Communications Nos. 4062/2021 and 4191/2022: Decision/Views

The authors of the communications are R.M. and Q.M., nationals of Pakistan born in 1991 and 1995, respectively. They claim that, by deporting them to Pakistan, the State party would violate their rights under article 7 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Sweden on 23 March 1976. The authors are represented by counsel.

On 14 December 2021 and 29 July 2022,³ pursuant to rule 94 of its rules of procedure, the Committee, acting through its Special Rapporteurs on new communications and interim measures, requested the State party to refrain from deporting R.M. and Q.M., respectively, to Pakistan while their case was under consideration by the Committee. The State party suspended their deportation and the authors remain in Sweden.

3. On 21 March 2023, the State party informed the Committee that it had not received Q.M.’s communication. On the same date, the communication was retransmitted to the State party. ↩

The authors are sisters. As Ahmadi Muslims, they were members of a persecuted religious minority in Pakistan, where they grew up. Their grandfather was the head Chairperson of a regional Ahmadi assembly. He was shot in the face while on his way home on an unspecified date. He survived the attack but fled with his family to Sweden. He and his family members were granted asylum in Sweden.

The authors’ father is the current head Chairperson of a local Ahmadi assembly and was stabbed by an unknown person in 2010 because of his religious beliefs.

R.M. recalls having been bullied and harassed at school during her childhood, owing to her religious beliefs. The bullying and harassment stopped when she moved to another city, but resumed two years later, when her religion became known to others. Fearing for her life, she dropped out of school.

On 1 August 2016, R.M. applied for a student residence permit in Sweden. On 25 August 2016, the application was granted. On an unspecified date, R.M. travelled to Sweden. The period of validity of her permit was extended and ultimately expired on 31 December 2018.

On 2 January 2019, R.M. applied for asylum in Sweden. On 22 September 2019, the Migration Agency held an oral asylum interview with R.M., in the presence of her appointed counsel and an interpreter.

On 18 April 2019, the Migration Agency rejected R.M.’s asylum application. The Migration Agency did not dispute R.M.’s allegations that her father was the head Chairperson of a local Ahmadi assembly; that he had been stabbed; that the family had filed a police report in response to the attack; that R.M.’s grandfather was the head of a regional Ahmadi assembly; that he had been shot by unknown men on the basis of his religion; that unknown persons had thrown rocks at her family’s house and had written threats on the walls of the house; or that R.M. had been verbally harassed and assaulted at school. However, the Migration Agency considered that R.M. had not provided evidence to support her claim that the attack against her father had been religiously motivated, given that the police report that was filed did not allege that the attack was religiously motivated. The Migration Agency also questioned R.M.’s assertion that the threats against her had intensified while she was at university. With respect to the general situation for Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan, the Migration Agency noted that they faced restrictions on the practice of their faith, but could lawfully practise it in private. The Migration Agency acknowledged that certain crimes against Ahmadi Muslims remained unpunished in Pakistan. However, the Migration Agency considered that it had not been shown that R.M. needed to manifest her religion in a way that contravened the laws of Pakistan, or that she had been subjected to persecution because of her relatives’ prominent roles within the Ahmadi Muslim community.

On 7 August 2020, the Migration Court rejected R.M.’s appeal against the decision of the Migration Agency. On 17 September 2020, the Migration Court of Appeal rejected R.M.’s request for leave to appeal against the decision of the Migration Court.

On 23 September 2020, the authors both requested the Migration Agency to stay the enforcement of their expulsion and to reconsider its previous decisions on their individual cases, in the light of new circumstances. On 30 September 2020, the authors’ family in Pakistan was targeted at their home by a mob of neighbours and persons from the local area who threatened to kill them owing to their religious beliefs, threw rocks at their house and tried to break in. On 10 December 2020, the Migration Agency rejected the authors’ application for reconsideration. On 2 March and 22 April 2021, that decision was upheld by the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal, respectively.

