Water and energy nexus

The water and energy nexus reflects a dual relationship: water is a key element for energy production and energy is crucial for ensuring access to safe, high-quality water and for managing its distribution across various uses. In that interconnection, water and energy systems not only support each other but also shape the possibilities for human well-being and environmental sustainability.

However, today’s dominant energy systems often undermine those goals. They frequently violate human rights, fail to ensure universal access and disproportionately burden marginalized and low-income communities. Large-scale energy infrastructure projects can disrupt aquatic ecosystems, pollute water sources and compromise the availability and quality of water, thereby threatening the realization of the human right to water.

New energy systems are increasingly being promoted as the world moves away from fossil fuels. While that transition is both urgent and necessary, it is important to acknowledge that renewable energy production also creates significant human and environmental impacts. The generation of renewable energy still relies heavily on the extraction of critical and other minerals, often replicating the extractivist practices historically associated with fossil fuel industries.

In many respects, current energy systems reproduce the inequities found in water systems. Access to energy, like access to water, is marked by stark disparities. Energy is produced and distributed under market-driven, growth-oriented paradigms that prioritize profit and industrial expansion over equity and ecological integrity. Those models exclude vast segments of the global population, while placing unsustainable demands on freshwater resources and exacerbating environmental degradation. In the face of emerging industries that are increasingly energy and water intensive, it is imperative to prioritize human rights over market-driven interests in policymaking and decision-making.

Moreover, most energy users lack democratic control or the opportunity to participate in decisions over how energy is produced, distributed and governed. Even those with access often face the challenges of affordability, reliability and safety, with disproportionate impacts on women, children and vulnerable populations. Fossil fuel-based systems continue to dominate, contributing to climate change, perpetuating environmental injustices and exacerbating resource conflicts, including over water. It is thus necessary to promote participatory governance in energy systems.

A new energy system is urgently needed, one that does not reproduce the injustices of the past. In pursuing new forms of energy generation, it is essential to ensure that they neither pollute nor deplete aquatic ecosystems. A transition from traditional supply-side strategies to new approaches focused on demand management and the conservation of aquatic ecosystems is needed. The fulfilment of everyone’s human rights must take precedence over the drive for ever-increasing energy production. A just energy transition must empower communities, centre equity, safeguard ecosystems and support sustainable and dignified livelihoods for all. A new concept of progress must be developed, in the wide space offered by our common home, whose floor must be the respect for human rights and whose ceiling is environmental sustainability, in this case, both climatic and water sustainability.

Crucially, a just transition in energy is inseparable from a just transition in water. The two are mutually reinforcing: equitable access to safe water depends on reliable, clean energy, while sustainable energy systems rely on responsible and equitable water management. As energy underpins nearly every aspect of daily life, including access to safe water, sanitation, food, healthcare and education, restructuring how energy is produced, distributed and governed is a foundational step towards a fairer, more sustainable and human rights-based future.

The Special Rapporteur is extremely grateful for the 32 submissions received for the present report.¹ He would like to acknowledge the engaged participation of more than 160 1 All submissions can be found at https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-input-water-andenergy-nexus-report. GE.25-10003 people in four online consultations. Their diverse knowledge and backgrounds contributed significantly to the report.

1. All submissions can be found at https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-input-water-and-energy-nexus-report. ↩

Water was recognized as a human right by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/292 in 2010 and has since been reflected in various ways across national legal frameworks. The recognition of water as a human right created binding obligations for States and entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses under the principles of non-discrimination, participation and accountability.²

2. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 15 (2002). ↩

While energy is not recognized in international human rights law, it is – like water – a necessary precondition for the fulfilment of the right to an adequate standard of living. That includes the human right to water, especially in contexts in which the availability and accessibility of water, as well as sanitation, depends fundamentally on reliable and sustainable energy.

At the national level, several countries have begun recognizing sustainable energy as a human right within their constitutional or legislative frameworks. In parallel, international instruments have acknowledged the importance of energy access, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Under article 14, the Convention includes provisions that protect the rights of rural women to adequate living conditions, explicitly referencing access to electricity. In its interpretation of article 14 (2) (h) of the Convention, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has emphasized the gendered impacts of limited energy access, highlighting that women and girls – often, primarily responsible for household energy use and fuel collection – face disproportionate burdens related to fuel scarcity, energy costs and exposure to health risks from indoor air pollution caused by inefficient and unsafe cooking methods.³

3. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 34 (2016), paras. 81–85. ↩

Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living. While the article does not explicitly refer to “energy” or “electricity”, its scope can be understood to encompass a human right based on multiple statements by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For instance, the Committee has recommended that States ensure that all households enjoy a minimum supply of energy and are able to meet their basic electricity needs. States must avoid power shutdowns for households that are unable to pay for their minimum needs and they are expected to mobilize or allocate more resources to ensure affordability of energy, for example through social tariff schemes and expanding their coverage.⁴ Moreover, in its general comment No. 4 (1991), the Committee lists access to energy among the facilities and services that adequate housing must contain to be in line with the Covenant (para. 8 (b)).⁵

4. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 24 (2017), para. 21; E/C.12/DEU/CO/6, para. 57; and E/C.12/BEL/CO/5, para. 43. See also the submission by the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. ↩
5. See also E/C.12/BEL/CO/5, paras. 42 and 43. ↩

The Special Rapporteur would like to emphasize that, given the interdependence of rights, the explicit recognition of the right to clean and sustainable energy necessary for a dignified life as a human right under international law should be considered. Such recognition would have several important implications.

First, recognizing energy as a stand-alone human right would overcome the current approach to managing energy as a mere commodity; it would oblige Governments to prioritize energy use to cover basic needs. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic underscored the urgent need to de-commodify essential services, including energy, without which many other rights are at risk, such as the rights to education, health, food and, notably, water. For the right to water and many others to be fully realized, a guaranteed minimum level of access to energy for everyone is indispensable.

Second, recognizing the human right to energy could provide a normative foundation for alternative models of energy governance, including decentralized systems that empower communities and promote energy sovereignty. It is important to enable individuals and communities to make their own decisions about the generation and management of key resources for their daily lives, such as energy, within their socioeconomic, environmental and cultural contexts, under the subsidiary oversight of the State, to ultimately guarantee both their rights and those of other communities. Such models not only reinforce participation and equitable access but also strengthen local resilience.

Third, it could help set the baseline for regulation. Energy, as in the case of water, has a central role in ensuring the right to an adequate standard of living and its provision should be held to similar human rights standards as those applicable to the human right to water. That includes ensuring that energy is available in sufficient quantity, accessible, affordable, of adequate quality and safety, and provided on a reliable basis. As the Special Rapporteur has previously emphasized,⁶ adding the element of sustainability to that framework is essential. Incorporating sustainability strengthens environmental protection and reinforces the interdependence of human rights, such as the human rights to food, health and a healthy environment. In that sense, sustainability must also be recognized as a core component of the human right to energy.

