COMMUNICATIONS NOS.2693/2015, 2898/2016, 3002/2017, 3084/2017 : DECISION/VIEWS

The authors of the communications are Aleksandra Vasilevich (communication No. 2693/2015), Anatoly Lebedko (communication No. 2898/2016), Vladimir Katsora (communication No. 3002/2017) and Valery Repnin (communication No. 3084/2017). The authors are nationals of Belarus born in 1987, 1961, 1957 and 1961, respectively. They claim that the State party has violated their rights under articles 2 (2) and (3), 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 30 December 1992. The authors of communications No.2898/2016 and No. 3084/2017 are represented by counsel. The authors of communications and communication No. 2693/2015 and 3002/2017 are not represented by counsel.

On 14 March 2023, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the Committee decided to join communications 2693/2015, 2898/2016, 3002/2017 and 3084/2017, submitted by four different authors, for decision, in view of their substantial factual and legal similarity.

The authors in all four communications submit that they were brought before the court, charged with significant administrative fines for participating in peaceful rallies and convicted for violating the provisions of the Public Events Act concerning the organization of meetings, thereby committing an administrative offence under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences.

On 26 October 2014, the author took part in the funeral procession of civil activist V. Desyatik in Svisloch City in the Grodno region. After the funeral, the author participated with others in a commemoration of the Belarusian uprising of 1863 in Grodno. Together with other participants, the author moved between a number of locations, walking from the memorial of the national hero of the uprising, K. Kalinovskiy, towards the burial place of R. Traugutt. The participants then visited the village of Yakushovka, where K. Kalinovskiy used to reside. During the event, participants made speeches about the history of the uprising, the culture of Belarus and the country’s situation at that time. They held red and white flags, symbols of the uprising and the national flag of Belarus.³ The author claims that during the whole event he could see representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who were video recording the procession.

3. The flag, used before 1996, is largely considered a symbol of the opposition. Its use is forbidden in public. ↩

On 16 December 2014, the Svisloch District Court of Grodno region found that, on 26 October 2014, from noon to 2 p.m., the author, together with other persons, had moved between different locations, including the Kalinovskiy and Traugutt memorials and the village of Yakushovka, holding the red and white flags, thus participating in an unauthorized protest in violation of the provisions of the Public Events Act. The Court ruled that the author had committed an administrative offence under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences and ordered her to pay a fine of 3,750,000 roubles.⁴

4. At the time of the administrative hearing, approximately $376. ↩

On an unspecified date, the author filed a cassation appeal against the decision of the Svisloch District Court with the Grodno Regional Court, which was rejected on 20 January 2015. Under the supervisory review procedure, the author further appealed to the Chair of the Grodno Regional Court and the Chair of the Supreme Court. Both appeals were rejected, on 15 April and 5 August 2015, respectively. The Supreme Court noted that the author had missed the submission deadline for appeal.

The author submits that she has exhausted domestic remedies, since in line with the Committee’s jurisprudence, an appeal under the supervisory review procedure before the Prosecutor’s Office does not constitute an effective remedy.⁵

5. Olechkevitch v. Belarus (CCPR/C/107/D/1785/2008), para. 7.3. ↩

The author is the Chair of the United Civil Party of Belarus, an opposition political party, who actively participates in the social and political life of the country. In 2016, he was brought before the courts and convicted for violating the provisions of the Public Events Act in relation to two separate incidents.

The first incident for which he was convicted occurred on 3 March 2016. On that date, the author was distributing leaflets inviting people to a meeting in Minsk on 25 March 2016.⁶

6. The author does not specify the aim of the meeting. ↩

On 2 May 2016, the Sovietskiy District Court in Minsk established that, on 3 March 2016, at noon, inside the Silhouette Shopping Mall, located at 1 Viery Charužaj Street in Minsk, the author and two other persons had been distributing leaflets inviting people to a meeting to take place on 25 March 2016. The Court concluded that the author’s actions violated the provisions of the Public Events Act and that he had thereby committed an administrative offence under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was fined 8,400,000 roubles.⁷

7. At the time of the administrative hearing, approximately $840. ↩

On 2 May 2016, the author appealed the decision to the Minsk City Court. His appeal was dismissed on 7 June 2016.

