Defining terrorism to respect and protect human rights

Annex I to the present report¹ details the Special Rapporteur’s activities in 2025. Highlights include reports on regional organizations² and administrative measures;³ a report on a country visit to Benin;⁴ a country visit to Somalia; 151 communications to Member States and other actors; 105 news releases; remarks at over 80 events; interventions before the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), the High Court of England and Wales and the Constitutional Court of Ecuador; publications on artificial intelligence, the UN80 initiative, the ninth review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, returns from the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; various academic visits; and numerous meetings with State representatives and civil society.

1. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/reports/srct-report-defining-terrorism-respect-protect-annex1.pdf. ↩
2. A/HRC/58/47. ↩
3. A/80/284. ↩
4. A/HRC/58/47/Add.1. ↩

For almost a century, the international community has unsuccessfully attempted to define terrorism.⁵ Today, the 25-year negotiations remain stalled on the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The problem of definition assumed acute practical significance after the Security Council required States to prevent and counter terrorism, including by criminalizing terrorist acts, under resolution 1373 (2001) and successive resolutions, in the absence of an international definition. Many States responded by defining terrorism unilaterally.

5. See Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). ↩

It remains urgent to internationally define terrorism to respect and protect human rights. For two decades, holders of the mandate have identified vague and overbroad definitions as among the most common rights violations while countering terrorism. Similar concerns have been expressed by international, regional and national human rights mechanisms, many States, civil society and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.⁶ Since many invasive legal consequences flow from a definition, excessive definitions can trigger a cascade of violations stemming from criminal offences, police and intelligence powers, terrorist listings of individuals and organizations, financial sanctions, other administrative measures, and immigration laws. Counter-terrorism law has become a tool of choice to suppress critics, including through transnational repression.⁷

6. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, analytical brief, June 2024, p. 5. ↩
7. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/activities/sr-ct-remarks-g7-transnational-repression.pdf. ↩

In the inaugural report under the mandate, in 2005, the then Special Rapporteur emphasized that vague and overbroad definitions do not satisfy the requirement of legality under article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,⁸ which is part of customary international law as reflected in article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Legality requires that “terrorism” offences are accessible and sufficiently 1 See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/reports/srct-reportdefining-terrorism-respect-protect-annex1.pdf. 2 A/HRC/58/47. 3 A/80/284. 4 A/HRC/58/47/Add.1. 5 See Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). 6 Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, analytical brief, June 2024, p. 5. 7 See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/activities/sr-ct-remarks-g7transnational-repression.pdf. 8 E/CN.4/2006/98, para. 46. GE.25-21096 precise and certain that a person can know in advance the scope of liability,⁹ and that offences are limited to conduct that is genuinely terrorist.¹⁰ 10 Problems of legality can arise from elements of offences and an offence’s structure.

8. E/CN.4/2006/98, para. 46. ↩
9. A/HRC/16/51, para. 27. See also https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/court-submissions/amicus-ecthr-yasak-v.-turkiye-un-sr-ct.pdf. ↩
10. E/CN.4/2006/98, para. 47; and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, p. 5. ↩

Vague and overbroad definitions are prone to both unintended consequences and deliberate abuse, often leading to violations of other rights, including to life, liberty, security of person, freedom from torture and other ill-treatment, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, participation in public affairs, and non-refoulement. Violations have fallen heavily on civil society, including human rights defenders, journalists, political opponents, minorities, Indigenous Peoples, humanitarians and even judges and lawyers.¹¹ The lack of an international definition also raises challenges for human rights compliance by the United Nations in its technical assistance and capacity-building activities. Excessive definitions can counterproductively fuel grievances and reduce community cooperation with law enforcement, inhibiting the flow of information to prevent terrorism.

11. See A/78/520. ↩

A common definition of terrorism is necessary to fulfil the international community’s aspiration to protect human rights from terrorist violence. Terrorism has been consistently characterized, by the General Assembly (since the early 1970s), the Security Council (since the 1980s), the Commission on Human Rights (from the 1990s), the Human Rights Council (since the 2000s), and regional organizations and many States, as threatening or destroying human rights and freedoms, particularly life, security of person and liberty, but also civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights. The offences in the 19 international counter-terrorism instruments¹² do not cover all means, methods and targets of terrorism. National laws criminalize most of the physical conduct underlying terrorist attacks, but ordinary offences do not recognize what is distinctively wrongful about terrorism, namely the instrumental terrorization of the public or compulsion of Governments. The wide differences in national and regional definitions have also impeded maximally effective, rights-respecting counter-terrorism action and transnational cooperation (including extradition and mutual judicial assistance) and enabled impunity. National differences in what is or is not terrorism can also stoke dangerous political tensions that risk escalating.

12. See https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/en/international-legal-instruments. ↩

An international definition could accordingly provide authoritative normative guidance to States to assist them in respecting and protecting human rights. For a definition of terrorism to be legitimate, it must express the will of the international community, developed through participatory and transparent processes open to all States, whether through multilateral treaty negotiation or the General Assembly, and with meaningful input from civil society. In a world of many imperfect criminal justice systems – including serious deficits in the rule of law, fair trial and judicial independence – any international definition destined for national implementation must be limited to the gravest harms to constrain inevitable abuses in practice.

The present report is aimed at assisting States to identify a “best practice” international definition to best enable them to respect and protect human rights and international law while countering terrorism. It revises the model definition formulated by the mandate holder in 2010.¹³ It may assist in the negotiation of the draft comprehensive convention, and in guiding the practice of United Nations entities and regional organizations, including in the implementation of Security Council resolutions and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the provision of United Nations technical assistance and capacity-building, and the work of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.

13. See A/HRC/16/51. ↩

The Special Rapporteur deeply appreciates the 58 submissions received from States, international and regional organizations, and civil society.¹⁴ Each has been closely considered, and many are reflected in the present report, even if length constraints do not allow for citation. While the present report is focused on terrorism, future work will address the definition of “violent extremism” and the concept of “extremism”.

14. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-inputs-definitions-terrorism-terrorist-organisation-and-violent-extremism. ↩

Death, serious bodily injury or hostage-taking

There is considerable support to limit terrorism to criminal acts that intentionally cause death or serious bodily injury or involve hostage-taking.¹⁵ Among relevant sources, Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) is too narrow because it requires that such acts also constitute offences under the international counter-terrorism conventions, which do not cover all terrorist methods, means and targets, including common types such as the use of guns, knives or vehicles. The 2010 model definition fills this gap by covering all serious criminal acts that intentionally cause death or serious injury.

