The authors of the communications are S. P. (communication 2932/2017), A. P. (communication 3005/2017), V. K. (communication 3047/2017) and B. N. (communication 3087/2017), all citizens of the Russian Federation, born in 1987, 1977, 1981 and 1973 respectively. All the authors claim that the State party has violated their rights under article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant. B.N. claims that the State party has also violated his rights under articles 14 (1) (5) and 26 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 1 January 1992. A.P. is represented by counsel, while the three other authors are unrepresented.
On 7 November 2024, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of its rules of procedure, the Committee decided to join communications 2932/2017, 3005/2017, 3047/2017 and 3087/2017 for a joint decision, in view of their substantial factual and legal similarities.
Communication 2932/2017 (S.P.)
On 26 July 2006, the Tulsky Regional Court found the author guilty of several crimes, including murder, and sentenced him to 24 years in prison. On 22 January 2007, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, acting as a court of second instance, upheld the author’s sentence after the author’s cassation appeal. Even though the cassation appeal was prepared and submitted by the author’s lawyer who represented him during the trial, the lawyer and the author were not present during the cassation hearing, while the prosecution was represented by the case prosecutor. On 27 October 2010, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, acting as a court of supervisory appeal, amended the author’s sentence to 23 years and 9 months in prison. The author did not raise the violation of his right to legal assistance in his appeal, and the hearing was held in the absence of the author and his lawyer. On 10 December 2015, the author submitted a new appeal for a supervisory review to the Presidium of the Supreme Court asking the court to quash the decisions of the cassation court dated 22 January 2007 and of the supervisory review dated 27 October 2010 for violating his right to legal defence at both hearings. On 24 December 2015, by a one-judge decision, the Supreme Court rejected the author’s appeal. The Supreme Court held that at the time of the cassation hearing, the Criminal Procedure Code was interpreted as obliging the cassation court to appoint a defence counsel only at the request of the convicted person. Since the author did not request the cassation court to appoint him a lawyer, there was no reason to believe that the court violated the author’s right to legal defence. Concerning the supervisory review decision dated 27 October 2010, the Supreme Court noted that the case file contained the author’s written waiver of his right to a defence counsel. On 20 June 2016, the Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of 24 December 2015.
Communication 3005/2017 (A.P.)
On 10 May 2006, the author was acquitted of several crimes, including murder and possession of illegal weapons by a jury verdict of Krasnoyarsk Regional Court. The case prosecutor appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court arguing that despite warnings by the presiding judge, the defence posed unlawful questions concerning evidence collected in the case. On 20 December 2006, the Supreme Court, acting as a cassation court of the second instance, quashed the trial court’s verdict and ordered a new trial by a different jury. The author was not represented by a lawyer during the cassation hearing, while the prosecution was represented by the case prosecutor. On 29 April 2010, after a re-trial, the author was found guilty of the initial crimes by a new jury. On 30 September 2010, Krasnoyarsk Regional Court sentenced the author to life imprisonment. On 3 November 2011, the Supreme Court, acting as a cassation court of the second instance, amended the verdict concerning the qualification of some charges but upheld the author’s sentence. On an unspecified date, the author submitted an appeal for a supervisory review to the Supreme Court asking to quash the decision of the cassation court dated 20 December 2006 for violating his right to legal defence during the cassation hearing. On 9 October 2012, the Supreme Court rejected the author’s appeal. The Supreme Court held that at the time of the cassation hearing, the Criminal Procedure Code was interpreted as obliging the cassation court to appoint a defence counsel only at the request of the convicted person. Since the author did not request the cassation court to appoint him a lawyer, there was no reason to believe that the court violated the author’s right to legal defence.
On an unspecified date, the author submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Court asking to find articles 51 (1) and (3) and 376 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) unconstitutional, alleging that they do not guarantee the right to legal assistance during cassation proceedings to acquitted persons. On 21 December 2011, the Constitutional Court rejected the author’s complaint noting that the cited articles of the CCP were in conformity with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court did not make any determination as to the violation of the author’s constitutional rights during the cassation proceedings noting that such determination would go beyond the competence of the Court.
Communication 3047/2017 (V.K.)