On 15 October 2021, R.M. again requested the Swedish Migration Agency to suspend the enforcement of her expulsion and to reconsider its decision on her asylum application. She argued that the Swedish police had requested her to apply for a passport for Pakistan. Given that she would be required to state her religious belief in the application, she would be exposed to an increased risk of persecution. On 19 October 2021, R.M.’s request was rejected and on 24 November 2021, the Migration Court rejected her subsequent appeal. As described below (para. 2.14), R.M. and Q.M. filed an unsuccessful application to the European Court of Human Rights concerning the same matter.

Like R.M., Q.M. recalls having been bullied and harassed at school during her childhood, owing to her religious beliefs. She was locked inside a classroom by her teachers. During one incident, five of Q.M.’s classmates physically attacked her. She was eventually suspended from school. Q.M. said that she did not try to finish her studies elsewhere or apply to university because of what had happened to R.M. at university.

On 26 June 2018, Q.M. applied for a student residence permit in Sweden. It was granted on 20 August 2018 and was later renewed. Q.M. arrived in Sweden in August 2018. After her residence permit expired on 31 January 2019, Q.M. applied for asylum on 5 February 2019.

On 13 September 2019 and 25 May and 28 August 2020, the Migration Agency, the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal, respectively, rejected Q.M.’s asylum request and her related appeals. The migration authorities found credible Q.M.’s account regarding the attacks and harassment targeting her family members (in particular, her father and grandfather) in Pakistan owing to their religious beliefs. The authorities did not contest Q.M.’s allegation that unknown individuals had thrown rocks at her family home and had written threats on the walls of the home. The authorities also considered that the general situation for Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan was difficult because of restrictions on their ability to publicly practise their faith and because of a general climate of impunity and the lack of State protection. However, the authorities considered that Q.M. could lawfully practise her religion in private in Pakistan and that it had not been demonstrated that she needed to manifest her religion in a way that violated the law. The Migration Court also found that Q.M. had not personally experienced persecution on the basis of her family members’ religious activities as Ahmadi Muslims.

As described above (para. 2.8), on 23 September 2020, Q.M. and R.M. unsuccessfully requested re-examination of their asylum applications.

On 29 June 2021, the authors jointly lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that the State party would violate their rights under article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) by deporting them to Pakistan. On 8 July 2021, the Court rejected the authors’ request for interim measures to suspend their deportation to Pakistan and declared their application inadmissible in a decision taken by a single judge. The Court considered that the conditions of admissibility set forth under articles 34 and 35 of the European Convention had not been met. The Court did not set forth additional reasoning.

After the Committee registered R.M.’s case, Q.M. filed a request to the State party’s Migration Agency to suspend her deportation based on her sister’s communication before the Committee. On 23 March 2022, the Migration Agency rejected Q.M.’s request.

The authors submit that, by deporting them to Pakistan, the State party would violate their rights under article 7 of the Covenant. They would face a real, personal and foreseeable risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment in Pakistan, owing to their religious beliefs as Ahmadi Muslims. Their father and grandfather, who occupied prominent positions as leaders of Ahmadi assemblies, were violently attacked because of their religious faith. The authors themselves were harassed for the same reason before leaving Pakistan. The State party’s migration authorities did not dispute the fact that Ahmadi Muslims cannot openly refer to themselves as Muslims or practise their faith openly without violating criminal laws.⁴ Furthermore, Ahmadi Muslims cannot refer to their leader as a prophet, cannot greet according to Muslim customs, or engage in any other Muslim customs or practices. The migration authorities also did not dispute that the authorities in Pakistan are unable to protect Ahmadi Muslims and that crimes against them are generally not investigated or punished. One of the authors’ grandfathers was granted asylum in Sweden after having been shot by men unknown to him. The Migration Agency also did not dispute that the authors’ other grandfather had been assaulted by unknown men who had threatened to kill him, his children and his grandchildren if he did not abandon his faith.

4. The authors refer to United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Factsheet: Ahmadiyya Muslims” (October 2021). ↩

While R.M. and Q.M. applied for asylum on similar grounds and submitted the same written evidence to the authorities, the authorities did not assess that evidence in the same manner when examining their separate cases. In R.M.’s case, the Migration Agency considered that it was not clear that the attack on the authors’ father had been motivated by religion, since that was not alleged in the police report filed on the case. In Q.M.’s case, the Migration Court did not articulate any doubts on that issue.