15. See Security Council resolution 1566 (2004); A/59/565 and A/59/565/Corr.1; A/HRC/16/51; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Defining ‘terrorism’ in national criminal legislation”, 27 March 2025; and submission from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. ↩

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention) also refers to acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, with a terrorist purpose.¹⁶ However, it alternatively criminalizes the financing of offences under other counter-terrorism conventions, which is overbroad, since offences under the other conventions are not limited to causing death or serious injury and have broader objectives, such as ensuring aviation, maritime and nuclear safety generally. The draft comprehensive convention would criminalize acts intentionally causing death or serious injury but would also criminalize harm to property and the environment.¹⁷

16. Art. 2 (1) (b). ↩
17. A/68/37, annex I, draft art. 2. ↩

Focusing on death, serious injury or hostage-taking¹⁸ would appropriately reserve the denunciatory and stigmatizing label, the exceptional law enforcement powers and the grave punitive consequences flowing from the terrorism category for the most serious acts directed at the human person and thus at the destruction of human rights, particularly the rights to life, security of person, and liberty. Although some terrorism laws include any injury to persons, the higher threshold of “serious” injury appropriately excludes lesser harms. Limiting terrorism to harms to people also avoids the real-world risks of criminalizing harm to property and information systems as terrorism, which can over-inclusively and disproportionately punish lesser harms as terrorism, including minor damage, unruly protests, public disorder and civil disobedience. Ordinary criminal laws can address these harms.

18. Some regional instruments add deprivation of liberty. ↩

The intent element of causing death or injury must, however, be carefully constructed. Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) and the Terrorist Financing Convention focus on acts that are intended to cause death or injury, meaning that death or injury need not occur, and such results could even be unlikely or impossible. Some submissions supported this approach. However, the definition should preferably require intentional killing or injury to reflect the gravity of terrorism, as under the draft comprehensive convention. Acts intended to cause death or injury that are unsuccessful could still be prosecuted as the inchoate offence of attempt.

National definitions differ on whether bodily injury is limited to physical harm or extends to mental harm¹⁹ absent physical injury. Textual references to “bodily” injury²⁰ are not determinative, since the mind is an integral part of the body. Serious mental harm could be intended by committing physical attacks on direct victims, which would traumatize indirect or secondary victims such as bystanders, first responders, family members or the public. It could also result from credible threats to commit terrorism. Where harm is caused to indirect victims, the conduct will likely already constitute terrorism because of the physical harm to the direct victims. Failing to recognize mental harm could diminish the experience of indirect victims in particular and imply that mental suffering and disability is less significant than physical harm. Victims’ organizations have advocated for recognizing it.

19. Australia, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, “Defining terrorism: issues paper” (2025), paras. 4.67 and 4.68. Available at https://www.inslm.gov.au/system/files/2025-08/INSLM-terrorism-Issues-Paper.pdf. ↩
20. In Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the draft comprehensive convention and the 2010 model definition. ↩

However, including mental harm has the potential to overexpand liability, particularly if credible threats to commit terrorism, absent actual violence, are criminalized and where mental harm is diffusely caused to the public. There may be uncertainty about the scope of mental harm, given evolving understandings of trauma and “psychosocial safety”, and how these subjectively apply differently between groups and interact with the right to freedom of expression. There are evidentiary challenges in proving mental harm in a criminal context, including where it may not manifest until years after an event. It is preferable to limit bodily injury to physical harm, while recognizing that indirect victims require assistance and protection under laws and policies concerning victims of terrorism.²¹

21. See the Model Legislative Provisions to Support the Needs and Protect the Rights of Victims of Terrorism. ↩

It is not uncommon for national laws and regional instruments to additionally criminalize as terrorism intentional acts that objectively “endanger” life or public safety, that is, where death or serious injury is not intentionally caused or even intended. For example, Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council criminalizes the “release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions” and “interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource”, in both cases where “the effect … is to endanger human life”.²² Other regional instruments refer to acts endangering life, physical integrity or freedom.²³ Some national laws refer to acts endangering a person’s life or creating a serious risk to public health or safety.²⁴ The use of explosives is sometimes included in this context, but the mere use of explosives, or other explosives-related activities, should not be included in a terrorism definition.

22. Art. 3 (1) (g) and (h). A proposed amendment to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005 is similar. ↩
23. Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, art. 1 (3) (a); and Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. See also Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. ↩
24. Terrorism Act 2000 of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, sect. 1 (2) (c) and (d); and Criminal Code of Australia, sect. 100.1 (2) (d) and (e). ↩

Endangerment offences are aimed at averting special risks to life and are common in ordinary criminal laws. They have the potential to unacceptably widen liability, and risk misuse, if their threshold and intent requirements are not stringent. A restrictive approach is for endangerment to require a high probability that death or serious injury would result (although short of near certainty),²⁵ rather than a mere possibility or even a substantial risk or likelihood. Furthermore, given the gravity of terrorism, a mental element of recklessness (awareness of a substantial risk that is unjustifiable to take), often found in ordinary endangerment offences, is too low. Rather, the perpetrator must either intend to endanger life or know (to a high level of certainty or a high probability) that it would occur. Since terrorist endangerment offences may be prone to abuse in some countries, they are not desirable in an international definition. The draft comprehensive convention does not include them and a proposal to do so was rejected.²⁶

25. Near certainty may come within the fault element of intentionally causing death or serious injury, where the person is aware that such result would occur. See paras. 31 and 32 below. ↩
26. A/56/37, annex III, proposal 5. ↩

While Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) and the 2010 model definition do not include mere harm to property as terrorism, attacks on property are covered if they are a means of intentionally causing death or injury, including where the act is an offence against property under the counter-terrorism conventions (for example, public places, aircraft, ships, embassies or nuclear facilities). Again, this approach appropriately confines terrorism to attacks on the person. Various regional instruments and national laws additionally cover acts against property where they endanger life.²⁷ If included, they should be restrictively constructed as in the examples above.

27. E.g. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council; and the Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism of 1999. ↩

It is nonetheless common in national laws and regional instruments to include harm to property even where it does not cause death or injury or endanger life.²⁸ Various State and civil society submissions supported such inclusion. It is conceivable that serious attacks on property could terrorize or intimidate the population or compel a Government, even absent death or injury, as where terrorists give effective warning to evacuate a significant public building before bombing it or in the case of certain attacks on critical infrastructure. However, including any damage to any property as terrorism, as in some regional instruments, sets the bar far too low, as does requiring “serious” damage without further qualification.²⁹ The Special Rapporteur does not recommend including harm to property unless it is a means of intentionally causing death or serious injury. If property is included in other situations, however, limits are necessary on both its nature and the gravity of harm.

