Dias Koshkarbayev (communication 2548/2015) and Dilnara Insenova (communication 2677/2015), both v. Kazakhstan

The authors of the communications are Dias Koshkarbayev (communication 2548/2015) and Dilnar Insenova (communication 2677/2015), both nationals of Kazakhstan, born in 1987 and 1972, respectively. They claim that the State party has violated their rights under articles 14 and 21 of the Covenant. Dilnar Insenova also claims that the State party has violated her rights under article 19 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 30 September 2009. The authors are represented by counsel.

On 16 July 2024, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of its rules of procedure, the Committee decided to join communications 2548/2015 and 2677/2015, which had been submitted by the same counsel on behalf of two different authors, for a joint decision, in view of their substantial factual and legal similarity.

As regards communication 2548/2015, on 11 February 2014, the government of Kazakhstan announced that the national currency would be devaluated by 30%. After the announcement, many Facebook users from Almaty announced that they would gather in the city center on 15 February to peacefully protest against the devaluation measures. On 15 February 2014, Mr. Koshkarbayev was passing by the area when he saw the protest and started to film it on his phone. He also spoke to some participants about the reasons for their protest and because he felt in solidarity with them he decided to stay. He was later detained by the police and cited for violating the legislation on organizing and holding peaceful assemblies. Later on the same day, the Specialized Inter-District Administrative Court of Almaty found Mr. Koshkarbayev guilty of the cited administrative offence and sentenced him to a fine in the amount of 9,260 tengé. His appeal to the Almaty City Court was denied on 4 March 2014. His requests for a supervisory review were dismissed by the Almaty City Prosecutor and by the Deputy Prosecutor General on 4 April and 14 July 2014, respectively.

As regards communication 2677/2015, on 15 July and 11 August 2014, Ms. Insenova and about a dozen other borrowers protested against banks’ lending policies near the building of the ATF bank and the Almaty city Akimat (mayor’s office), after which they were detained by the police and cited for violating the legislation on organizing and holding peaceful assemblies. On 15 July 2014, the Specialized Inter-District Administrative Court of Almaty found Ms. Insenova guilty of the cited administrative offence as to the first protest and sentenced her to a fine in the amount of 92,600 tengé. Her appeal to the Almaty City Court was denied on 5 August 2014. Her requests for a supervisory review were dismissed by the Almaty City Prosecutor and by the Deputy Prosecutor General on 6 October 2014 and 4 December respectively. As to the second protest, held on 11 August 2014 , the Specialized Inter-District Administrative Court of Almaty also found Ms. Insenova guilty of the cited administrative offence of violating the legislation on organizing and holding peaceful assemblies and sentenced her to a fine in the amount of 33,336 tengé. Her appeal to the Almaty City Court was denied on 2 September 2014. Her requests for a supervisory review were dismissed by the Almaty City Prosecutor and by the Prosecutor General on 20 October and 28 November 2014, respectively.

The authors submit that they have exhausted all available domestic remedies.

The authors claim that, by imposing fines on them, the State party has violated their right of peaceful assembly under article 21 of the Covenant. They argue that the State party has failed to provide any justification as to why it was necessary to restrict such right.

Ms. Insenova claims moreover that the State party has violated her right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Covenant.

Ms. Insenova also claims that the State party has violated her right to a fair trial under article 14 of the Covenant because during the consideration of her cases, the courts from the beginning took the position of the prosecution and did not take into account her arguments that were based on domestic and international law. She also claims that the consideration of her cases in appellate courts did not meet the criterion of impartiality, as the courts acted in the interests of the police.

Mr. Koshkarbayev claims that the State party violated his rights under article 14 (3) (d) and (g) of the Covenant because the police and the Specialized Inter-District Administrative Court of Almaty refused to provide him with counsel and to allow journalists to attend his court hearing.

The authors request that the Committee recommend that the State party: (a) bring to justice those responsible for the violation of their rights; (b) provide them with compensation, including legal costs; (c) take measures to lift the existing restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly and the right to a fair trial in the legislation of Kazakhstan that are contrary to articles 14 and 21 of the Covenant, respectively; and (d) ensure that conducting peaceful protests does not entail unwarranted interference by authorities or persecution of organizers and participants.

By note verbale dated 23 December 2015, the State party submitted its observations on admissibility of communication 2677/2015. The State party notes that, while asking for remedies in her communication, Ms. Insenova requests that those responsible for the violation of her rights be brought to justice. The State party refers to the Committee’s Views in H.C.M.A. v. Netherlands, in which it was held that the Covenant did not provide for the right to see another person criminally prosecuted.⁵ In the State party’s view, this makes the communication incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. Similarly, the State party argues that the remaining remedies requested by Ms. Insenova are also incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant. According to the State party, the remedies requested would also require the Committee to exceed its competencies and to amend domestic laws of the State party, thus interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign State.

