C. T. and K. M. v. Sweden

On 9 September 2005, the Committee requested the State party not to deport the complainants to Rwanda while their case is pending before the Committee, in accordance with rule 108, paragraph 1, of the Committee’s rules of procedures. On 7 November 2005, the State party acceded to the Committee’s request.

She further claims that she will be tried by the Gacaca courts, which were set up by the Government to avenge the genocide of 1994. She claims to be one of the 760,000 Hutus who are due to be tried by these courts, in particular for her alleged involvement in a massacre at

Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Committee against Torture must decide whether or not it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. It notes the State party’s confirmation, in the submission of 15 August 2006, that domestic remedies have been exhausted.

The Committee finds that no further obstacles to the admissibility of the complaint exist, declares it admissible and thus proceeds to its consideration on the merits.

The issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the complainants to Rwanda would violate the State party's obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

In assessing the risk of torture, the Committee takes into account all relevant considerations, including the existence in the relevant State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individuals concerned would be personally at risk in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country; additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.

The Committee recalls its General Comment No.1 on article 3, which states that the Committee is obliged to assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited, the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. In this regard, in its jurisprudence the Committee has determined that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal.

The Committee notes the claim that if the complainants are returned to Rwanda they will be detained and tortured, on the basis of the first named complainant’s involvement in the PDR-Ubuyanja party, for which reason she was detained and subjected to torture. She also fears that she may be tried before the Gacaca courts. On this latter issue, without wishing to consider whether the Gacaca courts meet international standards of due process, the Committee considers that fear of a future trial before them is in itself insufficient to amount to a reasonable fear of torture.

As to the first named complainant’s claim of past torture due to her political activism, the Committee notes that the State party questions her credibility due to her vagueness, inconsistency and lack of evidence in her account of and involvement in the PDR- Ubuyanja party and the argument that she would not suffer torture given the developments after the elections in 2003. The Committee notes that the State party did not contest, during the domestic proceedings, nor in its submission to the Committee, the first named complainant’s claim (supported by two medical reports) that she was repeatedly raped in detention, as a result of which she became pregnant, and gave birth to her son in Sweden. In fact, on a review of the decisions of the domestic authorities, it would appear that these medical reports were not taken into account at all and that the issue of whether or not the complainant had been raped and the consequences thereof for her and her son were not considered. Thus, on the basis of the medical evidence provided, and the State party’s failure to dispute the claim, the Committee considers that the first named complainant was repeatedly raped in detention and as such was subjected to torture in the past. On examining the dates of her detention and the date of birth of her son, the Committee considers it without doubt that he was the product of rape by public officials, and is thus a constant reminder to the first named complainant of her rape.

On the State party’s general argument that the first named complainant is not credible, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture and that such inconsistencies as may exist in the complainant's presentation of the facts are not material and do not raise doubts about the general veracity of her claims, especially since it has been demonstrated that she was repeatedly subjected to rape in detention.⁷ The Committee also takes into account the revised letter from LIPRODHOR (para. 5.8), the authenticity of which has not been contested by the State party, which attests to the first named complainant’s arrest along with her brother by the Directory of Military Intelligence.

7. Alan v. Switzerland, Case no. 21/1995, Decision adopted on 8 May 1996, Tala v. Sweden, Case no. 43/1996, Decision adopted 15 November 1996, Kisoki v. Sweden, Case no. 41/1996, Decision adopted on 8 May 1996. ↩

As to the general situation in Rwanda, the Committee considers that information provided by the complainants demonstrates that ethnic tensions continue to exist, thus increasing the likelihood that the first named complainant may be subjected to torture on return to Rwanda. For the above reasons, the Committee considers that substantial grounds exist for believing that the complainants would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to Rwanda.

The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, concludes that the removal of the complainants to Rwanda would amount to a breach of article 3 of the Convention.

The Committee urges the State party, in accordance with rule 112, paragraph 5, of its rules of procedure, to inform it, within 90 days from the date of the transmittal of this decision, of the steps taken in response to the decision expressed above. [Adopted in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic and Chinese as part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]