Communications Nos. 3025/2017 and 3037/2017: Decision/Views

The authors of the communications are Lilya Mullina, Yuliya Mullina and Vera Lukmanova (communication No. 3025/2017), nationals of Uzbekistan born in 1962, 1989 and 1941, respectively, and Chinni Nazarova, Feruza Mamatova, Gulnor Rizzaeva and Gulsara Imamova (communication No. 3037/2017), nationals of Uzbekistan born in 1959, 1976, 1953 and 1964, respectively. They claim that the State party has violated their rights under articles 9 (1),³ 17 (1), 18 (1) and (3), 19 (2) and (3), 21 (1) and (2) and 22 (1) and (2) of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Uzbekistan on 28 December 1995. The authors of both communications are represented by counsel.

3. Article 9 (1) of the Covenant is invoked only by the authors of communication No. 3037/2017. ↩

On 19 July 2023, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the Committee decided to join communications No. 3025/2017 and No. 3037/2017, submitted by two different groups of authors, for a joint decision, in view of their substantial factual and legal similarity.

The authors of both communications submit that they are Jehovah’s Witnesses. As such, they were subjected to administrative conviction for unlawful religious activities, their homes were searched, and their religious literature was seized and destroyed. Some were arbitrarily arrested and illegally detained. The appeals that they lodged before the domestic courts against the decisions of the local authorities were rejected.

The facts relevant to each individual communication are summarized below.

Lilya Mullina is the daughter of Vera Lukmanova and the mother of Yuliya Mullina. They all live in the same home in Tashkent. On 17 February 2014, police officers demanded to enter their home without a valid search warrant or other authorization, claiming that entry was necessary in order to conduct a “passport check”. Once they had gained entry to the home, they proceeded to search it unlawfully and to seize religious literature published by Jehovah’s Witnesses.

The authors were charged with a violation of the Administrative Liability Code for “illegal storage of religious literature for the purpose of distribution”. On 20 February 2014, they were tried and convicted by the Sirgali District Court for Criminal Cases. The Court summarily ruled that they were guilty because they were in possession of literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses, which was claimed to be unlawful solely because Jehovah’s Witnesses are not registered in the city of Tashkent. The Court relied on a report of the Committee on Religious Affairs, according to which literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses may be used only at the place of worship of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Chirchiq, where the sole registered religious organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Uzbekistan is based. The Sirgali District Court sentenced Lilya Mullina and Yuliya Mullina to a fine of 2,883,150 sum each (approximately €955 at the time) and Vera Lukmanova to a fine of 961,050 sum (approximately €318 at the time). The Court also ordered that the literature seized should be destroyed and their computer handed over to the State.

On 24 March 2014, the authors’ appeal was summarily rejected by the Tashkent City Court for Criminal Cases. On 15 January 2016, the authors filed a motion with the Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan, requesting him to exercise his discretionary authority and to protest their cases before the Supreme Court. On 22 January 2016, their application was referred by the Office of the Prosecutor General to the Tashkent Provincial Prosecutor for consideration on the merits. The authors note that more than one year has passed since that referral without any decision having been made on their application. They also note that, under article 315 of the Administrative Liability Code, they cannot appeal their conviction to the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan.

On 5 June 2014, a small group of Jehovah’s Witnesses gathered at the home of Ms. Nazarova, in Qarshi, to read and study the Bible and, afterwards, to enjoy a social visit. Police officers entered Ms. Nazarova’s home without permission, searched each person and confiscated personal property. The police officers transported the authors to the police station, where they were detained for about two hours. The authors were subsequently charged with an offence under the Administrative Liability Code, as Jehovah’s Witnesses do not have a registered religious organization in Qashqadaryo Province.

