A. B. v. Sweden

The complainant is A. B., a Russian national born in 1986. His request for asylum in Sweden was rejected and, at the time of submission of the complaint, he was awaiting deportation to the Russian Federation. He claims that such deportation would constitute a violation by Sweden of his rights under article 3 of the Convention against Torture. The complainant is represented by counsel.

On 15 March 2013, the Committee requested the State party to refrain from expelling the complainant to the Russian Federation while his complaint was under consideration by the Committee.

The complainant is a Russian citizen of Chechen origin, born in the Dubovsky District of the Rostov Oblast in Southern Russia. He professes the Muslim faith. In 2007, he moved to the Republic of Chechnya with his parents and brothers and settled in the village of Dai in the Shatoy region, approximately 60 kilometres from Grozny. The North Caucasian armed resistance still had a stronghold in the region. The complainant’s father opened a shop that sold groceries and clothes. Customers included personnel of the Chechen authorities as well as members of the armed resistance.

In October 2010, about 10 men wearing military uniforms came to the complainant’s home and took him away. The complainant believed that they were members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Shatoy region. They said that they needed to question him and took him to the militia station of Shatoy district. They told him that they knew that he sold groceries to the resistance fighters and that he helped them; that he delivered groceries to their bases in the mountains; and that he was an accomplice of the resistance. The complainant explained that he sold groceries to the armed resistance as he had no choice because they were always armed; however, he was not involved in or related to their activities. Thereafter, he was taken to another room where he was handcuffed and beaten with a truncheon and a rifle butt. He was hit all over his body, except for his face. He was put to sit on a chair with his arms attached to a bar and electrodes were attached to his little finger. One of the interrogators turned on the device which delivered electricity. They told that they knew that he had been cooperating with the resistance fighters and that he should confess. The complainant said that he had nothing to confess. After two hours of torture, he was left alone for about one hour. Thereafter, his arms were released from the bar and he was handcuffed. In the evening, “the boss” came in with some documents and told him that if he did not sign them, he would not get out alive. The complainant signed the documents, without reading the contents. He was then released.

The next day about 10 other men came to the complainant’s home and took him to the Office of the Russian Commandant in Khankala, Grozny. The documents that he had signed were presented, and new accusations were levelled at him. They accused him of being a former resistance fighter who had obtained amnesty but who continued to cooperate with the fighters by selling them groceries and that he had confessed in the documents that he had signed. He tried to explain to the federal authorities that he had been threatened and tortured in Shatoy and forced to sign the documents. He was taken to a small room without windows, located in the basement of the building, where he was again threatened, beaten and exposed to electrical shocks while in a sitting position, while hanging from a wall with his arms tied in front of him, and with electrodes attached to his feet and legs. He was doused with cold water, which made the electrical shocks even more painful. He lost consciousness. Following each torture session, he was placed in a 2m x 2m incarceration cell, which had a wooden bunk but no blanket. His clothes were never removed and he was left in his wet track pants and t-shirt. He was given some kind of porridge or boiled potatoes to eat once or twice a day. He was detained for two weeks and subjected to interrogations and torture several times a day. The interrogators in both Shatoy and Khankala were Chechens.

The complainant was released on the condition that he cooperated with the authorities by establishing contact or infiltrating the resistance fighters’ base in order to provide intelligence. He was told that if he failed to cooperate, he or his relatives would be killed. He went back to Dai, but his father did not think that it would be safe for him to stay there so he took him to the village of Nadterechnoe to stay with a friend.

Two or three days after his release, the authorities came to his home to look for him. As he had already left, his whole family was subjected to beatings. His wife and children moved to her parents’ home. Meanwhile, in Nadterechnoe, the complainant stayed indoors most of the time. His father visited him about twice a month.

After three to four months, his parents came to see him and told him that they had arranged for him to leave the country. They took him to the outskirts of Grozny and he left Chechnya in a van, together with his uncle and two cousins. They changed vans twice before arriving in Sweden on 17 May 2011. The complainant had no passport; however, he was not asked to produce any identity document on his way to Sweden. On 19 May 2011, the complainant applied for asylum in Sweden, where he was staying with a cousin, who had limited contact with his family. Through the cousin, he found out that the Chechen authorities had been looking for him again.

