COMMUNICATIONS NOS. 3056/2017, 3100/2018, 3130/2018 AND 3134/2018: DECISION/VIEWS

The authors of the communications are Olga Nikolaichik (communication No. 3056/2017), Anna Krasulina (communication No. 3100/2018), Artem Kovalev (communication No. 3130/2018) and Vadim Vasiliev (communication No. 3134/2018), nationals of Belarus born in 1968, 1969, 1994 and 1985 respectively. They claim that the State party has violated their rights under articles 19 and 21, read separately and in conjunction with article 2 (2) and (3), of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 30 December 1992. The authors of communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018 and No. 3130/2018 are represented by counsel. The author of communication No. 3134/2018 is not represented by counsel.

The present communications were submitted for consideration before the State party’s denunciation of the Optional Protocol became effective on 8 February 2023. In accordance with article 12 (2) of the Optional Protocol and the Committee’s previous case law, the State party continues to be subject to the application of the Optional Protocol in respect of the present communications.³

3. See, for example, Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago (CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998), para. 10; Lobban v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/80/D/797/1998), para. 11; and Shchiryakova et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/137/D/2911/2016, 3081/2017, 3137/2018 and 3150/2018). ↩

Pursuant to rule 97 (3) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the Committee decided to join communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018, No. 3130/2018 and No. 3134/2018 submitted by four different authors for a joint decision, in view of the substantial factual and legal similarity.

The four communications relate to administrative convictions under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“violation of the procedure for organizing and holding mass events”). The facts relevant to each communication are summarized below.

The author of communication No. 3056/2017 has repeatedly had significant administrative fines imposed on her under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences for unauthorized picketing.

On 24 March 2016, she was fined 10.5 million non-redenominated Belarusian roubles by Tsentralny District Court of Minsk for her picketing in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Minsk. The author had held the Belarusian national flag and shouted slogans. Her cassation appeal against this judgment was rejected by Minsk City Court on 19 April 2016.

On 13 June 2016, she was fined 8.4 million non-redenominated Belarusian roubles by Partizansky District Court of Minsk for taking part in a picket in honour of disappeared politicians and a disappeared journalist. The author had held a banner reading “Where is Z.? Where is G.? Where is K.? Where is Z.?” Her cassation appeal against this judgment was rejected on 29 July 2016 by Minsk City Court.

On 15 September 2016, she was fined 1,050 redenominated Belarusian roubles by Leninsky District Court of Minsk for picketing in front of Tsentralny District Court in support of a political prisoner. She had held a banner reading “Freedom to P., our history is on trial here”.

The author of communication No. 3100/2018 is an activist of the United Civic Party. On 30 March 2017, she found herself near a temporary detention facility in Minsk, waiting for members of her party to be freed from administrative arrest. She was holding a white-red-white flag. Due to this, on 21 April 2017, Moskovsky District Court of Minsk imposed an administrative fine on her of 1,150 Belarusian roubles (around €550), which is higher than an average salary, under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences. On 17 May 2017, Minsk City Court rejected the author’s cassation appeal against this judgment.

The author of communication No. 3130/2018 participated in an unauthorized peaceful march in Gomel on 19 February 2017 to protest against Presidential Decree No. 3 “on prevention of social dependency”. On 23 March 2017, he was convicted and sentenced to an administrative arrest of 10 days by Chechersky District Court in the Gomel Region under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences for breaching the public events organization procedure. On 14 April 2017, Gomel Regional Court rejected his cassation appeal against this judgment.

The author of communication No. 3134/2018 participated in an unauthorized peaceful demonstration named “March of angry Belarusians 2.0” on Nezavisimosty’ Square in Minsk on 21 October 2017 to protest against the taxation of unemployed citizens. On 7 December 2017, Zheleznodorozhny District Court in Gomel imposed an administrative fine of 230 Belarusian roubles (around €100) on the author under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences. On 12 January 2018, the author’s cassation appeal against this judgment was rejected by Gomel Regional Court.

All the authors submit that they have not attempted to lodge supervisory review appeals with judicial and prosecutorial authorities, claiming ineffectiveness of these remedies with reference to the Committee’s relevant case law.

The four authors claim that the State party has violated articles 19 and 21, read separately and in conjunction with article 2 (2) and (3), of the Covenant, because the restrictions imposed on their right to express their opinion at peaceful rallies were not necessary under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

In notes verbales dated 15 January 2017 and 16 June 2017 (communication No. 3056/2017), 5 March 2018 (communication No. 3100/2018), 8 May 2018 (communication No. 3130/2018) and 26 July 2018 (communication No. 3134/2018), the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and the merits of the communications.