5. Communication No. 213/1986, para. 11.6. ↩

The State party submits that Ms. Insenova has failed to substantiate how the domestic legislation violates her rights under articles 14 and 19 of the Covenant. The State party refers to the Committee’s Views in E.Z. v. Kazakhstan, in which the Committee found the communication inadmissible because the author had not substantiated his claims under article 14.⁶ Therefore, the State party argues that Ms. Insenova’s communication should be declared inadmissible in accordance with article 3 of the Optional Protocol, rule 99 (d) of the rules of procedure and the Committee’s jurisprudence.

6. CCPR/C/113/D/2021/2010, para. 7.5. ↩

Finally, the State party challenges the admissibility of the communication owing to the non-exhaustion of the available domestic legal remedies. The State party notes that, after Ms. Insenova’s requests for a supervisory review were rejected by the Deputy Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan on 28 November and 4 December 2014, she was entitled to submit a request to the Prosecutor General for a supervisory review. The State party refers to the Committee’s Views in T.K. v. France, in which the Committee held that mere doubts about the effectiveness of domestic remedies did not absolve an author from pursuing them.⁷ The State party gives the example of a domestic case, Filatova and Kuzmintsev, in which the akimat of Almaty had unlawfully denied permission for two individuals to carry out a hunger strike in their apartment. A request for a supervisory review to the Prosecutor General resulted in a new court decision in favour of the defendants and full restoration of their rights and freedoms. Therefore, the State party argues that communication 2677/2015 should be declared inadmissible in accordance with articles 2 and 5 of the Optional Protocol, rule 99 (f) of the rules of procedure and the Committee’s jurisprudence.

7. Communication No. 220/1987. ↩

By letters dated 5 January 2016, Ms. Insenova provided her comments to the State party’s observations. She reiterates that the State party has violated her rights under articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Covenant and that her attempts to obtain a remedy through national courts and the prosecutor’s office have been unsuccessful.

With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, Ms. Insenova submits that recourse to the Prosecutor’s Office is not an effective remedy that needs to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. Nevertheless, she filed requests to the Almaty City Prosecutor and to the Prosecutor General’s Office to initiate supervisory review proceedings in her administrative cases, but those requests were rejected. Therefore, all available and effective domestic remedies have been exhausted. She notes that in Filatova and Kuzmintsev, mentioned by the State party in its submission, the rights of one of the plaintiffs have not been restored and she has not been paid legal costs. The new ruling by a domestic court did not provide for a mechanism to restore the plaintiffs’ rights. In addition, the akimat of Almaty city refused to pay moral and material damages to the plaintiffs, or to punish the employee responsible for the unlawful ban on a hunger strike by the plaintiffs in the case. Therefore, Ms. Insenova submits that the State party’s use of the above-mentioned case as an example is inappropriate.

By notes verbale dated 16 August 2022, the State party submitted its observations on the merits of both communications. The State party submits that article 21 of the Covenant protects the right of peaceful assembly, which cannot be restricted unless the restrictions are imposed in conformity with the law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The State party submits that the provisions of article 21 of the Covenant are fully reflected in the domestic legislation of Kazakhstan. The State party notes that, in accordance with article 2 of the Law on the procedure for organizing and holding peaceful assemblies, meetings, marches, pickets and demonstrations, an authorization must be obtained from a designated State body prior to conducting such events. Furthermore, in accordance with article 9 of the above-mentioned law, persons who violate the prescribed procedure bear responsibility under the law. The State party notes that since both authors participated in peaceful assemblies that were held without prior authorizations, they were sanctioned in accordance with the Code of Administrative Violations.

With regard to the claim under article 19 of the author of communication 2677/2015, the State party submits that article 19 (2) of the Covenant guarantees freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information. At the same time, article 19 (3) allows for certain restrictions as provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights and reputations of others and for the protection of national security or of public order or of public health or morals. The State party notes that, contrary to what is being claimed by Ms. Insenova before the Committee, she was held responsible under the administrative procedure not for exercising her rights to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly, but rather for violating the requirements established in national legislation for the exercise of these rights.