The author was convicted for his participation in a second event, which occurred on 25 March 2016. On that day, he took part in a peaceful meeting in Kupala Square in Minsk, held without prior authorization by the competent authorities. Subsequently, the police charged him with participating in an unauthorized mass event, in violation of article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences.

On 12 April 2016, the Central District Court in Minsk found the author guilty of violating the provisions of the Public Events Act and article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and fined him 10,500,000 roubles.⁸ According to the Court’s decision, at approximately 5 p.m. on 25 March 2016, the author had actively participated in an unauthorized gathering devoted to “Freedom Day” in Kupala Square, and that he had shouted such slogans such as “Long live Belarus!”.

8. At the time of the administrative hearing, approximately $1,050. The author submits that this amount equals two average monthly salaries in the State party. ↩

On 20 April 2016, the author appealed the Central District Court decision to the Minsk City Court, noting that he had participated in a peaceful meeting and freely expressed his views as guaranteed by the national legislation. On 20 May 2016, the City Court dismissed his appeal.

The author submits that he has exhausted domestic remedies, since in line with the Committee’s jurisprudence, supervisory review procedures against court decisions that have entered into force do not constitute remedies that have to be exhausted for the purpose of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.⁹

9. Tulzhenkova v. Belarus (CCPR/C/103/D/1838/2008), annex, para. 8.3. ↩

On 19 February 2017 in Gomel City, the author participated in a street rally and a demonstration, held from noon to 1.10 p.m. in Uprising Square without prior authorization by the competent authorities, to protest against a presidential decree on prevention of social dependency. The peaceful event was attended by around 3,000 participants and was conducted without any incident. However, the author was subsequently summoned to the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel City, where a police record was filed against him for violating article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences.

On 17 March 2017, the Central District Court of Gomel established that the author had violated the provisions of the Public Events Act by participating in an unauthorized meeting, thereby committing an administrative offence under article 23.34 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences. Consequently, the Central District Court sentenced the author to 12 days of administrative detention.

On 20 March 2017, the author appealed the decision to Gomel Regional Court, noting that by sentencing him to an administrative arrest, the lower instance Court had restricted his constitutional right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The appeal was dismissed on 29 March 2017.

The author submits that he has exhausted domestic remedies, noting that according to the Committee’s jurisprudence, supervisory review procedures against court decisions that have entered into force do not constitute remedies that have to be exhausted for the purpose of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.¹⁰

10. Shumilin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1784/2008), annex, para. 8.3. ↩

On 25 March 2017, the author participated in a peaceful street rally on Sovietskiy Street in Gomel City to protest against the presidential decree on prevention of social dependency. Subsequently, the author was summoned to the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel City, where a police record was filed against him for violating article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences.

On 27 March 2017, the Soviet District Court of Gomel found that, on 25 March, from noon to 12.40 p.m., the author had participated in an unauthorized rally, walking on Sovietskiy Street from Uprising Square towards Yubileinaya Street in Gomel City while holding a red and white flag, in violation of the provisions of the Public Events Act. The Court ruled that he had committed an administrative offence under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to five days of administrative detention, which he served from 27 March to 2 April 2017.

On 4 April 2017, the author submitted a cassation appeal to the Gomel Regional Court, which was rejected on 28 April 2017.

The author submits that he has exhausted domestic remedies and refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence, stating that supervisory review procedures against court decisions that have entered into force do not constitute remedies that have to be exhausted for the purpose of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.¹¹

11. Ibid. ↩

The authors claim a violation of their rights under articles 19 and 21, in conjunction with articles 2 (2) and (3) of the Covenant on the grounds that the authorities failed to explain why the restrictions imposed on their rights for holding a peaceful protest were necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others. The authors therefore consider that by sentencing them to serve administrative detention (communications No. 3002/2017 and No. 3084/2017) and to pay a significant fine (communications No. 2693/2015 and No. 2898/2016) for holding pickets and expressing their views, the State party acted in violation of the Covenant.

The authors of the four communications ask the Committee to find their complaints admissible, consider them on the merits and find a violation of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 2 (2) and (3). The authors of communications No. 2693/2015 and No. 2898/2016 further ask the Committee to recommend to the State party to bring its national legislation into line with the provisions of the Covenant.

By notes verbales dated 4 February 2016,¹² 10 February¹³ and 23 August 2017,¹⁴ 22 February 2018¹⁵ and 7 February 2019,¹⁶ the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communications. In its observations in respect of the admissibility of all four communications, the State party submits that the authors failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies, as the possibilities for lodging further supervisory review appeals in their respective cases were not fully exhausted. Thus, it was possible for the authors to submit further appeals within the framework of the supervisory review procedure before the Chair or Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court¹⁷ and the competent prosecutor, in particular, the Prosecutor General or Deputy Prosecutor General.

12. In relation to communication No. 2693/2015. ↩
13. In relation to communication No. 2898/2016. ↩
14. In relation to communication No. 3002/2017. ↩
15. In relation to communication No. 3084/2017. ↩
16. In relation to communication No. 2693/2015, the State party submitted the same observation as on 4 February 2016. ↩
17. In communication No. 2693/2015, the State party noted only the author’s failure to appeal to the Prosecutor General. ↩

Referring to the merits of the communications, the State party argues that the authors’ claims of a violation of articles 19 and 21, in conjunction with article 2 (2) and (3), are unsubstantiated, noting in that respect that the courts’ decisions in the authors’ cases were taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic legislation, in particular, the Public Events Act. The State party observes that the national legislation that provides for the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of Belarus and does not contradict the international norms that allow each State to introduce restrictions to the rights and freedoms of a person that are necessary in a democratic society and in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as foreseen under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

The State party observes that the provisions of the Public Events Act, along with regulating the organization and conduct of meetings, rallies, street processions or demonstrations, pickets and other mass events in Belarus, are aimed at creating conditions for the realization of the constitutional rights of citizens and their freedoms.

On 6 March 2016,¹⁸ 17 March¹⁹ and 9 October 2017,²⁰ 7 May 2018²¹ and 10 August 2022,²² the authors submitted their comments on the State party’s observations. Addressing the State party’s arguments as to the inadmissibility of the communications for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the authors noted that the supervisory review procedure does not constitute an effective domestic remedy, as it does not entail a fresh examination of the case and its outcome depends on the sole discretion of the relevant prosecutor or judge. They additionally note that the current domestic legislation does not provide for the possibility of directly lodging a complaint before the Constitutional Court. They conclude that all available and effective domestic remedies have been exhausted in their cases.

18. Comments in relation to the State party’s observations in communication No. 2693/2015. ↩
19. Comments in relation to the State party’s observations in communication No. 2898/2016. ↩
20. Comments in relation to the State party’s observations in communication No. 3002/2017. ↩
21. Comments in relation to the State party’s observations in communication No. 3084/2017. ↩
22. Comments in relation to the State party’s observations in communication No. 2693/2015. ↩

The authors contend that the current domestic legislation on mass events and its application by the authorities of the State party resulted in a violation of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. They further submit that the State party has failed to implement the views adopted by the Committee in a number of similar cases²³ and that it has also failed to comply with the recommendations on amending the national legislation set out in the Joint Opinion on the Law on Mass Events of the Republic of Belarus, adopted by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe at the ninetieth plenary session of the Commission, in 2012.

23. Kirsanov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/110/D/1864/2009); Kuznetsov et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/1976/2010); Evrezov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/114/D/1988/2010); Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/113/D/1992/2010); Evrezov et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/112/D/1999/2010 and CCPR/C/112/D/1999/2010/Corr.1); and Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011). ↩

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the authors have failed to seek a supervisory review of the impugned decisions in their cases by the Prosecutor’s Office or by the Chair or Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court of Belarus. The Committee also notes the author’s arguments in communication No. 2693/2015 that she indeed appealed, unsuccessfully, the decisions in her cases under the supervisory review procedure before the president of a court (see para. 2.4 above). The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review submitted to a president of a court, directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge, constitutes an extraordinary remedy and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review submitted to a prosecutor’s office, dependent on the discretionary power of the prosecutor, requesting a review of court decisions that have taken effect, constitutes an extraordinary remedy and thus does not constitute a remedy that must be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.²⁴ The Committee notes that in the present cases, the authors have exhausted all available domestic remedies and that one of them (communication 2693/2015) has also attempted a supervisory review procedure, although unsuccessfully. Therefore, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communication.