Had the authors practised their faith openly in Pakistan and had roles in their local Ahmadi communities, they would have faced treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant, as their family members did. In the past, the Committee has found that, when assessing the need for international protection, it is necessary to consider all risk-enhancing circumstances.⁵ In the present case, the migration authorities assessed the authors’ circumstances separately instead of in a cumulative manner.

5. Q.A. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/127/D/3070/2017). ↩

In its submission of 30 June 2022 (regarding communication No. 4062/2021) and 19 September 2023 (regarding communication No. 4191/2022), the State party maintains that the communications are inadmissible under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol because the European Court of Human Rights examined the same matter.⁶ The European Court regularly makes decisions on admissibility in a single-judge formation after examining the substance of an application. The mere fact that a single judge took the decision of inadmissibility on the authors’ application does not signify that the European Court did not examine the application. According to its letter of 8 July 2021, the European Court decided not to request the State party to provide interim measures and found that, in the light of the material in its possession and insofar as it had the jurisdiction to examine the authors’ allegations, the conditions of admissibility provided for in articles 34 and 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights had not been fulfilled. Nothing indicates that the authors’ application failed to meet the procedural criteria of articles 34 or 35 of the European Convention. For example, they had exhausted domestic remedies when they filed the application. By process of elimination, the only possible ground of inadmissibility was article 35 (3) (a) of the European Convention, which requires sufficient consideration of the merits of the case.

6. See, for example, Mahabir v. Austria (CCPR/C/82/D/944/2000). Upon ratifying the Optional Protocol, the State party made the following declaration: “On the understanding that the provisions of article 5, paragraph 2, of the Protocol signify that the Human Rights Committee … shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined or has not been examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.” ↩

The communications are also inadmissible because they are manifestly unfounded. According to the Committee’s jurisprudence, the burden of meeting the high threshold of proof rests with the authors,⁷ who must establish that there is a real risk of treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of an expulsion. Considerable weight should be given to the assessment of the State party’s authorities. The State party does not underestimate the concerns that may legitimately be expressed regarding the general human rights situation in Pakistan, including the situation for Ahmadis.⁸ The migration authorities acknowledged those concerns in their decisions, having examined and cited various human rights reports. However, the general human rights situation for Ahmadis does not in and of itself suffice to establish that the authors’ expulsion would violate article 7 of the Covenant.⁹ As the State party’s migration authorities determined, the authors have failed to substantiate that they would personally face a real risk of being subjected to treatment in violation of article 7 of the Covenant in Pakistan.

7. For example, X v. Norway (CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014). ↩
8. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022: Events of 2021 (New York, 2022), pp. 510–515; European Asylum Support Office, Country of Origin Information Report: Pakistan – Security Situation (October 2021); United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note – Pakistan: Ahmadis, version 5.0 (September 2021); and United States of America, Department of State, “2019 report on international religious freedom: Pakistan” (2020). ↩
9. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, para. 30. ↩

Both the Migration Agency and the Migration Court thoroughly evaluated the authors’ cases. The Migration Agency held introductory asylum interviews with R.M. and Q.M. on 2 January and 5 February 2019, respectively. The minutes of those meetings were communicated to R.M.’s and Q.M.’s counsels on 17 January and 24 June 2019, respectively. Extensive asylum interviews were held with R.M. and Q.M. on 22 February and 25 June 2019, respectively. The interviews each lasted approximately three hours and were conducted in the presence of the authors’ public counsels. The minutes of the interviews were subsequently transmitted to the authors’ public counsels. The interviews were conducted in the presence of interpreters, whom the authors confirmed to have understood well. Through their public counsels, the authors have thus been invited to scrutinize and submit written observations on the minutes from the interviews and to make written submissions and appeals.

Thus, the authors each had several opportunities to explain the relevant facts and circumstances in support of their claims and to argue their cases, orally as well as in writing before the Migration Agency, and in writing before the Migration Court. The authorities had sufficient information to make well-informed and transparent assessments of their cases. There is no reason to find that the domestic rulings were inadequate or that the outcome of the domestic proceedings was in any way arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.