28. E.g. the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the Convention of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism of 2004; A/AC.249/1997/L.5, annex I, p. 16; and the Terrorism Act 2000 of the United Kingdom, sect. 1 (2) (b). ↩
29. Report of the Independent Commission on UK Counter-Terrorism Law, Policy and Practice (Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, 2025), recommendation 9. ↩

The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings covers only public places, public transport, infrastructure or State facilities and expansively defines these.³⁰ These objects were selected because they are often targeted by terrorists and the public is at special risk there. They are also important to the functioning of society and the Government. Limiting a general definition to attacks on public and State places or property is accordingly a way of confining terrorism to the most likely and serious harms.

30. Art. 2 (1), as defined in art. 1. ↩

The definitions of “public transportation”³¹ and “infrastructure facility”³² under the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings substantially cover what the Security Council calls “critical infrastructure”. In resolution 2341 (2017), the Council urged States to criminalize “terrorist attacks” intended to destroy or disable “critical infrastructure”. The resolution is not binding, and there is no international definition of critical infrastructure. If it were included in a general definition, legality requires that it be defined. The non-exhaustive definition in the Convention is a start, but “infrastructure” could be further particularized,³³ with a narrow focus on what is essential to protect life and public health. There is international guidance³⁴ and there are domestic definitions, but these can be too wide for criminal liability for terrorism.³⁵ As for other property, attacks on critical infrastructure should not be unconditionally covered. Given the breadth of such infrastructure, it is necessary to establish a high threshold of harm.

31. Art. 1 (6). ↩
32. Art. 1 (2) (“publicly or privately owned facility providing or distributing services for the benefit of the public, such as water, sewage, energy, fuel or communications”). ↩
33. E.g. to also include health facilities, emergency services, food systems, essential social services, navigation facilities, and financial and information systems. ↩
34. E.g. Office of Counter-Terrorism and United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, The Protection of Critical Infrastructure against Terrorist Attacks: Compendium of Good Practices (2018), p. 31. ↩
35. E.g. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022. ↩

Three international counter-terrorism instruments since 2005,³⁶ and some regional instruments³⁷ and national laws, include damage to the environment. The draft comprehensive convention includes environmental damage, but a proposal to include natural resources was rejected. It is clear that terrorists could damage the environment to intimidate the public or compel a Government, such as by contaminating water sources, causing floods, burning crops or setting wildfires. Such instrumental harm is distinguishable from illicit, organized environmental crimes committed by terrorist groups for profit (for example, illegal mining and trafficking in resources). Terrorist harm to the environment may overlap with other terrorism offences relating to endangering life, releasing dangerous substances or damaging property. Ordinary environmental crimes will usually be sufficient. There is nonetheless value in including environmental damage, if the threshold of harm is sufficiently high, particularly since human life, health and rights depend on the right to a clean and healthy environment. While damage to the “environment” is nebulous, the revised Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, of 2005, was the first of the international instruments to define it, to include damage to air, soil, water, fauna or flora.³⁸ Some environmental law instruments also instructively define it.³⁹

36. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005; revised Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, of 2005; and Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention) of 2010. ↩
37. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council; OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999; Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism of 1999; and Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1998. ↩
38. Art. 1 (1) (c) (iii). ↩
39. E.g. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context of 1991. ↩

The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings largely excludes private property, although infrastructure and public transport are defined to include privately owned facilities that serve the public, and State or government facilities could include private facilities used by State officials. Yet, attacks on private property generally, without causing death or injury, could clearly intend to intimidate the public or compel a Government. Even attacks on individual homes or vehicles could intimidate groups such as State officials, business leaders, journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders, Indigenous activists and other civil society actors. Various regional instruments, national laws and the draft comprehensive convention include private property. Attacks on inalienable communal property, such as the ancestral lands and resources of Indigenous Peoples or minorities, could also be intended to terrorize. Again, if private and communal property is included, a high harm threshold is required.

If property is included, it is vital to ensure not only that minor damage (such as graffiti or vandalism) is excluded, but also that more than even “serious” damage is required. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings requires that an act be intended to “cause extensive destruction” to specified public targets “where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss” objectively. The standard of “extensive destruction” was transposed from the war crime of extensive destruction of property under humanitarian law, further highlighting the severity of harm required. This dual formula, combined with the focus on public property, sets an appropriately high threshold, although in a general terrorism definition actual economic loss should always be required, and not merely be likely.

Laws that focus on major economic loss alone, without also requiring extensive property destruction,⁴⁰ are too broad. The draft comprehensive convention is too wide by providing as alternatives “serious damage” to property (without causing major economic loss) or any “damage” that results or is likely to result in major economic loss⁴¹ (without requiring extensive destruction). Any definition should further clarify that extensive destruction and major economic loss must both be intended, and not merely that loss is objectively likely. In the case of tangible cultural property of national or international significance, extensive destruction could be alternatively coupled with serious loss of cultural heritage value instead of major economic loss, given that the latter may be less relevant.

40. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council. ↩
41. A/68/37, annex I, draft art. 2 (1). ↩

While the Security Council urges the criminalization of “terrorist attacks” on critical infrastructure, this can and should be interpreted as subject to its definition of terrorism in resolution 1566 (2004), namely that terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure are those intended to cause death or serious injury⁴² (or rather, those that intentionally cause such harm). Confining terrorism in this way does not prevent States from applying ordinary offences to lesser harms or taking preventive and protective measures against attacks. Alternatively, at a minimum, as for other property, harm to critical infrastructure should be both extensive and cause major economic loss. Mere “disruption” of, “interference” with, or inconvenience to infrastructure – from interrupting public transport to blocking roads or hacking websites – must not be covered.

42. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate recognizes that requiring death or injury provides an “additional safeguard”. See “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, p. 17. ↩

Similar thresholds should apply to terrorist offences concerning financial, electronic or information systems (including intangible data) or their physical infrastructure. Some terrorism definitions unacceptably encompass mere illegal “interference” with an information system or data. Even seriously interfering with or disrupting an electronic system or destroying it should not be enough. The focus of terrorism should be not on the interference alone, but on the gravity of the resulting harm. If not limited to death, serious injury or danger to life, then extensive harm resulting in major economic loss should be required, or some equivalently serious intangible or non-pecuniary effect, for example the deletion of essential humanitarian or social security records upon which civilian survival depends, thereby endangering life. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council requires “extensive destruction” to an information system to either endanger life or result in major economic loss. Other legal regimes, including on cybercrime, are adequate to address lesser harms.

