group noted that the extraterritorial jurisdiction ban is underutilized, even when the opportunity to use it arises, when States are unwilling or unable to prosecute individuals for crimes or when companies are domiciled abroad. Additionally, businesses and local and national Governments tend to reduce the civil space surrounding the places affected by using retaliation, monitoring and threats to restrict awareness of abuses occurring outside of communities and national borders.

33. See submission from MiningWatch Canada. ↩

Various commercial entities are established to support State activities and align with the regional economic strategy, including shell companies that enable operational functions while providing plausible deniability.³⁴ These entities are present in various sectors and across different regions; some modalities are described below.

34. See Center for Advanced Defense Studies, “Unearthed: how Wagner’s mining operations entangled with global systems”. ↩

The Working Group examined a case in which military equipment was produced by a company in one State and subsequently sold by that State’s Government to another Government in a different region. The payment for this transaction was linked to the facilitation of logistics for transporting natural resources from third countries, thus illustrating that the commercial entities involved exist merely in name and serve primarily to facilitate money-laundering and the management of human resources.

Regarding gold-mining activities, it was observed that gold is transported from the region of extraction to the intermediary hubs, where it is exchanged for money, which then returns to the countries that extracted the gold. Thus, the global flow of associated illicit activities is evident, as countries that exploit natural resources are not from the region where these resources are extracted; rather, they use intermediaries in a third region then receive the profits. Jewellers receive gold from operations of this nature, which they melt to produce wedding jewellery to facilitate its trade after it is acquired by State-owned military and security entities in other regions.

The Working Group observed that consumers lack awareness of the indirect support that they provide to operations linked to human rights abuses when they purchase goods from companies that use private military and security companies for protection, which in turn infringe upon the rights of local populations. These goods, particularly those from large multinational corporations, are associated with the agricultural, financial, insurance and shipping sectors.³⁵ The shipping industry has been particularly important for transporting equipment and chemicals necessary for extraction. While flag States and the shipping industry have a crucial role to play in ensuring strong oversight, due diligence on collaborations with companies that are under sanctions or are linked to illicit activities is still not common practice.³⁶

35. Ibid., pp. 16–20. ↩
36. Ibid., p. 21. ↩

The Working Group received information regarding insufficient due diligence in respect of criminal activities and human rights abuses in the context of supply chain enablers. Certifying bodies do not perform effective due diligence to ensure that the natural resources that they certify are not from regions under sanctions or part of some form of criminal activity prior to certification and to verify that no human rights abuses were committed in the processes prior to certification. The current verification process does not prioritize inquiries on human rights violations but, rather, assesses the completion of due diligence in specific areas. This provides the market with plausible deniability, despite public reports of human rights abuses. Although awareness of these aspects is visible in them, certification forms often remain a mere box-ticking exercise for companies engaged in extraction. Furthermore, certifying bodies typically do not conduct on-the-ground verifications, nor do they involve civil society in substantiating claims. Moreover, they have faced accusations of contributing to greenwashing within the industry by keeping reporting voluntary, thereby failing to implement substantive and meaningful changes in processes and practice.

Companies in intermediary hub States are also employing international or regional compliance systems to prove that their exports are lawful. Unfortunately, these systems only serve to legitimize illicit shipments and do not track them.

There are a number of challenges hindering efforts to bring justice, the greatest of which is corruption on the part of the different companies involved.³⁷ These companies either negotiate agreements barring judicial action and investigations into reported violations or they bribe national and local officials. Companies are also known to hire attorneys to bring legal action against organizations or individuals who expose their wrongdoing. Local communities often lack access to legal expertise and face significant power imbalances against extractive companies and their security partners, especially when State security services are involved.³⁸

37. The Working Group observed that mining companies protect their collaborators, specifically private military and security companies, while State-owned enterprises include all associated actors within their network. ↩
38. See submission from RAID, p. 8. ↩

Challenges also include opaque beneficial ownership structures, gaps in sanctions regimes, misalignment of government interests and fast-evolving circumvention tactics. Another challenge is the hybridization of services, specifically collaboration between local government forces, such as the police, and commercial entities that provide security and are typically funded by extractive business entities. Because of their close cooperation, it can occasionally be challenging to identify their involvement and accountability in misconduct.³⁹ There is a lack of transparency in contracting, employment and licensing in the extractive industry, making it challenging to ascertain the identities of those operating in specific locations, the conditions under which they are operating and the boundaries of the licences.