Contrary to R.M.’s claim, the Migration Agency duly assessed both her individual and cumulative personal circumstances. The domestic authorities also found that the harassment and bullying endured by R.M. at the hands of unspecified private individuals was not of such severity that it constituted grounds for protection. The domestic authorities noted that R.M. was able to complete four years of study at university and to work after her graduation, and that she had never been personally attacked because of her relatives’ leading roles within the Ahmadi community. When asked to specify the alleged threat against her, R.M. made a general reference to the situation of Ahmadis in Pakistan. The domestic authorities also observed that R.M.’s family continued to live in the same house in Pakistan, and that her father, who was a leader within the Ahmadi community, continued to work in the family business and had not been subjected to harassment following R.M.’s departure in 2016. Shortly after the finalization of the expulsion order, R.M. alleged that she could not be removed from Sweden because her family had been attacked in their home in Pakistan. The domestic authorities found that the written evidence submitted did not suffice to make her claim probable. The Migration Court also noted that the claim had been submitted only two weeks after the finalization of the expulsion order and appeared to represent an escalation of R.M.’s account.

Regarding Q.M., the migration authorities considered that her membership in the Ahmadi community and the previous attacks on her family did not render it plausible that she would risk torture or ill-treatment upon return to Pakistan. In determining that Q.M. would not face a specific and individualized risk of persecution or abuse upon return to Pakistan, the authorities considered that her account concerning the alleged threats and her suspension from school lacked credibility. Furthermore, the Migration Court considered that Q.M. had escalated her account in her appeal to the Court. The authorities considered that the harassment that she alleged to have endured was not of such severity that it constituted grounds for protection. They also noted that Q.M. had been able to study, work and leave Pakistan legally with her own passport, and that she had not been personally attacked because of her relatives’ leading roles in the Ahmadi community. They further observed that her father had been able to work and support the family during the years when he was acting as a district Chairman in the Ahmadi community. Shortly after the expulsion order became final, Q.M. alleged that there were impediments to her expulsion. In her submission dated 23 September 2020, she asserted that her family’s house in Pakistan had been taken over by mullahs and that she had no family left in Pakistan. However, in her appeal, she stated that the attack on the family home had occurred on 30 September 2020. The Migration Court therefore questioned the credibility of that claim.

In R.M.’s comments of 28 February 2023 and Q.M.’s comments of 20 November 2023, the authors reiterate their claims and assert that the communication is admissible. It is credible that they would practise their faith openly in Pakistan. They have done so in Sweden. The European Court of Human Rights did not examine the merits of their application; it is not possible to ascertain the basis of the European Court’s decision through mere speculation. Everything suggests that the decision of the European Court was based on procedural considerations.

Regarding the merits, it is uncontested that the authorities in Pakistan cannot and do not protect Ahmadi Muslims against crimes. As single Ahmadi Muslim women, members of a well-known and persecuted family, and active members of their religious congregation, the authors face multiple risks in Pakistan.¹⁰ The migration authorities did not take those risks into account. With respect to article 18 of the Covenant, the migration authorities did not respect the authors’ fundamental right to practise their religious faith openly and did not properly address their claims of religious persecution. Under domestic law, the migration authorities were required to perform a cumulative assessment of the risks that they would face in Pakistan. They did not do so. Most open religious activities of Ahmadi Muslims are criminalized in Pakistan. They cannot openly pray, participate in religious activities or even talk about their faith. They may not print religious texts or even carry the Qur’an in public. The authors’ personal faith, and the Ahmadi faith in general, includes open and collective religious practices, such as collective prayers and religious festivities. The domestic authorities ignored the reason for which the authors were unable to practise their faith openly in Pakistan (i.e. owing to a fear of facing torture, ill-treatment and harassment.) The authors must enjoy the right to practise their faith openly, which is essential to their religious freedom. As remedies, the authors request the cancellation of their expulsion and compensation for each of them in the amount of 30,000 kronor, for their legal fees.