For terrorist environmental offences, the standards in the three international counter-terrorism conventions are too low: “substantial”⁴³ 43 or “serious” damage. 44 The standard of harm under humanitarian law – “widespread, long-term and severe”⁴⁵ – may be too high in a terrorism context. If not limited to causing death or injury, such offences should 40 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 41 A/68/37, annex I, draft art. 2 (1). 42 The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate recognizes that requiring death or injury provides an “additional safeguard”. See “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, p. 17. 43 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005, art. 2 (1); and revised Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, of 2005, art. 1 (1) (c) (iii). 44 Beijing Convention of 2010, art. 1 (1). 45 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 1977, arts. 35 (3) and 55; and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998, art. 8 (2) (b) (iv). GE.25-21096 require extensive harm resulting in major economic loss or something comparably serious. The proposed international crime of ecocide instructively refers to “severe” and either “widespread” or long-term damage.46

43. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005, art. 2 (1); and revised Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, of 2005, art. 1 (1) (c) (iii). ↩
45. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 1977, arts. 35 (3) and 55; and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998, art. 8 (2) (b) (iv). ↩

The definition contained in Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and a proposed amendment to the definition under the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, include a cumulative contextual requirement that the act “may seriously damage a country or an international organisation”. This assists in further limiting terrorist acts, and some submissions advocated its inclusion. The bar should be raised to require that the act does (not “may”) cause serious damage, and the meaning of damage to a country or organization should be more concretely specified.

Many terrorism laws include vague and overbroad conduct elements that must be avoided. Examples include acts prejudicing national security or public safety, or against moral integrity; overthrowing the Government, and various types of serious economic harm; causing unspecified “grave consequences”; impeding the work of public authorities; and merely blocking traffic or free movement or occupying public squares. Some civil society stakeholders suggested that desecration of bodies or graves should be included. A credible “threat” to commit terrorism should not form part of the definition but should be an ancillary offence with proportionate penalties.

There is widespread agreement that the mental element of terrorism should be an intention to commit conduct, to appropriately reflect the gravity of culpability. This is the approach in many national laws and international and regional conventions, Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), the 2010 model definition and the draft comprehensive convention. Like transnational criminal cooperation treaties generally, the counter-terrorism conventions and the draft comprehensive convention do not define intention but leave its interpretation to national law. It is preferable to restrict terrorism offences to direct intention, that is, where a person deliberately, consciously or voluntarily means to commit the act or cause the harmful result.

Intention in many legal systems can, however, extend to indirect intention (or oblique intention or dolus indirectus), namely where the person was aware or knew that the harm would result in the ordinary course of events. Such knowledge requires that the result is virtually certain to occur, and not a mere possibility or even a substantial risk or likelihood. Since indirect intention can apply even to international crimes,⁴⁷ its application to terrorism cannot be readily excluded. Intention must, however, exclude lesser mental standards such as dolus eventualis, negligence (foreseeable risk) or recklessness (awareness of a substantial risk that is unjustifiable to take).

47. Rome Statute of 1998, art. 30 (2). ↩

There is broad international consensus that a defining characteristic of terrorism is its instrumental coercive nature. In international and regional instruments and national laws, this is most commonly expressed though specific intent or purpose elements. Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) suggests three alternative intents: (a) to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons; (b) to intimidate a population; or (c) to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Actual terrorization, intimidation or compulsion is not required.

Element (a) alone is provided in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly in 1994, a 1937 League of Nations terrorism convention from which it is derived, and a draft crime proposed in 1998 for inclusion in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This focuses the crime singularly on terrorization of the public, and not also on harm to Governments.

Alternative elements (a) and (c) only are found in the 2010 model definition and the purported customary international crime of terrorism identified by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.⁴⁸ Alternative elements (b) and (c) only are provided in the Terrorist Financing Convention, the draft comprehensive convention, many national laws, the 2004 report of the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,⁴⁹ and the guidance note of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on defining “terrorism” in national criminal legislation.⁵⁰ These combinations (terror/intimidation or compulsion) reflect the emerging consensus on specific intent. Some submissions nonetheless expressed concern that such elements are ambiguous and prone to being abused against civil society.

48. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., case No. STL-11-01/I, Appeals Chamber, Interlocutory Decision, 16 February 2011, para. 85. ↩
49. A/59/565 and A/59/565/Corr.1. ↩
50. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/biefer-practical-advice-defining-terrorism.pdf. ↩

Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the definition proposed by the Council of Europe also include elements (b) and (c), but provide a unique third alternative, discussed below. The Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism conflates elements (a), (b) and (c). The Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism and Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism include only element (a) as one alternative among many wider ones.

Provoke a state of terror or intimidate a population

There is much similarity between the elements of provoking a state of terror and intimidating people, although a state of terror implies greater harm than mere intimidation. A state of terror is closer to the ordinary meaning of terrorism and has been endorsed by the General Assembly. The intimidation standard is more frequently used in binding instruments and national laws but is too low. The European Union (and likely soon the Council of Europe) strikes a better balance by requiring an intent to “seriously” intimidate. It is unhelpfully duplicative for a definition to provide as alternatives both a state of terror and intimidation, as Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) does.

The object of terror or intimidation is expressed in different ways. The Terrorist Financing Convention and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) refer to intimidating “a population”, which risks being narrowly interpreted as a reference to the whole population. The Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and resolution 1566 (2004) refer more liberally to provoking a state of terror in “the general public” or in “a group of persons or particular persons”, while the 2010 model definition and some national laws similarly refer to the general public/population or a segment/section of it. A definition should ensure that not only the whole public but also parts of it are protected, including natural persons associating through entities such as non-governmental organizations, trade unions, religious bodies, media outlets, educational institutions, corporations and so on.⁵¹ However, recognizing the intimidation of “particular persons” – even a single person – may widen terrorism too far to cover less serious acts.

51. Under Canadian law, a separate compulsion element applies to “organizations” as well as Governments and international organizations. ↩

Compelling a Government or international organization

There is broad consensus on the alternative element of compelling (or coercing) a Government or international organization to do or refrain from doing something, although some submissions argued that terrorism should focus solely on intimidation of people, and not on protecting Governments. This element is aimed at protecting these vital political entities from unlawful coercive violence. In the case of Governments, it also indirectly protects the human right of the population to participate in political affairs free from violent interference. It also ensures that Governments can protect and fulfil human rights, including socioeconomic rights, without violent disruption. International organizations evidently require protection against terrorism, given past attacks against the United Nations.