On 3 October 2011, the Swedish Migration Board rejected the complainant’s request for asylum, finding that his story lacked credibility. The complainant notes, in particular, that the Board considered that it was not credible that he was released one day after his initial arrest, then re-arrested and released again after two weeks, although he was accused of having committed a serious crime. The complainant states that the Board claimed that such activity did not correspond to the known practices of the Chechen authorities, as reported by human rights organizations. The complainant also points out that the Board noted that: (i) he could not explain how his father managed to visit him in Nadterechnoe without disclosing his location; (ii) he stated that he did not have any scars or bruises as a result of the alleged torture and severe ill-treatment suffered; (iii) there was no information that his relatives had been persecuted by the authorities; and (iv) he did not submit any documentation in support of his claims.

On an unspecified date, the complainant appealed the decision of the Swedish Migration Board before the Migration Court in Malmö. He alleged that the course of action that he described was “normal” in Chechnya; that he was released after one day because the Chechen authorities knew that he and his family would be afraid; and that the persecution was a measure of control rather than a preliminary investigation. He pointed out that many people in Chechnya were suspected of collaborating with the resistance, which made it impossible for the authorities to conduct surveillance on all of them and their relatives. He asserted that it was most likely for that reason that his father was not followed by the authorities when he visited him in Nadterechnoe. The complainant also noted that the human rights information referred to by the Board dated from 2009 and that there were new, updated reports, including from the State party, indicating that the human rights situation in Chechnya had worsened in 2010. On 18 September 2012, the Migration Court rejected the complainant’s appeal. Although the Court found parts of the complainant’s story to be supported by available country information, it still did not find the complainant’s allegations fully convincing.

On an unspecified date, the complainant filed an application for leave to appeal the decision of the Migration Court before the Migration Court of Appeal. The application was rejected on 17 October 2012 and the decision to expel the complainant became final on 7 November 2012.

On 19 November 2012, the complainant met with the Migration Board about his removal to the Russian Federation. The Swedish authorities encouraged him to return and offered him 30,000 Swedish kronor. On 28 November 2012, he informed the authorities that he was not interested in the money. On 8 March 2013, the complainant was informed that he had four weeks to leave the country voluntarily.

Given his personal situation and in the light of the previous persecution which he had suffered in Chechnya, the complainant claims that the Swedish authorities did not adequately assess the risk to which he would be subjected if returned to the Russian Federation. Returning him to the Russian Federation would violate article 3 of the Convention.

He argues that torture is widely used in Chechnya to keep the population under control. In his case, there was no ground for his arrest nor for a criminal investigation. All the charges were fabricated and the officials no doubt knew that. The fact that torture is used to extract information and force confessions in fabricated criminal cases cannot be unknown to the Swedish migration authorities.

By note verbale of 16 September 2013, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. Based on the facts of the case, the State party notes that the complainant arrived in Sweden on 17 May 2011 and applied for asylum two days later. The Swedish Migration Board rejected his application and ordered his deportation to the Russian Federation on 3 October 2011. The complainant appealed that decision before the Migration Court, which rejected the appeal on 18 September 2012. On 17 October 2012, the Migration Court of Appeal refused to grant the complainant leave to appeal that decision, and the decision to expel the complainant became final and non-appealable on 7 November 2012.

The State party further notes that according to article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention, the Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement and states that it is not aware whether the present case was or is subject to any other such investigation or settlement. However, the State party acknowledges that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted in the present case.

The State party maintains that the complainant’s assertion that he would be at risk of being treated in a manner that would violate article 3 of the Convention if returned to the Russian Federation fails to rise to the minimum level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility. It submits that the present communication is manifestly unfounded and thus inadmissible under article 22 (2) of the Convention and rule 113 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure.³ Should the Committee conclude that the communication is admissible, the issue before it would be whether the forced return of the complainant to the Russian Federation would violate the obligation of Sweden under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or return a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

3. The State party refers to communication No. 216/2002, H. I. A. v. Sweden, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 2 May 2003, para. 6.2. ↩

The State party notes that, when determining whether the forced return of a person to another country would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee has repeatedly emphasized that the aim of such a determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. Therefore, it follows that the existence of such a pattern in itself is not a sufficient ground for concluding that an individual would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country. Additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be “personally” at risk.⁴

4. The State party refers to communications No. 150/1999, S. L. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 11 May 2001, para. 6.3; and No. 213/2002, E. J. V. M. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 8.3. ↩

In the light of the foregoing, the State party notes that, in determining whether the forced return of the complainant to the Russian Federation would constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention, the following considerations were taken into account: (i) the general human rights situation in the Russian Federation; and, in particular, (ii) whether the complainant would be “personally” at risk of being subjected to torture if returned.