On 18 August 2014, the authors were tried and convicted by the Qarshi City Court for Criminal Cases. The Court ruled that Ms. Nazarova and Ms. Mamatova were active members of an illegal non-Islamic religious sect, Jehovah’s Witnesses, which was not registered with the Ministry of Justice in Qashqadaryo Province. The Court also ruled that Ms. Nazarova and Ms. Mamatova had engaged in unlawful religious activity in their homes, had engaged in religious study with Ms. Rizzaeva and Ms. Imamova and had unlawfully stored religious literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Court ordered the authors to pay combined fines of 27,080,000 sum (approximately €6,690 at the time). The authors note that the fines are equivalent to 220 monthly minimum wage payments in Uzbekistan.⁴ The Court ordered that the Bibles and most of the other religious literature seized from the authors in the police raid should be destroyed.⁵

4. It would have taken one person paid the official minimum wage more than 18 years to earn 27,080,000 sum. ↩
5. In total, 26 items of literature and 41 leaflets printed at home. ↩

On 12 September 2014, the authors’ appeal was summarily rejected by the Chair of the Qarshi City Court for Criminal Cases. On 15 January 2016, the authors filed a motion with the Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan, requesting him to exercise his discretionary authority and to protest their cases before the Supreme Court. On 29 January 2016, the motion was referred to the Qashqadaryo Provincial Prosecutor for consideration by the Deputy Provincial Prosecutor on the merits. The authors note that more than one year has passed since that referral, without any decision having been made on their application. They note that, under article 315 of the Administrative Liability Code, they cannot appeal their conviction to the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan.

The authors of communication No. 3037/2017 claim that, in violation of their rights under article 9 of the Covenant, the police arrested and detained them at the police station for about two hours and that the arrest and detention were arbitrary and illegal, as the underlying purpose was not to investigate but to intimidate and coerce them into not exercising their freedom of belief, assembly and association. They claim that the police provided no evidence to the domestic courts to justify their detention at the police station. The authors also claim that the sole reason for the police raid, their apprehension and their subsequent administrative conviction was that they were reading and studying the Bible and were in possession of copies of it and other religious literature published by Jehovah’s Witnesses.

The authors of both communications claim that the State party breached their rights under article 17 of the Covenant. The authors of communication No. 3025/2017 note that, under that article and under the Constitution of Uzbekistan, they are entitled to privacy and security of the home and of their personal belongings. They argue that the police officers used the ruse of a “passport check” to demand entry to their home and note that they provided no justification as to why passport checks were necessary for citizens of Uzbekistan. Once the police officers had gained entry, they changed their initially stated purpose for entering the home to an entirely different one, namely, a search to find illegal religious literature. The authors argue that it is evident that the police’s real purpose was to target the authors’ peaceful activity, amounting to an unlawful interference with their right to privacy. The authors of communication No. 3037/2017 claim that the police raid and subsequent search and seizure of their belongings interfered with their right to privacy and security of the home and of their personal belongings and that there was no justification for that interference. They note that the right to gather peacefully as a small group for the purpose of association, including religious association, is protected by article 29 of the Constitution and articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant. They argue that those fundamental rights are inviolable and cannot be made dependent on whether individual believers are members of a locally registered religious organization.

The authors argue that the police raid and administrative convictions were based solely on the faulty premise that, because Jehovah’s Witnesses are not registered in the city of Tashkent (in the case of communication No. 3025/2017) or in Qashqadaryo Province (in the case of communication No. 3047/2017), they do not have the right to assemble and to possess religious literature published by Jehovah’s Witnesses. The authors note the Committee’s jurisprudence according to which legal registration is not a prerequisite for the exercise of fundamental human rights. Accordingly, the authors argue that the police search of their home and seizure of their personal belongings and their subsequent administrative convictions and fines have interfered with their rights guaranteed by article 18 (1) of the Covenant.

The authors note that they were convicted under the Administrative Liability Code because it was alleged that they had stored religious literature published by Jehovah’s Witnesses in their home with the goal of distributing the material. They note that the trial court reached that conclusion despite there being no evidence that they had intended to distribute the literature and that, in any event, even if they had intended to do so, such peaceful actions are protected by article 19 (2) of the Covenant. They claim that their prosecution and conviction based on the State party’s allegation that it is illegal to distribute religious literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses without State approval has interfered with their right to seek, receive and impart information. In communication No. 3037/2017, the authors claim that they were convicted of an administrative offence solely because they were studying the Bible and were in possession of copies of it and other religious literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The State party has therefore interfered with the right of all the authors to freely seek, receive and impart information, in violation of their rights under article 19 of the Covenant.

In addition, the authors claim that the State party authorities have violated their right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association. They note that the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has observed that “registration does not constitute a precondition for practising one’s religion or belief”.⁶ They argue that the enjoyment of freedom of religion or belief does not depend on any acts of State approval or administrative registration. They note that the sole justification given for the police raid and their administrative convictions was that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not registered in the city of Tashkent (communication No. 3025/2017) or in Qashqadaryo Province (communication No. 3037/2017) and that, consequently, their religious activity was considered to be illegal, in violation of their rights under articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant.