The State party confirms that the author of communication No. 3056/2017 was fined on three occasions under article 23.34 (1) and (3) of the Code of Administrative Offences for participation in public events not authorized by the Minsk City Executive Committee: on 24 March 2016 by Tsentralny District Court, on 13 June 2016 by Partizansky District Court and on 15 September 2016 by Leninsky District Court. These judgments were upheld by Minsk City Court on 19 April 2016, 29 July 2016 and 25 October 2016 respectively. Minsk City Court’s decisions entered into force on the day of their adoption.

With regard to communication No. 3100/2018, the State party submits that on 21 April 2017, Moskovsky District Court found the author guilty of breaching the procedure for organizing and conducting mass events under article 23.34 (3) of the Code of Administrative Offences. The conviction related to a meeting held on 30 March 2017 in front of the offenders’ detention centre of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk City Executive Committee. The author was fined 50 basic units. This judgment was upheld on 17 May 2017 by a decision of Minsk City Court that entered into force on the same day.

The State party submits that on 23 March 2017, the author of communication No. 3130/2018 was convicted by Chechersky District Court under article 23.34 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, for violation of the procedure for conducting a meeting or a street march committed by a participant in such an event. The author was punished by an administrative arrest of 10 days. The judgment was upheld by a decision of Gomel Regional Court on 14 April 2017, which entered into force on the same day.

As regards communication No. 3134/2018, the State party submits that its author was found guilty of breaching the procedure for conducting a meeting under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences by Zhelezhnodorozhny District Court on 7 December 2017. He was fined 10 basic units, which corresponded to 230 Belarusian roubles. The judgment was upheld on 12 January 2018 by Gomel Regional Court, with that decision entering into force on the same day.

In response to all four communications, the State party notes that article 12.11 (1) and (2) of the Procedural and Executive Code on Administrative Offences allows for the lodging of supervisory review appeals against judicial decisions on administrative offences with judicial and prosecutorial authorities. The authors of communications No. 3056/2017 and No. 3100/2018 could have lodged supervisory review appeals with the Chairpersons of Minsk City Court and the Supreme Court of Belarus, whereas the authors of communications No. 3130/2018 and No. 3134/2018 could have lodged supervisory review appeals with the Chairpersons of Gomel Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Belarus. All the authors could have also lodged supervisory review appeals with prosecutorial authorities. Article 12.11 (3) of the above-mentioned Code establishes a deadline of six months for lodging supervisory review appeals against judgments on administrative offences following their entry into force. There is no indication in the communications that over this period their authors were unable to lodge supervisory review appeals or that any obstacles were created to their lodging of such appeals.

The State party refutes the authors’ argument about the ineffectiveness of supervisory review appeals to prosecutorial authorities. It states that in 2017 alone, prosecutorial authorities raised 3,766 protests against judgments on administrative offences, 3,665 (97 per cent) of which were satisfied. The State party argues therefore that supervisory review appeals to prosecutorial authorities are an effective remedy.

In the light of the above, the State party concludes that the four communications are inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol due to failure to exhaust domestic remedies and constitute an abuse of the right of submission under its article 3.

The State party rejects the authors’ claims of violations of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. It argues that its Public Events Act of 30 December 1997 is compliant with articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, including with the restrictions that the Covenant allows to the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of association. Articles 33 and 35 of the State party’s Constitution also guarantee freedom of expression and freedom of assembly insofar as the exercise thereof does not violate public order and the rights of other citizens.

In submissions dated 27 April 2018 (communication No. 3056/2017), 5 June 2018 (communication No. 3100/2018), 13 July 2018 (communication No. 3130/2018) and 23 November 2021 (communication No. 3134/2018), the authors provided the following comments on the State party’s observations.

All the authors contest the State party’s assertions about the effectiveness of supervisory review appeals before judicial and prosecutorial authorities. They note that such appeals depend on the discretionary power of the judge or the prosecutor and are limited to consideration of issues of law rather than of facts and evidence.

The authors of communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018 and No. 3130/2018 note that both the Committee and the European Court of Human Rights⁴ have acknowledged that supervisory review procedures in former Soviet States depend on discretionary powers of supervising authorities and cannot be considered an effective remedy for the purpose of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Only cassation appeals, like the appeals that they attempted, result in a re-examination on the merits.