Furthermore, the State party recalls the Committee’s jurisprudence, according to which the burden of proof in cases like the present one rests with the complainant who must present an arguable case establishing that he runs a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture⁵ and the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion; if the risk does not meet the test of being highly probable, it must be personal and present.⁶

5. See, for example, communications No. 178/2001, H. O. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 13 November 2001, para. 13; and No. 203/2002, A. R. v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3. ↩
6. See, for example, the Committee’s general comment No. 1(1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, paras. 5–7. ↩

The State party notes that the Russian Federation is a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as well to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It therefore assumes that the Committee is well aware of the general human rights situation in that country, including in the North Caucasus area. In that regard, the State party refers to various reports containing information on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation.⁷

7. See United States of America, Department of State, Human Rights Report – Russia 2012; Amnesty International, Report 2012 – Russian Federation; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Russia; Danish Immigration Service, Chechens in the Russian Federation – residence registration, racially motivated violence and fabricated criminal cases, 4/2012, August 2012; Swedish Migration Board, Country Profile – Russia (Landprofil Ryssland), 25 February 2011; Sweden, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mänskliga rättigheter i Ryska Federationen 2011. ↩

The State party acknowledges that, while many reports indicate that the general level of violence and serious human rights violations in the Chechen Republic have decreased in recent years, there are still reports about violations such as disappearances, abuse and killings. The State party does not underestimate the concerns that may legitimately be expressed with regard to the current human rights situation in the Russian Federation and, more specifically in the North Caucasus area. However, the current situation in Chechnya does not in itself suffice to establish that the general situation in the region is such that deportation of the complainant would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention.⁸ Therefore, the State party contends that the deportation of the complainant to the Russian Federation would only constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention, if the complainant can show that he would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in Chechnya. In the present case, the complainant has failed to substantiate his claims to that effect.

8. See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, I v. Sweden, application No. 61204/09, judgement of 5 September 2013, para. 58. ↩

The State party points out that several provisions in the Swedish Aliens Act reflect the same principles as those set out in article 3 of the Convention and the Swedish migration authorities apply the same kind of test when considering an application for asylum under the Aliens Act as that applied by the Committee when examining communications under the Convention. The fact that the Swedish authorities applied such a test with regard to the complainant’s asylum request is indicated by the references in their decisions to chapter 4, sections 1, 2 and 2 (a), of the Aliens Act. Furthermore, the State party points out that chapter 12, sections 1 to 3, of the Aliens Act provide that the expulsion of an alien may never be enforced to a country where there are reasonable grounds to assume that the alien would be in danger of being subjected to, inter alia, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or to a country where the alien would not be protected from being sent on to a country in which he or she would be at such risk.

The State party also notes that the national authorities are in a very good position to assess the information submitted by an asylum seeker and to appraise the credibility of his or her claims. In that regard, the State party underlines that, in the present case, both the Migration Board and the Migration Court conducted a thorough examination of the complainant’s case. As part of the asylum application process, the complainant was interviewed by Migration Board. The purpose of the interview was to give him an opportunity to present the reasons why he needed protection and to explain all the facts relevant to the Migration Board’s assessment. The interview lasted 3 hours and 20 minutes and was conducted in the presence of an interpreter, who the complainant confirmed that he understood well. The complainant has also argued his case in writing before the Migration Board and the migration courts. The Migration Court also held an oral hearing during which the complainant presented his arguments. The complainant was represented by legal counsel throughout the asylum application process. Against that background, the State party holds that the Migration Board and the migration courts had sufficient information, together with facts and documentation, to constitute a solid basis for making a well-informed, transparent and reasonable assessment of the complainant’s need for protection in Sweden.