6. See A/79/190. ↩

The current development model based on unlimited growth marginalizes basic human rights and clearly exceeds sustainability limits. The existing water and energy systems not only fail to provide equitable access but also surpass ecological boundaries, contributing to the escalating global water crisis. That dual crisis of exclusion and unsustainability demands urgent and profound changes. Water and energy systems must be examined, assessing how well they meet basic needs, uphold human rights and ensure sustainability amid increasing demands in the context of climate change.

Systematic and large-scale discharges, often toxic, along with the overexploitation of aquatic ecosystems, particularly groundwater, and the construction of large dams, have serious implications for human rights and cause severe environmental impacts. Energy systems significantly contribute to the current global water crisis by exploiting and polluting aquatic ecosystems. Coal, hydrocarbons, hydropower and nuclear energy, as the primary energy sources, are also major contributors to those issues, as the Special Rapporteur will demonstrate below.

Coal mining requires approximately 250 litres of water for each tonne of coal,⁷ which has involved hoarding and polluting the water that communities need, especially in regions with scarce water resources. In La Guajira, Colombia, the massive withdrawal of water flows and even the diversion of rivers, by the largest coal mining company in Latin America, has disrupted the provision of drinking water for the Wayúu people.⁸ Contamination has also been documented in water bodies within the area concerned, while several sanctioning processes due to non-compliance with wastewater discharge permits have been initiated.⁹ Courts have repeatedly found in favour of those alleging non-compliance with the free, prior and informed consent¹⁰ of Indigenous Peoples.

7. Claire M. Côte and others, “Systems modelling for effective mine water management”, Environmental Modelling & Software, vol. 25, No. 12 (December 2010). ↩
8. Submission by the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense. ↩
9. See https://news.un.org/es/story/2020/09/1481412 (in Spanish). ↩
10. Ibid. See Constitutional Court of Colombia, Pueblo Yukpa, Case No. T-9.079.598, Judgment, 25 September 2023; and Comunidad Indígena Media Luna Dos, Case No. T-5.451.805, Judgment, 13 December 2016; and Administrative Court of La Guajira, Colombia, Comunidad Negra Los Negros de Cañaverales, Judgment, 22 January 2019 (all judgments in Spanish). ↩

Hydrocarbons also require large amounts of water for their extraction and processing, and cause serious toxic pollution through discharges, spills and leaks into water bodies, threatening drinking water supplies.¹¹ In Toyah, Texas, the United States of America, people endured four years without access to safe water, after an abandoned well burst, contaminating the water with toxics.¹² In the Peruvian Amazon, more than 500 oil spills affecting rivers have occurred in the last three decades, with catastrophic consequences for public health. The Kukama women have recently obtained legal personhood status for the Marañón River to strengthen their fight for its restoration.¹³

11. Williams Fredy Proaño López, “Water in the petroleum and petrochemicals sector: uses and treatments”, Master’s dissertation, University of Alcalá and Rey Juan Carlos University, 2019 (in Spanish). Available at https://ebuah.uah.es/dspace/bitstream/handle/10017/41883/TFM_Proano_Lopez_2019.pdf. ↩
12. Submission by the Leave it in the Ground Initiative. ↩
13. See A/HRC/54/32/Add.2. ↩

Thermal power plants require large volumes of water, which can affect the availability of drinking water in sensitive areas, as seen in South Asia, particularly in India.¹⁴ Moreover, those plants emit sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, leading to the formation of acid rain. That acid rain can dissolve heavy metals in specific geological environments, posing serious risks to public health.¹⁵

14. Submission by the ABCD Centre. ↩
15. Manas Ranjan Panda and others, “Vulnerability assessment of thermal power plants in India under water stress conditions”, Energy, vol. 276 (August 2023). ↩

Nuclear power plants require large reserves of water to cool the reactors and pose extremely serious risks. In fact, accidents and radioactive leaks in nuclear power plants, together with the risks involved in managing radioactive waste for thousands of years, justify widespread social rejection. The construction of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in India, faced multiple delays due to opposition from local fishers, leading to protests and human rights concerns, including actions against members of the People’s Movement against Nuclear Energy.¹⁶ Key concerns of local residents include insufficient water resources to meet the plant’s demands, the environmental impact of hot water discharges into nearby rivers, potential radiation risks and the lack of an adequate contingency plan for emergencies.¹⁷

16. Communication IND 24/2012, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=15568. ↩
17. Ajmal Khan, “Anti-nuclear movement in India: protests in Kudankulam and Jaitapur”, South Asia Research, vol. 42, No. 1 (February 2022); Raminder Kaur, Kudankulam: The Story of an Indo-Russian Nuclear Power Plant (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020); and Raminder Kaur, “Nuclear necropower: the engineering of death conditions around a nuclear power station in South India”, Political Geography, vol. 85 (2021). ↩

Hydropower often causes major socioenvironmental impacts as a result of large dams, hence it cannot be characterized as green or sustainable energy, even though it is renewable and clean. In addition, large reservoirs (both for hydropower and irrigation) generate significant water losses due to evaporation, especially in a warming climate. In the Zambezi basin, about 16 per cent of the river’s annual flow evaporates from reservoirs, making hydropower the largest water consumer in the region, despite its frequent classification as a non-consumptive use of water.¹⁸ In Guatemala, Indigenous communities, including the Chuj, Q’aanjob’al and Akatek Mayan groups, have been severely affected by the construction of two hydroelectric dams, San Mateo and San Andrés, financed by IDB Invest and implemented by a Guatemalan company. The dams, which have severely affected communities’ water supplies, were authorized despite the absence of adequate consultations with the local communities and without providing affected communities with sufficient information on the risks.¹⁹

18. Submission by CounterCurrent, Waterkeeper Alliance and Ríos to Rivers. ↩
19. Submission by the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense; Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense, “Guatemalan Indigenous communities file complaint for dams’ damages”, 6 August 2018; and Inter-American Development Bank, Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism, Compliance Review Report Generadora San Mateo S.A. and Generadora San Andrés S.A. Projects (GU3794A-01 and GU3798A-01) (2021), MICI-CII-GU-2018-0136 (2021), p. 3. ↩

Mini power plants, which do not flood valleys or towns, often cause significant environmental impacts and serious problems for riverine populations by drying up long stretches of rivers, as recognized in the Declaration on River Protection adopted by the Republika Srpska.²⁰

20. See https://www.wwf.mg/?2195441/Parliament-of-the-Republic-of-Srpska-Adopted-the-Declaration-on-River-Protection. ↩

Reversible hydropower plants, which operate in a closed circuit, undoubtedly have the lowest environmental impact and allow the integration of night-time wind energy into the electricity system. That is why those plants are at the top of the European Union’s priorities in hydroelectric generation.²¹

21. European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Clean Energy Technology Observatory: Hydropower and Pumped-Storage Hydropower in the European Union (Luxembourg, 2024). ↩

Developing the energy transition under a systematic increase in demand places increasing pressure on non-renewable resources, while also putting human rights at risk. The demand for critical minerals, such as graphite, lithium and cobalt, is expected to surge by 450 per cent between 2018 and 2050.²² A transition of that magnitude presents substantial challenges, with mineral value chains too often linked with human rights abuses, environmental degradation²³ and depletion of water. A prime example of the disparity between critical minerals and human rights fulfilment can be found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is home to one of the world’s largest reserves of critical minerals, holding 57 per cent of global cobalt reserves²⁴ and supplying 70 per cent of the market, primarily for vehicle batteries and other technology products.²⁵ Despite that wealth of resources, the country is among the five poorest nations in the world. An estimated 73.5 per cent of its population lived on less than $2.15 a day in 2024.²⁶ Furthermore, mineral exploitation has resulted in violence and the displacement of communities, which was particularly noted during 2025.²⁷ While the carbon dioxide-free renewable energy sources that govern energy transition strategies are undoubtedly necessary, they also generate socioenvironmental impacts that cannot be ignored, as the Special Rapporteur will analyse further.