24. Gryk v. Belarus (CCPR/C/136/D/2961/2017), para. 6.3; Tolchin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/3241/2018), para. 6.3; and Shchukina v. Belarus (CCPR/C/134/D/3242/2018), para. 6.3. ↩

The Committee takes note of the authors’ claims that the State party violated their rights under articles 19 and 21, read in conjunction with article 2 (2) of the Covenant. The Committee reiterates that the provisions of article 2 cannot be invoked in a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol in conjunction with other provisions of the Covenant, except when the failure by the State party to observe its obligations under article 2 is the proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant directly affecting the individual claiming to be a victim.²⁵ The Committee notes, however, that the authors have already alleged a violation of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, resulting from the interpretation and application of the existing laws of the State party, and the Committee does not consider the examination of whether the State party has also violated its general obligations under article 2 (2), read in conjunction with articles 19 and 21, to be distinct from examination of the violation of the authors’ rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore considers that the authors’ claims in that regard are incompatible with article 2 of the Covenant and thus inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

25. Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011), annex, para. 7.4.; and Zhukovsky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/127/D/2724/2016), para. 6.4. ↩

The Committee notes the authors’ claims under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 2 (3). In the absence, however, of any further pertinent information on file, the Committee considers that the authors have failed to sufficiently substantiate those claims for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee notes that the facts, as submitted by the authors in their respective communications, raise issues under articles 19 (2) and 21 of the Covenant, taken separately. The Committee, therefore, considers the claims under articles 19 (2) and 21 in the four communications sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, and proceeds with its consideration of the merits.

The Committee has considered the communications in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee takes note of the authors’ claims that their rights to freedom of expression and assembly have been restricted in violation of both article 19 (2) and article 21 of the Covenant, as they were sentenced to serve administrative detention (communications No. 3002/2017 and No. 3084/2017) or to pay significant fines (communications No. 2693/2015 and No. 2898/2016) for extending invitations to and participating in peaceful rallies and for expressing their views, as specified in detail in paragraphs 2.3, 2.8, 2.11, 2.15 and 2.19 above. It also takes note of the authors’ argument that the authorities failed to explain why the restrictions imposed on their rights were necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, as required, respectively, by articles 19 (3) and 21 of the Covenant.

Considering the authors’ claim that their right of peaceful assembly was unreasonably restricted by the State party on account of imposing administrative detentions and significant fines for holding peaceful public events, the Committee notes that the issue before it is to determine whether the restrictions imposed were justified under article 21 of the Covenant.

In its general comment No. 37 (2020), the Committee stated that peaceful assemblies may in principle be conducted in all spaces to which the public has access or should have access, such as public squares and streets.²⁶ Peaceful assemblies should not be relegated to remote areas where they cannot effectively capture the attention of those who are being addressed or of the general public. As a general rule, there can be no blanket ban on all assemblies in the capital city, in all public places except one specific location within a city or outside the city centre, or on all the streets in a city.

26. General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly, para. 55. ↩

The Committee recalls that the right of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed under article 21 of the Covenant, is a fundamental human right, essential for public expression of an individual’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society. Given that peaceful assemblies often have expressive functions, and that political speech enjoys particular protection as a form of expression, assemblies with a political message should enjoy a heightened level of accommodation and protection.²⁷ Article 21 of the Covenant protects peaceful assemblies wherever they take place: outdoors, indoors and online; in public and private spaces; or a combination thereof. Such assemblies may take many forms, including demonstrations, protests, meetings, processions, rallies, sit-ins, candlelight vigils and flash mobs. They are protected under article 21 whether they are stationary, such as pickets, or mobile, such as processions or marches.²⁸ The organizers of an assembly generally have the right to choose a location within sight and sound of their target audience,²⁹ and no restriction to this right is permissible, unless it: (a) is imposed in conformity with the law; and (b) is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), protection of public health or morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. When a State party imposes restrictions with the aim of reconciling an individual’s right to assembly and the aforementioned interests of general concern, it should be guided by the objective of facilitating the right, rather than seeking unnecessary or disproportionate limitations to it.³⁰ The State party is thus under an obligation to justify the limitation of the right protected by article 21 of the Covenant.³¹

27. Ibid, para. 32; see also general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, paras. 34, 3738 and 4243. ↩
28. General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly, para. 6. ↩
29. Ibid., para. 22. ↩
30. Ibid., para. 36. ↩
31. Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 8.4. ↩