An intent to merely “influence” a Government⁵² is too broad.⁵³ European Union law (which is likely to be emulated by the Council of Europe) represents best practice by requiring an act to “unduly” compel. Compulsion (or alternatively intimidation of the public) arguably covers assassinations, so it is unnecessary to add an alternative of “undermining” a Government to cover them, which would overexpand liability in other situations.

52. E.g. Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism of 1999; Terrorism Act 2000 of the United Kingdom; and Federal Act No. 35-FZ of 2006 of the Russian Federation. ↩
53. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, p. 24; and Report of the Independent Commission on UK Counter-Terrorism Law, Policy and Practice, recommendation 8. ↩

Other specific intent elements

A myriad of other specific intent elements in regional and national laws have not attracted consensus. Many are vague and overbroad, infringe legality and are prone to abuse and violation of rights. Some conflate other criminal or security threats with terrorism. None should be included in an international definition. The Special Rapporteur and others have expressed concern, for example, that the European Union law element of “seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation” is uncertain and overbroad, out of step with international best practice and unnecessary to counter terrorism.⁵⁴ Other regional purpose elements are highly problematic,⁵⁵ including: undermining public safety; violating public security; disrupting public services or creating general insurrection; imperiling people’s honour, freedoms, security or rights; hazarding the environment or property; endangering a national resource or international facilities; or threatening State stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty. Many national laws are similarly problematic.⁵⁶

54. See communications OTH 133/2024 and OTH 35/2025 (concerning the Council of Europe’s proposed replication of the definition contained in Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council). All communications mentioned in the present report are available from https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments. ↩
55. See also A/79/324, para. 16. ↩
56. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, pp. 23 and 24. ↩

Purpose, aim, objective, cause or motive

Some States have added a cumulative specific intent element, namely that the act intended to intimidate a population or compel a Government must be committed for a political, ideological or religious purpose.⁵⁷ While the 2010 model definition does not include it, the then Special Rapporteur explained that these motives narrow the definition.⁵⁸ The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate agrees that this “common practice” increases precision.⁵⁹ Strong international support is found in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted by consensus, which describes terrorism as criminal acts for “political purposes”. The Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy suggested that such an element is part of customary law;⁶⁰ the Special Tribunal for Lebanon disagreed but noted it would enhance legality and prevent overly expansive application.⁶¹ Some submissions supported its inclusion; others opposed it.

57. E.g., Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, New Zealand, South Africa and United Kingdom. ↩
58. A/HRC/16/51, para. 27. ↩
59. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, p. 16. ↩
60. Italy v. Bouyahia Maher Ben Abdelaziz et al., First Criminal Section, Judgment, 17 January 2007, para. 2.1. ↩
61. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Appeals Chamber, Interlocutory Decision, para. 106. ↩

A purpose or motive element differentiates terrorism from “ordinary” private violence that also terrorizes people or compels a Government, including crime animated by profit, personal grievances, perceived injustice, revenge, hatred, jealousy, family disputes, domestic violence, a fixation with mass shootings, conspiracy theories or mental illness. Terrorism is qualitatively different from other crimes, and is commonly perceived as such by the public, because of its instrumental political or ideological nature. A motive element expressively denounces such aims. These deep political or ideological commitments of terrorists, and their tendency to propagandize and recruit, further justify terrorism laws. Victims of terrorism have argued that motive helps victims to understand the causes of attacks, aiding recovery. Authorities find it useful in threat assessment and prevention, and public education.

While criminal law does not usually include motive as an element, international and national criminal laws have recognized motive-based distinctions, such as piracy for “private ends” and organized crime for a “financial or other material benefit”.⁶² Grave recent abuses of counter-terrorism laws against drug cartels and gangs,⁶³ where they are not politically or ideologically motivated, further support the need for a sharp distinction.⁶⁴ Proportionate amendments to organized crime laws could be adopted where necessary instead of unjustifiably escalating to a counter-terrorism paradigm.

62. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, art. 101; and United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, arts. 2 and 5. ↩
63. See communication USA 30/2025; and https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/un-experts-condemn-united-states-blockade-and-aggression-against-venezuela. ↩
64. See also the statement by Mexico in the Sixth Committee on 6 October 2025. Available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/80/pdfs/statements/int_terrorism/02mtg_mexico.pdf. ↩

A focus on motive does not criminalize expression, belief or opinion, but addresses it only where it motivates unlawful violence. It can thus constitute a necessary and proportionate restriction on rights to legitimately protect the rights of others and ensure national security. The risks of discriminatory profiling of political or ideological causes by law enforcement, and of the “martyrdom” effect of legally amplifying causes, are real but outweighed by the benefits of denouncing and deterring unlawful causal violence. Critically, it is a safeguard against arbitrary or excessive prosecutions, since it requires proof of an element additional to intimidation or compulsion, thus differentiating organized crime, racial hatred or private violence that can also intimidate or compel. Where a terrorist purpose cannot be proven or does not exist, conduct that intimidates or compels could still be prosecuted as ordinary, public order or security offences, and any gaps filled by tailored new non-terrorist offences.

The most common purposes in national laws are political, ideological and religious. Annex II includes a discussion of their interpretation and the recommendation that a definition include only political and ideological motives and omit religion.⁶⁵ To summarize, in practice, targeting religious motives tends to have discriminatory and stigmatizing effects that outweigh the benefits of criminally denouncing them. To the extent that religion is assimilable to an ideology,⁶⁶ it is unnecessary to separately include it. Some religious violence may also qualify as “political” terrorism, as where a terrorist group seeks to overthrow a Government. It is also unnecessary to include a “racial” purpose, since racist violence would already qualify as ideological and/or political (and is already addressed by racial hatred laws). An exception might be if a country faced widespread sectarian violence. A definition should require the terrorist purpose to be the dominant, or at least a substantial, purpose, to exclude cases where the terrorist purpose is minor and outweighed by private motives.

65. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/reports/srct-report-defining-terrorism-respect-protect-annex2.pdf. ↩
66. A/57/273-S/2002/875, annex, para. 13. ↩

The international community has consistently condemned terrorism as unjustifiable regardless of motive or the perpetrator.⁶⁷ Yet, it is recognized that even narrow definitions require principled exceptions to protect human rights and confine them to genuinely terrorist conduct. Prosecutorial discretion is not sufficient, and excessive reliance on it to control overbroad definitions politicizes the criminal law and is not consistent with legality, the separation of powers and the rule of law.⁶⁸

67. See e.g. General Assembly resolution 49/60, annex, para. 3. ↩
68. Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, R v. Gul, Judgment, [2013] UKSC 64, 23 October 2013, para. 36. ↩

Activities of armed forces in armed conflict

Many definitions prima facie apply to hostilities in armed conflict, which intrinsically involve violence to compel Governments (in international or non-international conflict), and sometimes to intimidate civilians. Yet, violence in armed conflict should not be conflated with terrorism. Combatants in international conflicts enjoy criminal immunity for conduct that does not violate humanitarian law, despite recent unlawful prosecutions of some for terrorism.⁶⁹ Non-State armed groups do not necessarily target civilians; and foreign laws traditionally did not interfere in another country’s political struggles by criminalizing rebellion against foreign Governments. At the same time, most terrorist-type conduct against civilians committed in armed conflict already constitutes war crimes or crimes against humanity, whether by State or non-State forces.