On 19 May 2006, the Volovsky District Court found the author guilty of several crimes, including murder, and sentenced him to 19 years in prison. The murder charge alone carried a possible punishment of 20 years in prison, life imprisonment or the death penalty. The author’s cassation appeal to Tulsky Regional Court was prepared and submitted by his lawyer who had represented him during the trial, however the cassation hearing was held in the absence of the author and his counsel, while the prosecution was represented by the case prosecutor. On 19 July 2006, Tulsky Regional Court denied the cassation appeal and upheld the sentence of the trial court. On 22 June 2011, Syktyvkar City Court reduced the author’s sentence to 18 years and 9 months in prison due to the amendment of the Criminal Code. On 6 April 2016, the author lodged a new cassation appeal to the Supreme Court asking the court to quash the decision of the cassation court dated 19 July 2006 due to the absence of his lawyer at the cassation hearing. On 26 April 2016, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. The author further submitted appeals for a supervisory review to the Prosecutor General and the Supreme Court requesting a review of his case due to the violation of his right to defence by the cassation court, but they were rejected on 18 and 22 August 2016 respectively. On 1 February 2017, the author lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which was rejected on 28 March 2017.
Communication 3087/2017 (B.N.)
On 7 June 2008, the Maikopsk Military Garrison Court found the author guilty of fraud, committed while he was serving in the Russian military, and sentenced him to six months of imprisonment (suspended). On 7 August 2008, the North Caucasus District Military Court heard the author’s cassation appeal, in the absence of his lawyers, even though the author had orally requested that a lawyer be present. On 22 March 2010, the author filed an appeal for a supervisory review claiming a violation of his right to legal assistance at the cassation hearing. On 28 April 2010, the Supreme Court granted a supervisory review and ordered the author’s supervisory appeal to be examined by the Presidium of North Caucasus District Military Court. On 15 June 2010, a panel of 4 judges of North Caucasus District Military Court examined the author’s appeal. The court found that the author and his lawyers were duly informed about the time, date and place of the cassation hearing, and there was no record of the author asking the court to appoint another lawyer to be present at the hearing. Based on the above, the court denied the author’s appeal. This ruling was later upheld by the Supreme Court on 11 November 2010 and the Chairperson of the Supreme Court on 17 January 2011.
On an unspecified date, the author submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Court asking to find article 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional, alleging that the cassation court’s interpretation of the said article allowed for an examination of his cassation appeal without a lawyer. On 22 January 2014, the Constitutional Court rejected the author’s complaint noting that in its decision dated 8 February 2007, it already determined that articles 50 and 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not be interpreted as allowing limitation of the right to legal assistance during cassation proceedings.3
- After the Constitutional Court’s decision, the author submitted several complaints to the Office of the Military Prosecutor of the Southern Military Circuit, Office of the Prosecutor General and Prikubansky District Court ↩
On 7 February, 20 April and 9 June 2014, the author submitted complaints to the Office of the Military Prosecutor of the Southern Military Circuit asking to initiate supervisory review proceedings due to the violation of his right to legal assistance during the cassation hearing. The Office of the Military Prosecutor of the Southern Military Circuit rejected all of the author’s complaints for a failure to substantiate. Further appeals to the Office of the Prosecutor General and Prikubansky District Court were also denied.
Complaint
The authors claim to be victims of violations by the State party of their rights under article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant. The authors claim that by considering their cassation appeals in the absence of lawyers, the State party has violated their rights under article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant.
B.N. (communication 3087/2017) also claims that the absence of a lawyer during his cassation hearing violated his rights under article 14 (1) of the Covenant. He further claims that the failure of the State party to grant him a new cassation hearing constitutes a violation of his rights under article 14 (5) of the Covenant. Finally, he argues that the State party has violated his rights under article 26 of the Covenant because in other similar cases, the Supreme Court found that there was a violation of the right to legal assistance.4
- The author submits to a decision of the Supreme Court concerning one Mr. T. ↩
Communication 2932/2017 (S.P.)