6. A/65/207, para. 22. ↩

In notes verbales dated 20 April 2021 and 15 February 2018, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of communications No. 3025 and No. 3037, respectively. On 13 February 2022, the State party also submitted additional observations in response to the comments of the authors of communication No. 3025. In its observations, the State party does not challenge the admissibility of the communications.⁷

7. However, in its additional (rejoinder) observations in relation to communication No. 3025/2017, the State party concludes that the Committee should find that communication inadmissible, as there is no convincing evidence that the authors’ rights were violated. ↩

Concerning the merits of the communications, the State party argues that the authors’ claims in both communications are unfounded and that the courts correctly charged them. The State party submits that all the authors are followers of a Christian religious denomination and unofficial non-Islamic religious sect, namely, Jehovah’s Witnesses, which is represented in Uzbekistan by a single religious organization officially registered in the city of Chirchiq in Tashkent Province.⁸ The State party admits that, although that specific organization has not committed violations of current legislation, it is responsible for the violations committed by its members in other regions of Uzbekistan. Often, when illegal religious meetings were organized, the names of representatives of the Chirchiq community of Jehovah’s Witnesses were mentioned, although the directors of the organization do not admit this. Previously, Jehovah’s Witnesses had also been registered in the city of Fergana. However, the members of that organization had repeatedly conducted missionary activity among minors, without the consent of the minors’ parents, and educational activities involving children. Justice and law enforcement agencies had received complaints from citizens, including parents. The activity of the organization was terminated.

8. The State party provides the exact address in Chirchiq, Tashkent Province. ↩

The State party submits that Jehovah’s Witnesses have an official registration that allows them to carry out lawful religious activities only in the city of Chirchiq, at a specific address. Even though the official registration provides a basis for legitimate religious activity only at that address, the followers have deliberately tried to conduct their illegal religious activity in almost all regional centres and major cities, including the city of Tashkent (in the case of communication No. 3025/2017) and the city of Qarshi (in the case of communication No. 3037/2017). Those violations have been documented by local law enforcement agencies in accordance with the established procedure.⁹

9. As an example, the State party notes that a special group of representatives of law enforcement agencies was established to verify the findings set out in the report of the Directorate of Internal Affairs of Sirgali District of the city of Tashkent regarding the illegal storage of religious materials by the religious organization. ↩

The State party argues that, with the consent of the occupants, inspections of the premises where the authors resided were carried out in the presence of witnesses and in accordance with all the procedural norms of law. The inspections revealed the presence of prohibited religious materials, which were seized as physical evidence and included in the case file.

In accordance with the law, the banned religious materials that were seized were sent to the Committee on Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers for an expert analysis to be conducted in accordance with the established procedure. Subsequently, the collected materials and physical evidence were sent to the relevant district court for criminal cases for consideration on the merits.

The State party challenges the claim that the authors practise individually the teachings of Jehovah’s Witnesses. It argues that, even though the authors state in their appeal that they practise the religious teachings of Jehovah’s Witnesses individually, they are all organized into groups formed on the basis of their location and conduct their activities under the supervision of their “overseers”, known as “the elders”. Given that the illegal activity of the authors adversely affects the social and spiritual sphere of society and is a root cause of various kinds of interpersonal conflict, in particular within families, their activity outside the Chirchiq community is considered to be destructive and corruptive to society. The State party affirms that its understanding fully reflects the norms of international law.¹⁰ The State party fully supports the rulings of the Sirgali District Court for Criminal Cases of the city of Tashkent (communication No. 3025/2017) and the Qarshi City Court for Criminal Cases of Qashqadaryo Province (communication No. 3037/2017) by which the authors were found guilty of committing administrative violations (engaging in illegal religious activity, such as the unlawful production or storage, with the aim of distribution, of materials of religious content) and received administrative penalties, in the form of fines,¹¹ under the Administrative Liability Code. In addition, the State party affirms that the religious content of the literature and leaflets seized was confirmed by a conclusion of the Committee on Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers.