The State party recalls the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1997) on article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, which states that the Committee is not an appellate, a quasi-judicial or an administrative body, and that considerable weight will be given to findings of facts that are made by organs of the State party concerned, as well as its jurisprudence.⁹ Moreover, the Committee has held that it is for the courts of the States parties to the Convention, and not for the Committee, to evaluate the facts and evidence in a particular case, unless it can be ascertained that the manner in which the evaluation was made was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.¹⁰

9. See the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, para. 9; also communication No. 277/2005, N. Z. S. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 22 November 2006, para. 8.6. ↩
10. See, for example, communication No. 219/2002, G. K. v. Switzerland, Views adopted on 7 May 2003, para. 6.12. ↩

In the light of the aforementioned and the fact that the Migration Board and the migration courts are specialized bodies with particular expertise in the field of asylum law and practice, the State party contends that there is no reason to conclude that the national rulings were inadequate or that the outcome of the domestic proceedings was arbitrary in any way or that they amounted to a denial of justice in the present case. The State party submits that great weight must be attached to the opinions of the Swedish migration authorities, as expressed in their decisions to expel the complainant to the Russian Federation.

The State party observes that the complainant alleged that expelling him to the Russian Federation would be a violation of article 3 of the Convention, as he would risk being subjected to torture because he had been suspected of supporting the rebels in the Chechnya region by selling groceries from his father’s shop to them. However, the complainant emphasized that he had never sympathized with the rebels nor participated in their activities. Despite that, he alleged that he was arrested, detained and subjected to torture on two occasions. In that regard, the State party, like the migration authorities, finds many aspects of the complainant’s story contradictory and vague and raises questions about his general credibility. In particular, the complainant has not provided any medical documentation showing that he had been subjected to ill-treatment. During the domestic proceedings, the complainant stated that there were no visible scars or other injuries on his body from the torture that he allegedly suffered. In that regard, the State party, like the migration authorities, finds it implausible that a person who had allegedly been subjected to severe torture has no scars or signs of such treatment on his body. The State party stresses that it is up to the complainant to establish, prima facie, his asylum case. The State party also maintains that, where there is no evidence of alleged abuse or ill-treatment, there is no obligation on the part of the migration authorities to initiate a medical investigation.¹¹

11. See, for example, communication No. 464/2011, K. H. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 23 November 2012, para. 8.8. ↩

The State party shares the conclusions of the migration authorities that several aspects of the complainant’s account of his experiences are questionable as available country information only partially supports the story that he presented to the domestic authorities. Even if his statements concerning the first arrest and the claim that he was forced to sign a confession might be supported by certain publicly available reports, the country information does not support the “practice” alleged by the complainant that he was re-arrested after only one night of being released the first time, then he was sought almost immediately after being released the second time, despite the condition and assignment that he claims was given to him. In relation to the first arrest, the State party notes that it is normal that there is an imminent risk that a person against whom the authorities have levelled serious accusations, who has been deprived of his liberty and who has been subjected to extensive assaults by the authorities would go into hiding upon release in order to avoid the authorities. Therefore, the State party does not find it plausible that the Chechen authorities would have released him without any commitments on his part, as suggested by the complainant.

Moreover, in relation to the second arrest, the State party submits that the manner in which the complainant was supposed to execute the task assigned to him seems unlikely. It also appears improbable that his father would have been able to visit him regularly despite the authorities’ interest in him. It would have been important to consider the associated risk that the complainant’s hiding place would be revealed and that he and his friend would be exposed to danger. If the authorities had such an interest in the complainant as he alleges, they would have been able to find him either by following his father or by interrogating friends of the family.

The State party refers to available country information, according to which a substantial proportion of the population in the Chechen Republic has supported the rebels at some point, and highlights the fact that the authorities are currently not interested in people who have done so only sporadically. It is also clear that the Chechen authorities focus on persons suspected of having supported or collaborated with high-profile rebels and who have provided substantial support for a longer period of time.¹² The State party also notes that the complainant has not provided any documentation or evidence indicating that he is wanted by the authorities, nor has he submitted any documents showing that there are investigations or proceedings pending against him before the Chechen authorities.