4. Reference is made to European Court of Human Rights, Tumilovich v. Russia (application No. 47033/99), decision of inadmissibility of 22 June 1999. ↩

The authors of communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018 and No. 3130/2018 also argue that it is next to impossible to observe the six-month deadline stipulated in the domestic legislation for challenging a judgment on an administrative offence if the appeal is to be submitted to the Chairperson of the regional court and then later to the Chairperson of the Supreme Court. Such appeals are examined in rotation by several of the Chairperson’s deputies. The Chairperson of the Supreme Court has five deputies, whereas the Prosecutor General has four deputies. The State party does not explain which deputy the authors had to address their appeals to in order to ensure that the appeals were examined directly by the Chairperson of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General.

The author of communication No. 3134/2018 adds that supervisory review appeals are subject to high taxes, which amount to 2 basic units in cases where a fine of 10 basic units is contested.

Regarding the statistics provided by the State party, according to which in 2017, prosecutorial authorities raised 3,766 protests against judgments related to administrative offences, 3,665 (97 per cent) of which were satisfied, the authors of communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018 and No. 3130/2018 note that the State party does not explain how many of these cases related to exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the right of peaceful assembly. According to statistics on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry registered 3.9 million administrative offences in 2017. Therefore, according to the authors, the number of prosecutorial protests cited by the State party is less than 0.1 per cent of the total number of administrative offences prosecuted in the country.

According to the author of communication No. 3134/2018, the statistics provided by the State party only prove the ineffectiveness of the prosecutorial supervisory review procedure. He refers to statistics of the Supreme Court according to which in 2017, the Court examined 370,109 cases relating to administrative offences. The 3,766 protests raised by prosecutorial authorities thus constitute 1 per cent of the relevant cases examined in 2017. The author also points out that the State party has not disclosed the number of supervisory review appeals submitted to prosecutorial authorities and the percentage among those of the 3,766 protests raised. Furthermore, the State party has not provided any examples of protests raised in cases related to exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the right of freedom of peaceful assembly.

All the authors reaffirm their claims regarding violations of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The author of communication No. 3134/2018 notes that the State party has not explained why the restrictions imposed on his rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly were necessary and proportionate under articles 19 and 21. He refers to the Committee’s general comment No. 37 (2020), according to which a failure to notify the authorities of an upcoming assembly, where required, does not render the act of participation in that assembly unlawful, and must not in itself be used as a basis for imposing undue sanctions.⁵

5. See para. 71. ↩

The authors of communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018 and No. 3130/2018 add that while referring to the Public Events Act, the State party omits to mention that it has failed to comply with recommendations on amending that law provided in the joint opinion on the Public Events Act adopted by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in 2012. Neither has the State party complied with the Committee’s recommendations to bring its Public Events Act into compliance with its international obligations.⁶ The authors conclude that both the Public Events Act on its own and its application in their specific cases have resulted in violations of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

6. Reference is made, inter alia, to Kuznetsov et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/1976/2010); and Evrezov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/114/D/1988/2010). ↩

Before considering any claims contained in communications, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communications are admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the authors have failed to seek a supervisory review by prosecutorial and judicial authorities of the impugned decisions. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review submitted to a president of a court, directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge, constitutes an extraordinary remedy, and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review submitted to a prosecutor’s office, dependent on the discretionary power of the prosecutor, requesting a review of court decisions that have taken effect, constitutes an extraordinary remedy and thus does not constitute a remedy that must be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.⁷

7. Gryk v. Belarus (CCPR/C/136/D/2961/2017), para. 6.3; Tolchin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/3241/2018), para. 6.3; Shchukina v. Belarus (CCPR/C/134/D/3242/2018), para. 6.3; and Vasilevich et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/137/D/2693/2015, 2898/2016, 3002/2017 and 3084/2017), para. 6.3. ↩

While welcoming the statistics provided by the State party on the high rate of successful protests raised by prosecutorial authorities against judicial judgments relating to administrative offences in 2017, the Committee observes that the State party has not disclosed the percentage of this figure out of the total number of the supervisory review appeals submitted to prosecutors over the same period. Neither has the State provided any specific information on the effectiveness of the supervisory review procedure in cases related to administrative convictions imposed on participants in public rallies such as those examined in the present Views. The absence of this data prevents the Committee from reaching a different conclusion, compared to its previous case law, on the effectiveness of supervisory review by prosecutorial authorities. The Committee concludes that the authors have exhausted all available effective domestic remedies and that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communications.