69. See A/80/382. ↩

States are entitled to criminalize non-State violence against themselves as domestic crimes. However, asymmetrically and transnationally criminalizing all non-State violence against all Governments as terrorism, as some national laws do, risks undermining humanitarian law. It reduces incentives for non-State armed groups to comply with humanitarian law, since they are treated as terrorists irrespective of whether they respect humanitarian law (by only targeting the military) or systematically violate it (by attacking civilians). Stigmatization as terrorists also politically impedes peacemaking and post-conflict reconciliation, including eligibility for amnesties (for acts in accordance with humanitarian law) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. There is accordingly considerable support to exclude armed conflict from a definition, either wholly or partly, so that it is primarily regulated by humanitarian law as the lex specialis tailored to violence in war. Terrorism would thus primarily be a peacetime crime but could still apply in limited circumstances to reinforce humanitarian law to protect civilians.

Accordingly, six international counter-terrorism instruments since 1997, some amending earlier conventions, and a number of regional instruments, exclude the “activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law”.⁷⁰ Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) partly takes this approach by defining terrorism by reference to these instruments, but it also includes other instruments without such an exclusion, thus recognizing that their offences could apply in armed conflict. While Security Council counter-terrorism sanctions list armed groups for the purpose of an assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo, this does not preclude an exemption for armed conflict in national and international definitions of terrorism generally.

70. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1979, as amended by the Amendment of 2005; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970, as amended by the Beijing Protocol of 2010; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988, as amended by the Protocol of 2005; and Beijing Convention of 2010. See also Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council; and Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005. ↩

Properly interpreted, “armed forces” under humanitarian law include both State armed forces and non-State armed groups,⁷¹ a meaning confirmed by drafting records. Non-State forces should be subject to responsible command and have capacity to implement humanitarian law,⁷² in principle preventing attacks on civilians. This exclusion is, however, too broad in exempting conduct that violates humanitarian law, such as attacks on civilians intended to terrorize. An alternative would be to exclude only activities that are in accordance with humanitarian law, thus enabling attacks on civilians to be prosecuted as both war crime and terrorism offences, and activating often considerable counter-terrorism powers. Proposals to this effect have not thus far been accepted in negotiations for the draft comprehensive convention.

71. See Ben Saul, “From conflict to complementarity: reconciling international counterterrorism law and international humanitarian law”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 103 (2022). ↩
72. See e.g. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 1977, art. 1 (1). ↩

The draft comprehensive convention text is based on the six earlier instruments. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, however, proposed excluding the activities of the “parties” rather than “armed forces”,⁷³ and not only in armed conflict but also during “foreign occupation”.⁷⁴ The proposal is largely unnecessary: armed forces in armed conflict under humanitarian law include self-determination forces (whether in non-international armed conflict or in international conflict under the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), and foreign occupation constitutes international armed conflict where humanitarian law applies. Some disputed territories present difficulties where there are self-determination claims but the law of occupation may not apply.

73. See A/C.6/59/L.10. ↩
74. A/57/37 and A/57/37/Corr.1, annex IV. ↩

The proposal would widen the exclusion to the extent that the “parties” encompass actors beyond the “armed forces”, such as the civilian or political wings of a liberation movement. Violence by civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, who are not members of armed forces (that is, not performing a continuous combat function), would thus be excluded, as would indirect participation such as providing funds, weapons or logistical support, or recruiting or propagandizing. Humanitarian law does not prohibit mere civilian participation in hostilities, absent violations such as attacks on civilians. However, such persons are not subject to the same disciplinary expectations as non-State armed groups, heightening risks of violations.

Conduct in armed conflict in accordance with humanitarian law

Some national laws exclude conduct in armed conflict that is in accordance with, or does not violate, international humanitarian law.⁷⁵ This approach is narrower in excluding only conduct that is consistent with humanitarian law, but wider in excluding conduct by any actor, not only armed forces. Its focus on conduct avoids uncertainties and controversies over the exclusion of actors and thus addresses the concerns of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and is the preferable approach. It ensures that counter-terrorism law does not interfere with humanitarian law’s fine balance between military necessity and humanitarian protection. Those who target military personnel or objectives in accordance with humanitarian law or merely participate in hostilities (directly or indirectly), without targeting civilians, would not be terrorists.

75. Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and Switzerland. ↩

Terrorism offences would still apply to serious violations of humanitarian law, such as targeting civilians, hostage-taking, torture and the war crime of intending to spread terror among civilians.⁷⁶ Terrorism offences, like crimes against humanity and genocide, would thus reinforce humanitarian law, including through preparatory terrorism offences and special powers that may have no equivalents in humanitarian law. This approach is preferable to excluding all conduct in armed conflict, as was suggested in negotiations for the draft comprehensive convention. Preparatory terrorist acts in foreign States (such as financing, recruitment, arms trafficking, travel and support) related to an armed conflict in another State could still be prosecuted as terrorism where they relate to violations of humanitarian law. Acts with no nexus to a conflict could also be prosecuted as terrorism, since these are not subject to humanitarian law and fall outside the exclusion.

76. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Galić, case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 30 November 2006, paras. 87–90. ↩

Humanitarian activities by impartial humanitarian organizations

Humanitarian activities are not intended to cause (or support or finance) death or injury and would not qualify as terrorism. However, many States have enacted preparatory offences of support or funding of terrorist organizations, and some, particularly where they lack a proximate connection to the commission of violence, risk criminalizing legitimate humanitarian activities. An exclusion is therefore necessary to protect lawful humanitarian action (including medical care) under humanitarian law and human rights law. The International Committee of the Red Cross has duly called for excluding the “provision of exclusively humanitarian activities by impartial humanitarian organizations carried out in accordance with international humanitarian law”.⁷⁷ There are exclusions in the context of the European Union⁷⁸ and in various national laws.⁷⁹ Many submissions supported an exemption.

77. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Humanitarian exemptions in domestic counterterrorism legislation”, legal factsheet (2025). ↩
78. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council, recital 38. ↩
79. In addition to those implementing Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council, see e.g. the laws of Chad, Ethiopia and Switzerland. ↩

While the Security Council has adopted a humanitarian exemption from sanctions,⁸⁰ it has not expressly extended an exemption to terrorist offences, including financing offences, under its resolutions. However, the Council recognizes that all counter-terrorism measures must be implemented in accordance with humanitarian law,⁸¹ which explicitly safeguards humanitarian and medical activities. Terrorism offences do not, and cannot, override humanitarian law: security aims cannot justify depriving civilians of their means of survival. A humanitarian exemption is thus necessary to safeguard humanitarian law and humanitarian action from terrorism offences. Humanitarian organizations also have sophisticated policies and procedures in place to prevent aid diversion.

80. See Security Council resolutions 2664 (2022) and 2761 (2024). ↩
81. Security Council resolution 2462 (2019), para. 6. ↩

Activities of State military forces in the exercise of their official duties

Six counter-terrorism instruments since 1997 exclude the activities of State military forces in the exercise of their official duties (that is, beyond armed conflict), “inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law”. Official duties in peacetime may include assistance to law enforcement, evacuation operations, peace operations and humanitarian relief, although specifying these would increase certainty. The use of force may be necessary, for instance, to ensure the security of humanitarian action, quell violent riots or protect civilians. States and non-State actors are thus not similarly situated and should not be subject to identical terrorism liabilities. The exclusion does not apply to non-military officials, though a similar rationale would apply to some police activities.

The exclusion is nonetheless too broad. In the negotiations for the draft comprehensive convention, the Organization of the Islamic Conference proposed excluding State military forces only if their activities are “in conformity” with, and not merely “governed by”, international law.⁸² While excessive use of force by State authorities is addressed by other international law⁸³ and domestic law, such violations do not necessarily entail transnational criminal liability as under the draft comprehensive convention. To maintain moral symmetry and broaden its legitimacy, a definition should equally cover comparably wrongful, unlawful acts committed by State officials and non-State actors. Thus, extrajudicial killings or enforced disappearances by military forces could be prosecuted as terrorism, just as they already can be if the perpetrators are police or civilian intelligence officers. State forces may still, however, enjoy functional immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction and immunities under status of forces agreements.

82. A/C.6/65/L.10, annex III, p. 25. ↩
83. Including human rights law, crimes against humanity and genocide, the prohibition on the use of force and the duty of non-intervention, respect for sovereignty, and the law of State responsibility. ↩

Five regional instruments exclude self-determination struggles,⁸⁴ that is, even outside armed conflict, albeit “in accordance with … international law”. Such exclusions do not provide immunity for all self-determination violence, which remains subject to other international rules, but exempt it from labelling and suppression as “terrorism”. International law recognizes the right to resist the forcible denial of self-determination,⁸⁵ subject to compliance with international law. The regional exclusions duly recognize that self-determination must be exercised consistently with international law, which should mean that attacks on civilians in peacetime could still be covered by a terrorism definition. In the negotiations for a comprehensive convention, proposals to fully exempt self-determination struggles have not been accepted. Instead, the above-mentioned exemption for armed forces in armed conflict (subject to debates about its scope) under humanitarian law has rightly been seen as the appropriate framework and aids to depoliticize the issue. There has also been a proposed savings clause for the rights of peoples under international law, the effect of which is unclear, and a proposed preambular recognition of self-determination.⁸⁶

84. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism of 1999, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1998, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999, Convention of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism of 2004 and Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol) of 2014 (not in force), art. 28G. See also the African Union’s African Model Anti-Terrorism Law of 2011, sect. 4 (xl) (b). ↩
85. See e.g. General Assembly resolution 37/43, para. 2; and International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, General List No. 186, Declaration of Judge Charlesworth, para. 23. ↩
86. See A/57/37 and A/57/37/Corr.1, annex IV; and A/C.6/60/INF/2. ↩

Acts of protest not causing death or serious injury

Where a definition of terrorism is not limited to causing death or serious injury (or endangering life), it should exclude acts of advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action where they do not cause death or serious injury. Such exclusion is found in some national laws,⁸⁷ was supported by various submissions, and is recommended by OHCHR and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.⁸⁸ It ensures that terrorism offences do not unjustifiably criminalize property damage in the exercise, albeit unruly or excessive, of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association and political participation, including in the light of the traditions of liberal democracy, “direct action” and civil disobedience. Property damage or minor personal injury can be effectively prosecuted as ordinary or public order offences. While liability for unruly protest can constitute lawful restrictions on civil and political rights, it would be unnecessary and disproportionate to stigmatize and more severely punish such conduct as terrorism.

87. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. ↩
88. OHCHR, “Defining ‘terrorism’”; and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “A commentary on the codification of the terrorism offence”, p. 17 (a “good practice”). ↩

Such a clause is particularly essential if the threshold for property damage is too low and would otherwise capture acts such as graffiti, vandalism and damage during disorderly street demonstrations. Even where the threshold for harm is high, the clause may still be necessary, as where widespread and coordinated popular protests or riots in a city damage buildings and infrastructure and disrupt commerce, causing “extensive damage” and “major economic loss”.

Acts in defence of human rights

Some States have more generally excluded acts intended to create or restore democracy, the constitution or human rights.⁸⁹ Two States repealed such provisions after the Financial Action Task Force asserted that they are not permissible while countering terrorist financing, yet financing laws must comply with human rights law. Many constitutions recognize a right to resist, as a last resort, anyone seeking to abolish or forcibly change the constitutional order or to defend democracy and human rights,⁹⁰ and national terrorism laws are subject to constitutional limits. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has also supported exceptions for the defence or exercise of human rights.

89. Austria (repealed), Greece (repealed), New Zealand (repealed) and Switzerland (financing offences). ↩
90. E.g. Argentina, Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Latvia, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). ↩

While there is no positive “right to resist” domestic oppression under international law (in contrast to resistance to foreign occupation), the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes that human rights must be protected if humans are “not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression”. The “political offence exception” in extradition long acknowledged that political offences against foreign Governments should not be subject to legal cooperation, except where perpetrators indiscriminately, disproportionately or atrociously attacked civilians or assassinated Heads of Government. The trend towards eliminating the political offence exception for terrorism is problematic in that many terrorism definitions criminalize violence not only against civilians but also against any foreign Government, which would have condemned, for example, resistance to Nazi Germany, and in principle require other States to cooperate to prosecute offenders. Overbroad criminalization and the blanket elimination of the political offence exception prevent the courts from responding in a proportionate way to the real-world conditions of political violence, including the kinds of resistance that originally inspired the human rights movement in revolutionary opposition to authoritarian power.