On 5 April 2017, the State party submitted its observations on admissibility of communication No. 2932/2017. The State party argues that the author’s communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission according to rule 99 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. It notes that the author alleges a violation of his right to legal assistance during the cassation and supervisory review proceedings, which took place on 22 January 2007 and 27 October 2010 respectively. Meanwhile, the author submitted his communication to the Committee on 10 January 2017,5 that is almost 10 years after his cassation hearing and 6 years and 2 months after the supervisory review. The State party notes that in the communication, there are no indications of any circumstances justifying such a delay. Therefore, the author’s communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission and as such inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
- According to the information available to the Secretariat, the author’s initial submission to the Committee is dated 13 March 2017. ↩
The State party submits that the communication is also inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. It notes that the author did not raise the issue of the absence of legal assistance during cassation proceedings until 10 December 2015 when he submitted an appeal for a supervisory review to the Supreme Court.
On 14 July 2017, the State party submitted its observations on the merits of communication No. 2932/2017. The State party notes that at the sentencing by the trial court, the author and his lawyer were informed about their right to request the cassation court to be present during the cassation hearing. However, in his cassation appeal, the author did not ask to be present during the cassation hearing or to be assigned a lawyer to represent him. The State party notes that the author’s lawyer was notified about the time and date of the cassation hearing at least 1,5 months in advance, however neither the lawyer nor the author attended the hearing. The State party also notes that at the time of the author’s cassation hearing, the general practice of the courts under article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not to provide a lawyer unless expressly requested by a defendant. On 8 February 2007, the Constitutional Court held that legal assistance during cassation proceedings should be provided on the same conditions as for earlier stages in the proceedings, and that it was mandatory in the situations listed in article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It further underlined the obligation of courts to secure the participation of defence counsel in cassation proceedings. However, since the author’s cassation hearing was held on 22 January 2007, the ruling of the Constitutional Court could not be retroactively applied to the author’s case. Finally, the State party notes that the author formally waived his right to a lawyer during the supervisory hearing at the Supreme Court on 27 October 2010 and represented himself at the hearing.
Communication 3005/2017 (A.P.)
On 18 April 2019, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of communication No. 3005/2017. It notes that the author did not raise the alleged violation of his right to legal assistance in domestic courts until 4 April 2011, when he submitted an appeal for a supervisory review to the Supreme Court, which was rejected on 27 April 2011. It also notes that the author submitted his communication to the Committee on 20 April 2017, while the cassation proceedings in his case took place on 20 December 2006, i.e. more than 10 years after the alleged violation and 6 years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The State party notes that in the communication, there are no indications of any circumstances justifying such a delay. Therefore, the author’s communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission and as such inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
On the merits of the communication, the State party submits that according to the legislation at the time of the alleged violation, the cassation procedure was regulated by article 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which allowed for the participation of a lawyer for the convicted person. However, in the absence of an explicit request for a lawyer, cassation courts considered that the convicted person consented to participate in the proceedings without a lawyer. The State party notes that the cassation court ensured the participation of the author, and his lawyer was informed about the date and place of the cassation hearing. The law did not prevent consideration of a criminal case in case of non-appearance of persons, notified in a timely manner about the date, time and place of the proceedings. The State party submits that on 8 February 2007, the Constitutional Court held that courts must provide legal assistance to defendants in cassation proceedings unless they expressly waive their right to a lawyer. However, since the author’s cassation hearing was held on 20 December 2006, the ruling of the Constitutional Court could not be retroactively applied to the author’s case.
Communication 3047/2017 (V.K.)
On 27 August 2018, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of communication No. 3047/2017. It notes that the cassation proceedings in the author’s case took place on 19 July 2006, however he did not raise the alleged violation of his right to legal assistance at the domestic level until 6 April 2016, when he submitted a new cassation appeal to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the author submitted 2 appeals for a supervisory review that were rejected by the Supreme Court on 15 December 2008 and 30 December 2009 respectively, asking the court to review and lower his sentence.6 The State party notes that the author submitted his communication to the Committee on 9 June 2017,7 i.e. almost 11 years after the alleged violation and 9,5 years after the initial supervisory review, and there are no indications in the communication of any circumstances justifying such a delay. Therefore, the author’s communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission and as such inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. The State party submits that on 8 February 2007, the Constitutional Court held that cassation courts must provide legal assistance to defendants unless they expressly waive their right to a lawyer. However, since the author’s cassation hearing was held on 19 July 2006, the ruling of the Constitutional Court could not be retroactively applied to the author’s case.