With regard to the authors’ claims under article 14 of the Covenant, the State party submits that during their court hearings, the authors were provided with all the rights and guarantees provided for by law. As to the allegations of Mr. Koshkarbayev that the police and the Specialized Inter-District Administrative Court of Almaty refused to provide him with counsel and to allow journalists to attend his court hearing, the State party notes that he participated in all court hearings and has been informed in writing by the courts about the right to counsel, which he did not exercise.

By letters dated 23 October 2023, the authors reiterated their previous arguments that they consider their rights under articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Covenant to be violated by the State party.

By notes verbale dated 16 January 2024, the State party submitted its further observations on both communications. It notes that the local legislation does not limit the rights of citizens to express their opinions, but only establishes conditions for peaceful assemblies in order to ensure the public order and safety of all members of the public. The State party reiterates that the authors’ rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant were not violated since they did not have permission from the local executive body to hold the event, meaning their actions were against the law. It notes that the authors’ actions could have led to mass violations of public order and endangered the health and safety of participants and the public.

The State party submits that a new Law on the procedure for organizing and holding peaceful assemblies in Kazakhstan entered into force on 6 June 2020. It was adopted taking into consideration the recommendations of civil society, including on the notification procedure relating to the holding of public assemblies, whereby the local executive bodies must render their decision on public assembly requests within three working days. The State party further notes that the new Law provides a general presumption in favour of holding peaceful assemblies and sets out an exhaustive list of grounds on which local executive bodies may refuse to authorize the holding of an assembly. Such grounds include violation of the integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan; undermining the security of the state; inciting social, racial, national, religious, class or tribal discord; violation of other provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, laws and other normative legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the existence of a threat to state security; and violation of public order, life and health of other persons.

The State party notes that the previous Law restricted the possibility of holding peaceful assemblies only in places determined by local municipalities, including single pickets. The new Law establishes that picketing can be held anywhere, except for mass graves, strategic and military facilities, or territories adjacent to the residences of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Thus, single pickets can be held in any place, near any landmark or facility, including buildings of central state bodies, local executive bodies, which will allow citizens to be heard by the authorities. The State party also notes that the previous Law did not distinguish between participants and organizers, did not define their rights and obligations, and only established prohibitions. In this regard, the new Law defines the status, rights and obligations of organizers and participants.

Based on the above, the State party concludes that its legislation regulating the organisation and conduct of peaceful assemblies currently corresponds to generally accepted world practice. It also submits that since 2020, more than 800 meetings and pickets on various issues have been held in Kazakhstan by civil activists and non-governmental organisations.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the remedies requested by Ms. Insenova (communication 2677/2015) require the Committee to exceed its competencies and to amend domestic laws of the State party, thus interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, which makes the communications incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, pursuant to article 3 of the Optional Protocol. However, the Committee points out that, under the procedure established by the Optional Protocol, when it finds violations of the Covenant, it is competent to determine the reparation measures that the State party should take in order to remedy the harm caused and prevent future violations. Thus, there is nothing to prevent the authors from requesting or proposing measures of redress, although the Committee is not bound by any such requests.⁸ The Committee therefore considers that it is not precluded under article 3 of the Optional Protocol from examining the communication.

8. Delgado Burgoa v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (CCPR/C/122/D/2628/2015), para. 10.3. ↩

The Committee notes the State party’s argument that Ms. Insenova has failed to exhaust domestic remedies because she did not file a request for supervisory review with the Prosecutor General. The Committee also notes that, on various dates, Ms. Insenova did submit requests to initiate supervisory review proceedings to the Almaty City Prosecutor and to the General Prosecutor’s Office, and that they were all dismissed. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which petition to a prosecutor’s office and depending on the discretionary power of the prosecutor for supervisory review of court decisions that have taken effect does not constitute a remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.⁹ Accordingly, the Committee finds that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining communication 2677/2015.

9. Alekseev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009), para. 8.4; Zhagiparov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/124/D/2441/2014), para. 12.3; and Poplavny and Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/118/D/2139/2012), para. 7.3. ↩

The Committee further notes Mr. Koshkarbayev’s claim that the State party has violated his rights under articles 14 (3) (d) and (g) of the Covenant because the police and the Specialized Inter-District Administrative Court of Almaty refused to provide him with counsel and to allow mass media to attend his court hearings. The Committee also notes the State party’s submission that Mr. Koshkarbayev participated in all court hearings and has been informed in writing by the courts about the right to counsel, which he did not exercise. The Committee also notes Ms. Insenova’s claim that the State party has violated her right to a fair trial under article 14 of the Covenant because during the consideration of her cases, the courts from the beginning took the position of the prosecution and did not take into account her arguments that were based on domestic and international law, and that the appellate courts acted in the interests of the police. In the absence of any other information or explanation of pertinence on file from both authors, the Committee considers that the authors have failed to sufficiently substantiate these allegations for the purposes of admissibility, and finds them inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee considers that the authors have sufficiently substantiated the remaining claims which raise issues under article 21 of the Covenant in respect of both authors, and under article 19 of the Covenant in respect of Ms. Insenova. It therefore declares this part of the communications admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits.

The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee notes the authors’ claims that the State party has violated their right of peaceful assembly under article 21 of the Covenant by sentencing them to fines for participating in peaceful protests on 15 February 2014 (Mr. Koshkarbayev) and on 15 July and 11 August 2014 (Ms. Insenova). The Committee also notes the claim by Ms. Insenova that the State party has violated her right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Covenant. The authors do not consider that the restrictions imposed on their rights are necessary, nor that they fall within the permissible restrictions enshrined in articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The Committee further notes that the State party acknowledges that the authors’ rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant were restricted but considers that the restrictions were compatible with the Covenant.

The Committee refers to its general comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly and recalls that the right of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed under article 21 of the Covenant, is a fundamental human right that is essential for the public expression of an individual’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society. Assemblies may take many forms, including demonstrations, protests, meetings, processions, rallies, sit-ins, candlelit vigils and flash mobs. They are protected under article 21 whether they are stationary, such as pickets, or mobile, such as processions or marches.¹⁰ No restriction to this right is permissible, unless it is (a) imposed in conformity with the law; and (b) necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. When a State party imposes restrictions with the aim of reconciling an individual’s right to assembly and the aforementioned interests of general concern, it should be guided by the objective of facilitating the right, rather than seeking unnecessary or disproportionate limitations to it.¹¹ The State party is thus under the obligation to justify the restriction of the right protected by article 21 of the Covenant, and to demonstrate that such restriction does not serve as a disproportionate obstacle to the exercise of the right.¹²

10. General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 6. ↩
11. Ibid., para 36. ↩
12. Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 8.4. ↩

The Committee has consistently observed that authorization regimes that require individuals wishing to assemble or participate in an assembly to apply for permission (or a permit) from the authorities prior to doing so, undercut the notion that peaceful assembly is a basic right.¹³ Where such regimes exist, they must in practice function as a system of notification, with authorization being granted as a matter of course in the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise.¹⁴ Such systems should not be overly bureaucratic;¹⁵ and notification regimes, for their part, must not in practice function as authorization systems.¹⁶

13. CCPR/C/MAR/CO/6, para. 45; CCPR/C/GMB/CO/2, para. 41; and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa”, para. 71. ↩
14. General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 73. ↩
15. Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011), para. 8.3. ↩
16. General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 73; and CCPR/C/JOR/CO/5, para. 32. ↩

The Committee notes that the State party invokes the provisions of the previous Law on the procedure for organizing and holding peaceful assemblies, meetings, marches, pickets and demonstrations. Said law, which required application to be made and authorization by the local executive authorities to be received prior to the intended event, which constitute restrictions to the right of peaceful assembly. The Committee recalls that the right of peaceful assembly is a right, not a privilege. Restrictions on this right, even if authorized by law, must also meet the criteria set out in the second sentence of article 21 of the Covenant. In this connection, the Committee observes that restrictions imposed for the protection of “the rights and freedoms of others” may relate to the protection of Covenant rights and other human rights of people not participating in the assembly. At the same time, assemblies are a legitimate use of public and other spaces, and since they may entail by their very nature a certain level of disruption to ordinary life, such disruptions have to be accommodated, unless they impose a disproportionate burden, in which case the authorities must be able to provide detailed justification for any restrictions.¹⁷ The Committee also observes that “public order” refers to the sum of the rules that ensure the proper functioning of society, or the set of fundamental principles on which society is founded, which also entail respect for human rights, including the right of peaceful assembly.¹⁸ States parties should not therefore rely on a vague definition of “public order” to justify overbroad restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly.¹⁹ Peaceful assemblies can in some cases be inherently or deliberately disruptive and require a significant degree of toleration. “Public order” and “law and order” are not synonyms, and the prohibition of “public disorder” in domestic law should not be used unduly to restrict peaceful assemblies.²⁰, In the present communications, the Committee notes that the State party has not provided any specific information as to the nature of the disturbance occasioned by the assemblies in question.

17. Sambetbai v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/130/D/2418/2014), para. 12.5; Stambrovsky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/112/D/1987/2010), para. 7.6; and Pugach v. Belarus (CCPR/C/114/D/1984/2010), para. 7.8. ↩
18. General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 44. ↩
19. CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/1, para. 26; and CCPR/C/DZA/CO/4, para. 45. ↩
20. General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 44. ↩

The Committee recalls that article 21 of the Covenant provides that any restrictions to the right of peaceful assembly must be “necessary in a democratic society”, meaning that they must be both necessary and proportionate in the context of a society based on democracy, the rule of law, political pluralism and human rights, as opposed to being merely reasonable or expedient.²¹ Such restrictions must be appropriate responses to a pressing social need, related to one of the permissible grounds in article 21 of the Covenant.²² They must also be the least intrusive among the measures that might serve the relevant protective function.²³ Moreover, they must be proportionate, which requires a value assessment, weighing the nature and detrimental impact of the interference on the exercise of the right against the resultant benefit to one of the grounds for interfering.²⁴ If the detriment outweighs the benefit, the restriction is disproportionate and thus not permissible.

21. Ibid., para. 40. ↩
22. Arkhangelskiy et al. v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/137/D/2538/2015), para. 8.6. ↩
23. Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2137/2012), para. 7.4. ↩
24. General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 40. ↩

The Committee observes that the State party has not demonstrated that sanctioning the authors with fines for participating in a peaceful assembly was necessary in a democratic society to pursue a legitimate aim or was proportionate to such an aim in accordance with the requirements article 21 of the Covenant. The Committee also recalls that any restrictions on participation in peaceful assemblies should be based on a differentiated or individualized assessment of the conduct of the participants and the assembly concerned. Blanket restrictions on peaceful assemblies are presumptively disproportionate.²⁵ For these reasons, the Committee concludes that notwithstanding its arguments under the 2020 Law, which in any event was not applied to the authors, the State party has failed to justify the restriction on the authors’ right of peaceful assembly and has thus violated article 21 of the Covenant.

25. Ibid., para. 38. ↩

The Committee notes the claims made by Ms. Insenova that the State party has violated her right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee must therefore decide whether the restrictions imposed on Ms. Insenova are allowed under any of the permissible restrictions laid out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant.

The Committee notes that sanctioning Ms. Insenova for expressing her views through participation in a public event interfered with her right to impart information and ideas of any kind, as protected under article 19 (2) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that article 19 (3) of the Covenant allows certain restrictions, but these are only such as are provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others or for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public) or of public health or morals. The Committee refers to its general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, in which it states that those freedoms are indispensable conditions for the full development of the person and essential for any society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society (para. 2). Any restriction on the exercise of these freedoms must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. Restrictions must be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on which they were predicated (para. 22). The Committee recalls that the onus is on the State party to demonstrate that the restrictions on the authors’ rights under article 19 were necessary and proportionate.²⁶

26. Pivonos v. Belarus (CCPR/C/106/D/1830/2008), para. 9.3; Olechkevitch v. Belarus (CCPR/C/107/D/1785/2008), para. 8.5; Sambetbai v. Kazakhstan, para. 12.8; Kurtinbaeva v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/130/D/2540/2015), para. 9.9; Nurlanuly v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/130/D/2546/2015), para. 9.9; and Kulumbetov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/130/D/2547/2015), para. 8.9. ↩

The Committee observes that sentencing Ms. Insenova to fines for participating in peaceful albeit unauthorized events with an expressive purpose, raises serious doubts as to the necessity and proportionality of the restrictions on the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee also observes in this regard that the State party has failed to invoke any specific grounds to support the necessity of such restrictions, as required under article 19 (3) of the Covenant.²⁷ Nor did the State party demonstrate that the measures selected were the least intrusive in nature or proportionate to the interest that it sought to protect. The Committee considers that, in the circumstances of the cases, the restrictions imposed on Ms. Insenova, although based on domestic law, were not justified pursuant to the conditions set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee therefore concludes that her rights under article 19 of the Covenant have been violated.²⁸

27. Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan, para. 7.5; and Zalesskaya v. Belarus (CCPR/C/101/D/1604/2007), para. 10.5. ↩
28. Svetik v. Belarus, para. 7.3; and Shchetko and Shchetko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001), para. 7.5. ↩

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State party of the rights of both authors under article 21 of the Covenant, and of the rights of Ms. Insenova under article 19 (2) of the Covenant.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide all the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated to take appropriate steps to provide the authors with adequate compensation and reimbursement of the imposed fines and any legal costs incurred by them. The State party is also under an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and to disseminate them widely in the official languages of the State party.