Various State and civil society submissions supported such exclusion. It would need to be strictly limited to responding to the most exceptional threats and be subject to the strict conditions of resistance as a last resort, the pursuit of human rights, and the use of means that respect human rights – including a prohibition on indiscriminate or disproportionate violence against civilians.

Questions of “State terrorism” were partly addressed above in the context of exemptions for conduct in armed conflict and State military activities in peacetime. Annex II to the present report⁹¹ includes discussion of five further issues. Firstly, State officials are prima facie criminally liable for terrorism under existing international counter-terrorism instruments and national laws, subject to any exemptions from a definition. Secondly, international law has not lifted the functional immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction of State officials who commit terrorism, although agreement to lift it would advance accountability and justice for victims.

91. See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/reports/srct-report-defining-terrorism-respect-protect-annex2.pdf. ↩

Thirdly, while States are not internationally legally responsible for the commission of terrorism under existing counter-terrorism conventions, they are responsible for breaches of treaty obligations to criminalize and prevent such offences and investigate, apprehend and prosecute or extradite offenders, including their officials. Fourthly, States are responsible for breaches of Security Council obligations to refrain from committing, and to prevent and suppress, terrorism, as well as of other international obligations prohibiting the use of force and foreign intervention, including by sending or supporting terrorists. Finally, international law has not lifted the civil immunity of States before foreign courts for terrorism (despite a few outlier national laws doing so), with the possible exception of “territorial torts”. Again, lifting civil immunity could advance justice, but brings risks of politicized abuse.

The Special Rapporteur’s revised model definition of terrorism, which should be interpreted in the light of the discussion above, is as follows:

Any person commits a terrorist offence if that person, by any serious criminal act, intentionally⁹² causes death, serious bodily injury,⁹³ or hostage-taking,⁹⁴ where:
(a) The purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is:
(i) To provoke a state of terror in⁹⁵ the public or a group of persons; or
(ii) To unduly compel a Government or an international organization⁹⁶ to do or to abstain from doing any act;
(b) The conduct is intended to advance a political or ideological purpose, which must be a substantial purpose; and
(c) The conduct, given its nature or context, intentionally causes serious damage to a country or an international organization.

92. Intention should be limited to direct intention. ↩
93. Defined as physical injury. ↩
94. Deprivation of liberty could be added. ↩
95. “To seriously intimidate” could be substituted. ↩
96. Compulsion of “any organization” could be included to expressly cover entities. ↩

A terrorist offence does not include:
(a) An act of advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that does not intentionally cause death or serious bodily injury;⁹⁷
(b) Conduct committed in armed conflict that does not violate⁹⁸ international humanitarian law;
(c) The provision of humanitarian activities⁹⁹ by impartial humanitarian organizations in accordance with international humanitarian law;
(d) The activities of State military forces in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are in accordance with international law; and
(e) An act intended to establish or re-establish democracy, constitutional Government or the rule of law, or to exercise or safeguard human rights.¹⁰⁰

97. If harm to property is included in the definition. ↩
98. Or “is in accordance with” humanitarian law. ↩
99. Including medical and protection activities. ↩
100. Such a provision could include the right to resist forcible denial of self-determination, in accordance with international law. ↩

The Special Rapporteur does not recommend including acts endangering life or harm to property in an international definition. However, since these are already included in many national laws, regional instruments and the draft comprehensive convention, if such offences are retained, to prevent their abuse in practice it is recommended to limit them as per the following sample physical conduct elements. The specific intent, motive, and context elements in paragraph 68 (1) (a)–(c) above would also apply. Any person commits a terrorist offence if that person, by any serious criminal act, intentionally causes:
• A high likelihood of danger to life 92 Intention should be limited to direct intention. 93 Defined as physical injury. 94 Deprivation of liberty could be added. 95 “To seriously intimidate” could be substituted. 96 Compulsion of “any organization” could be included to expressly cover entities. 97 If harm to property is included in the definition. 98 Or “is in accordance with” humanitarian law. 99 Including medical and protection activities. 100 Such a provision could include the right to resist forcible denial of self-determination, in accordance with international law. GE.25-21096
• Extensive destruction of public places, public transport, public property, State facilities, or other critical infrastructure,¹⁰¹ 101 which intentionally causes a high likelihood of danger to life or major economic loss¹⁰²
• Extensive destruction to tangible cultural property, which intentionally causes a high likelihood of danger to life, major economic loss, or serious loss of cultural heritage of national or international significance
• Disablement, extensive damage or destruction of, or serious interference with, an electronic system,¹⁰³ which intentionally causes a high likelihood of danger to life or major economic loss
• Severe and widespread, or long-term, damage to the environment, which intentionally causes a high likelihood of danger to life or major economic loss¹⁰⁴

101. The terms should be narrowly defined, based on the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and criminal law guidance on “critical infrastructure”. ↩
102. The same thresholds of harm should be applied if private and communal property are included in a definition. ↩
103. Alternatively, “information systems”. Electronic and information systems include financial systems. ↩
104. Alternative harms could include intentionally causing serious loss of cultural heritage or serious harm to Indigenous or minority cultural rights. ↩

The Special Rapporteur recommends that Member States:
(a) Undertake human rights assessments of any proposed terrorism definitions and offences, and any amendments, to ensure they are consistent with international law;
(b) Periodically review terrorism definitions, offences and laws to ensure their operation complies with international law; and establish and adequately resource a permanent independent reviewer mechanism to monitor counter-terrorism laws and their operation;
(c) Ensure that there is a comprehensive system of internal and external oversight of counter-terrorism laws and measures, consistent with international standards;
(d) Provide accessible and effective remedies for human rights violations resulting from vague and overbroad definitions of terrorism;
(e) Promptly finalize the draft comprehensive convention, with full respect for international human rights law and other international law, after meaningfully consulting diverse civil society organizations.

The Special Rapporteur recommends that the United Nations ensure that all counter-terrorism resolutions, activities under the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and technical assistance and capacity-building are guided by best practice international standards on the definition of terrorism, including when conducting human rights due diligence. 101 The terms should be narrowly defined, based on the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and criminal law guidance on “critical infrastructure”. 102 The same thresholds of harm should be applied if private and communal property are included in a definition. 103 Alternatively, “information systems”. Electronic and information systems include financial systems. 104 Alternative harms could include intentionally causing serious loss of cultural heritage or serious harm to Indigenous or minority cultural rights.