12. See Swedish Migration Board, Country Profile – Russia, 25 February 2011, pp. 23–24. ↩

Moreover, the complainant alleged that the authorities threatened to kill his family when they were searching for the complainant at his house. However, after he left the Russian Federation, his cousin was in touch with his father and was informed that the family is alive. The State party finds that, considering the Chechen authorities’ alleged interest in the complainant, the allegations regarding threats to his family and the fact that to date nothing has happened to his family further undermines the credibility of the complainant’s story.

The State party submits that the complainant’s account of what happened to his family is vague and partially contradictory. The complainant first told the Migration Board that his father had told him that his wife and children had been sent to his wife’s parents when he was hiding from the Chechen authorities in Nadterechnoe. However, during the oral hearing before the Migration Court, the complainant claimed that the information regarding his family had come from his cousin, after he had arrived in Sweden. The State party notes that the complainant has not given a credible explanation for that discrepancy in his account.

In the light of the foregoing, the State party notes that, in accordance with the principle of the burden of proof in asylum cases, it is appropriate to require that an applicant provides all relevant information, tells the truth and helps the asylum officer to clarify all the facts in the case. The applicant should also make an effort to support his statements by providing any available evidence and giving a satisfactory explanation for any lack of evidence.¹³ Only when that has been done can the asylum-seeking applicant be granted the benefit of the doubt.

13. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, articles 195 and 205 (a). ↩

In sum and with reference to the foregoing, the State party submits that the circumstances invoked by the complainant are not sufficient to show that the alleged risk of torture fulfils the requirements of being foreseeable, real and personal. Accordingly, the enforcement of the expulsion order would, under the present circumstances, not constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention. Since the complainant’s claim under article 3 fails to rise to the basic level of substantiation, the communication should be declared inadmissible as manifestly unfounded.

Finally, the State party notes that the complainant was born and raised in the Dubovsky District of Rostov Oblast, where he lived until 2007, that is, when he was 20 years old. It is clear from his domestic passport, which he submitted to the Swedish authorities, that he was registered in Chechnya in January 2007. Hence, the complainant has lived most of his life outside Chechnya. Furthermore, according to his domestic passport, his marriage was registered in Rostov on 19 November 2009. During the oral hearing before the Migration Court, he stated that his wife lived with her family in Rostov and that her family, like his own, commuted between Rostov and Chechnya. The complainant finished upper secondary school and stated that he is in good physical and mental health. In the State party’s view, no information has emerged about his personal situation to indicate that he would be unable to provide for himself in Rostov or anywhere else in the Russian Federation, even in the absence of an established social network. Against that background, the State party asserts that it is possible and reasonable for the complainant and his family to consider resettling in Rostov or in another part of the Russian Federation if they, for reasons other than those alleged in the present case, feel threatened, for example, by the unstable situation in the Chechen Republic.

In that regard, the State party notes that, based on relevant Russian legislation, it seems that citizens are not obliged to return to their hometown to cancel their registration before changing their place of residence. Therefore the complainant could immediately take up residence and register in a different place upon return to the Russian Federation.¹⁴

14. See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, A.M. and Others v. Sweden, application No. 38813/08, decision adopted on 16 June 2009. ↩

On 3 January 2014, the complainant submitted his comments on the State party’s observations. He states that the State party failed to explain why “the application of the State party’s comprehensive legislation concerning asylum proceedings has failed” in the present case and that it merely reiterates the arguments and considerations made by the Swedish Migration Board. The complainant observes that the State party neither acknowledges nor denies that he was subjected to torture in the past, but only refers to a number of circumstances and facts allegedly demonstrating that his story is not credible. The actual act of torture has been neglected and not properly investigated.

The complainant adds that, in December 2013, the Swedish Amnesty Fund granted him the necessary funding to undergo psychological and medical examinations in order to investigate the impact of the ill-treatment to which he was subjected in Chechnya.¹⁵

15. No further information, in particular on the results of the examination, was provided. ↩

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide whether it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, (5) (a) of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has acknowledged that the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies. Accordingly, the Committee finds no further obstacles to the admissibility of the communication. It declares the communication admissible and proceeds to its examination on the merits.

In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties concerned.