The Committee takes note of the authors’ claims that the State party has violated their rights under articles 19 and 21, read in conjunction with article 2 (2), of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that the provisions of article 2 cannot be invoked in a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol in conjunction with other provisions of the Covenant, except when the failure by the State party to observe its obligations under article 2 is the proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant directly affecting the individual claiming to be a victim.⁸ The Committee notes that the authors have already alleged violations of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, resulting from the interpretation and application of the existing laws of the State party, and the Committee does not consider an examination of whether the State party has also violated its general obligations under article 2 (2), read in conjunction with articles 19 and 21, to be distinct from an examination of the violations of the authors’ rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore considers that the authors’ claims in that regard are incompatible with article 2 of the Covenant and thus inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

8. Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011), para. 7.4; Zhukovsky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/127/D/2724/2016), para. 6.4; and Vasilevich et al. v. Belarus, para. 6.4. ↩

The Committee also takes note of the authors’ claims under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 2 (3). In the absence, however, of any further pertinent information on file, the Committee considers that the authors have failed to sufficiently substantiate those claims for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee notes that the facts, as submitted by the authors in their respective communications, raise issues under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, taken separately. The Committee therefore considers the claims under articles 19 (2) and 21 raised in the four communications to be sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and proceeds with its consideration of the merits.

The Committee has considered the communications in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee takes note of the authors’ claims that their rights to freedom of expression and assembly have been restricted, in violation of both article 19 and article 21 of the Covenant, as significant fines were imposed on them (communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018 and No. 3134/2018) or they were sentenced to administrative detention (communication No. 3130/2018) for participating in peaceful public events and for expressing their views, as specified in detail in paragraphs 2.2 to 2.8 above.

Considering the authors’ claim that their right of peaceful assembly was unreasonably restricted by the State party by its imposition of significant fines and administrative detention for participating in peaceful public events, the Committee notes that the issue before it is to determine whether the restrictions imposed were justified under article 21 of the Covenant.

The Committee recalls that the right of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed under article 21 of the Covenant, is a fundamental human right, essential for public expression of an individual’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society. Given that peaceful assemblies often have expressive functions, and that political speech enjoys particular protection as a form of expression, assemblies with a political message should enjoy a heightened level of accommodation and protection.⁹ The peaceful assemblies covered by article 21 may take many forms, including demonstrations, protests, meetings, processions, rallies, sit-ins, candlelight vigils and flash mobs. They are protected under article 21 whether they are stationary, such as pickets, or mobile, such as processions or marches.¹⁰ The organizers of an assembly generally have the right to choose a location within sight and sound of their target audience,¹¹ and no restriction to this right is permissible, unless it: (a) is imposed in conformity with the law; and (b) is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), protection of public health or morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. When a State party imposes restrictions with the aim of reconciling an individual’s right to assembly and the aforementioned interests of general concern, it should be guided by the objective of facilitating the right, rather than seeking unnecessary or disproportionate limitations to it. Restrictions must not be discriminatory, impair the essence of the right, or be aimed at discouraging participation in assemblies or causing a chilling effect.¹² The State party is thus under an obligation to justify the limitation of the right protected by article 21 of the Covenant.¹³

9. See the Committee’s general comment No. 37 (2020), para. 32. ↩
10. Ibid., para 6. ↩
11. Ibid., para. 22. ↩
12. Ibid., para. 36. ↩
13. Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 8.4. ↩

A failure to notify the authorities of an upcoming assembly, where required, does not render the act of participation in the assembly unlawful, and must not in itself be used as a basis for dispersing the assembly or arresting the participants or organizers, or for imposing undue sanctions, such as charging the participants or organizers with criminal offences. Where administrative sanctions are imposed on organizers for failure to notify, this must be justified by the authorities. Lack of notification does not absolve the authorities of the obligation, within their abilities, to facilitate the assembly and to protect the participants.¹⁴ Where authorization regimes persist in domestic law, they must in practice function as a system of notification, with authorization being granted as a matter of course, in the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise. Notification regimes, for their part, must not in practice function as authorization systems.¹⁵

