Olga Nikolaichik , Anna Krasulina (represented by counsel, Leonid Sudalenko), Artem Kovalev (represented by counsel, Leonid Sudalenko), Vadim Vasiliev (not represented) v. Belarus

The authors of the communications are Olga Nikolaichik (communication No. 3056/2017), Anna Krasulina (communication No. 3100/2018), Artem Kovalev (communication No. 3130/2018) and Vadim Vasiliev (communication No. 3134/2018), nationals of Belarus born in 1968, 1969, 1994 and 1985, respectively. They claim that the State party has violated their rights under articles 19 and 21, taken separately and in conjunction with article 2 (2) and (3), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant). The Optional Protocol entered into force for Belarus on 30 December 1992. The authors of communications Nos. 3056/2017, 3100/2018, 3130/2018 are represented by counsel. The author of communication No. 3134/2018 is not represented.

The present communications were submitted for consideration before the State party’s denunciation of the Optional Protocol became effective on 8 February 2023. In accordance with article 12 (2) of the Optional Protocol and the Committee’s previous case law, the State party continues to be subject to the application of the Optional Protocol as regards the present communications.⁴

4. See e.g. Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago (CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998), para. 10; Lobban v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/80/D/797/1998), para. 11; Shchiryakova et al. v. Belarus (CCPR /C/137/DR/2911/2016). ↩

On, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the Committee decided to join communications 3056/2017, 3100/2018, 3130/2018 and 3134/2018 submitted by four different authors for a joint decision, in view of substantial factual and legal similarity.

The four communications relate to administrative convictions under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (“Violation of the procedure for organizing and holding mass events”). The facts relevant to each communication are summarized below.

The author of communication No. 3056/2017 has repeatedly been imposed significant administrative fines under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses for unauthorized picketing.

On 24 March 2016, a fine of 10,500,000 non-redenominated Belarusian rubleswas imposed on her by Tsentralny District Court of Minsk due to her picketing in front of the Embassy of Russian Federation in Minsk. The author had held the Belarusian national flag and shouted slogans. Her cassation appeal against this judgement was rejected by Minsk City Court on 19 April 2016.

On 13 June 2016, a fine of 8,400,000 non-redenominated Belarusianrubles was imposed on her by Partizansky District Court of Minsk due to her participation in a picket in honour of disappeared politicians and journalist. The author had held a banner “Where is Z.? Where is G.? Where is K.? Where is Z.?” Her cassation appeal against this judgement was rejected on 29 July 2016 by Minsk City Court.

On 15 September 2016, a fine of 1050 redenominated Belarusian rubleswas imposed on the author by Leninsky District Court of Minsk due to her picketing in front of Tsentralny District Court in support of a political prisoner. She had held a banner “Freedom to P., our history is on trial here”.

The author of communication No. 3100/2018 is an activist of the United Civic Party. On 30 March 2017, she found herself near a temporary detention facility in Minsk, waiting for members of her party to be liberated from administrative arrests. She was holding a white-red-white flag. Due to this, on 21 April 2017, Moskovsky District Court of Minsk imposed on her an administrative fine of 1150 Belarusian rubles (around 550 euros), which is higher than an average salary, under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses. On 17 May 2017, Minsk City Court rejected the author’s cassation appeal against this judgement.

The author of the communication No. 3130/2018 participated in an unauthorized peaceful march in Gomel on 19 February 2017 to protest the presidential Decree No. 3 “On prevention of social dependency”. On 23 March 2017, he was convicted to an administrative arrest of 10 days by Chechersky District Court of Gomel Region under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses for breaching the public events organization procedure. On 14 April 2017, Gomel Regional Court rejected his cassation appeal against this judgement.

The author of the communication No. 3134/2018 participated in an unauthorized peaceful demonstration “March of angry Belarusians 2.0” on Nezavisimosty square in Minsk on 21 October 2017 to protest against taxation of unemployed citizens. On 7 December 2017, Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Gomel imposed an administrative fine of 230 Belarusian rubles (around 100 euros) on the author under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses. On 12 January 2018, the author’s cassation appeal against this judgement was rejected by Gomel Regional Court.

All the authors submit that they have not attempted lodging supervisory review appeals with judicial and prosecutorial authorities, claiming ineffectiveness of these remedies with a reference to the Committee’s relevant case law.

The four authors claim that the State party has violated articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant taken in conjunction with its article 2 (2) and (3) because the restrictions imposed on their right to express their opinion in peaceful rallies were not necessary under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

By notes verbales of 15 January and 16 June 2017 (communication No. 3056/2017), 5 March 2018 (communication No. 3100/2018), 8 May 2018 (communication No. 3130/2018) and 26 July 2018 (communication No. 3134/2018) the State party submitted its observations on admissibility and merits of the communications.

