The authors of the communications are Andrey Strizhak (author of the communication No. 2579/2015), Sergey Kosobutsky,Viktor Kozlov, Konstantin Zhukovski and Leonid Sudalenko (authors of the communication No. 2968/2017), Zinaida Shumilina, Vasily Polyakov and Mikhail Nepomnyashchikh (authors of the communications No. 3057/2017), Viktor Kozlov, Leonid Sudalenko and Anatoly Poplavny (authors of the communication No. 3059/2017), and Vladimir Nepomnyashchikh (author of the communication No. 3099/2018 and No. 3234/2018). The authors are nationals of Belarus. They claim that the State party has violated their rights under articles 2 (2), 2 (3), 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Belarus on 30 December 1992.
On … July 2023, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the Committee decided to deal with communications Nos. 2579/2015, 2968/2017, 3057/2017, 3059/2017, 3099/2018 and 3234/2018 jointly, in view of substantial factual and legal similarity.
The facts as submitted by the authors
All authors filed applications for authorization to organize peaceful assemblies with the respective local executive authorities in the cities of Rechitsa and Gomel between 2013 and 2017. Their applications were rejected. Subsequently, all authors have filed unsuccessful appeals against the decisions of the executive authorities in various courts.
The facts relevant to each individual communication are summarized below.
Communication No. 2579/2015, Andrey Strizhak v. Belarus
On 23 August 2013, the author submitted an application to the Rechitsa District Executive Committee of the Gomel Region, requesting an authorisation to organize on 8 September 2013, a peaceful march of up to 15 participants in the city centre. The purpose of the march was to raise public awareness about the government's decision to abolish the reimbursement of sick leave for employees with children. Along with the application, the author included a signed document agreeing to cover any expenses related to maintaining public order, providing healthcare, and cleaning the area within 10 days after the event, as stipulated by the relevant decision of the local executive authority.
On 29 August 2013, the Executive Committee denied the authorization to organize the march, on the ground that the author’s application did not fulfil the requirements of the Public Events Act4 and the decision of the Executive Committee of 10 April 2012 No. 802 on mass events in the Rechitsa District. According to Decision No. 802, the Executive Committee has designated two specific locations for organizing public events in the town. Additionally, the decision mandates that contracts be signed with the relevant service providers prior to the event, covering aspects such as maintaining public order, providing medical services during the event, and cleaning the location afterwards. The author's request to hold the event was rejected due to two reasons. Firstly, the planned event's location did not fall within the designated areas specified for such purposes. Secondly, the author had not fulfilled the requirement of entering into contracts with the necessary service providers beforehand.
- Article 9 of the Public Events Act gives discretion to the local executive authorities to determine permanent locations for the conduct of public events. ↩
On 11 September 2013, the author appealed the decision of the Executive Committee of 29 August 2013 to the Rechitsa District Court of the Gomel Region. On 8 October 2013, the author’s appeal was rejected by the court. On 15 October 2013, the author submitted appeal against the decision of the District Court to the Gomel Regional Court, and this appeal was rejected on 5 November 2013. The courts found that the author failed to comply with the requirements for organization of public events as set out in the Public Events Act and the Decision No. 802 of the Rechitsa Executive Committee.
Communication No. 2968/2017, Sergey Kosobutsky et al. v. Belarus
On 11 May 2016, the authors submitted an application to the Gomel City Executive Committee requesting an authorization to conduct a public event in the form of a picket at the location, authorized for such events by the Executive Committee, namely, the site adjacent to the square at the intersection of Barykina and Voiskovaya streets in Gomel. The purpose of the event was to draw attention to the issue of wage reduction for workers in Belarus. On 20 May 2016, the Executive Committee denied the authorization to hold the picket on the ground that the authors’ application did not fulfil the requirements of the Executive Committee Decision No.755 of 15 August 2013 on mass events in Gomel City. According to Decision No. 755, there are two designated locations in Gomel for organizing public events: a park and an area adjacent to the stadium. If an event is organized without the involvement of a state institution, the organizers are required to provide contracts with specific service providers along with their application for permission. These contracts include a contract with the Central Gomel Town Polyclinic for medical services during the event, and a contract with the community enterprise “GorSAP” responsible for road maintenance, for cleaning services after the event. The authors failed to provide the necessary contracts with the service providers, resulting in the denial of their authorization request.
On 23 May 2016, the authors appealed the decision of the Executive Committee before the Central District Court of Gomel. Their appeal was rejected on 16 June 2016. Their cassation appeal of 17 June 2016 to the Gomel Regional Court was rejected on 9 August 2016. The authors filed requests for supervisory review to the Chair of the Gomel Regional Court on 20 September 2016 and to the Chair of the Supreme Court of Belarus (unspecified dated). Their requests were rejected on 3 October and 17 November 2016, respectively. The authors filed requests for supervisory review to the Gomel Prosecutor’s office on 25 November 2016, and to the the Prosecutor General’s office on 20 December 2016. These requests were also rejected on 14 December 2016 and 10 February 2017, respectively. The author’s appeals were rejected on the ground that they failed to comply with the requirements of the Executive Committee Decision No. 775.
Communication No. 3057/2017, Zinaida Shumilina et al. v. Belarus
On 29 December 2014, the authors submitted an application to the Gomel City Executive Committee, seeking authorization to conduct several peaceful pickets in various locations around Gomel on 17 January 2015. The purpose of these pickets was to express their views on the financial crisis in Belarus and to call for the resignation of President Lukashenko.
On 10 January 2015, the Executive Committee denied the authorization to hold the pickets requested by the authors. The reason cited for the denial was that the authors' application did not meet the requirements outlined in the Executive Committee Decision No. 755 on mass events in Gomel City. Specifically, the planned locations for the pickets differed from those specified in the Decree, and the authors failed to provide contracts with the necessary service providers as mandated by the decision.
On 20 January 2015, the authors appealed the decision of the Executive Committee before the Central District Court of Gomel. Their appeal was rejected on 25 February 2015. The authors’ appeal to the Gomel Regional Court of 16 March 2015, was rejected on 23 April 2015. The authors submitted requests for supervisory review to the Chair of the Gomel Regional Court on 14 August 2015, to the Chair of the Supreme Court on 5 October 2015, to the Gomel Region Prosecutor’s office on 24 November 2015, and to the Prosecutor General on 17 February 2016. Their requests were rejected on 25 September, 17 November, 28 December 2015, and 21 April 2016, respectively on the ground that the authors have failed to comply with the requirements of the Executive Committee Decision No. 775.
Communication No. 3059/2017, Victor Kozlov et al. v. Belarus
On 7 September 2015, the authors submitted an application to the Gomel City Executive Committee, seeking authorization to organize a march in the city center on 27 September 2015. The purpose of the march was to draw public attention to the exercise of voting rights in the upcoming Presidential elections. To support their application, the authors included a signed document in which they committed to covering any costs associated with maintaining public order, providing healthcare services, and cleaning the area within 10 days. This commitment was made in accordance with the Executive Committee Decision No. 755.
On 21 September 2015, the Executive Committee rejected the application having determined that the requested march's itinerary contradicted the provisions of the Public Events Act. According to this act, no public events should be authorized within a distance of less than 50 meters from local administrations and less than 200 meters from mass media editorial offices. Furthermore, the decision referred to the Executive Committee Decision no. 775 in that the authors failed to provide contracts with service providers along with their application.
On 24 September 2015, the the authors appealed the decision of the Executive Committee before the Central District Court of Gomel. Their appeal was rejected on 12 October 2015. The authors’ cassation appeal to the Gomel Regional Court dated 14 October 2015, was rejected on 24 November 2015. The authors submitted requests for supervisory review to the Chair of the Gomel Regional Court on 11 December 2015, to the Chair of the Supreme Court of Belarus on 19 January 2016, to the Gomel Region Prosecutor’s office on 9 March 2016, and to the Prosecutor General’s Office on 18 April 2016. Their requests were rejected on 16 January, 2 March, 8 April and 15 June 2016, respectively. The authors’ appeals were rejected because they failed to comply with the requirements of the Executive Committee Decision No. 775.
Communication No. 3099/2018, Vladimir Nepomnyashchikh v. Belarus
On an unspecified date in February 2017, the author submitted an application to the Gomel City Executive Committee, seeking authorization to organize a demonstration in the city centre on 19 February 2017. The purpose of the demonstration was to protest against the Presidential decree of 2 April 2015 No. 3 on the prevention of social dependency. On 13 February 2017 the Executive Committee denied the authorization for the event. Its decision was based on the fact that the author did not comply with the provisions which require that public events should not be authorized within a distance of less than 50 meters from local administration buildings and less than 200 meters from mass media editorial offices. Furthermore, the author failed to provide contracts with public service providers as required by the Executive Committee's Decision No. 755 on mass events in Gomel City. On the same date the author appealed the decision of the Executive Committee before the Central District Court in Gomel, which rejected his appeal on 4 April 2017. On 16 May 2017, the author’s cassation appeal, submitted on 7 April 2017, was rejected by the Gomel Regional Court for failure to comply with the requirements for orginizing public events, as set out in of the Executive Committee Decision No. 775.5
- Despite the lack of authorization, the author took part in the mass event on 19 February 2017. On 15 March 2017, the Central District Court in Gomel subjected the author to three days of administrative detention and fined him in the amount equal to 255 EUR. The author did not appeal this decision. ↩
Communication No. 3234/2018, Vladimir Nepomnyashchikh v. Belarus
On 18 December 2017, the author submitted an application to the Gomel Executive Committee, seeking an authorization for a peaceful picket of up to 10 participants. The purpose of the picket was to draw attention to two main issues: the blocking of the website 'Belarussian partisan' and the absence of free speech in Belarus. On 28 December 2017, the Executive Committee denied the authorization for the picket because the author failed to provide contracts with public service providers required under the Decision No. 755 on mass events in Gomel City. On 6 January 2018, the author appealed against the Executive Committe decision to the Central District Court in Gomel, which rejected his appeal on 5 April 2018. On 14 June 2018, the author’s cassation appeal (submitted on 12 May 2018) was rejected by the Gomel Regional Court. On 14 June 2018, the author’s request for supervisory review (submitted on 12 May), was rejected by the President of the Gomel Regional Court. On 3 August 2018, his request for supervisory review (submitted on 18 May) was rejected by the President of the Supreme Court because the author failed to comply with requirements of the Executive Committee Decision No. 775.
The complaint
All authors assert that the denial of their requests for authorization of public events by local executive authorities, based on existing legislation, violated their rights under articles 19 and 21, read in conjunction with article 2(2) and (3), of the Covenant. They argue that neither the local authorities nor the courts assessed whether the limitations imposed on their rights under the Rechitsa Executive Committee Decision No. 802 and the Gomel Executive Committee Decision No. 755 were justified on the grounds of national security, public safety, public order, for the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The authors contend that these decisions, which confine all mass events to two remote locations in Rechitsa and three locations in Gomel, and require organizers to enter into prior paid contracts with city service providers, unduly restrict their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. They further claim that the provisions of the Public Events Act grant local executive authorities the power to designate permanent locations for mass events without requiring justification for such limitations.
The authors ask the Committee to recommend that the State party aligns provisions of its legislation on organization of public events with the standards set out in articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.
State party’s observations on admissibility and merits
In respect of communication No. 2579/2015, the State party submits that the author himself acknowledges that he has not exhausted all available domestic remedies, contrary to the requirements of article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The State party views the Committee's decision to register the communication as a violation of article 5 of the Optional Protocol. Furthermore, the State party argues that the Committee's arbitrary interpretation of articles 2 and 5 of the Optional Protocol contradicts the principles of treaty interpretation outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Due to these procedural violations by the author and the Committee, the State party states that it will cease further correspondence.
The State party challenges the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the authors of communications Nos. 3057/2017, 3059/2017, 3099/2018 and 3234/2018. The State party notes that the author of communications No. 3099/2018 and 3234/2018 failed to submit a request for supervisory review under article 439 of the Civil Procedure Code. The authors of communications Nos. 2968/2017, 3057/2017 and 3059/2017 have not availed themselves fully of this procedure, which provides a possibility to file a request for supervisory review through the President of the Supreme Court or his/her deputies, as well through the Prosecutor General or his/her deputies.
On the merits, the State party submits that the organization of public events affects the rights of others. In order to protect these rights, the State party has established a procedure for organization of public events in the Public Events Act. According to article 9 of the Act local executive authorities are empowered to determine locations for public events. The locations proposed by the authors of communications Nos. 3057/2017, 3059/2017, 3099/2018 and 3234/2018 did not correspond to those designated for such purposes by the respective decisions of the local authorities.
In order to guarantee protection of public order and of the rights of the participants of public events and the rights of others, the national legislation requires conclusion of contracts with public service providers in advance of the public event. The authors of communications Nos. 2968/2017, 3057/2017, 3059/2017, 3099/2018 have not provided such contracts together with their application to the local executive committees. The state party concludes that the authors’ applications have been rejected in accordance with the national law and that there has been no violation of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.
Authors’ comments on the State party’s observations
On 11 May 2015,12 23 January 2020,13 28 April 2017,14 12 May 2018, 5 June 2018,15 and 17 April 2019,16 the authors submitted their comments on the State party’s respective observations. Addressing the State party’s arguments as to the inadmissibility of the communications for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the authors of communications Nos. 2579/2015, 2968/2017, 3057/2017, 3059/2017, 3099/2018 and 3234/2018 submit that the supervisory review procedure does not constitute an effective domestic remedy, as it does not entail a fresh examination of the case and its outcome depends on the sole discretion of the relevant prosecutor or judge. In addition, the authors of communications 2968/2017, 3057/2017, 3059/2017 and 3234/2018 submit, that the President of the Supreme Court of Belarus has five deputies, several of whom may review the appeal. The Prosecutor General has four deputies. The State party does not explain which deputy needs to be addressed so that the appeal is reviewed personally by the President of the Supreme Court or by the Prosecutor General. They addressed their request to the President of the Supreme Court and to the Prosecutor General. Their requests were rejected by one of the deputies. The authors cannot be blaimed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies because the mentioned officials delegated to their deputies the consideration of their requests.
In reply to the disagreement of the State party with the Committee’s decision to register the communication, the author of communication No. 2579/2015 submits that, the role of the Committee ultimately includes interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant and development of jurisprudence. By refusing to recognize the standard practices, methods of work and precedents of the Committee, Belarus in effect refuses to recognize its competence to interpret the Covenant, which contradicts the Committee’s objective and goals. The author submits that, having voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the Committee, the State party has no right to infringe on its competence and ignore it opinion. The State party is not only obliged to implement the decisions of the Committee, but it is also obliged to recognize its standards, practices, methods of work and precedents. The above argument is based on the most important principles of international law — pacta sunt servanda — according to which every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.
Regarding the State party's argument that there has been no violation of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, the authors of communications Nos. 2969/2017 and 3234/2018 argue that the State party failed to demonstrate the necessity of the limitation imposed on their rights and the specific legitimate aim pursued under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. Furthermore, the authors of communications Nos. 3057/2017, 3059/2017, and 3099/2018 state that the State party refers to the Public Events Act, which itself needs to be amended in accordance with the conclusions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of 16-17 March 2012.17 Additionally, the State party has failed to implement numerous recommendations made by the Committee, which called for alignment of the Public Events Act with the standards outlined in articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.18
- The authors refer to the European Commission’s for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the OSCE Office’s for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights joint opinion “On the Law on Mass Events of the Republic of Belarus”, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 90th Plenary Session (Venice, 16-17 March 2012). ↩
- Reference is made to Kirsanov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/110/D/1864/2009); Kuznetsov et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/1976/2010); Evrezov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/114/D/1988/2010); Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/113/D/1992/2010); Evrezov et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/112/D/1999/2010); and Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011). ↩
Lack of cooperation from the State party in communication No. 2579/2015
The Committee notes the State party’s assertion that the present communication was registered in violation of the provisions of the Optional Protocol and that the State party therefore will cease further correspondence thereon.
The Committee notes that by adhering to the Optional Protocol, a State party to the Covenant recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant (preamble and art. 1). Implicit in a State’s adherence to the Optional Protocol is an undertaking to cooperate with the Committee in good faith so as to permit and enable it to consider such communications and after examination to forward its views to the State party and to the individual (art. 5 (1) and (4)). It is incompatible with these obligations for a State party to take any action that would prevent or frustrate the Committee in its consideration and examination of a communication and in the expression of its Views.19 It is up to the Committee to determine whether a case should be registered. By failing to accept the competence of the Committee to determine whether a communication shall be registered and by declaring that it will cease all correspondence concerning the communication, the State party has violated its obligations under article 1 of the Optional Protocol.
- See, for example, communications Nos. 1867/2009, 1936/2010, 1975/2010, 1977/2010- 1981/2010 and 2010/2010, Levinov v. Belarus, Views adopted on 19 July 2012, para. 8.2 and No. 869/1999, Piandiong et al. v. the Philippines, Views adopted on 19 October 2000, para. 5.1. ↩
Consideration of admissibility
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.
The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.
The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the authors of all communications failed to seek a supervisory review of the impugned decisions in their cases by the Prosecutor’s and Prosecutor General’s Office or by the President or Deputy President of a higher court and of the Supreme Court of Belarus. In this context, the Committee considers that filing requests for supervisory review with the president of a court directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge constitutes an extraordinary remedy and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review submitted to a prosecutor’s office, dependent on the discretionary power of the prosecutor, requesting a review of court decisions that have taken effect constitutes an extraordinary remedy, and thus does not constitute a remedy that must be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.20 The Committee also notes that the requests for supervisory review submitted by the authors in communications Nos. 2968/2017, 3057/2017, 3059/2017, and 3234/2018 to a higher court, the Supreme Court and to the Prosecutor’s Office, were not effective and that the circumstances under which sanctions were imposed, are similar to communications Nos. 2579/2015 and 3099/2018. The Committee notes that in the present case, the authors have exhausted all effective domestic remedies, and therefore, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communication.
- Grygory Gryk v. Belarus (CCPR/C/136/D/2961/2017), para. 6.3; Andrei Tolchin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/3241/2018), para. 6.3; Natalya Shchukina v. Belarus (CCPR/C/134/D/3242/2018), para. 6.3. ↩
The Committee takes note of authors’ claims that the State party violated their rights under articles 19 and 21, read in conjunction with article 2 (2) of the Covenant. The Committee reiterates that the provisions of article 2 of the Covenant cannot be invoked in a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol in conjunction with other provisions of the Covenant, except when the failure by the State party to observe its obligations under article 2 is the proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant directly affecting the individual claiming to be a victim.21 The Committee notes, however, that the first and fourth authors have already alleged a violation of their rights under article 19 of the Covenant, resulting from the interpretation and application of the existing laws of the State party, and the Committee does not consider the examination of whether the State party has also violated its general obligations under article 2 (2), read in conjunction with article 19, to be distinct from examination of the violation of these authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore considers that the authors’ claims in that regard are incompatible with article 2 of the Covenant and thus inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
- Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011), para. 7.4.; Zhukovsky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/127/D/2724/2016), para. 6.4. ↩
The Committee further notes the authors’ claims under articles 19 and 21, read in conjunction with article 2 (3) of the Covenant. In the absence of any further pertinent information on file, however, the Committee considers that the authors have failed to sufficiently substantiate such claims for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares this part of their communications inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
The Committee finally notes that the facts, as submitted by all authors in their respective communications, raise issues under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The Committee, therefore, consider these parts of the communications sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, and proceeds with their consideration of the merits.
Considerations of the merits
The Committee has considered the communications in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
The Committee notes the authors’ claim that their applications for organization of public events were rejected on the basis of decisions No. 802 of the Rechitsa Executive Committee and No. 755 of the Gomel Executive Committee. The authors claim that these decisions unduly restrict their right to freedom of expression and the right of peaceful assembly by imposing on the organizers of public events an obligation to conclude paid contracts with city service providers and by allocating, respectively, two and three remote locations for all mass events to be held in Rechitsa and in Gomel. It also notes the authors’ argument that the authorities failed to explain why the restrictions imposed on their rights were necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others, as required, respectively, by article 19 (3) and the second sentence of article 21 of the Covenant.
Considering the authors’ claims that their right to freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly were unreasonably restricted by the State party, the Committee notes that the issue before it is to determine whether the restrictions imposed were justified under articles 19 (3) and 21 of the Covenant.
In its general comment No. 37 (2020), the Committee stated that peaceful assemblies may in principle be conducted in all spaces to which the public has access or should have access, such as public squares and streets.22 Peaceful assemblies should not be relegated to remote areas where they cannot effectively capture the attention of those who are being addressed or of the general public. As a general rule, there can be no blanket ban on all assemblies in the capital city, in all public places except one specific location within a city or outside the city centre, or on all the streets in a city.