On the merits of the communication, the State party submits that on 24 May 2006, the author submitted a cassation appeal to Tulsky Regional Court where he complained about the excessive severity of his sentence and asked for a reduction. On 13 June 2006, he amended his cassation appeal by providing additional information about his past military service and medal awards. On 27 June 2006, the author and his lawyer were informed about the date and place of the cassation hearing, however they did not attend the hearing. The State party notes that at the time of the alleged violation, the domestic legislation was interpreted by courts as obliging to provide a lawyer only if expressly requested by the convicted person.
Communication 3087/2017 (B.N.)
On 27 August 2018, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of communication No. 3087/2017. It notes that the author waited for 6,5 years after the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of North Caucasus District Military Court on 11 November 2010 before submitting his communication to the Committee on 14 June 2017. The State party notes that in the communication, there are no indications of any circumstances justifying such a delay. Therefore, the author’s communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission and as such inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
The State party submits that the author has not substantiated his claim under article 26 of the Covenant. The State party further notes that the cases referred to by the author are substantially different from the author’s case and cannot be considered similar. In the case of Mr. T, which was specifically referred to by the author, the Supreme Court had determined that Mr. T petitioned the cassation court to provide him with a lawyer, however the court did not examine the petition. He also was not informed about the time and place of the cassation hearing and, as a consequence, could not participate in the hearing. Therefore, the State party submits that the author’s reference to the case of Mr. T and other similar cases is unsubstantiated and inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
On the merits of the communication, the State party notes that the author’s lawyers were informed about the time and place of the cassation hearing, however they did not attend it. While the author knew that his lawyers did not appear for the cassation hearing, he did not petition the court for a new lawyer nor asked the court to postpone the hearing, and chose to represent himself. The State party submits that it cannot be held liable for the actions of the author’s lawyers. Within the meaning of article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant, relevant domestic authorities are obliged to intervene only if the appointed lawyer commits an obvious mistake or if the convicted person asks the court to appoint a lawyer. According to the State party, in the present case, the cassation court reasonably assessed the author’s behaviour who could have asked for a new lawyer or request a postponement of the hearing, and considered it to be a waiver of the right to legal counsel and proceeded with the examination of the cassation complaint.
Communication 2932/2017 (S.P.)
In a letter dated 11 July 2017, the author confirms that he submitted his communication to the Committee 10 years after the cassation hearing and 6 years and 3 months after the ruling of the Supreme Court on his appeal for a supervisory review. He submits that he is illiterate in legal matters, comes from a low-income family and was 18 years old when he committed the crime he was sentenced for. His lawyer was appointed by the trial court and stopped providing the author with legal advice after the trial ended. The author submits that on 22 January 2007, he was transferred to a prison in Krasnoyarsk, a city 5,000 kilometers away from his hometown, which deprived him of seeing his family and receiving information support. He notes that the prison library has no information on the Covenant or human rights protection mechanisms, and inmates cannot access the Internet or receive legal literature from outside. The author learned about the Covenant in 2015 from another inmate, which prompted him to exhaust domestic remedies in 2015-2016, before submitting his communication to the Committee.
The author further notes that a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it is submitted five years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication. According to the author, decisions of the domestic courts can be quashed by the Presidium of the Supreme Court. In his case, the final judicial decision was issued by the Deputy Chairperson of the Supreme Court on 30 June 2016, while the final prosecutorial decision rejecting his appeal for a supervisory review was a decision by the Deputy Prosecutor General dated 20 July 2016. Therefore, the author argues, that his communication to the Committee was submitted less than a year after he fully exhausted domestic remedies.
In a letter dated 21 August 2017, the author submits that in its observations on the merits, the State party omitted to mention that article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the mandatory presence of a defence lawyer in cases where the defendant may be sentenced to 15 years or more in prison, life imprisonment or death. He notes that even though he was charged with murder, which carried a possible death sentence, he was not informed about his right to a lawyer at the cassation court, in violation of article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant. The author argues that irrespective of the absence of such a request at the cassation hearing and in view of the subsequent decision of the Constitutional Court dated 8 February 2007, the domestic courts were obliged to inform him about his right to legal assistance and assign him a lawyer for the cassation hearing.
The author further submits that the State party has also violated his right under article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant at the supervisory review stage of the proceedings because he was again not provided with a lawyer. He notes that the only reason he signed a waiver to a lawyer at the supervisory hearing was because he was told that the legal expenses incurred by the assigned lawyer would be later recovered from him per articles 131 and 143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The author argues that despite his signed waiver, the Supreme Court should have provided him with a lawyer in the interests of justice and as per the requirements of article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Communication 3005/2017 (A.P.)