22. World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2023, 18th edition (Geneva, 2023), chaps. 1 and 3. ↩
23. United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, “Resourcing the energy transition: principles to guide critical energy transition minerals towards equity and justice” (2024), pp. 3 and 7. ↩
24. See https://www.statista.com/statistics/264930/global-cobalt-reserves. ↩
25. See https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/africa-transition-going-beyond-conflict-free-transition-minerals-governance-drc. ↩
26. See https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview. ↩
27. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/special-sessions/session37/37-special-session. ↩

Solar energy is crucial in the energy transition. However, when referring to the production of photovoltaic electricity²⁸ and its management, there are serious problems and 19 Submission by the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense; Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense, “Guatemalan Indigenous communities file complaint for dams’ damages”, 6 August 2018; and Inter-American Development Bank, Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism, Compliance Review Report Generadora San Mateo S.A. and Generadora San Andrés S.A. Projects (GU3794A-01 and GU3798A-01) (2021), MICI-CII-GU-2018-0136 (2021), p. 3. 20 See https://www.wwf.mg/?2195441/Parliament-of-the-Republic-of-Srpska-Adopted-the-Declarationon-River-Protection. 21 European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Clean Energy Technology Observatory: Hydropower and Pumped-Storage Hydropower in the European Union (Luxembourg, 2024). 22 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2023, 18th edition (Geneva, 2023), chaps. 1 and 3. 23 United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, “Resourcing the energy transition: principles to guide critical energy transition minerals towards equity and justice” (2024), pp. 3 and 7. 24 See https://www.statista.com/statistics/264930/global-cobalt-reserves. 25 See https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/africa-transition-going-beyond-conflict-freetransition-minerals-governance-drc. 26 See https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview. 27 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/special-sessions/session37/37-special-session. 28 Unlike solar thermal energy, which does not generate relevant environmental impacts, both in domestic panels and in large solar power plants. GE.25-10003 risks of toxic pollution of water bodies in the manufacturing of photovoltaic panels and batteries:²⁹ (a) The extraction of minerals such as lithium, copper and other critical minerals requires large amounts of water, which results in toxic discharges into water bodies.³⁰ The United States and Mexico have announced plans to scale up lithium mining in the Sonora Desert with a $48 million investment, significantly utilizing underground water, which threatens the livelihoods of Yaqui communities dependent on the Yaqui River;³¹ (b) The emission of sulphur dioxide in nickel and cobalt mining and refining for electric batteries, for example, generates acid rain and contributes to the greenhouse effect;³² (c) When disposing of batteries, there is a risk of toxic contamination.

28. Unlike solar thermal energy, which does not generate relevant environmental impacts, both in domestic panels and in large solar power plants. ↩
29. See https://acee.princeton.edu/acee-news/electric-vehicle-transition-could-create-unwanted-air-pollution-hotspots-in-china-and-india. ↩
30. Submission by the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. ↩
31. Rochelle Diver, on behalf of the International Indian Treaty Council, statement on agenda item 5 (g) at the twenty-third session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, 15–26 April 2024. ↩
32. See https://www.meteored.com.ar/noticias/actualidad/la-transicion-a-autos-electricos-puede-generar-puntos-criticos-de-contaminacion-advierte-una-investigacion-de-princeton.html (in Spanish). ↩

Green hydrogen, given its portability and the fact that it only generates water vapor when burned, can replace hydrocarbons in the automotive and air traffic sectors. However, producing green hydrogen by electrolysis³³ requires 37 litres of high-quality water for each kilogram of hydrogen, and between 50 and 60 kilowatt-hours of electricity. Therefore, if it were to replace hydrocarbons, its production could compete with and jeopardize other uses of water, even drinking water and sanitation in sensitive areas, especially during periods of drought. According to the Net Zero 2030 Routemap of Water UK, water demand could increase by 15 to 20 per cent.³⁴

33. See https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/ministerio/planes-estrategias/hidrogeno.html (in Spanish). ↩
34. See https://www.bluefieldresearch.com/green-hydrogen-the-hydrogen-economy-realizing-the-water-sectors-crucial-role-in-the-energy-transition. ↩

Biofuels, as a renewable energy with net-zero emissions, can also replace hydrocarbons in uses such as the automotive sector or aviation. However, current production processes require massive irrigation of food crops, such as corn or sugarcane, which can exceed sustainable water availability and compete with food production, jeopardizing the human right to safe drinking water, sanitation and food. The water footprint of biofuels is approximately 8,160 litres for each kilogram of biofuel.³⁵ Until cellulosic biomass biofuel technologies are developed, the massive diversion of food to produce biodiesel will be more of a risk to the global water and food crises than a solution.³⁶ In Thailand, oil palm cultivation has emerged as a major source of biodiesel. That industry, however, raises serious human rights concerns, particularly regarding affected communities and Indigenous Peoples. Thai farmers, part of the Southern Peasant Federation, have faced land disputes with palm oil companies, resulting in evictions and threats to land defenders, such as the Dam Onmuang case.³⁷

35. See https://repositorio.udec.cl/items/79368163-8029-4830-ab4c-f22a256a2bc3 (in Spanish). ↩
36. Caleb H. Geissler, Joonjae Ryu and Christos T. Maraveilas, “The future of biofuels in the United States transportation sector”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 192 (March 2024). ↩
37. Communication THA 9/2020, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25746. ↩

Without significant change, resource extraction for clean energy is likely to replicate the same exploitative patterns seen in fossil fuel extraction and create so-called green sacrifice zones.³⁸ In the so-called lithium triangle, the delicate ecosystems of the highlands of Argentina, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Chile, as well as the survival of the 29 See https://acee.princeton.edu/acee-news/electric-vehicle-transition-could-create-unwanted-airpollution-hotspots-in-china-and-india. 30 Submission by the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 31 Rochelle Diver, on behalf of the International Indian Treaty Council, statement on agenda item 5 (g) at the twenty-third session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, 15–26 April 2024. 32 See https://www.meteored.com.ar/noticias/actualidad/la-transicion-a-autos-electricos-puede-generarpuntos-criticos-de-contaminacion-advierte-una-investigacion-de-princeton.html (in Spanish). 33 See https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/ministerio/planes-estrategias/hidrogeno.html (in Spanish). 34 See https://www.bluefieldresearch.com/green-hydrogen-the-hydrogen-economy-realizing-the-watersectors-crucial-role-in-the-energy-transition. 35 See https://repositorio.udec.cl/items/79368163-8029-4830-ab4c-f22a256a2bc3 (in Spanish). 36 Caleb H. Geissler, Joonjae Ryu and Christos T. Maraveilas, “The future of biofuels in the United States transportation sector”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 192 (March 2024). 37 Communication THA 9/2020, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25746. 38 Christos Zografos and Paul Robbins, “Green sacrifice zones or why a green new deal cannot ignore the cost shifts of just transitions”, One Earth, vol. 3, No. 5 (November 2020). GE.25-10003 Indigenous communities that inhabit these territories, are at risk, as the triangle is characterized as an extraction zone in so-called strategic policies.³⁹