- General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21), para. 55. ↩
The Committee further recalls that the right of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed under article 21 of the Covenant, is a fundamental human right, essential for public expression of an individual’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society. Given that peaceful assemblies often have expressive functions, and that political speech enjoys particular protection as a form of expression, assemblies with a political message should enjoy a heightened level of accommodation and protection.23 Article 21 of the Covenant protects peaceful assemblies wherever they take place: outdoors, indoors and online; in public and private spaces; or a combination thereof. Such assemblies may take many forms, including demonstrations, protests, meetings, marchs, rallies, sit-ins, candlelit vigils and flash mobs. They are protected under article 21 whether they are stationary, such as pickets, or mobile, such as processions or marches.24 The organizers of an assembly generally have the right to choose a location within sight and sound of their target audience,25 and no restriction to this right is permissible, unless it (a) is imposed in conformity with the law; and (b) is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), protection of public health or morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. When a State party imposes restrictions with the aim of reconciling an individual’s right to assembly and the aforementioned interests of general concern, it should be guided by the objective of facilitating the right, rather than seeking unnecessary or disproportionate limitations to it.26 The State party is thus under an obligation to justify the limitation of the right protected by article 21 of the Covenant.27
- Ibid, para. 32; see General comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, paras. 34, 37–38 and 42–43. ↩
- General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21),, para 6. ↩
- Ibid., para. 22. ↩
- Ibid., para 36. ↩
- See Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 8.4. ↩
The Committee recalls its general comment No. 34 (2011) on freedoms of opinion and expression, in which it stated, inter alia, that the freedom of expression is essential for any society and constitutes a foundation stone for every free and democratic society.28 It notes that article 19 (3) of the Covenant allows for certain restrictions on the freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart information and ideas, only to the extent that those restrictions are provided for by law and only if they are necessary (a) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Finally, any restriction on freedom of expression must not be overbroad in nature – that is, it must be the least intrusive among the measures that might achieve the relevant protective function and proportionate to the interest being protected.29 The Committee recalls that the onus is on the State party to demonstrate that the restrictions on the author’s rights under article 19 of the Covenant were necessary and proportionate.30
The Committee notes that the national authorities refused to authorize the organization of peaceful public events by the authors on the grounds that the planned locations of the events were different from those few locations in Rechitsa and Gomel under, respectively, the executive committees’decisions Nos. 802 and 755 and because the authors had failed to conclude contracts with city service providers. It also observes that from the material on files, it transpires that the national authorities have failed to demonstrate how peaceful events held in the locations proposed by the authors would jeopardize national security, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It notes in particular that neither the decisions of the Executive Committees of Rechitsa and Gomel to refuse the authors’ requests to hold public events nor the court decisions provide any explanation of why the restrictions imposed in decisions Nos. 802 and 755 and applied in the authors’ cases were necessary and justified.
The Committee further notes that the de facto prohibition imposed by decisions Nos. 802 and 755 of an assembly in any public location in the entire city, with the exception of two remote locations in Rechitsa and three remote locations in Gomel, unduly limits the right of assembly and the freedom of expression. It also notes that requesting the organizers of small (up to 10-15 participants) events to contract additional services imposes a disproportionate burden on the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of expression in the same context. In these circumstances, the Committee finds the formal application of decisions Nos. 802 and 755 and the rejection by the State party’s authorities of the authors’ requests to hold peaceful public events to be unjustified and concludes that the authors’ rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant have been violated.
The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State party of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant in all communications. The Committee finds that the State party has also violated its obligations under article 1 of the Optional Protocol in communication No. 2579/2015
Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated, inter alia, to take appropriate steps to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the futureIn that connection, the Committee notes that it has dealt with similar cases in respect of similar laws and practices of the State party in a number of earlier communications,31 and thus the State party should revise its normative framework, in particular its Public Events Act, consistent with its obligation under article 2 (2), with a view to ensuring that the rights under article 19 and 21 of the Covenant may be fully enjoyed in the State party.
- See, e.g., Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010); Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010) ↩
On becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant. The present communication was submitted for consideration before the State party’s denunciation of the Optional Protocol became effective on 8 February 2023. In accordance with article 12 (2) of the Optional Protocol and the Committee’s previous case law, the State party continues to be subject to the application of the Optional Protocol as regards the present communication.32 Since pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them widely disseminated in the official languages of the State party.
- See e.g. Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago (CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998), para. 10; Lobban v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/80/D/797/1998), para. 11; Shchiryakova et al. v. Belarus (CCPR /C/137/DR/2911/2016). ↩