The State party confirms that the author of the communication No. 3056/2017 has been imposed fines on three occasions under article 23.34 (1) and (3) of the Code of Administrative Offenses for participation in public events not authorized by Minsk City Executive Committee: on 24 March 2016 by Tsentralny District Court of Minsk, on 13 June 2016 by Partizansky District Court of Minsk and on 15 September 2016 by Leninsky District Court of Minsk. These judgements were upheld by Minsk City Court on 19 April 2016, 29 July 2016 and 25 October 2016, respectively. Minsk City Court’s decisions entered into force on the day of their adoption.

With regards to the communication No. 3100/2018, the State party submits that on 21 April 2017, Moskovsky District Court of Minsk found the author guilty of breaching the procedure for organizing and conducting mass events under article 23.34 (3) of the Code of Administrative Offenses. The conviction referred to a meeting held on 30 March 2017 in front of the offenders’ isolation centre of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of Minsk City Executive Committee. The author was imposed a fine of 50 basic units. This judgement was upheld on 17 May 2017 by a decision of Minsk City Court, which entered into force on the same day.

The State party submits that on 23 March 2017, the author of the communication No. 3130/2018 was convicted by Chechersky District Court of Gomel Region under article 23.34 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offenses for violation of the procedure for conducting a meeting or a street march committed by a participant of such an event. He was punished with an administrative arrest of 10 days. The judgement was upheld by a decision of Gomel Regional Court on 14 April 2017, which entered into force on the same day.

As regards the communication No. 3134/2018, the State party submits that its author was found guilty of breaching the procedure for conducting a meeting under article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses by Zhelezhnodorozhny District of Gomel on 7 December 2017. He was imposed a fine of 10 basic units, which corresponded to 230 Belarusian rubles. The judgement was upheld on 12 January 2018 by Gomel Regional Court. This decision entered into force on the same day.

In response to all the four communications, the State party notes that article 12.11 (1) and (2) of the Procedural and Execution Code of the Republic of Belarus on Administrative Offenses allows for lodging supervisory review appeals against judicial decisions on administrative offenses with judicial and prosecutorial authorities. The authors of communications Nos. 3056/2017 and 3100/2018 could have lodged supervisory review appeals with the Chairpersons of Minsk City Court and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus, whereas the authors of the communications Nos. 3130/2018 and 3134/2018 could have lodged supervisory review appeals with the Chairpersons of Gomel Regional Court and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus. All the authors could have also lodged supervisory review appeals with prosecutorial authorities. Article 12.11 (3) of the above-mentioned Code establishes the deadline of 6 months for lodging supervisory review appeals against judgements on administrative offenses following their entry into force. There is no indication in the communications that over this period, their authors were unable to lodge supervisory review appeals or that any obstacles were created for their lodging such appeals.

The State party refutes the authors’ argument about ineffectiveness of supervisory review appeals to prosecutorial authorities. It states that in 2017 alone, prosecutorial authorities raised 3766 protests against judgements on administrative offenses, 3665 (97%) of which were satisfied. The State party argues therefore that supervisory review appeals to prosecutorial authorities are an effective remedy.

In light of the above, the State party concludes that the four communications are inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and constitute an abuse of the right of submission under its article 3.

The State party rejects the authors’ claims about violation of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. It argues that its Public Events Act of 30 December 1997 is compliant with articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, including the restrictions it allows to the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of association. Articles 33 and 35 of the State party’s Constitution also guarantee the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly insofar as their exercise does not violate the public order and the rights of other citizens.

By submissions dated 27 April 2018 (communication No. 3056/2017), 5 June 2018 (communication No. 3100/2018), 13 July 2018 (communication No. 3130/2018) and 23 November 2021 (communication No. 3134/2018), the authors provided the following comments on the State party’s observations.

All the authors contest the State party’s assertions about the effectiveness of the supervisory review appeals before judicial and prosecutorial authorities. They note that such appeals depend on the discretionary power of the judge or the prosecutor and are limited to consideration of the issues of law rather than facts and evidence.

The authors of the communication Nos. 3056/2017, 3100/2018 and 3130/2018 note that both the Committee and the European Court of Human Rights⁵ have acknowledged that supervisory review procedures in ex-Soviet States depend on discretionary powers of supervising authorities and cannot be considered an effective remedy for the exhaustion purposes. Only cassation appeals, like the ones attempted by them, result in re-examination on the merits.

5. Reference made to ECHR, Tumilovich v. Russia, application No.47033/99, inadmissibility decision of 22 June 1999. ↩

The authors of the communication Nos. 3056/2017, 3100/2018 and 3130/2018 also argue that it is next to impossible to observe the 6-month deadline foreseen by domestic legislation for challenging a judgement on administrative offenses if appeals are to be submitted to the Chairperson of the regional court and later to the Chairperson of the Supreme Court. Such appeals are examined by rotation by several of the Chairperson’s deputies. The Chairperson of the Supreme Court has five deputies, whereas the Prosecutor General has four deputies. The State party does not explain which deputy the authors had to address in order to ensure that their appeals were examined directly by the Chairperson of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General.

The author of the communication No. 3134/2018 adds that supervisory review appeals are subject to high taxes, which amount to 2 basic units in cases where a fine of 10 basic unit is contested.

Regarding the statistics provided by the State party, according to which in 2017, prosecutorial authorities raised 3766 protests against judgements related to administrative offenses, 3665 (97%) of which were satisfied, the authors of the communications Nos. 3056/2017, 3100/2018 and 3130/2018 note that the State party does not explain how many of these cases related to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the right of peaceful assembly. According to statistics on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it registered 3,9 million administrative offenses in 2017Therefore, according to the authors, the number of prosecutorial protests cited by the State party is less than 0,1% of the total number of cases on administrative offenses in the country.

According to the author of the communication No. 3134/2018, the statistics provided by the State party only prove the ineffectiveness of the prosecutorial supervisory review procedure. He refers to statistics of the Supreme Court according to which in 2017, the Court examined 370109 cases on administrative offenses. The 3766 protests raised by prosecutorial authorities thus constitute 1% of the relevant cases examined in 2017. The author also points out that the State party has not disclosed the number of supervisory review appeals submitted to prosecutorial authorities and the percentage among those of the 3766 protests raised. Furthermore, the State party has not provided any examples of protests raised in cases related to the exercise of the freedom of expression and the freedom of peaceful assembly.

All the authors reaffirm their claims about violation of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The author of the communication No. 3134/2018 notes that the State party has not explained why the restrictions imposed on his rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly were necessary and proportional under articles 19 and 21. He refers to General Comment No. 37 according to which a failure to notify the authorities of an upcoming assembly, where required, does not render the act of participation in this assembly unlawful, and must not in itself be used as a basis for imposing undue sanctions.⁶

6. General Comment No 37 (2020), CCPR/C/GC/37, para. 71. ↩

The authors of the communication Nos. 3056/2017, 3100/2018 and 3130/2018 add that while referring to the Public Events Act, the State party omits to mention that it has failed to comply with recommendations on amending this law provided in the Joint Opinion on the Law on Mass Events of the Republic of Belarus, adopted by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2012. Neither has the State party complied with the Committee’s recommendations to bring its Public Events Act in compliance with its international obligations.⁷ The authors conclude that both the Public Events Act on its own and its application in their specific cases have resulted in violation of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

7. Reference is made, inter alia, to Kuznetsov et al. v. Belarus, CCPR/C/111/D/1976/2010; Evrezov v. Belarus, CCPR/C/114/D/1988/2010. ↩

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communications are admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the authors have failed to seek a supervisory review of the impugned decisions by prosecutorial and judicial authorities. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review submitted to a president of a court, directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge, constitutes an extraordinary remedy and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review submitted to a prosecutor’s office, dependent on the discretionary power of the prosecutor, requesting a review of court decisions that have taken effect, constitutes an extraordinary remedy and thus does not constitute a remedy that must be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.⁸

8. Gryk v. Belarus (CCPR/C/136/D/2961/2017), para. 6.3; Tolchin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/3241/2018), para. 6.3; and Shchukina v. Belarus (CCPR/C/134/D/3242/2018), para. 6.3; Vasilevich and others v. Belarus (CCPR/C/137/D/2693/2015, CCPR/C/137/D/2898/2016 CCPR/C/137/D/3002/2017, CCPR/C/137/D/3084/2017, para. 6.3. ↩

While welcoming the statistics provided by the State party on the high rate of successful protests raised by prosecutorial authorities against judicial judgements on administrative offenses in 2017, the Committee observes that the State party has not disclosed the percentage of this figure from the total number of the supervisory review appeals submitted to prosecutors over the same period. Neither has the State provided any specific information on the effectiveness of the supervisory review procedure in cases related to administrative convictions imposed on participants of public rallies like those examined in the present views. The absence of this data prevents the Committee from reaching a different conclusion, compared to its previous case law, on the effectiveness of the supervisory review by prosecutorial authorities. The Committee concludes that the authors have exhausted all available effective domestic remedies and that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communication.

The Committee takes note of the authors’ claims that the State party has violated their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with its article 2 (2). The Committee recalls that the provisions of article 2 cannot be invoked in a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol in conjunction with other provisions of the Covenant, except when the failure by the State party to observe its obligations under article 2 is the proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant directly affecting the individual claiming to be a victim.⁹ The Committee notes that the authors have already alleged a violation of their rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, resulting from the interpretation and application of the existing laws of the State party, and the Committee does not consider the examination of whether the State party has also violated its general obligations under article 2 (2), read in conjunction with articles 19 and 21, to be distinct from examination of the violation of the authors’ rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore considers that the authors’ claims in that regard are incompatible with article 2 of the Covenant and thus inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

9. Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011), annex, para. 7.4.; and Zhukovsky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/127/D/2724/2016), para. 6.4; Vasilevich and others v. Belarus (CCPR/C/137/D/2693/2015, CCPR/C/137/D/2898/2016 CCPR/C/137/D/3002/2017, CCPR/C/137/D/3084/2017, para. 6.4. ↩

The Committee also takes note of the authors’ claims under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 2 (3). In the absence, however, of any further pertinent information on file, the Committee considers that the authors have failed to sufficiently substantiate those claims for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee notes that the facts, as submitted by the authors in their respective communications, raise issues under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, taken separately. The Committee, therefore, considers the claims under articles 19 (2) and 21 raised by the four communications sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and proceeds with their consideration of the merits.

The Committee has considered the communications in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee takes note of the authors’ claims that their rights to freedom of expression and assembly have been restricted in violation of both article 19 and article 21 of the Covenant, as they were sentenced to pay significant fines (communications Nos. 3056/2017, 3100/2018 and 3134/2018) or serve administrative detention (communication No. 3130/2018) for participating in peaceful public events and for expressing their views, as specified in detail in paragraphs 2.2 to 2.8 above.

Considering the authors’ claim that their right of peaceful assembly was unreasonably restricted by the State party on account of imposing significant fines and administrative detention for participating in peaceful public events, the Committee notes that the issue before it is to determine whether the restrictions imposed were justified under article 21 of the Covenant.

The Committee recalls that the right of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed under article 21 of the Covenant, is a fundamental human right, essential for public expression of an individual’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society. Given that peaceful assemblies often have expressive functions, and that political speech enjoys particular protection as a form of expression, assemblies with a political message should enjoy a heightened level of accommodation and protection.¹⁰ The peaceful assemblies covered by Article 21 may take many forms, including demonstrations, protests, meetings, processions, rallies, sit-ins, candlelight vigils and flash mobs. They are protected under article 21 whether they are stationary, such as pickets, or mobile, such as processions or marches.¹¹ The organizers of an assembly generally have the right to choose a location within sight and sound of their target audience,¹² and no restriction to this right is permissible, unless it: (a) is imposed in conformity with the law; and (b) is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), protection of public health or morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. When a State party imposes restrictions with the aim of reconciling an individual’s right to assembly and the aforementioned interests of general concern, it should be guided by the objective of facilitating the right, rather than seeking unnecessary or disproportionate limitations to it. Restrictions must not be discriminatory, impair the essence of the right, or be aimed at discouraging participation in assemblies or causing a chilling effect.¹³The State party is thus under an obligation to justify the limitation of the right protected by article 21 of the Covenant.¹⁴

10. General comment No. 37 (2020), CCPR/C/GC/37, para. 32. ↩
11. Ibid., para 6. ↩
12. Ibid., para. 22. ↩
13. Ibid., para. 36. ↩
14. Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 8.4. ↩

A failure to notify the authorities of an upcoming assembly, where required, does not render the act of participation in the assembly unlawful, and must not in itself be used as a basis for dispersing the assembly or arresting the participants or organizers, or for imposing undue sanctions, such as charging the participants or organizers with criminal offences. Where administrative sanctions are imposed on organizers for failure to notify, this must be justified by the authorities. Lack of notification does not absolve the authorities from the obligation, within their abilities, to facilitate the assembly and to protect the participants.¹⁵ Where authorization regimes persist in domestic law, they must in practice function as a system of notification, with authorization being granted as a matter of course, in the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise. Notification regimes, for their part, must not in practice function as authorization systems.¹⁶