In a letter dated 14 November 2020, the author submits that the final ruling in his case was rendered by the Deputy Chairperson of the Supreme Court on 30 June 2016, while his communication was registered by the Committee in July 2017. Therefore, the author argues that the communication does not constitute an abuse of the right of submission. He also notes that he is legally illiterate and was able to submit appeals only when he had enough money to pay a lawyer.
Concerning the merits of the communication, the author rejects the State party’s argument that the ruling of the Constitutional Court cannot be retroactively applied to his case. He notes that on 21 December 2011, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision on his complaint (para. 2.3), in which it established that the provisions of articles 51 and 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure assumed the obligation of the cassation court to ensure the participation of a lawyer. The author argues that in such circumstances, the State party is obliged to follow the decision of the Constitutional Court because articles 79 (3) and 100 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court provide for the retroactivity clause in cases examined by the Court.
Communication 3047/2017 (V.K.)
In a letter dated 19 October 2018, the author rejects the State party’s argument that there is an abuse of the right of submission. He notes that the Russian legislation does not establish time limits for submitting a cassation appeal, and refers to a similar case where the cassation court in the State party granted an appeal 9 years after the defendant’s right to legal assistance was violated by the court of second instance.
The author further notes that although he and his lawyer were informed about the time and place of the cassation hearing on 19 July 2006, he did not know that his lawyer had failed to appear at the hearing because he himself did not participate in the cassation hearing. The author submits that the cassation court should have informed him that his lawyer had failed to appear at the hearing and that he had the right to appoint a different lawyer or request the court to assign one to him. He notes that the obligation to provide defendants with legal assistance lies not only with first-instance courts but also with second-instance courts.
Concerning the State party’s submission that the 2007 ruling of the Constitutional Court could not be retroactively applied to his case, the author argues that since the Court held that the previous interpretation of article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by domestic courts was unconstitutional, all lawfully submitted appeals against decisions that had been based on the unconstitutional interpretation of the right to legal assistance at the cassation court should have been granted by higher courts.
Communication 3087/2017 (B.N.)
In a letter dated 29 October 2018, the author rejects the State party’s argument that the communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission. He notes that on 22 January 2014, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision on his complaint, and after this decision, between 2014 and 2018 he submitted several complaints to the prosecutor’s office and domestic courts. He also notes that he is legally illiterate and has not seen any reference to the Committee’s individual communications procedure in the domestic laws.
Concerning his discrimination claim, the author submits that because he had previously won a case against the State party at the European Court of Human Rights, the State party decided not to provide him with a lawyer at the cassation hearing, while others in a similar situation, such as the defendant in the 8 February 2007 ruling of the Constitutional Court, received a new cassation hearing and were assigned a lawyer.
The author rejects the State party’s assertion that he did not file a petition to the cassation court to assign him a lawyer and reiterates that such a request was submitted to the court orally. Given the Constitutional Court’s ruling that courts must provide legal assistance to defendants in cassation proceedings unless they expressly waive their right to a lawyer, the author argues that the State party has violated his rights under article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant.
Finally, the author submits that the lack of the State party’s observation concerning his claim under article 14 (5) of the Covenant can be interpreted as an admission of a violation of his rights.
Communication 3005/2017 (A.P.)
On 10 March 2021, the State party reiterates that the cassation proceedings in the author’s case were held in strict conformity with the criminal procedure legislation at the time of the alleged violation. It notes that the author’s reference to the decision of the Constitutional Court dated 21 December 2011 is without merit because the Court determined that the contested provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not violate the author’s rights. Moreover, the said decision was based on several new interpretations of the Code of Criminal Procedure that had been made by the Constitutional Court after 8 February 2007, i.e. after the author’s cassation proceedings, and, therefore, could not be retroactively applied to his case.
Communication 3047/2017 (V.K.)
In a letter dated 7 December 2021, the author informed the Committee that he had been released from prison on 30 November 2021.
Communication 3087/2017 (B.N.)
On 21 September 2020, the State party reiterated its arguments that communication No. 3087/2017 constitutes an abuse of the right of submission and noted that the author has not presented new information that would show that the State party has violated his rights under the Covenant.