39. Ibid., p. 9. ↩

Identification of perpetrators is difficult. Reports may refer to them speaking a specific language or wearing specific uniforms; however, it may be challenging to determine whether they belong to armed groups, State actors or private military and security companies, especially when the State operates in an integrated manner and has an agreement with such entities. In addition, documenting and investigating typically carry significant risks. Individuals involved in these efforts, including journalists, human rights defenders and 35 Ibid., pp. 16–20. 36 Ibid., p. 21. 37 The Working Group observed that mining companies protect their collaborators, specifically private military and security companies, while State-owned enterprises include all associated actors within their network. 38 See submission from RAID, p. 8. 39 Ibid., p. 9. GE.25-11182 researchers, are frequently tortured or killed, and victims and their families are subjected to security threats and reprisals.

When extraction sites and security providers are in remote locations and employ only nationals of the State where the extraction companies are domiciled, there is deficient reporting of human rights abuses. This is frequently the result of a lack of mechanisms and opportunities, rather than the absence of violations.

The Working Group received information regarding a variety of pre-emptive and other tools aimed at ensuring accountability through restorative justice.⁴⁰ Tools to pre-emptively address human rights concerns include operational-level grievance mechanisms and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which companies operating in the territory are required to respect.

40. See submissions from MiningWatch Canada and RAID. ↩

Operational-level grievance mechanisms are established to resolve disputes fairly, locally, transparently and quickly. To ensure best results, they should be designed through extensive community and stakeholder participation and consultation; be accessible and transparent, with a physical office and telephone helpline to enable reporting of grievances, taking into consideration that rights holders may be illiterate; guarantee independence, impartiality and due process; be composed of independent investigators or experts so that complainants have access to independent legal advice; and be subject to regular monitoring by independent experts, the results of which should published clearly to allow for continuous improvement. In addition, users of operational-level grievance mechanisms should not be made to waive their legal rights and or be precluded from using other judicial and non-judicial complaints mechanisms.

The Working Group was informed that restorative justice measures may involve financial compensation, the training of guards in de-escalation techniques, the employment of female guards and the provision of training and funding for alternative income-generating activities, particularly in cases where artisanal miners and farmers have lost access to land.

Existing soft-law mechanisms are often deemed insufficient and deficient, as their provisions tend to be vague, qualified and difficult for communities to monitor or enforce.⁴¹

41. See submission from RAID, p. 9. ↩

The Working Group, acknowledging the diverse regional challenges, aimed to identify effective practices in the use of private military and security companies in the extraction of natural resources. Although a model case was not identified, certain factors have contributed to improved respect for human rights, including the awarding of compensation to victims and coverage of their medical expenses. These factors include the involvement of local communities in securing mining sites, corporate social responsibility initiatives in education and training aimed at ensuring alternative livelihoods, and increased participation of women in security forces. Furthermore, engagement with relevant organizations, including the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association, has led to the development of alternative practical solutions to the issues arising from the use of private and military security companies.

For example, agribusinesses, which occupy vast tracts of land and impede the movement of the local population, have built roads across their plantations to ensure secure passage. This has altered the responsibilities of contracted private military and security companies, as they have ceased to engage with local communities attempting to pass through the land. Furthermore, the security personnel has been changed and is now exclusively composed of women.⁴²

42. See Leigh Day, “Camellia Plc – Kakuzi: Leigh Day secured a settlement on behalf of 85 victims of unlawful violence”, 14 February 2021. ↩

The involvement of local communities in security and protection for extractive activities and agribusiness has yielded positive outcomes. Local communities participated as stakeholders in these initiatives and were provided with additional job opportunities in areas where such opportunities are limited. Additionally, corporate social responsibility initiatives that genuinely engage with local communities have proved effective in incorporating these communities into operations and decreasing the propensity for violence. However, there is a concern that some initiatives merely serve to cover up the bribing of local leaders. Lastly, acknowledging the rights of artisanal miners who have historically engaged in the exploration of extraction sites has also been shown to reduce tensions and violence with local communities.

While there are existing international frameworks to regulate the operations of private military and security companies in the context of natural resources and extractive industries, it is clear that robust oversight and accountability mechanisms are critical to preventing human rights violations, particularly in vulnerable local communities where these operations occur. Additionally, there is a lack of information on the issues addressed in this report and therefore great need for further research.