10. The State party refers to article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ↩
11. The largest fine imposed was equivalent to 60 monthly minimum wage payments (Ms. Nazarova, communication No. 3037/2027). ↩

On 19 August 2021 and 24 July 2018, the authors of communications No. 3025/2017 and No. 3037/2017, respectively, submitted their comments on the State party’s observations. They maintain that the State party does not raise any new facts or arguments and merely repeats the conclusions of the domestic courts. In essence, the State party claims that the State authorities were justified in raiding in authors’ homes, seizing their peaceful religious literature and then imposing massive administrative fines on them simply because Jehovah’s Witnesses do not have legal registration in the city of Tashkent or in the city of Qarshi and Qashqadaryo Province.

The authors therefore refer to their respective original submissions, which establish that the actions of the State authorities have violated multiple provisions of the Covenant and that those violations cannot be justified.

The State party submitted additional observations, in response to the authors’ comments, on 13 February 2022. The State party argues with regard to communication No. 3025/2017 that the law enforcement authorities did not undertake a search or raid of the authors’ home but rather an inspection. It submits that such practices are used in, for instance, the United States of America, in the form of the plain view exception or consent searches. The State party contends that, in the United States, it is possible to conduct a search without a warrant, but the rule is to have “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion”, which sets a lower standard.

The State party maintains that the restriction of illegal religious activity is in compliance with the Covenant, as it is aimed at protecting public safety and order.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee notes that, in the present cases, the authors have exhausted all available domestic remedies and that the State party has not contested the admissibility of the communications. Consequently, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communications.

The Committee notes that the authors have sufficiently substantiated their claims under articles 9, 17 to 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant, for the purposes of admissibility, and proceeds with their consideration on the merits.

The Committee has considered the communications in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee first considers the claims made by the authors of communication No. 3037/2017 under article 9 of the Covenant, namely that, on 5 June 2014, while the authors were reading and studying the Bible at the home of Ms. Nazarova, police officers entered her home without permission, searched each person, confiscated personal property, apprehended the authors and transported them to the police station, where they were detained for about two hours. The Committee notes that the State party has not provided any explanation for the authors’ arrest and detention.

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, in which it refers to the prohibition of arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty, that is, deprivation of liberty that is not imposed on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. It recalls that liberty of person concerns freedom from confinement of the body. Examples of deprivation of liberty include police custody, remand detention, imprisonment after conviction, house arrest, administrative detention and confinement to a restricted area of an airport, as well as being involuntarily transported.¹² The notion of “arbitrariness” must be interpreted to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability and due process of law. The Committee recalls that the term “arrest” refers to any apprehension of a person that commences a deprivation of liberty and that the term “detention” refers to the deprivation of liberty that begins with the arrest and continues in time from apprehension until release. Arrest within the meaning of article 9 need not involve a formal arrest as defined under domestic law.¹³ Arrest or detention is arbitrary when carried out as punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights as guaranteed by the Covenant, including freedom of opinion and expression (art. 19), freedom of assembly (art. 21), freedom of association (art. 22), freedom of religion (art. 18) and the right to privacy (art. 17). Arrest or detention on discriminatory grounds in violation of articles 2 (1), 3 or 26 is also in principle arbitrary.¹⁴

12. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), paras. 3 and 5. ↩
13. Ibid., para. 13. ↩
14. Ibid., para. 17. ↩

In the case of communication No. 3037/2017, the Committee notes that, according to the submissions from the parties, the authors’ detention began at the home of Ms. Nazarova, continued at the police station and ended around two hours later and that police officers also completed a search of Ms. Nazarova’s apartment. The Committee recalls that, for an arrest to be in compliance with article 9 (1), it must be not only lawful, but also reasonable and necessary, taking into account all the circumstances.¹⁵ The Committee considers that the State party has failed to show why it was necessary to detain the authors. In view of the circumstances described, the Committee concludes that the State party violated the rights of the authors of communication No. 3037/2017 under article 9 (1) of the Covenant.

15. Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2137/2012), para. 7.2; and Amedzro v. Tajikistan (CCPR/C/133/D/3258/2018), para. 7.4. ↩

The Committee notes the claim made by the authors of communication No. 3025/2017 and one of the authors of communication No. 3037/2017, namely, Ms. Nazarova, that the State party violated their right to privacy and security of the home under article 17 (1) of the Covenant by entering their homes without presenting a valid search warrant or identification, searching their homes, confiscating religious literature and interrupting a peaceful religious discussion that posed no threat to the safety of others. It also notes the affirmation made by the authors of communication No. 3025/2017 that police officers demanded to enter their home, claiming that it was necessary to conduct a “passport check”, but, once they had gained entry, they proceeded to search the home unlawfully and to seize religious publications. It further notes the State party’s argument that the entry to the authors’ homes by police officers was not unlawful or arbitrary, as the police officers were carrying out not searches but simply inspections of the premises where the authors resided, with the consent of the occupants, in the presence of witnesses and in accordance with all the procedural norms of the law. While refraining from examining the legality of the raids, the Committee recalls that, under article 17 of the Covenant, it is necessary for any interference in the home to be both lawful and not arbitrary.¹⁶ The Committee recalls that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of its general comment No. 16 (1988) on the right to privacy, the concept of arbitrariness in article 17 is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law is in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and, in any event, is reasonable in the particular circumstances. The Committee notes that the State party has not contested the authors’ assertion that the police officers did not present a warrant to enter or search their homes and did not identify the basis for their inspections and seizure of personal religious books. The Committee considers that the State party, while referring to the unlawfulness of the possession of religious literature and the holding of a religious meeting, has not set forth any arguments to demonstrate that the conduct of the police was not arbitrary.

16. See, inter alia, Rojas García v. Colombia (CCPR/C/71/D/687/1996), para. 10.3. ↩

As to the actions of the police, the Committee considers that the State party has not explained why the police considered the circumstances so urgent as to justify entering the authors’ homes. The Committee considers that the searches of the authors’ homes by the police were disproportionate to the threat of harm allegedly associated with the possession of religious literature and the holding of religious meetings and that other, less intrusive measures could have been implemented instead. The Committee therefore considers that the warrantless searches of the authors’ homes and confiscation of their computers and religious books was not a necessary or reasonable means of achieving the aim of compliance with the law on the registration of religious associations. Consequently, the Committee concludes that the State party violated the authors’ rights under article 17 (1) insofar as the police arbitrarily interfered with their homes and their privacy.

In relation to the authors’ claims under article 18 (1) and (3) of the Covenant, the Committee recalls its general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in which it stated that article 18 does not permit any limitations whatsoever on freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice (para. 3). By contrast, the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject to certain limitations, but only those prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, the freedom to manifest one’s beliefs in worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts, including those integral to the conduct by the religious group of its basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose religious leaders, priests and teachers and the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools.¹⁷

17. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 22 (1993), para. 4. See also, inter alia, Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago (CCPR/C/74/D/721/1996), para. 6.6; and Leven v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2131/2012), para. 9.2. ↩

The Committee must now address the question of whether the limitations on the authors’ right to manifest their religion are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that article 18 (3) is to be interpreted strictly and that limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. The Committee also recalls that, in interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States parties should proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, including the right to equality and non-discrimination on all grounds specified in articles 2, 3 and 26.¹⁸

18. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 22 (1993), para. 8; and Leven v. Kazakhstan, para. 9.3. ↩

In the present cases, the Committee notes that the authors were charged with and convicted of illegal religious activity and that administrative penalties were imposed under article 184 (communication No. 3025/2017) and articles 184 and 240 (communication No. 3037/2017) of the Code of Administrative Responsibility in the form of fines, the size of which varied among the authors, from the equivalent of 30 monthly minimum wage payments to the equivalent of 10 monthly minimum wage payments (communication No. 3025/2017) and from the equivalent of 60 monthly minimum wage payments to the equivalent of 50 monthly minimum wage payments (communication No. 3037/2017). Consistent with its general comment No. 22 (1993), the Committee considers that the above-mentioned activities form part of the authors’ right to manifest their beliefs and that their convictions and the fines imposed on them constitute limitations of that right.