Consideration of admissibility
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.
The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.
The Committee notes the State party’s observations that due to the delay in submitting the present communications, the Committee should consider them inadmissible as constituting an abuse of the right of submission under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
The Committee notes that A.P. (communication 2932/2017), was convicted and sentenced to 24 years in prison on 26 July 2006, while the cassation proceedings were held on 22 January 2007. The author’s sentence was further amended on 27 October 2010 by the Supreme Court on supervisory review. Therefore, the communication was submitted to the Committee 10 years after the alleged violation and more than 6 years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The Committee also notes that in the case of A.P. (communication 3005/2017), the cassation proceedings took place on 20 December 2006, while the author’s appeal for a supervisory review to the Supreme Court was rejected on 27 April 2011. Therefore, the author submitted the communication 10 years after the alleged violation and 6 years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The Committee further notes that V.K. (communication 3047/2017) was convicted and sentenced to 19 years in prison on 19 May 2006, while the cassation proceedings were held on 19 July 2006. The Committee notes the State party’s submission that the author submitted 2 appeals for a supervisory review that were rejected by the Supreme Court on 15 December 2008 and 30 December 2009 respectively. The author did not raise the alleged violation of his right to legal assistance at the domestic level until 6 April 2016, when he submitted a new cassation appeal to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the communication was submitted to the Committee 11 years after the alleged violation and more than 8 years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
Finally, the Committee notes that B.N. (communication 3087/2017) was convicted and sentenced to six months in prison on 7 June 2008, while the cassation proceedings were held on 7 August 2008. The author’s sentence was later upheld on supervisory review on 15 June 2010. Therefore, the communication was submitted to the Committee almost 9 years after the alleged violation and 7 years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The Committee notes that there are no fixed time limits for submission of communications under the Optional Protocol and that a mere delay in submission does not constitute an abuse of the rights of communication. However, in certain circumstances, the Committee expects a reasonable explanation justifying a delay.8 In addition, according to rule 99 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedures, a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it is submitted after five years from the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication or, where applicable, after three years from the conclusion of another procedure of international investigation or settlement, unless there are reasons justifying the delay taking into account all the circumstances of the communication.
- Kaliyev v. Russia Federation (CCPR/C/127/D/2977/2017), para. 8.5. ↩
The Committee notes the authors’ assertion that their communications do not constitute an abuse of the right of submission because S.P. and A.P. exhausted domestic remedies only on 30 June 2016 when the Deputy Chairperson of the Supreme Court rejective their respective appeals for a supervisory review (paras. 5.2 and 5.5), while in B.N’s case, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision on his complaint on 22 January 2014, and there were several further judicial and prosecutorial decisions concerning his case (para. 5.10). The authors argue that the timeline of the above proceedings suggests that the communications were submitted less than five years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Committee considers, however, that the above appeals and complaints constitute extraordinary review proceedings launched long after the judgments against the authors became final.9 The Committee also notes V.K.’s argument that the Russian legislation does not establish time limits for submitting a cassation appeal (para. 5.7). However, the Committee considers that this argument applies to cassation appeals submitted after 2013 when with the creation of appellate courts, cassation review became an extraordinary review process at the domestic level.10
The Committee also considers that the claims by S.P., A.P. and B.N. about their legal illiteracy and lack of awareness of their rights remain vague and general in nature. In this connection, the Committee observes that notwithstanding their legal illiteracy claims, S.P. and B.N. were able to prepare appeals for a supervisory review to the Supreme Court. The Committee notes that there is nothing in the submissions to suggest that they were limited in contacting the outside world from prison, especially considering the complaints to the domestic authorities submitted by them while in prison. The Committee also observes from the materials on file that A.P. has been represented by the same lawyer before the Committee and throughout the judicial proceedings, that is at least since 2011, when he submitted his complaint to the Constitutional Court.
In view of the above, the Committee, therefore, considers that the authors have failed to provide a convincing explanation for the delay in submission of their communications to the Committee. In the absence of such an explanation, the Committee concludes that submitting the communication after such a long lapse of time constitutes an abuse of the right of submission. Accordingly, the Committee finds all communications inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol and rule 99 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure.
The Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communications 2932/2017, 3005/2017, 3047/2017 and 3087/2017 are inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol;