Juan Gasparini v. Argentina

The author of the communication is Juan Gasparini, a national of Argentina. He asserts that the State party has violated his rights under article 14 (1) and (5) and article 19 (2) of the Covenant, both articles read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3). The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 8 November 1986. The author is represented by counsel.

The author of the communication was granted political asylum in Switzerland in 1980 for having been subjected to torture at the Navy School of Mechanics, at which he was detained for more than a year, during the Argentine dictatorship.

The author was accredited as a journalist by the United Nations Office at Geneva in 1988, has been a member of Impressum, a Swiss journalists’ association, since 1989 and has published several books on human rights violations and corruption in Argentina.

The facts of the present communication relate to his investigation into how, with the help of lawyers and accountants, marines attached to the Argentine Navy School of Mechanics changed the names of the owners of real estate by altering documents and falsifying signatures so as to be able to sell the property to third parties and pocket the money from the sales, thus dispossessing the real owners, who were victims of enforced disappearance.

In particular, in a book entitled La delgada línea blanca, the contents of which served as the basis for allegations of corruption that are still pending before the Argentine courts, the author reported the theft of 27 hectares in Chacras de Coria, in the Province of Mendoza, which were sold for US$ 20 million. According to his investigation, this land belonged to the three owners of the company Cerro Largo, all of whom disappeared.

After the publication of the book, Federico Gómez Miranda, the son of the adviser and lawyer of Cerro Largo, who disappeared at the same time as the three owners of the company, was reported in the press to be claiming that the findings of the author’s investigations were false and that his father was also one of the owners of the land in Chacras de Coria. The author’s response appeared in a published press release in which he was quoted as stating that Mr. Gómez Miranda “is claiming ownership of property that does not belong to him”.

In 2006, Mr. Gómez Miranda brought a civil libel suit against the author in which he sought damages of 100,000 Argentine pesos⁴ and claimed that the author’s statements in the press had impeached his honour, injuring his most intimate being and his feelings for his missing father, brought discredit upon him, damaging his reputation with respect to the action he had been taking since his father’s disappearance in an attempt to establish the truth.

4. Approximately US$ 8,000 in 2006. ↩

The author responded to the lawsuit by denying that he had made injurious allegations and asserting that he had in no way intended to cause injury to Mr. Gómez Miranda but that the findings of his investigations had simply not shown Mr. Gómez Miranda’s father to be one of the owners of the land in question.

On 19 April 2009, the Mendoza Federal Civil Court of First Instance ruled that the author’s actions did not constitute libel since it had not been proved that he had acted with malice.

On 26 May 2011, the Mendoza Federal Appeals Court ruled on the appeal filed by Mr. Gómez Miranda, overturned the lower court’s ruling and declared the tort liability of the author for the civil offence of libel. The author was not considered a journalist by the Federal Appeals Court for the purposes of the case since he was not the author of the press release in which his statements were reproduced. In the judgment, Mr. Gasparini was ordered to pay compensation of 50,000 Argentine pesos.

The author recounts that two of the three judges of the Mendoza Federal Appeals Court who were responsible for the Court’s ruling were subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for collusion and obstructing the investigation of serious human rights violations that occurred during the dictatorship.⁵

5. Federal Criminal and Correctional Court No. 1 of Mendoza, judgment of 20 September 2017. ↩

The author lodged an extraordinary federal appeal with the Mendoza Federal Appeals Court; in the appeal, he sought the recusal of the three judges on grounds of lack of impartiality, as they were “sympathetic to the dictatorship”, and he had been a victim of State terrorism during the dictatorship.

The three judges in question were removed from the case by the Judges Impeachment Panel, and, as a result, the Mendoza Federal Appeals Court had a new composition when it ruled on the extraordinary appeal filed by the author. On 18 December 2013, the Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that, as the appeal challenged only points of fact and evidence, the requirement for extraordinary appeals to address a point of federal law was not met.

On 19 February 2014, the author brought complaint proceedings before the Supreme Court to challenge the dismissal of his extraordinary federal appeal. On 19 February 2019, the Supreme Court, mentioning article 280 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, ruled that the appeal was inadmissible.⁶

6. The author refers to the Supreme Court, judgment No. 48/2014 (50/G)/SC1. Article 280 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure provides that the Supreme Court, “at its discretion and on the sole basis of this law, may dismiss an extraordinary appeal if the federal grievance is insufficient or the matters raised lack substance or significance”. ↩

First, the author alleges that the State party has violated his right to freedom of expression under article 19 (2) of the Covenant, in that he was wrongly found liable for the tort of libel in the exercise of his profession as an investigative journalist, without regard to the special protection that the subject matter of his book merits as information of interest to the public and that the court considered his case as if he were simply a private individual, not a journalist.

The author adds that his being found responsible for alleged libel is having a chilling effect on the journalistic investigation of abuse of authority during the dictatorship.

Secondly, the author claims that the State party failed to guarantee access to an independent and impartial tribunal, in violation of article 14 (1) of the Covenant. While judges are required not to have a direct interest in the cases they hear, a set position or a preference for any of the parties and not to be in any way connected to the dispute, this condition was not met by two of the judges who heard his case, as they were subsequently given life sentences for collusion and obstructing the investigation of serious human rights violations that occurred during the dictatorship.

Thirdly, the author claims that he did not benefit from the judicial safeguards that he was entitled to, as the Supreme Court failed to give a reasoned explanation for the dismissal of his complaint.

Lastly, although the author does not allege a violation of article 14 (5) of the Covenant in his communication, in his communication he requests that the State party be called to account for a violation of this article, affirming that, although he was not convicted of a criminal offence, a civil and financial penalty undermines a journalist’s credibility and should therefore be subject to review.

The author requests the Committee to order the State party: (a) to review the penalty imposed on him; (b) to adjust the civil appeals system in order to allow persons found liable on appeal on matters related to freedom of expression to bring an ordinary appeal for a review of the facts and evidence before a higher judicial authority; (c) to provide compensation for the damage and injury suffered as a result of the proceedings; (d) to make a public acknowledgement of responsibility in which it issues an apology to him and underscores the importance and the essential role of freedom of expression in democracy; (e) to distribute the book on his investigation of corruption during the dictatorship; and (f) to finalize the criminal investigations, which have been ongoing for more than twenty years, into the allegations of fraudulent appropriation of the property of relatives of the disappeared persons that are at the origin of this dispute.

In its observations of 13 May 2022, the State party notes the need to frame the present communication within the unique memory, truth, justice and reparation processes through which the serious human rights violations of the past are being addressed. The State party specifies that the author was recognized in 1997 as a victim of the civilian and military dictatorship and received compensation for the unlawful deprivation of liberty he experienced and for his forced exile.⁷ The State party further specifies that, as the son of a disappeared person, Mr. Gómez Miranda, the plaintiff in the civil suit against the author, is also a victim of the dictatorship.

7. The author received the benefits provided for in Act No. 24.043 in respect of the period from 10 January 1977 to 1 August 1979 pursuant to decision No. 1339/97 of 11 July 1997 of the Ministry of the Interior. Subsequently, he requested that the benefits be extended to cover the period until 28 October 1983, a request that was granted by Ministry of Justice and Human Rights decision No. 474/2004 of 27 May 2004. ↩

The State party accepts that the communication meets all the admissibility criteria, in that it meets ratione temporis criteria, there is no international lis pendens and the author has exhausted domestic remedies.

On the merits, the State party acknowledges its international responsibility for the violation of the right to freedom of expression enshrined in article 19 (2) of the Covenant. In the words of the State party, “the judgment of Mendoza Federal Court of 26 May 2011 violated Mr. Gasparini’s right to freedom of expression” insofar as it constituted a disproportionate restriction of his right to publish information in that it failed to recognize the special protection that information of interest to the public – which the information whose publication resulted in his being found liable undoubtedly was – merits, and because it failed to take account of the status of the two parties in the dispute as victims of State terrorism, the direct injury suffered by Mr. Gasparini as a result of the events reported in his publications and the possible revictimization to which the judicial proceedings could give rise.

Referring to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,⁸ the State party adds that the Court should have considered whether the finding against the author and the order to pay damages were reasonable. In the words of the State party, “there are other means of protecting the right to honour that have less severe implications for freedom of expression. Through the exercise of the right to rectification, for example, the offending information could have been corrected, or a response issued, in the same medium in which the information was published.” Referring again to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,⁹ the State party notes that “the judgment also had implications for the right to the truth in the collective sense, since the information that Mr. Gasparini published, which led to the finding against him, formed part of his account of investigations into serious human rights violations”.

8. Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, judgment of 2 July 2004, para. 103. ↩
9. Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, judgment of 22 September 2009, para. 119. ↩

The State party also acknowledges its international responsibility for the violation of the right to a fair trial, enshrined in article 14 (1) of the Covenant, which arose “as a result of the participation of the judges of Chamber A of the Mendoza Federal Appeals Court that was manifestly incompatible with memory, truth, justice and reparation processes and had a direct impact on the outcome of the appeal”. The State party notes that two of the three judges were sentenced in criminal proceedings to life imprisonment and an absolute and permanent disqualification from public office for their active role in obstructing investigations into criminal offences committed by State agents during the dictatorship. For the State party, “it is thus evident that the judges […] were clearly ill-disposed towards the unique process of transitional justice under way in Argentina and that this prejudice prevented them from ruling impartially on the appeal brought before them. Such partiality was also made manifest by the failure to take into account the extent to which the dissemination of the information at the origin of the lawsuit was in the public interest”.

Lastly, the State party submits that the dismissal of the complaint proceedings brought before the Supreme Court does not constitute a violation of the Covenant. The State party specifies that Act No. 23.774 amended article 280 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, by virtue of which the Supreme Court, “at its discretion and on the sole basis of this law, may dismiss an extraordinary appeal if the federal grievance is insufficient or the matters raised lack substance or significance”. The State party explains that this amendment introduced what is referred to in doctrine as “Argentine certiorari” and served to reduce the Court’s excess workload without being unreasonable in a similar way to the writ of certiorari under the law of the United States of America, the Brazilian filtro da repercussão geral (general legal relevance filter) and the German grundsätzliche Bedeutung (fundamental significance filter).

On 6 July 2022, the author welcomed the State party’s partial acceptance of international responsibility, which effectively ended the dispute with regard to the particular facts and rights.

With regard to the dispute over the violation of judicial guarantees resulting from the dismissal without further explanation by the Supreme Court of the author’s appeal, the author states that, while he understands that “ordering reparations that entail adjustments to the Argentine justice system as currently conceived could create more problems in that it would jeopardize the fine balance between the role of the judiciary and the role of government institutions in the resolution of key conflicts of public interest”, it was the summary dismissal of his appeal that crystallized the violation of his right to freedom of expression.

The author notes that the State party failed to comment on the reparations he requested. The author takes this silence as an implicit acknowledgement of his right to reparation for the violations of his rights and reiterates his request for the measures of reparation outlined in his initial communication.

On 23 September 2022, the State party indicated that it stood by its previous observations and expressed interest in initiating a dialogue with the author.

On 3 November 2022, the author stated that he would not enter into a friendly settlement process because he wanted his case to end with a finding by the Committee that his human rights had been violated.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee notes the State party’s acknowledgement that the communication is admissible insofar as it meets ratione temporis criteria, there is no international lis pendens and the author has exhausted domestic remedies (see para. 4.2). The Committee also notes that the author challenged the finding of liability up to the level of the Supreme Court. The Committee is therefore of the view that article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the communication.

The Committee is of the belief that the complaint regarding the violation of article 14 (5) of the Covenant is incompatible ratione materiae since this article does not apply to proceedings determining rights and obligations in a civil suit or to any other proceedings that are not part of a criminal appeal process.¹⁰ The Committee therefore finds this part of the communication inadmissible.

10. General comment No. 32 (2007), para. 46. ↩

The Committee is also of the opinion that the complaint that the rejection by the Supreme Court, without reasoned explanation, of the author’s appeal (see para. 5.2) constitutes a violation of article 14 of the Covenant is inadmissible for want of sufficient substantiation.

In the Committee’s opinion, the author has sufficiently substantiated, for admissibility purposes, his claims under articles 14 (1) of the Covenant, in relation to the court’s alleged lack of independence and impartiality, and 19 (2), read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3). It therefore finds this part of the communication admissible and proceeds to its consideration of the merits.

The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee appreciates the State party’s offer to engage in dialogue with a view to reaching a friendly settlement. The Committee also appreciates the State party’s acceptance of the facts of the communication, as well as its acknowledgement of international responsibility for violations of the right to freedom of expression under article 19 (2) of the Covenant and the right to a fair trial under article 14 (1).

In particular, the Committee notes that the State party acknowledges that the author’s right to freedom of expression was violated due to a disproportionate restriction of his right to disclose information, in that the decision of the Mendoza Federal Appeals Court failed to take account of the special protection that the information of interest to the public that the author published, which led to his being found liable, should have been given and that the Court failed to consider whether the finding of liability and the order to pay damages were reasonable given that there were other ways of protecting the right to honour that would have interfered less severely with the author’s freedom of expression. The State party adds that the finding against the author also has implications for the right to the truth, in the collective sense, as the information that the author published, which led to the finding, came to light as a result of his investigations into serious human rights violations (see paras. 4.3 and 4.4).

The Committee notes that the State party also accepts that the right to a fair trial was violated owing to the involvement of judges who were evidently opposed to the memory, truth, justice and reparation process and who were subsequently sentenced in criminal proceedings to life imprisonment and an absolute and permanent disqualification from holding public office for their active role in obstructing investigations into crimes committed during the dictatorship (see para. 4.5).

The Committee is of the view that the State party’s acknowledgement of the facts and the violations of the Covenant make a positive contribution to the consideration of this communication and have considerable material and symbolic value as assurances of the nonrepetition of similar incidents.¹¹ As the parties do not disagree on these two issues, the Committee is of the opinion that the dispute has been settled and accepts the parties’ view that the facts of which it has been apprised constitute a violation of the author’s right to freedom of expression under article 19 (2) of the Covenant and his right to a fair trial under article 14 (1) of the Covenant, both articles read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3).

11. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Almeida v. Argentina, judgment of 17 November 2020, para. 22, Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, judgment of 26 May 2010, para. 18, Guerrero, Molina et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, judgment of 3 June 2021, para. 31, and Vicky Hernández et al. v. Honduras, judgment of 26 March 2021, para. 16. ↩

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts of which it has been apprised show that the State party violated articles 19 (2) and 14 (1) of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3).

In accordance with article 2 (3) of the Covenant, the State party is required to provide an effective remedy. Accordingly, the State party should: (a) review the penalty imposed on the author, and (b) provide the author with full reparation, including adequate compensation, for the harm he has suffered. The State party is also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures that have been taken to give effect to the present Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views in its official languages and to disseminate them widely.

This case marks an important milestone: for the first time, a State party has acknowledged its responsibility for violating the Covenant in response to a complaint under the first Optional Protocol to the Covenant. In particular, Argentina recognizes that the author’s rights to freedom of expression and to an impartial tribunal were infringed when he was ordered to pay civil libel damages for publishing a book investigating human rights abuses perpetrated during the military dictatorship in that country, and when his appeal was reviewed by judges who had actively obstructed such investigations (see paras. 4.4 and 4.5 of the Views). The Committee rightly commends the State party for making a positive contribution to memory, truth, justice and reparation processes in Argentina, which it notes has considerable material and symbolic value as assurances of the non-repetition of similar incidents (see para. 9.5 of the Views).

I write separately for two reasons: first, to provide additional context for the Committee’s remedial choices in this case; and second, to offer guidance regarding the remedies of acknowledgement of responsibility and apology in international human rights law, both which have evolved significantly in recent years.

The Committee does not require Argentina to apologize or to publicly acknowledge its responsibility (see para. 11 of the Views), although the author specifically requested both remedies (see para. 3.6 of the Views). Such a public statement would have enhanced the material and symbolic value of the State party’s admission and broadened awareness of the violations in this case. However, the decision itself includes a detailed statement from Argentina accepting the facts and legal claims alleged by the author (see paras. 4.1–4.5 of the Views).¹² Thus, the publication and dissemination of the Committee’s Views themselves constitute a formal and public acknowledgment by Argentina of the country’s responsibility for the violations of the author’s rights.

12. The State party contested only one aspect of the complaint: the challenge to the Supreme Court’s rejection of the author’s extraordinary appeal without providing a reasoned decision (para. 4.6). The Committee dismisses that claim of the author’s as insufficiently substantiated (para. 8.4). ↩

The Committee’s general approach to remedies is set forth in its guidelines on measures of reparation under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It states: “When the Committee finds that an individual communication reveals violations of Covenant rights, it sets out measures designed to make full reparation to the victims (restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction), as well as measures aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of similar violations in the future (guarantees of non-repetition).”¹³ As a measure of satisfaction, the Committee “may request that States parties issue a public apology, particularly in cases of grave or systematic violations where the injury cannot be fully redressed by restitution or compensation only”.¹⁴ In the guidelines, the Committee does not mention acknowledgments of responsibility, but refers to public manifestations of such acknowledgments, including “having a monument built, putting up a commemorative plaque or changing the name of a street or other public place in cases involving grave or systematic violations”.¹⁵ The Committee, in the guidelines, cites the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly in 2005, which include “public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility” among the appropriate measures of satisfaction. In addition, in a 2019 report on apologies for gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law, Fabian Salvioli, then Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence (and a former member of the Human Rights Committee), provided a comprehensive review of “key themes of relevance in the consideration of public apologies, with a view to developing a practical schema to assist in the design and delivery of more effective apologies”.¹⁶

13. Guidelines on measures of reparation under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. 2. ↩
14. Ibid., para. 11 (e). ↩
15. Ibid., para. 11 (f). ↩
16. A/74/147, para. 4. ↩

The Committee’s jurisprudence reflects similar concepts. In response to findings of grave or gross breaches of the Covenant, the Committee sometimes indicates various forms of apology.¹⁷ However, the case law is not fully coherent. For example, an author’s request for an apology is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for indicating that remedy. The Committee has sometimes ordered a State party to apologize even though the author did not request an apology,¹⁸ while in other instances it has considered such requests in fashioning the remedy.¹⁹ In still other cases, the Committee has declined, without explanation, requests for an apology or an acknowledgment of responsibility.²⁰ In addition, authors often seek measures of satisfaction that are more wide-ranging than those awarded by the Committee.²¹

17. For example, in Devi Maya Nepal v. Nepal (CCPR/C/132/D/2615/2015), the author was raped and subjected to other forms of violence and infringements of her privacy, honour, reputation and family life. The Committee ordered Nepal to provide, inter alia, “appropriate measures of satisfaction to the author for the violations suffered, including arranging an official apology in a private ceremony” (para. 9). In Baruani v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (CCPR/C/110/D/1890/2009), para. 8, the Committee required the State party to provide “a formal public apology to the author and his family” after finding the State party had violated the Covenant prohibitions on torture and arbitrary detention. ↩
18. Lecraft v. Spain (CCPR/C/96/D/1493/2006), paras. 8 and 9; and Baruani v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 8. ↩
19. Abromchik v. Belarus (CCPR/C/122/D/2228/2012), paras. 2.9 and 12; and Tharu and Tharuni v. Nepal (CCPR/C/134/D/3199/2018), paras. 3.6 and 9. ↩
20. Fofana v. Ecuador (CCPR/C/124/D/2290/2013), paras. 3.10 and 10; and A.S. v. Nepal (CCPR/C/115/D/2077/2011), paras. 3.10 and 10. ↩
21. For example, in Guneththige and Guneththige v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/113/D/2087/2011) the author requested “a public apology containing an unequivocal acknowledgement of the numerous violations of the Covenant in the present case” (para. 3.12), but the Committee required only “a public apology to the family” (para. 8). ↩

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed the most extensive jurisprudence on apologies and acknowledgements of responsibility. The Court typically orders such measures of satisfaction “to repair violations to the rights to life, integrity and personal liberty”,²² although it occasionally declines to indicate these remedies in such cases even when petitioners request them.²³ Significantly, States often apologize or acknowledge their responsibility prior to or during proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as Argentina did in two recent cases involving human rights abuses perpetrated during the military dictatorship.²⁴ If the acknowledgement is not “comprehensive”,²⁵ however, the Court may order the State to hold a “public ceremony”²⁶ that refers to the facts and violations declared in the judgment and specifies “who must participate in the public act, how it must be conducted and disseminated, and when it must occur”.²⁷

22. See, for example, Castañeda Gutman v. México, Judgment, 6 August 2008, para. 239. ↩
23. See, for example, Jenkins v. Argentina, Judgment, 26 November 2019, paras. 135 and 138; and Fleury et al. v. Haiti, Judgment, 23 November 2011, paras. 124 and 125. ↩
24. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Julien Grisonas Family v. Argentina, Judgment, 23 September 2021, paras. 276 and 277; and Almeida v. Argentina, Judgment, 17 November 2020, para. 14. ↩
25. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Almeida v. Argentina, para. 22. ↩
26. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Julien-Grisonas Family v. Argentina, para. 278. ↩
27. Bridget Mayeux and Justin Mirabal, Collective and Moral Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Human Rights Clinic, University of Texas School of Law, November 2009), p. 27, available at https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/04/2009-HRC-Cambodia-CollectiveReparations.pdf. See also A/74/147, para. 14 (summarizing the Court’s jurisprudence in this area). ↩

Both the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have previously ordered apologies or acknowledgements of responsibility for violations similar to those at issue in this case, although the case law is not fully consistent. In one example from the Committee, Marchant Reyes et al. v. Chile, the police had removed and destroyed several artistic works that had been displayed to honour the defence of human rights and democracy on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the 1973 coup d’état in Chile.²⁸ The State party had acknowledged the facts as violations of the Covenant without, however, attempting to justify them.²⁹ The Committee found a violation of the authors’ right to freedom of expression under article 19 (2) of the Covenant,³⁰ and ordered a public acknowledgement of the violation of their rights in accordance with the Committee’s Views on the communication.³¹ In a similar example from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Kimel v. Argentina, a journalist and writer had been convicted of criminal libel for publishing a book criticizing an investigation into five clergymen murdered during that country’s military dictatorship.³² During proceedings before the Court, the State had acknowledged its responsibility for violating the right to freedom of thought and expression and the right to a fair trial.³³ The Court accepted this “as a confession to the facts” and as “acquiescence to the victim’s legal claims”,³⁴ but nevertheless ordered the State to “hold a public act of acknowledgment of responsibility”.³⁵ However, in several other cases in which violations of the right to freedom of expression were found, the Committee and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights have declined to order apologies or acknowledgements of responsibilities notwithstanding requests by the authors.³⁶

28. Marchant Reyes et al. v. Chile (CCPR/C/121/D/2627/2015), paras. 2.2 and 5.1. ↩
29. Ibid., para. 5.2. ↩
30. Ibid., para. 7.8. ↩
31. Ibid., para. 9. The Committee did not, however, accede to the authors’ request to order the police to make a public apology in which they acknowledge their mistake and undertake to defend and respect human rights (ibid., para. 3.6). ↩
32. Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment of 2 May 2008. ↩
33. Ibid., paras. 18–22. ↩
34. Ibid., para. 25. ↩
35. Ibid., para. 126. ↩
36. See, for example, Human Rights Committee, Ibragimov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/131/D/2452/2014), paras. 5.4 and 15; Human Rights Committee, Arkadyevich v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/115/D/2141/2012), paras. 3.4 and 9; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica, Judgment, 23 May 2022, paras. 105 and 107; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, Judgment, 29 November 2011, paras. 109 and 110. ↩

In future cases, the Committee should develop a more systematic approach to determining when States parties should apologize and/or acknowledge their responsibility.³⁷ Depending on the facts and circumstances presented, such measures of satisfaction may be appropriate not only in response to grave or systemic violations of the Covenant but also for other infringements of civil and political rights. Relevant factors may include the magnitude or seriousness of the violations, whether a victim has requested such remedies, the State party’s response to such a request, whether an acknowledgement or apology will confer dignity on the victims or honour their memory, and whether the remedy will guard against repetition of the violations.

37. The Committee has more often required States parties to apologize than to acknowledge their responsibility, although it appears that the former remedy encompasses the latter. See A/74/147, para. 3 (a) (defining a public apology to include “an acknowledgement of a wrong deliberately or negligently inflicted that is named”). ↩