The Committee notes the State party’s argument that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not registered in the city of Tashkent or in the city of Qarshi or Qashqadaryo Province and that, as a result, they do not have the right to congregate or to possess or store religious literature published by Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Committee, however, reiterates that article 18 (1) of the Covenant protects the right of all members of a religious congregation to manifest their religion in community with others, in worship, observance, practice and teaching. The Committee concludes that the punishment imposed on the authors, in particular the magnitude of the fines, amounts to a limitation of their right to manifest their religion under article 18 (1). The Committee observes that the limitation in question, although prescribed by law, was not proportionate. In addition, the Committee observes that the State party has failed to justify that limitation as serving any legitimate purpose identified in article 18 (3). The State party has also failed to justify that such limitation of the right to manifest religion is proportionate to any legitimate purpose. The Committee therefore concludes that such limitation does not meet the requirements of article 18 (3) and that the authors’ rights under article 18 (1) of the Covenant have been violated.

The Committee notes the authors’ claims that their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association have been restricted, in violation of articles 19 (2) and 22 of the Covenant, as their religious activity was considered to be illegal on the basis that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not registered in the city of Tashkent (communication No. 3025/2017) or in Qashqadaryo Province (communication No. 3037/2017). Thus, the authors were sanctioned for simply having religious literature in their homes or organizing social visits of a peaceful nature in their own homes in order to practise their beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses, as specified in detail in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.8 above. It also notes the authors’ argument that the authorities failed to explain why the restrictions imposed on their rights were necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, public order or the protection of public health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others, as required by articles 19 (3) and 22 (2) of the Covenant.

Consequently, the next issue before the Committee is whether the police raids of the authors’ homes, the seizure and destruction of their religious literature and the imposition of fines solely on the basis that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not registered in the cities of Tashkent and Qarshi unreasonably restricted the authors’ right to freedom of expression and freedom of association under articles 19 and 22 of the Covenant. In accordance with articles 19 (3) and 22 (2) of the Covenant, any restriction on the above-mentioned rights must cumulatively meet the following conditions: (a) it must be provided for by law; (b) it must be imposed for one of the purposes set out expressly; and (c) it must be “necessary in a democratic society” for achieving one of those purposes. The reference to a “democratic society” in the context of article 22 indicates, in the Committee’s opinion, that the existence and operation of associations, including those that peacefully promote ideas not necessarily favourably viewed by the Government or the majority of the population, is a cornerstone of any society.¹⁹

19. See, for example, Zvozskov et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/88/D/1039/2001), para. 7.2. ↩

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, in which it stated, inter alia, that freedom of expression is essential for any society and constitutes a foundation stone for every free and democratic society.²⁰ It notes that article 19 (3) of the Covenant allows for certain restrictions on freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart information and ideas, only to the extent that those restrictions are provided for by law and only if they are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or public order (ordre public) or of public health or morals. Any restriction on freedom of expression must not be overbroad in nature, that is, it must be the least intrusive among the measures that might achieve the relevant protective function and proportionate to the interest being protected.²¹ The Committee recalls that the onus is on the State party to demonstrate that the restrictions on the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant were necessary and proportionate.²²

20. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 2. ↩
21. Ibid., para. 34. ↩
22. Androsenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/116/D/2092/2011), para. 7.3. ↩

In the present cases, in the light of the information available on file, police officers demanded entry to the authors’ home without a valid search warrant or other authorization, claiming that entry was necessary in order to conduct a “passport check”, and, once they had gained access, proceeded to search the home unlawfully and to seize religious publications published by Jehovah’s Witnesses (communication No. 3025/2017) and to arrest and detain the authors for about two hours (communication No. 3037/2017). The Committee takes note of the State party’s general argument that Jehovah’s Witnesses have an official registration that allows them to carry out lawful religious activities only in the city of Chirchiq, at a specific address, and that, despite the fact that official registration provides a basis for legitimate religious activity only at that address, the followers have deliberately tried to conduct their illegal religious activity in almost all regional centres and major cities, including the cities of Tashkent and Qarshi. The Committee, however, considers that the State party’s practice of police raids, searches of private homes and seizures and destruction of religious literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses do not meet the standards of necessity and proportionality under articles 19 and 22 of the Covenant.

In addition, in the absence of further explanations from the State party, the facts reveal that the police entered the authors’ homes without the necessary judicial authorization, that the intervention of the police resulted in an unjustified restriction of the right to peaceful assembly and thus that the facts constitute violations of the authors’ rights under article 21 of the Covenant.

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State party of the authors’ rights under articles 9, 17 to 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated, inter alia, to provide the authors with adequate compensation, including reimbursement of any legal costs they have incurred. The State party is also under an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the present Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them widely disseminated in the official language of the State party.