38. Christos Zografos and Paul Robbins, “Green sacrifice zones or why a green new deal cannot ignore the cost shifts of just transitions”, One Earth, vol. 3, No. 5 (November 2020). ↩
39. Submission by the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense. ↩

In 2018, the World Health Organization estimated that more than 2 billion people lacked access to safe drinking water;⁴⁰ based on recent research, that figure has now doubled to 4 billion.⁴¹ Billions of people, the vast majority of whom, as the Special Rapporteur insists in his reports, are not strictly thirsty people without water in their living environments, but extremely impoverished people who live next to rivers or on contaminated aquifers, or whose water is grabbed by powerful actors for their productive activities.⁴² In that context, it is essential to restore the health of the aquatic ecosystems on which these billions of people depend daily.

40. See https://www.sciencenews.org/article/future-will-people-have-enough-water-live. ↩
41. See https://www.eawag.ch/en/info/portal/news/news-archive/archive-detail/four-billion-people-estimated-to-lack-safe-drinking-water-services. ↩
42. See A/HRC/54/32. ↩

Regarding energy, approximately 1 billion people still lack access to electricity and more than 1.5 billion rely on solid biomass for cooking fuel; inefficient cooking systems caused 6.7 million deaths in 2020, disproportionately affecting women and children.⁴³

43. See https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/household-air-pollution-and-health. ↩

In the face of arguments of scarcity, as emphasized in previous reports,⁴⁴ guaranteeing basic human rights requires only a fraction of total resource use: for water, less than 5 per cent of current extractions. No river or aquifer will run dry by allocating just 5 per cent of current extractions to human rights needs. Similarly, the basic share of clean and sustainable energy needed to ensure the human right to safe drinking water represents only a small fraction of total energy demand.

44. A/HRC/54/32, para. 2. ↩

The increase in the world’s population does not completely explain the ever-growing demand for water and energy, which, in the main, is the result of new productive demands linked to powerful economic interests.⁴⁵ The fact that millions remain without electricity or access to safe drinking water is not a technical or resource limitation, but a consequence and a driver of deep inequalities across and within countries.

45. Ibid., para. 41. ↩

Satisfying the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation requires not only the availability of water flows, but also distribution, storage, treatment and sanitation, with the corresponding basic infrastructure, as well as significant energy consumption, in particular, for groundwater pumping, pressurization of networks and sanitation of sewage returns. The lack of such infrastructure and the necessary energy often leads to a violation of the human right to safe drinking water and entails enormous work for women and girls in many impoverished communities. In South Africa, despite existing legislation protecting the right to basic energy and water services for the entire population, including those unable to pay due to poverty, water and electricity are still being cut off for many impoverished households.⁴⁶ By linking water, electricity and other utility bills in certain municipalities, non-payment of any of these services leads to the disconnection of both water and electricity, disproportionately affecting the poorest and undermining the effective implementation of existing legislation. 39 Submission by the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense. 40 See https://www.sciencenews.org/article/future-will-people-have-enough-water-live. 41 See https://www.eawag.ch/en/info/portal/news/news-archive/archive-detail/four-billion-peopleestimated-to-lack-safe-drinking-water-services. 42 See A/HRC/54/32. 43 See https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/household-air-pollution-and-health. 44 A/HRC/54/32, para. 2. 45 Ibid., para. 41. 46 Public Affairs Research Institute, “Empty promises: the struggle for equitable access to water in South Africa” (Johannesburg, 2024). Relevant information was also received during consultations. GE.25-10003

46. Public Affairs Research Institute, “Empty promises: the struggle for equitable access to water in South Africa” (Johannesburg, 2024). Relevant information was also received during consultations. ↩

In 2014, the water sector consumed approximately 120 million tonnes of oil equivalent of energy, which accounted for 4 per cent of total global electricity consumption. Approximately 40 per cent was used for water extraction, 25 per cent for wastewater treatment and 20 per cent for water distribution.⁴⁷ It should therefore be noted that energy is also essential for enabling water treatment processes, which are critical for ensuring the human right to sanitation. The Global Water Research Coalition estimates the energy footprint of supply (treatment and supply) to be between 0.4 kWh/m3 and 1 kWh/m3 and the footprint of wastewater treatment (collection and treatment) to be between 0.5 kWh/m3 and 0.7 kWh/m3.⁴⁸ Energy consumption from domestic and industrial water use accounts for almost 3 per cent of the total. If irrigation is included that figure increases to nearly 5 per cent.⁴⁹

47. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2016 (Paris, 2016), p. 370. ↩
48. Global Water Research Coalition, “Water and energy: report of the GWRC research strategy workshop” (London, 2008). ↩
49. Spain, El Instituto para la Diversificación y Ahorro de la Energía, Estudio de Prospectiva: Consumo Energético en el Sector Agua (2010) (in Spanish), p. 6. ↩

Energy costs generate serious affordability problems, both in rural and impoverished urban settings. During his country visit to Tunisia,⁵⁰ for example, the Special Rapporteur observed that more than a third of rural communities, even those with wells, could not afford pumping power. The Special Rapporteur recommended prioritizing the energy transition, in that case to solar energy, by subsidizing solar pumping technology as a strategy to ensure affordable management costs for those communities. Energy costs in Nigeria, particularly in Adamawa State, make it difficult for a large proportion of the population to obtain safe drinking water and sanitation. That situation becomes severe during the dry season, as the energy becomes more unstable.⁵¹ Therefore, it is vital to select cost-effective technologies and establish tariff policies that guarantee the affordability of those services for all.

50. A/HRC/54/32/Add.1. ↩
51. Submission by the Initiative for Justice, Development and Peace-Building in Nigeria. ↩

The treatment of sewage returns in large settlements requires the use of intensive technologies with high energy consumption. In Uganda, the high cost of energy needed for water treatment leads to water bills that many cannot afford.⁵² However, if costs are spread over many residents, affordable tariffs can be achieved. In rural settlements, extensive wastewater treatment plants are affordable as they consume little or no energy.

52. Submission by Community Integrated Development Initiatives (Uganda). ↩

New technologies present viable alternatives to guarantee the right to safe drinking water. Since those technologies consume large amounts of energy, it is essential to use clean and renewable energy sources. Desalination of seawater or brackish water by reverse osmosis offers an alternative source of quality water, although it entails high energy costs. In fact, those technologies offer the advantages of modularity and flexibility compared with other traditional options, such as large transfers, allowing their operation to be adapted to cycles of scarcity and to specific locations on the coastline.

Regenerating degraded water flows for reuse offers a complementary source. However, beyond the high energy costs involved, if such reuse reduces the ecological flow that must be maintained in waterways, it can generate serious environmental impacts.

It is increasingly clear that a shift is needed from traditional supply-side strategies in water management and planning, which dominated throughout the twentieth century, to new approaches focused on demand management and the conservation of aquatic ecosystems. That requires a substantial curb of water-intensive industries, including agriculture. Beyond modernizing irrigation systems and improving efficiency, reducing or limiting irrigation 47 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2016 (Paris, 2016), p. 370. 48 Global Water Research Coalition, “Water and energy: report of the GWRC research strategy workshop” (London, 2008). 49 Spain, El Instituto para la Diversificación y Ahorro de la Energía, Estudio de Prospectiva: Consumo Energético en el Sector Agua (2010) (in Spanish), p. 6. 50 A/HRC/54/32/Add.1. 51 Submission by the Initiative for Justice, Development and Peace-Building in Nigeria. 52 Submission by Community Integrated Development Initiatives (Uganda). GE.25-10003 expansion and promoting adaptation food production strategies based on drought-resistant crops, among other measures, are necessary.⁵³

53. See A/79/190. ↩

Similarly, as far as energy is concerned, a fair and sustainable transition requires curbing and managing energy demand, beyond shifting to clean and renewable energy sources. Currently, the transportation sector consumes 38 per cent of total energy; the industrial sector 29 per cent; domestic consumption 16 per cent; and commerce and services, agriculture, mining, construction and others account for 17 per cent. That distribution of demand currently emits 60 per cent of greenhouse gases.⁵⁴ To contain climate change, those emissions must be reduced by 45 per cent by 2030.⁵⁵ However, according to the United Nations Environment Programme, demand continues to increase, reaching an annual increase of 1.3 per cent in 2023.

54. See https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/energy. ↩
55. See https://netzeroclimate.org/what-is-net-zero-2. ↩

However, what is more serious is assuming unlimited growth prospects in all sectors and opening the door to a new sector that not only demands significant amounts of water but also consumes enormous amounts of electricity, namely, mega-data centres.

With the emergence of artificial intelligence and the rise of cryptocurrencies, the demand for data computing is skyrocketing, leading to a rapid increase in the number of mega-data centres. That growth generates significant and worrying demands for water, as well as a dramatic rise in electricity consumption. Those trends pose serious risks to aquatic ecosystems and present unsustainable prospects for the future.

In addition, the proliferation, often in the name of economic progress, of such data centres happened in opaque circumstances, with a lack of transparency, participation, access to information and accountability.⁵⁶ Even the total number of centres in the world is not clear, although sources estimate that there are more than 10,000.

56. See https://www.iea.org/commentaries/what-the-data-centre-and-ai-boom-could-mean-for-the-energy-sector. ↩

Significantly, the Minister for the Environment, Climate and Communications of Ireland, one of the countries with the highest concentration of mega-data centres, in response to a parliamentary question, stated that there was no record held by a public body that included the energy and water needs of data centres.⁵⁷

57. See https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2023-02-02/201/?highlight%5B0%5D=data&highlight%5B1%5D=centres. ↩

Regarding the water demand for cooling such facilities, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in 2024, a lack of transparency made it difficult to access up-to-date information and to assess the sector’s water consumption at the national or regional level.⁵⁸ For example, the total annual operational water footprint of such centres in the United States was estimated at 513 million m3 in 2018, placing them among the top 10 most water-intensive industries in the country.⁵⁹ In a recent study, it was estimated that, as a result of the global demand for artificial intelligence, between 4.2 billion and 6.6 billion m3 of water will be required by 2027.⁶⁰

58. Digital Economy Report 2024 (United Nations publication, 2024), p. 84. ↩
59. Md Abu Bakar Siddik, Arman Shehabi and Landon Marston, “The environmental footprint of data centres in the United States”, Environmental Research Letters, vol. 16 (2021). ↩
60. Pengfei Li and others, “Making AI less ‘thirsty’: uncovering and addressing the secret water footprint of AI models”, available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.03271. ↩

Although those water demands are at the moment much lower than those required for irrigation, they are not only highly significant in certain water-scarce areas, but are also being proposed as demands to be satisfied as a priority, in opaque agreements with large corporations. Such a priority undoubtedly entails serious risks for other uses, such as irrigation or even drinking water supplies, during periods of drought. Attention should also 53 See A/79/190. 54 See https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/energy. 55 See https://netzeroclimate.org/what-is-net-zero-2. 56 See https://www.iea.org/commentaries/what-the-data-centre-and-ai-boom-could-mean-for-theenergy-sector. 57 See https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2023-0202/201/?highlight%5B0%5D=data&highlight%5B1%5D=centres. 58 Digital Economy Report 2024 (United Nations publication, 2024), p. 84. 59 Md Abu Bakar Siddik, Arman Shehabi and Landon Marston, “The environmental footprint of data centres in the United States”, Environmental Research Letters, vol. 16 (2021). 60 Pengfei Li and others, “Making AI less ‘thirsty’: uncovering and addressing the secret water footprint of AI models”, available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.03271. GE.25-10003 be paid to the risks to water supplies that may be generated by the cooling processes of those centres, an issue on which there is hardly any information.⁶¹

61. See https://www.computerweekly.com/blog/Ahead-in-the-Clouds/Why-water-usage-is-the-datacentre-industrys-dirty-little-secret; and Xiaolei Yuan and others, “Waste heat recoveries in data centers: a review”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 188 (December 2023). ↩

In addition to the direct impacts of those new demands on aquatic ecosystems, indirect impacts may be even more serious. The exponential growth in energy demand generates intense pressure to revive the construction of large hydroelectric dams – which would have a corresponding impact on riverine communities and freshwater ecosystems – and thermal and nuclear power plants, even at the cost of accelerating climate change and increasing the risks of water pollution.⁶² In fact, corporations, such as Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft, are developing strategic alliances with the hydrocarbon industry and even plan to build nuclear power plants to meet their explosive energy demands.⁶³

62. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, United States Data Center Energy Usage Report (June 2016), pp. 27 and 28. ↩
63. See https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2024/09/09/american-natural-gas-needed-for-spread-of-data-centers; and https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-powered-data-center. ↩

The manufacture of computer equipment in those centres requires critical minerals, the extraction of which, as explained above, causes major pollution problems in water bodies.⁶⁴

64. See https://www.mining-technology.com/analyst-comment/lithium-mining-negative-environmental-impact. ↩

According to the International Energy Agency, electricity consumption is set to double between 2022 and 2026.⁶⁵ Moreover, in its report on the energy used by data centres in the United States, prepared in 2024 for the Department of Energy, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory noted an exponential growth in electricity consumption, estimating that it could account for 12 per cent of total electricity consumption by 2028.⁶⁶

65. International Energy Agency, Electricity 2024: Analysis and Forecast to 2026 (Paris, 2024), p. 31. ↩
66. Arman Shehabi and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report (Berkeley, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2024), p. 5. ↩

The 82 centres operating in Ireland consumed 21 per cent of electricity in 2023, more than all households;⁶⁷ that figure is expected to be 32 per cent by 2026, according to the International Energy Agency.⁶⁸ According to a recent study, between 2017 and 2023, all additional wind energy generation in Ireland was absorbed by data centres, whose demand grew at the same rate as renewables.⁶⁹ That growth in electricity demand and the difficulties in supplying all users have led the Government to rethink the facilities offered to those corporations, even halting the construction of new centres in the Dublin area.

67. See https://www.plataformadenaria.com/2024/11/05/irlanda-adios-al-paraiso-de-los-centros-de-datos (in Spanish). ↩
68. International Energy Agency, Electricity 2024, p. 32. ↩
69. Hannah Daly, “Data centres in the context of Ireland’s carbon budgets” (2024), p. 3. ↩

Faced with the growing alarm, new centres are moving to countries that continue to offer water and energy, often subsidized with public funds, prioritizing alternative energies for these centres that were originally intended for the energy transition in other sectors.

This new sector is in fact directly and indirectly driving up greenhouse gas emissions. In the absence of precise data, it was recently estimated that electricity demand from data centres in Ireland was responsible for 4.5 per cent of total cardon dioxide emissions.⁷⁰ Microsoft increased its emissions by almost 30 per cent last year compared with 2020.⁷¹

70. Ibid., p. 16. ↩
71. See https://www.theregister.com/2024/09/06/datacenters_set_to_emit_3x. ↩

From a social point of view, the priority and the energy tariffs that such corporations enjoy result in inequitable asymmetries in relation to other sectors that generate more jobs and that deserve preferential attention. Such a situation exists at a time when energy poverty continues to grow worldwide. According to the United Nations Development Programme, in 2024, at least 1.18 billion people suffered from energy poverty and were unable to use 61 See https://www.computerweekly.com/blog/Ahead-in-the-Clouds/Why-water-usage-is-thedatacentre-industrys-dirty-little-secret; and Xiaolei Yuan and others, “Waste heat recoveries in data centers: a review”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 188 (December 2023). 62 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, United States Data Center Energy Usage Report (June 2016), pp. 27 and 28. 63 See https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2024/09/09/american-natural-gas-needed-forspread-of-data-centers; and https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-powered-data-center. 64 See https://www.mining-technology.com/analyst-comment/lithium-mining-negative-environmentalimpact. 65 International Energy Agency, Electricity 2024: Analysis and Forecast to 2026 (Paris, 2024), p. 31. 66 Arman Shehabi and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report (Berkeley, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2024), p. 5. 67 See https://www.plataformadenaria.com/2024/11/05/irlanda-adios-al-paraiso-de-los-centros-de-datos (in Spanish). 68 International Energy Agency, Electricity 2024, p. 32. 69 Hannah Daly, “Data centres in the context of Ireland’s carbon budgets” (2024), p. 3. 70 Ibid., p. 16. 71 See https://www.theregister.com/2024/09/06/datacenters_set_to_emit_3x. GE.25-10003 electricity – 60 per cent higher than the 733 million people who lacked electricity in 2020, according to official data.⁷²

72. Brian Mina and others, “Lost in the dark: a survey of energy poverty from space”, Joule, vol. 8, No. 7 (2024). ↩

In short, such a massive growth in the demand for water and, especially, electricity undermines the mitigation plans that have been agreed and generates dangerous competition with other demands, including basic needs and, in particular, the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation,⁷³ as well as affordable electricity for the basic needs of impoverished populations.⁷⁴

73. See https://zur.uy/google-y-la-campana-ciudadana-frente-a-su-nuevo-proyecto-de-datacenter-en-uruguay (in Spanish); https://apnews.com/article/chile-google-data-center-water-drought-environment-d1c6a7a8e8e6e45257ac84fb750b2162; and https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/dry-land-for-thirsty-data. ↩
74. See https://notherenotanywhere.com/campaigns/data-centres. ↩

The ongoing climate crisis and the broad consensus that it is driven by greenhouse gases emissions, particularly carbon dioxide, make the energy transition a central pilar of mitigation strategies.

However, most of the main risks and social impacts of climate change materialize through the water cycle: drought, floods and sea-level rise. For that reason, the Special Rapporteur has been insisting on the need to pay greater attention to adaptation strategies, which should be led by the water transition, minimizing the risks to populations, particularly those living in situations of greater vulnerability to droughts, floods and rising sea and ocean levels.

Just as the energy transition aims to curb climate change by promoting sustainable climate management, the water transition must guarantee sustainable management of aquatic ecosystems at basin level, under the responsibility of States and the populations that depend on them, as a common natural heritage.⁷⁵

75. See A/HRC/57/48. ↩

However, in addition to promoting the double transition in an integrated way, applying the principle of sustainability to the management of both aquatic ecosystems and the climate emergency, it must be ensured that these transitions are fair, according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

Moreover, to the extent that those transitions involve managing vital assets and heritage for humanity as a whole, the double challenge must be addressed from a human rights perspective, paying particular attention to those living in situations of greater vulnerability. The double transition should:
(a) Respect the limits and requirements to curb climate change and restore aquatic ecosystems;
(b) Ensure, as a top priority, safe water, sanitation and basic clean and sustainable energy supplies for a dignified life for all, paying special attention to those living in poverty and vulnerability;
(c) Promote participatory, transparent and publicly accountable governance of these essential goods and services.

The close link between the climate crisis, produced by the energy system, and the water crisis demands a double and integrated transition, just as mitigation and adaptation strategies must be integrated. The energy transition, imperative to address the climate crisis, 72 Brian Mina and others, “Lost in the dark: a survey of energy poverty from space”, Joule, vol. 8, No. 7 (2024). 73 See https://zur.uy/google-y-la-campana-ciudadana-frente-a-su-nuevo-proyecto-de-datacenter-enuruguay (in Spanish); https://apnews.com/article/chile-google-data-center-water-droughtenvironment-d1c6a7a8e8e6e45257ac84fb750b2162; and https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/dryland-for-thirsty-data. 74 See https://notherenotanywhere.com/campaigns/data-centres. 75 See A/HRC/57/48. GE.25-10003 must take into account the global water crisis and the limited sustainable availability of water resources.⁷⁶

76. Submission by the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. ↩

Therefore, in the view of the Special Rapporteur, it makes no sense to address the climate crisis and in the process aggravate the unsustainability of aquatic ecosystems, just as it makes no sense to promote hydrological planning that contributes to worsening the climate emergency. It is not reasonable, for example, to promote a new wave of large hydroelectric dams without taking into account their impacts on river ecosystems and to neglect the serious effects on the human rights of riverine communities. It is also contradictory to tackle the global water crisis by increasing the use of fossil fuels in massive seawater desalination and wastewater regeneration processes.

In both water and energy management, it is necessary to promote demand management strategies to avoid expectations beyond the limits of sustainability, in relation to the climate emergency and the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems.

Alternative energy sources, such as solar, green hydrogen and biofuels, which are presented as clean solutions, must undoubtedly be an important part of the energy transition, but consideration must be given to the challenges that they entail in order to prioritize the lowest-impact options, establish the limits within which they should be developed and adequately manage risks.