14. See the Committee’s general comment No. 37 (2020), para. 71. ↩
15. Ibid., para. 73. ↩

In the present case, the Committee must consider whether the restrictions imposed on the authors’ right of peaceful assembly are justified under any of the criteria set out in the second sentence of article 21 of the Covenant. In the light of the information available on file, the authors were sentenced by the domestic courts to significant fines (communications No. 3056/2017, No. 3100/2018 and No. 3134/2018) or administrative detention (communication No. 3130/2018) for participating in peaceful assemblies in violation of the provisions of the Public Events Act. The Committee notes, however, that the domestic courts did not provide any justification or explanation as to how, in practice, the authors’ participation in such peaceful assemblies had violated the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set out in article 21 of the Covenant. Neither has the State party provided any justification for restricting the authors’ rights under article 21 in its submissions before the Committee, particularly in the light of the chilling effect of the sanctions imposed. In the absence of any further explanations from the State party regarding the matter, the Committee concludes that the State party has violated the authors’ rights under article 21 of the Covenant.¹⁶

16. Malei v. Belarus (CCPR/C/129/D/2404/2014), para. 9.7; Tolchina et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2857/2016), para. 7.6; Zavadskaya et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2865/2016), para. 7.6; Popova v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/122/D/2217/2012), para. 7.6; Sadykov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/129/D/2456/2014), para. 7.7; and Vasilevich et al. v. Belarus, para. 7.7. ↩

The Committee also takes note of the authors’ claims that their right to freedom of expression has been restricted, in violation of article 19 of the Covenant, since they were found guilty of an administrative offence and required to pay significant administrative fines or to serve administrative detention for participating in peaceful rallies with an expressive purpose. The issue before the Committee is therefore to determine whether the restrictions imposed on the authors’ freedom of expression can be justified under any of the criteria set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant.

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 34 (2011), in which it stated, inter alia, that freedom of expression is essential for any society and constitutes a foundation stone for every free and democratic society.¹⁷ It notes that article 19 (3) of the Covenant allows for certain restrictions on freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart information and ideas, only to the extent that those restrictions are provided for by law and only if they are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Finally, any restriction on freedom of expression must not be overbroad in nature – that is, it must be the least intrusive among the measures that might achieve the relevant protective function and proportionate to the interest being protected.¹⁸ The Committee recalls that it is for the State party to demonstrate that the restrictions on the author’s rights under article 19 were necessary and proportionate.¹⁹

17. See the Committee’s general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 2. ↩
18. Ibid., para. 34. ↩
19. Androsenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/116/D/2092/2011), para. 7.3. ↩

The Committee observes that sentencing the authors to heavy administrative fines or administrative detention for participating in peaceful, albeit unauthorized, meetings with an expressive purpose raises serious doubts as to the necessity and proportionality of the restrictions on the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee observes in this regard that the State party has failed to invoke and justify any specific grounds to support the necessity of such restrictions, as required under article 19 (3) of the Covenant.²⁰ The State party has also failed to demonstrate that the measures selected were the least intrusive in nature or proportionate to the interest that it sought to protect, particularly in the light of the chilling effect of such measures. The Committee considers that, in the circumstances of the cases before it, the restrictions imposed on the authors and the sanctions imposed, although based on domestic law, were not justified pursuant to the conditions set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant. It therefore concludes that the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant have been violated.²¹

20. Zalesskaya v. Belarus (CCPR/C/101/D/1604/2007), para. 10.5; and Vasilevich et al. v. Belarus, para. 7.10. ↩
21. Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2137/2012), para. 7.5; Zhagiparov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/124/D/2441/2014), para. 13.4; and Shchetko and Shchetko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001), para. 7.5. ↩

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose violations by the State party of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated to provide the authors with adequate compensation, including reimbursement of the fines and of any legal costs incurred by them. The State party is also under an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. In that connection, the Committee notes that it has dealt with similar cases in respect of the same laws and practices of the State party in a number of earlier communications,²² and thus requires the State party to revise its normative framework on public events, consistent with its obligation under article 2 (2), with a view to ensuring that the rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant may be fully enjoyed in the State party.

22. See, for example, Abramovich v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2702/2015), Romanchik and Shchukina v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/2917/2016), Belenky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/2860/2016) and Fedynich v. Belarus (CCPR/C/136/D/2913/2016). ↩

On becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant. The present communications were submitted for consideration before the State party’s denunciation of the Optional Protocol became effective on 8 February 2023. Since, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them widely disseminated in the official languages of the State party.