In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainant to the Russian Federation would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to the Russian Federation. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being “highly probable” (para. 6), the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he faces a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk.¹⁶ Although, under the terms of its general comment No. 1, the Committee is free to assess the facts on the basis of the full set of circumstances in every case, considerable weight is given to the findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned (para. 9).¹⁷

16. See also, communication No. 203/2002, A. R. v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3. ↩
17. See, inter alia, communication No. 356/2008, N. S. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 6 May 2010, para. 7.3. ↩

In the present case, the complainant alleges that if he is returned to the Russian Federation he may be subjected to torture as he had been subjected to ill-treatment, including beatings and electric shocks, in 2010 by Chechen officials and that torture is widely used in Chechnya with the “purpose” of keeping people under control.

In that connection, the Committee notes that, even if it accepts the claim that the complainant was subjected to torture in the past, the question is whether he still remains at risk of torture in the Russian Federation. The Committee notes that, at present, the human rights situation in the Russian Federation is a matter of concern, in particular in the northern Caucasus region. The Committee recalls that, in 2012, it had expressed concern at numerous, ongoing and consistent reports of serious human rights abuses inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials or other persons acting in official capacities in the northern Caucasus, including the Chechen Republic, including torture and ill-treatment, abductions, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the Committee recognizes that the occurrence of human rights violations in his/her country of origin is not sufficient, in itself, to permit to conclude that a complainant, would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture.¹⁹

18. See CAT/C/RUS/CO/5, para. 13. ↩
19. See, inter alia, communication No. 519/2012, T. M. v. Republic of Korea, decision adopted on 21 November 2014, para. 9.7. ↩

The Committee notes that the State party has drawn attention to the inconsistencies and contradictions in the complainant’s accounts and submissions, which cast doubts on his general credibility and on the veracity of his claims. In particular, the State party notes that the complainant had stated to the asylum authorities that he had never sympathized with the rebels nor taken part in their activities, but had only sold them groceries when they came to his father’s shop. However, according to the State party, despite the fact that he had never been involved in the rebels’ activities, he also claimed that he had been arrested, detained and allegedly tortured. Furthermore, the State party notes that the available country information does not support the existence of a practice such as the one alleged by the complainant, that he was sought at his home almost immediately after being released from the first arrest and that he was re-arrested despite being given an “assignment” to carry out. In addition, according to the State party, it appears highly unlikely that the complainant would have been given the assignment to infiltrate the rebels’ base despite the lack of cooperation on his part during his second detention. Furthermore, the State party noted that the complainant affirmed that his father visited him regularly while he was staying with friends in the village of Nadterechnoe. The State party reasons that, if the authorities had such an interest in the complainant, as he alleges, and they were indeed looking for him after his second release, they would have been able to find him either by following his father or by interrogating friends of the family. Moreover, the State party notes that the complainant did not provide any medical documentation to support his claims that he had been subjected to ill-treatment nor any documentation or evidence indicating that he was wanted by the Chechen authorities, nor has he submitted any documents showing that investigations or proceedings are pending against him before the Chechen authorities. In that connection, the Committee notes that the complainant has also not submitted any evidence to it to substantiate his claim that he would risk being subjected to torture by the authorities if returned to the Russian Federation.

The Committee further observes that the complainant merely stated before the Swedish Migration Board and the Migration Court that he feared that he would be subjected to torture if returned to the Russian Federation as he had been tortured in the past and would surely be targeted again. However, the Committee notes that the authorities of the State party thoroughly evaluated the complainant’s allegations at the domestic level and found that they lacked credibility.

The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, whereby the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory, and indicates that it is generally for the complainant to present an arguable case.²⁰ In the light of the considerations above and on the basis of all the information submitted to it by the complainant, including with regard to the general human rights situation in the Russian Federation, the Committee considers that the complainant has not provided sufficient evidence to enable it to conclude that his deportation to his country of origin would expose him to a foreseeable, real and personal risk of torture within the meaning of article 3 of the Convention.

20. See communications No. 298/2006, C.A.R.M. et al. v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2007, para. 8.10; No. 256/2004, M. Z. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 12 May 2006, para. 9.3; No. 214/2002, M. A. K. v. Germany, decision adopted on 12 May 2004, para. 13.5; No. 150/1999, S. L. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 11 May 2001, para. 6.3; and No. 347/2008, N. B-M. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 14 November 2011, para. 9.9. ↩

Accordingly, the Committee, acting under article 22 (7) of the Convention, concludes that the complainant’s return to the Russian Federation would not constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention by the State party.