10. The authors each provide documents which they claim represent membership certificates signed by the head Chairman of the national Ahmadi assembly in Sweden. According to the authors’ summaries, the Chairman stated that they were active members of the assembly, and that according to reports received from an office in Pakistan, they were also active members of a local assembly in Pakistan. ↩

On 25 April 2023, the State party provided additional observations regarding R.M. (communication No. 4062/2021). The State party disagrees with R.M.’s assertion that the decision of the European Court of Human Rights was undoubtedly based on a procedural ground. The mere fact that a decision by the European Court does not specify reasoning does not establish that the case was decided without sufficient consideration of the merits. Furthermore, according to available statistics, 30,750 out of 39,570 applications decided by the European Court in 2022 were decisions taken by a single judge. Accordingly, the number of single-judge decisions is not likely to be equal to the number of applications decided without sufficient consideration on the merits.

R.M.’s claim under article 18 of the Covenant is inadmissible ratione materiae because that provision does not apply extraterritorially. The State party reiterates, with respect to article 7 of the Covenant, that both the Migration Agency and the Migration Court thoroughly examined R.M.’s case.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

Under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol and the State party’s reservation to that provision, the Committee is precluded from examining a matter that is being examined or has been examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. On 8 July 2021, the European Court of Human Rights declared the authors’ application inadmissible. The Committee notes, however, that the decision of the European Court does not set forth a specific justification for the finding of inadmissibility. It is therefore unclear whether the decision was based on procedural or substantive grounds.¹¹ Thus, while it has taken into account the State party’s position on this issue, the Committee is unable to conclude that the same matter has been examined by the European Court. Accordingly, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol from examining the communication.

11. For example, X v. Iceland (CCPR/C/130/D/2818/2016), para. 6.2. ↩

The Committee notes that in the original communications, the authors invoked article 7 of the Covenant, and that they later invoked article 18 of the Covenant in their comments on the State party’s observations. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence in which it stated that authors must raise all of their claims in their initial submission, before the State party is asked to provide its observations on admissibility and the merits of the communication, unless the authors can demonstrate why they were unable to raise all of their claims at the same time.¹² In the present case, the authors have not explained why they did not invoke article 18 of the Covenant until after the State party had been invited to submit its observations on the case. Accordingly, the Committee declares that claim inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

12. For example, S v. Australia (CCPR/C/137/D/2999/2017), para. 8.4; D.Č. v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/134/D/3327/2019), para. 8.4; and S.R. v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/132/D/3313/2019), para. 8.8. ↩

The Committee notes the State party’s position that the communication is inadmissible because it is insufficiently substantiated. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it referred to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant (para. 12). The risk must be personal, and there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish the existence of a real risk of irreparable harm. In making such an assessment, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the country to which the author faces removal.¹³ Considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party, and it is generally for the organs of States parties to the Covenant to review or evaluate the facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.¹⁴ The issue of whether the State party’s authorities properly assessed the risk of torture or illtreatment faced by R.M. and Q.M. in the event of their deportation to Pakistan should be evaluated on the basis of the information that was available to the State party’s authorities when they issued the decisions relating to their deportation.¹⁵

13. For example, Kim v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/139/D/4170/2022), para. 8.3; and Z v. Denmark (CCPR/C/137/D/2795/2016), para. 6.5. ↩
14. For example, Teitiota v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016), para. 9.3; and Z.H. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2602/2015), para. 7.4. ↩
15. For example, Lapshin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/135/D/2945/2017), para. 9.3. ↩