The Working Group recommends that Member States:
(a) Refrain from recruiting, using, financing and training mercenaries, and prohibit such conduct in domestic law, in line with the offences established in the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries;
(b) Investigate, prosecute and punish alleged violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights committed by mercenaries, mercenary-related actors and personnel of private military and security companies, including in relation to offences committed previously at home or abroad, and provide victims with effective access to justice, accountability and remedies;
(c) Consider mutual cooperation to facilitate investigations and the prosecution of those involved in the recruitment of mercenaries and mercenary-related actors, including through legal assistance and extradition agreements;
(d) In circumstances where private military and security companies and their personnel are incorporated in or licensed to operate in a State, the State must adopt legislation regulating the activities of private military and security companies, particularly in the areas of licensing, certification, registration, vetting of personnel, the scope of permissible and prohibited activities, the use of force, firearms and other weapons, accountability and remedies for violations, taking into account the transnational nature and activities of some private military and security companies;
(e) Develop a robust culture of oversight of national bodies for the certification of private military and security companies, and ensure that any persons involved in accreditation is qualified in international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(f) Adopt a legally binding international instrument on the activities of private military and security companies to ensure consistent regulation at the national level, including in relation to the recruitment of personnel, vetting procedures and standards on the adequate prevention of human rights violations, the protection of victims, accountability and effective remedies;
(g) Take all measures necessary to ensure that companies based in or managed from the State’s territory are legally liable for human rights violations resulting from their activities conducted abroad or the activities of their subsidiaries or affiliates and that national legislation contains provisions on extraterritorial jurisdiction to facilitate the prosecution of private security companies and their personnel;
(h) Create an enabling environment in which civil society and human rights defenders, including lawyers and community representatives working on the prevention of illegal exploitation of land and natural resources, can access relevant information, participate in decision-making and express opinions freely, including through peaceful assemblies, without threat of prosecution or other harm; and ensure that cases of violations of human rights are promptly and impartially investigated and that those responsible for the violations are held to account.

The Working Group recommends that private military and security companies:
(a) Be cognizant of the heightened risk of being implicated in violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law when operating in natural resource areas, particularly when their personnel is armed; ensure that they have adequate procedures and processes in place for human rights due diligence to prevent violations by their personnel, including stringent vetting and screening processes, clearly articulated policies on human rights, international humanitarian and criminal law that outline consequences for violations, and reporting mechanisms; and cooperate with any remediation or judicial processes and ensure that implicated personnel are not transferred elsewhere;
(b) Ensure that their employees respect and receive adequate continuous training on human rights and international humanitarian law, conduct extensive background searches to ensure employees have not been involved in misconduct during previous assignments, consider how their regular security activities might be used by other actors to commit human rights violations and take steps to mitigate the risks of complicity;
(c) Enhance their own transparency with regard to the military and security services provided and make public, in a timely manner, sufficiently detailed information about their corporate structures, operational procedures, services, procurement procedures, the terms of contracts and the names of services providers. States and corporations should not invoke national security concerns as a general reason for restricting access to this information; rather, limitations on access to information must meet the test of legality, necessity and proportionality, in line with the right to information;
(d) Issue periodic reports, including detailed information regarding the number and nature of complaints, the alleged involvement of security providers and the action taken in response to the complaints, and make investigation policies and procedures publicly available;
(e) Provide avenues for effective accountability, oversight and remedies, including non-judicial remedies, for victims of human rights violations related to natural resource exploitation activities.

The Working Group recommends that relevant stakeholders:
(a) Consider using the principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts of the International Law Commission as a basis for a binding convention;
(b) Consider including widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment that is disproportionate to the expected military advantage as a war crime in non-international armed conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
(c) Recommend to international organizations that they promote capacity-building programmes to support States in developing the capacity necessary to regulate and oversee private military and security companies operating in their territories, particularly in resource-rich areas;
(d) Recommend to international organizations that they facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogue among States, private military and security companies, civil society and affected communities with the aim of identifying challenges and developing collaborative solutions, particularly at the regional level;
(e) Strengthen local civil society organizations through increased resources and training in available remedies to provide extraterritorial judicial responses to human rights violations;
(f) Recommend to the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights that it consider individual and collective forms of reparations, particularly when addressing harm to entire communities, such as environmental damage.

The Working Group recommends that businesses, including multinationals:
(a) Neither tolerate nor profit from gross human rights violations and abuses, such as widespread sexual violence, war crimes or other serious violations of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity or genocide;
(b) Immediately suspend or discontinue engagement with upstream suppliers when a reasonable risk has been identified that they are sourcing inputs from or are linked to any party committing serious abuses;
(c) Eliminate any direct and indirect support to non-State armed groups through the extraction, transport, trade, handling or export of minerals, which includes but is not limited to procuring minerals from, making payments to or otherwise providing logistical assistance or equipment to non-State armed groups or their affiliates who: (i) illegally control mining sites or otherwise control transportation routes, places where minerals are traded or upstream actors in the supply chain; (ii) illegally tax or extort money or minerals at points of access to mining sites, along transportation routes or at places where minerals are traded; or (iii) illegally tax or extort intermediaries, export companies or international traders;
(d) Recognize that the role of public or private security forces at mining sites and surrounding areas and along transportation routes should be solely to maintain the rule of law, which includes safeguarding human rights, providing security for mine workers, equipment and facilities, and protecting the mining site or transportation routes from interference with legitimate extraction and trade activities;
(e) In recognition of the fact that the communities in their footprint are most likely permanent, change their perspective to view these communities as an opportunity for engagement and investment.