Sustaining the paradigm of unlimited growth and promoting the expectation that any level of water and energy consumption can be achieved by improving efficiency and developing new technologies is unrealistic and reckless. Improving efficiency is important, but it does not guarantee sustainability. If we continue to nurture the prospect of unlimited growth, with increasing demands for energy and water, even if they are managed and used efficiently, we will continue to aggravate the problems of unsustainability. In other words, we can kill the planet efficiently if we do not assume the limits and restrictions imposed by the principle of sustainability.

A proper energy transition, beyond promoting a shift in supply sources and improving efficiency, must include a change in consumption patterns, especially in high-consumption sectors. If demand growth is not curbed, it will not be possible to open up prospects for sustainability or respect for human rights.

When it comes to water management, ensuring a sustainable future involves restoring and preserving the health of aquatic ecosystems and respecting the sustainability limits imposed by the natural order and staying within the boundaries that climate change imposes on the water cycle.⁷⁷

77. A/HRC/57/48, paras. 92–95. ↩

A good example is the European Green Deal, promoted by the European Commission, which plans to improve water efficiency by 10 per cent and promote the circular economy while simultaneously contemplating a six-fold increase in water reuse.⁷⁸ However, the main element in ensuring sustainability in water management lies in the legal requirement, imposed by the Water Framework Directive,⁷⁹ to preserve the good status of aquatic ecosystems, respecting sustainability limits.

78. See https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en; and https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/water-reuse_en. ↩
79. See https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/water-framework-directive_en. ↩

Promoting a just double transition from a human rights perspective requires regulating and even detaching the right to water and the right to energy from the logic of the market, so that even those who find it difficult to pay the corresponding tariff or price can still have effective access to them. It also implies the obligation of States to prioritize, within their means, public resources and budgets to ensure at least a progressive realization of those rights for the entire population.⁸⁰

80. A/HRC/56/61, para. 1. ↩

The fact that water and aquatic ecosystems are generally under public domain legal regimes, under the principle of general interest rather than private interest, at least on paper, makes it easier to assume a human rights-based approach to water governance, although it certainly does not guarantee it. However, energy is generally considered as a business space. The Special Rapporteur wishes to emphasize that a human rights-based approach that considers all human beings as holders of a right to access the necessary clean and healthy energy for a dignified life is vital because, as established by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it is essential to guarantee activities and assets necessary for the fulfilment of an adequate standard of living, such as pumping and distributing water to homes, ensuring safe drinking water, hygiene and health; energy for cooking and heating homes; and light so that children can study.

The human right to safe drinking water or the need to supply energy to a growing population are often manipulated to justify new developments based on the efficiency brought by new technologies. However, just as efficiency does not guarantee sustainability, neither does it guarantee the fulfilment of human rights. Efficiency saves resources that are available for other uses; but without prioritization based on human rights, there is no guarantee that this availability is used to fulfil human rights for those living in poverty. Efficiency does not ensure human rights.

An essential key to human rights-based governance lies in ensuring transparent, participatory and accountable management.⁸¹

81. United Nations Development Programme and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNDP-OHCHR Toolkit for Collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions (2010). ↩

However, it is difficult to promote human rights-based governance if the energy is generated in large nuclear or thermal power plants or in large solar or wind farms, and if water management depends solely on large dams, since such large infrastructure can only be promoted and managed by States or large private or public companies.

Furthermore, effective participation in water and energy management cannot exist if it remains shrouded in the opacity imposed by corporate secrecy.

Therefore, it is necessary to promote appropriate regulation that guarantees transparency and public accountability for managers of both water and energy.

The modularity of technologies, such as solar panels or even wind turbines, facilitates participatory energy governance, as well as significant levels of energy sovereignty at the household, community and municipal levels. It should be noted, however, that enabling does not mean guaranteeing. In fact, in many countries, the transition to wind and solar energy has been placed in the hands of large electricity companies, leaving self-consumption in the background and making it difficult for the surpluses to be transferred to the grid, while the latter can cover the deficits, under fair economic conditions in both directions.

The concept of energy sovereignty has traditionally been understood as necessary at the national level, as one of the keys to preserving national sovereignty. But to the extent that energy, like water and food, is vital to each territory and community, promoting energy sovereignty strengthens social resilience and effective participation as it empowers communities in decision-making on these vital issues.

Similarly, in water management, promoting so-called in-transit regulation strategies, that is ponds and small reservoirs in the very territories in which the water is used, both for irrigation and to supply municipal services, makes it possible to decentralize management and place it in the hands of irrigation communities and municipalities, without losing the supervision and coordination, at the basin level, of the corresponding agencies or institutions. Specifically, in-transit regulation allows for the flexibility of large irrigation systems, which traditionally operate in shifts by relying on large dams that regulate the flows at the headwaters, to move to what is known as on-demand irrigation, which is much more efficient and flexible.

In addition, that modular and decentralized infrastructure, located in the territory in which the water is used, can be managed by the users themselves, whether irrigation communities or municipalities.

Developing participatory water and energy governance also requires specific attention to the role that women habitually play in carrying water and firewood, the burning of which often leads to unhealthy conditions in their homes, of which they and their children are the main victims.

It is in the home, in fact, where the link between water and energy is most clear, insofar as much of the energy needed is that required to extract and carry water from wells, rivers and springs to homes. Ensuring the provision of safe drinking water and healthy energy is essential to ensure the human rights to adequate housing, food and health – which are all linked to care in the family and community environment for which women are often responsible. However, in most communities, women are marginalized in water and land tenure agreements, as well as in decision-making spaces, violating the principle of non-discrimination. It is therefore essential and urgent to ensure spaces for women’s equal participation in water and energy management.

As explained above, in the current context of climate change, it is necessary, on the one hand, to promote mitigation strategies driven by the energy transition and, on the other, adaptation strategies driven by the water transition. Both needs, like two sides of the same coin, entail the urgent need for integrated water and energy planning with shared objectives, such as curbing climate change, by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and ensuring the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems, particularly aquifers, wetlands and riparian ecosystems.

Adaptation strategies require river basin hydrological plans, as well as territorial and urban planning, which remain within the scope of State powers or, in the case of transboundary basins, regional agreements, where it is urgent to implement the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.

However, mitigation strategies require global agreements, on which the United Nations is working tirelessly, albeit with results that are far from effective since the agreements are non-binding. The current inability to adopt binding commitments is now compounded by the unacceptable behaviour of large corporations, which are defiantly and irresponsibly ignoring international agreements and effectively relaunching the use of fossil fuels.

Ensuring effective integration of energy and water planning requires consideration and management of the problems highlighted in the present report regarding the use of energy sources, whether renewable or non-greenhouse gas emitting, that have a devastating effect on aquatic ecosystems and people living in vulnerable conditions.

Such a situation requires a resolute adoption of a human rights-based approach to the governance of the double transition. Demand management strategies must be promoted in both water and energy planning to curb growth in demand and distribute the transition from fossil fuels to alternative sources, assuming social and environmental priorities and establishing limits compatible with respect for human rights and the principle of sustainability in the development and application of each of these sources. As regards, in particular, the development of new large dams, at least the recommendations of the World Commission on Dams should be followed.⁸²

82. See https://www.irn.org/wcd/#rec. ↩

The implementation of modular and decentralized infrastructure, both in water and energy, favours the development of circular economy strategies. Participatory governance and the circular economy go hand in hand, empowering people and communities to manage their needs and strengthening their ties to their territories.