The Committee observes that the authors allege that their deportation to Pakistan would expose them to a real and personal risk of torture or ill-treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant because of the general risks of violence that Ahmadi Muslims face in Pakistan, the lack of State protection for Ahmadi Muslims, the harassment that they each endured owing to their faith, their status as members of a prominent Ahmadi family, their active and collective participation in religious activities, and the violent, religiously motivated attacks on their father and grandfathers. Regarding the circumstances of the authors’ departure from Pakistan, the Committee notes that, according to the decisions of the Migration Agency, in 2015, the authors each applied for a visa to travel to Sweden for a wedding, but their applications were denied, as was R.M.’s related appeal. In 2016, R.M. applied for and obtained a student visa and then travelled to Sweden, where she applied for asylum after the expiration of the visa. In 2018, Q.M. did the same. The Migration Agency noted that several of the authors’ family members had applied for asylum while holding visas for Sweden, and thus questioned R.M.’s credibility when she stated that she was unaware that she could apply for asylum while her visa was valid. The Migration Agency also took note of Q.M.’s statement, in her application for a student visa, that she wanted to study in Sweden to be accepted into a higher education institution in Pakistan, and that she intended to return to Pakistan and start her career there. The Committee considers that the above circumstances, when considered in conjunction with the absence of details in the communications about the timing and specific nature of the incidents in which the authors were allegedly targeted before they left Pakistan, undermine their claim that they would face a personal and real risk of being tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if they were returned to Pakistan.

With respect to the procedural aspects of the domestic asylum proceedings, the Committee notes that each of the authors was represented by counsel appointed by the State party, and was interviewed twice by the Migration Agency, with interpretation services. The Committee also notes that the authors each availed themselves of the opportunity to file appeals before the Migration Court and received reasoned decisions from both bodies.

Concerning the evaluation by the State party’s migration authorities of the authors’ substantive claims, the Committee notes that, according to the documents made available to it, the attacks on the authors’ father and maternal grandfather were alleged to have occurred in 2010 and in the 1990s, respectively. The Committee observes that those incidents are relatively remote in time, as is the alleged attack on the authors’ paternal grandfather, which took place between 2009 and 2011. According to the decisions of the Migration Agency, R.M. indicated that the attack on the authors’ maternal grandfather occurred in or around 1999, whereas Q.M. stated that it had occurred in 1992. The Migration Agency, however, did not question that the attack had occurred.

While the authors claim that they would face a risk for openly practising their faith, they acknowledge that – unlike their father and grandfather, who occupied prominent positions in Ahmadi assemblies – they personally did not practise their faith openly in Pakistan. The Committee also notes R.M.’s statement to the Migration Agency that she faced intense threats of being killed and kidnapped after her graduation from university, to the extent that she could not leave her house. The Committee notes that R.M. did not provide details about those threats in the present communication or in her application to the European Court of Human Rights. The migration authorities noted that R.M. had never been personally attacked because of her relatives’ leading roles within the Ahmadi community, and that R.M., when asked to specify the alleged threat against her, referred to the general situation for Ahmadis in Pakistan. The Migration Agency also found certain aspects of Q.M.’s account lacking in detail and credibility. For example, it considered that Q.M. had provided a vague account of the course of events relating to her alleged suspension from university and had not credibly explained how she had continued to receive threats by telephone after changing her phone number. The Migration Court also considered that Q.M. had escalated her allegations during the appeal proceedings.

The Committee observes that the authors based their application for reconsideration of their asylum claim, dated 23 September 2020, on new circumstances that had transpired when a mob attacked their family in their house in Pakistan. However, elsewhere (i.e. in a subsequent appeal, in the communication of R.M., and in the application of R.M. to the European Court of Human Rights), it was alleged that the attack on the house had occurred on 30 September 2020, that is, after the authors had filed their application for reconsideration. The Committee is seriously concerned by credible reports regarding widespread human rights violations against Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan. However, in the light of the above considerations, it deems that the authors have not sufficiently substantiated their claim that, if they were returned to Pakistan, they would personally be exposed to a risk of being tortured or subjected to ill-treatment,¹⁶ or that the evaluation by the migration authorities of their claim under article 7 of the Covenant was clearly arbitrary or erroneous or amounted to a denial of justice.¹⁷ Accordingly, the Committee declares that claim inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

16. S.K. v. Canada (CCPR/C/133/D/2623/2015), para. 7.6; and B.R. and M.G. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/138/D/2342/2014), para. 12.10. ↩
17. A and B v. Denmark (CCPR/C/117/D/2291/2013), paras. 8.4–8.6. ↩

In the light of its findings, the Committee does not deem it necessary to examine other grounds of inadmissibility.

The Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communications are inadmissible under articles 2 and 3 of the Optional Protocol;