15. General comment No. 37 (2020), CCPR/C/GC/37, para. 71. ↩
16. Ibid., para. 73. ↩

In the present case, the Committee must consider whether the restrictions imposed on the authors’ right of peaceful assembly are justified under any of the criteria set out in the second sentence of article 21 of the Covenant. In the light of the information available on file, the authors were sentenced by the domestic Courts to significant fines (communications Nos. 3056/2017, 3100/2018 and 3134/2018) or administrative detention (communication No. 3130/2018) for participating in peaceful assemblies in violation of the provisions of the Public Events Act. The Committee notes, however, that the domestic courts did not provide any justification or explanation as to how, in practice, the authors’ participation in such peaceful assemblies had violated the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set out in article 21 of the Covenant. Neither has the State party provided any justification for restricting the authors’ rights under article 21 in its submissions before the Committee, particularly in light of the chilling effect of the imposed sanctions. In the absence of any further explanations from the State party regarding the matter, the Committee concludes that the State party has violated the authors’ rights under article 21 of the Covenant.¹⁷

17. Vladimir Malei v. Belarus (CCPR/C/129/D/2404/2014), para 9.7; Tolchina et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2857/2016), para 7.6; Zavadskaya et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2865/2016), para 7.6; Popova v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/122/D/2217/2012), para. 7.6; and Sadykov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/129/D/2456/2014), para. 7.7; Vasilevich and others v. Belarus (CCPR/C/137/D/2693/2015, CCPR/C/137/D/2898/2016 CCPR/C/137/D/3002/2017, CCPR/C/137/D/3084/2017, para. 7.7. ↩

The Committee also takes note of the authors’ claims that their right to freedom of expression has been restricted in violation of article 19 of the Covenant, since they were found guilty of an administrative offence and sentenced to pay significant administrative fines or to administrative detention for participating in peaceful rallies with an expressive purpose. The issue before the Committee is therefore to determine whether the restrictions imposed on the authors’ freedom of expression can be justified under any of the criteria set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant.

The Committee recalls its General comment No. 34 (2011) in which it stated, inter alia, that freedom of expression is essential for any society and constitutes a foundation stone for every free and democratic society.¹⁸ It notes that article 19 (3) of the Covenant allows for certain restrictions on the freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart information and ideas, only to the extent that those restrictions are provided for by law and only if they are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Finally, any restriction on freedom of expression must not be overbroad in nature – that is, it must be the least intrusive among the measures that might achieve the relevant protective function and proportionate to the interest being protected.¹⁹ The Committee recalls that it is for the State party to demonstrate that the restrictions on the author’s rights under article 19 were necessary and proportionate.²⁰

18. General comment No. 34 (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 2. ↩
19. Ibid., para. 34. ↩
20. Androsenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/116/D/2092/2011), para. 7.3. ↩

The Committee observes that sentencing the authors to heavy administrative fines or administrative detention for participating in peaceful, albeit unauthorized, meetings with an expressive purpose raises serious doubts as to the necessity and proportionality of the restrictions on the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee observes in this regard that the State party has failed to invoke and justify any specific grounds to support the necessity of such restrictions as required under article 19 (3) of the Covenant.²¹ The State party has also failed to demonstrate that the measures selected were the least intrusive in nature or proportionate to the interest that it sought to protect, particularly in light of the chilling effect of such measures. The Committee considers that, in the circumstances of the cases before it, the restrictions imposed on the authors and the imposed sanctions, although based on domestic law, were not justified pursuant to the conditions set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant. It therefore concludes that the authors’ rights under article 19 of the Covenant have been violated.²²

21. Zalesskaya v. Belarus (CCPR/C/101/D/1604/2007), para. 10.5; Vasilevich and others v. Belarus (CCPR/C/137/D/2693/2015, CCPR/C/137/D/2898/2016 CCPR/C/137/D/3002/2017, CCPR/C/137/D/3084/2017, para. 7.10. ↩
22. Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2137/2012), para. 7.5; Zhagiparov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/124/D/2441/2014), para. 13.4; and Shchetko and Shchetko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001), para. 7.5. ↩

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State party of articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated, , to provide the authors with adequate compensation, including reimbursement of the fines and any legal costs incurred by them. The State party is also under an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. In that connection, the Committee notes that it has dealt with similar cases in respect of the same laws and practices of the State party in a number of earlier communications,²³ and thus requires the State party to revise its normative framework on public events, consistent with its obligation under article 2 (2), with a view to ensuring that the rights under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant may be fully enjoyed in the State party.

23. See, e.g., Abramovich v. Belarus (CCPR/C/132/D/2702/2015); Romanchik and Shchukina v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/2917/2016); Belenky v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/2860/2016); Fedynich v. Belarus (CCPR/C/136/D/2913/2016) ↩

On becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant. The present communication was submitted for consideration before the State party’s denunciation of the Optional Protocol became effective on 8 February 2023. Since pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them widely disseminated in the official languages of the State party.