Circular economy strategies seek to close the cycles of production, use/consumption and waste management in local spaces for reuse, reducing transportation costs, inefficiencies and the demand and consumption of water, energy and other materials. Such an approach opposes traditional linear strategies of production, use and generation of waste that becomes pollution.

Modular technologies facilitate the promotion of the circular economy at the local level, which, in turn, encourages collective empowerment in water and energy governance.

According to the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Colombia, in its energy efficiency plan (2017–2022), which is linked to the development of the circular economy, the audits carried out estimated potential savings of 40 per cent in electricity consumption.⁸³

83. See https://es.linkedin.com/pulse/eficiencia-energética-y-econom%C3%ADa-circular-qué-significan- (in Spanish). ↩

The dual water and energy transition also demands profound urban planning reforms. On the one hand, as the Special Rapporteur has explained in previous reports, the model of so-called sponge cities must be promoted, adapted to the growing risk of flooding by making urban areas permeable.

However, on the other hand, in line with the energy transition that must be implemented, it is necessary to promote public transport, as a mobility model that is of general interest and therefore deserves to be financed and even subsidized; while promoting pedestrian and bicycle mobility and discouraging car use.

In the face of accelerating climate change, deepening social inequalities and the growing degradation of ecosystems, it is imperative to adopt a human rights-based, sustainable and integrated approach to managing water and energy. Those essential elements underpin not only environmental resilience but also the fulfilment of fundamental human rights. The following conclusions outline key recommendations aimed at advancing a dual water and energy transition that prioritizes human rights, ecological integrity and democratic governance.

The human right to healthy and sustainable energy should be recognized by the General Assembly, as it did, in 2010, in the case of the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation. At the national level, the legal recognition of both the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, as well as the human right to clean and sustainable energy, must include specific norms and regulations to ensure the minimum necessary to guarantee the human rights to drinking water and sanitation, as well as the minimum electricity consumption for a dignified life for the entire population, even for those who cannot pay, and must be established by law.

Adaptation strategies driven by the water transition must be promoted, as is the case of mitigation strategies driven by the energy transition. A dual and integrated transition in which the objectives of curbing climate change and restoring the health of aquatic ecosystems must be coherently shared, promoting a human rights-based management approach. That not only represents a technological challenge but, above all, a challenge in terms of participatory, transparent and accountable governance. All initiatives must guarantee the equal participation of women.

As a priority, measures must be taken to restore and conserve aquatic ecosystems and, in particular, wetlands, riparian ecosystems and aquifers. They are key in the hydrological transition that must govern climate change adaptation strategies, putting an end to the overexploitation and contamination of aquifers, so that they can serve as strategic reserves for managing the droughts that climate change is exacerbating.

The development of wind and solar energy must be promoted as essential elements in the energy transition. Governments and other institutions should:
(a) Develop regulations that promote self-consumption – family, cooperative and local – by integrating surpluses into the grid under equitable economic conditions;
(b) Prioritize the energy transition in rural areas with low grid coverage through adequately funded and even subsidized solar panels and/or wind turbines, which allow water to be pumped and stored in elevated reservoirs, thereby storing solar or wind energy in the form of potential energy, ensuring affordable management costs for communities;
(c) Preserve the population’s control over its territory in the face of the interests of large electricity companies in developing large solar or wind farms;
(d) Ensure in law the mandatory recycling of materials, both photovoltaic panels and discarded batteries, after their useful life.

The Special Rapporteur recommends that the problems of unsustainability and the risks to human rights that underlie current energy transition strategies should be further addressed. He thus encourages the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Conference of the Parties thereto and the subsidiary bodies thereof and all related United Nations bodies to explicitly align transition policies with human rights treaties and mechanisms, including in financing mechanisms.

A progressive and equitable transition towards biofuels, green hydrogen and electric vehicles should be encouraged, ensuring that all alternatives receive balanced attention since no single option can address the full scope of the challenge. For this to be achieved:
(a) With respect to green hydrogen and biofuels. International agreements and national regulations should be promoted that regulate the development of green hydrogen and biofuels, giving effective priority to drinking water and sanitation supplies and food production, as well as protecting the customary water rights and uses of rural communities and Indigenous Peoples, avoiding water and land grabbing processes for energy uses. At the same time, it is urgent to promote technologies to obtain hydrogen from seawater, as well as lignin digestion technologies to produce biofuels, instead of food-based production;
(b) With respect to electric vehicles. The limited availability of the minerals required to produce batteries must be taken into account. In addition, the right to the prior, informed and free consent of Indigenous Peoples and communities affected by the exploitation of minerals such as lithium must be guaranteed, avoiding toxic contamination of water bodies at all costs.

Based on historical evidence of the risks posed by nuclear power plants and the radioactive waste that they generate, and noting the limited availability of uranium and the impacts of its extraction on surrounding communities, the Special Rapporteur recommends not only avoiding the creation of new plants but also progressively dismantling existing ones.

With respect to hydropower, the Special Rapporteur recommends prioritizing reversible power plants and regulating the operation of small hydropower plants, ensuring the effective participation of riverine populations in flow monitoring and the shared enjoyment of the electricity produced. As regards the issue of large dams, the Special Rapporteur supports the recommendations of the World Commission on Dams and insists on avoiding the construction of new projects without the free, prior and informed consent of the affected populations.

The Special Rapporteur recommends complementing the existing large dams with in-transit regulation, by means of ponds and small reservoirs, outside the watercourses and close to the users, in order to make their regulation more flexible. The local population should be involved in managing and locating the reservoirs, whenever possible, so that they are filled and emptied by gravity to allow energy savings.

Circular economy strategies should be promoted, to reduce costs and consumption of both energy and water, strengthen people’s ties to their territories and ecosystems and reinforce community responsibility in the sustainable management of their water and energy sources. In line with that, integrated agro-livestock strategies should be promoted, encouraging extensive livestock farming and farm distribution that allows for the integration of slurry and manure as fertilizer into nearby agriculture, as well as biogas production, avoiding macrofarms and high concentrations of intensive livestock farming.

The above-mentioned dual water and energy transition should be promoted. It should include the development of new urbanism models that integrate the water cycle into their planning and allow for less energy intensive requirements. That can be seen in examples such as the sponge city model, creating cities that are permeable and adapted to the growing risks of flooding; and models of public transportation – by train, metro and tram – in which mobility is considered a matter of general interest and adequate infrastructure and subsidies are promoted to reduce costs and encourage their use, while promoting pedestrian and bicycle mobility.

States and international institutions should promote a moratorium on the development of data centres and provide clear information on their water and energy consumption and the risks that they pose to climate change, the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems, the human rights of impoverished populations and the survival of vulnerable productive sectors. Based on transparency and adequate information, priorities should be established based on the principles of sustainability, equity and compliance with human rights to regulate the water and energy demands of such centres.