In the present case, the Committee must consider whether the restrictions imposed on the authors’ right of peaceful assembly are justified under any of the criteria set out in the second sentence of article 21 of the Covenant. In the light of the information available on file, the authors were sentenced by the domestic Courts to administrative detention (communications No. 3002/2017 and No. 3084/2017) or significant administrative fines (communications No. 2693/201 and No. 2898/2016) for participating in peaceful rallies in violation of the provisions of the Public Events Act. The Committee notes, however, that the domestic courts did not provide any justification or explanation as to how, in practice, the authors’ participation in such peaceful rallies had violated the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set out in article 21 of the Covenant. In that respect, the State party refers to the fact that the provisions of the Public Events Act, along with regulating the organization and conduct of meetings in Belarus, are aimed at creating the conditions for the realization of the constitutional rights of citizens and their freedoms (see para. 4.3 above), but does not explain why, in the present cases, such constitutional rights of citizens or their freedoms were violated by the peaceful rallies in which the authors participated.

In the absence of any further explanations from the State party regarding the matter, the Committee concludes that the State party has violated the authors’ rights under article 21 of the Covenant.³²

32. Vladimir Malei v. Belarus (CCPR/C/129/D/2404/2014), para. 9.7; Tolchina et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2857/2016), para. 7.6; Zavadskaya et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2865/2016), para. 7.6; Popova v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/122/D/2217/2012), para. 7.6; and Sadykov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/129/D/2456/2014), para. 7.7. ↩

The Committee also takes note of the authors’ claims that their right to freedom of expression has been restricted in violation of article 19 (2) of the Covenant, since they were found guilty of an administrative offence and sentenced to administrative detention or to pay significant administrative fines for participating in peaceful rallies and publicly expressing their opinion on matters of public concern. The issue before the Committee is therefore to determine whether the restrictions imposed on the authors’ freedom of expression can be justified under any of the criteria set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant.

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, in which it stated, inter alia, that freedom of expression is essential for any society and constitutes a foundation stone for every free and democratic society.³³ It notes that article 19 (3) of the Covenant allows for certain restrictions on the freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart information and ideas, only to the extent that those restrictions are provided for by law and only if they are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Finally, any restriction on freedom of expression must not be overbroad in nature – that is, it must be the least intrusive among the measures that might achieve the relevant protective function and proportionate to the interest being protected.³⁴ The Committee recalls that the onus is on the State party to demonstrate that the restrictions on the author’s rights under article 19 of the Covenant were necessary and proportionate.³⁵

33. General comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, para. 2. ↩
34. Ibid., para. 34. ↩
35. Androsenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/116/D/2092/2011), para. 7.3. ↩

The Committee observes that sentencing the authors to administrative detention or imposing heavy administrative fines for participating in a peaceful, albeit unauthorized, meeting with an expressive purpose raises serious doubts as to the necessity and proportionality of the restrictions on the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee observes in this regard that the State party has failed to invoke and justify any specific grounds to support the necessity of such restrictions as required under article 19 (3) of the Covenant.³⁶ The State party has also failed to demonstrate that the measures selected were the least intrusive in nature or proportionate to the interest that it sought to protect. The Committee considers that, in the circumstances of the cases before it, the restrictions imposed on the authors and the imposed sanctions, although based on domestic law, were not justified pursuant to the conditions set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant. It therefore concludes that the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant have been violated.³⁷

36. Zalesskaya v. Belarus (CCPR/C/101/D/1604/2007), para. 10.5. ↩
37. Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2137/2012), para. 7.5; Zhagiparov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/124/D/2441/2014), para. 13.4; and Shchetko and Shchetko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001), para. 7.5. ↩

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State party of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated, inter alia, to provide the authors with adequate compensation, including reimbursement of the fines and any legal costs incurred by them. The State party is also under an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. In that connection, the Committee notes that it has dealt with similar cases in respect of the same laws and practices of the State party in a number of earlier communications, and thus requires the State party to revise its normative framework on public events, consistent with its obligation under article 2 (2), with a view to ensuring that the rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant may be fully enjoyed in the State party.

On becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there had been a violation of the Covenant. The present communications were submitted for consideration before the State party’s denunciation of the Optional Protocol became effective, on 8 February 2023. In accordance with article 12 (2) of the Optional Protocol and the Committee’s previous case law, the State party continues to be subject to the application of the Optional Protocol in respect of the present communication.³⁸ Since, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them widely disseminated in the official languages of the State party.

38. See, for example, Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago (CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998), para. 10; and Lobban v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/80/D/797/1998), para. 11. ↩