Communication CCPR 3628/2019: Views violation

The author of the communication is Norma (pseudonym), a national of Ecuador born on 14 September 1999. She claims that the State Party has violated her rights under article 2 (3) of the Covenant, read in conjunction with articles 3, 6 (1), 7, 9, 17, 19, 24 (1) and 26; article 6, read alone and in conjunction with article 24 (1); article 7, read alone and in conjunction with article 24 (1); article 9; article 17, read alone and in conjunction with article 24 (1); article 19; and articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant. The author is represented by counsel. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 23 March 1976.

On 19 and 26 April 2021, the Committee received two third-party submissions (see paras. 5 and 6 below). A summary of the submissions can be found in annexes I and II of document CCPR/C/142/D/3627/2019.

The author submits that her case is representative of a widespread pattern of sexual violence against girls in Latin America. The rate of forced motherhood in the State Party is among the highest in Latin America, despite the entry into force in 2018 of the Comprehensive Organic Act on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women, which states that any pregnancy in a minor under the age of 15 years is deemed high-risk and can be legally terminated. The State Party is also among the countries where systematic impunity exists for sexual violence – even though under domestic regulations all sexual relations with girls under the age of 14 years are classed as rape, only 1 per cent of rape complaints result in a satisfactory sentence – and where legal and cultural barriers hinder access to sexual and reproductive health services.

The author maintains that, in this context, access to information on preventing sexual violence and pregnancy among girls is insufficient. In addition, it is almost impossible for girls who are victims of sexual violence to obtain access to a legal abortion, despite the fact that article 150 of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code provides for therapeutic abortion in order to avoid any “risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman”,⁴ which includes 13-year-old girls.

4. And despite the fact that, since 2021, the Code allows abortions for anyone who has been a victim of sexual violence. ↩

The author was born in Chespi, in the Province of Pichincha, and lived there with her family. They lived in poverty, and there was domestic violence in the household. When she was four years old, her mother left her father because of the violence and took Norma’s two sisters with her. Norma remained with her father, her older brother and a female cousin. When Norma was five years old, her cousin managed to tell the authorities that she was being sexually abused by her uncle (the author’s father).

The author and her cousin were put under the protection of the National Institute for Children and the Family, which placed the author with her paternal aunt and, later, with other relatives. In 2006, when the author was seven years old, the Institute decided that she should return to live with her mother, who was living with a new partner and the author’s sisters. Two years later, her 15-year-old brother discovered that her stepfather was sexually abusing Norma’s 11-year-old sister, who became pregnant. Norma then went to live with her grandparents.

In 2011, when Norma was 12 years old, her grandmother passed away. After seven years apart, and now no longer under the protection of the Institute, Norma had to return to live with her father, who began to sexually abuse her. In 2012, she stopped attending school because she felt “sad all the time”. The school authorities took no interest in the reason she had left school.

In early 2013, when she was 13 years old, Norma began to feel strange and noticed that her body was changing. As she had not received any sex education, she was not aware that menstruation should occur regularly. She was given permission to visit her older sister, who realized that Norma was pregnant. Her siblings decided to remove her from her father and took her to live with an aunt. In June 2013, her aunt took her to a doctor’s office, where it was confirmed that she was 27 weeks pregnant. When she requested an abortion, the doctor replied that it was too late to terminate the pregnancy and simply recommended that she should file a criminal complaint. Norma did not want to become a mother and thought about taking her own life.⁵

5. This is confirmed in a forensic psychiatric report. ↩

On 18 July 2013, Norma attended her first prenatal appointment at the hospital. An ultrasound showed that she was 32 and a half weeks pregnant and that the fetus was healthy. Norma was observed to be showing signs of depression. She reiterated to the authorities that she had absolutely no desire to be pregnant or to become a mother and stated that she wanted the child to be adopted by a member of her family. She was not provided with any information.

On 2 September 2013, a second prenatal check-up confirmed that she was 36 weeks pregnant. On 8 September 2013, Norma was admitted to the hospital in great pain. She refused to let medical staff perform a physical examination and check her dilation because she did not understand what was happening. The staff became violent with her and questioned whether she had been a victim of rape. One doctor even said to her: “How come you could open your legs before and now it’s time to give birth you don’t want to?” Although Norma’s aunt reminded them that she was a child victim of incest, the mistreatment continued and a public prosecutor had to be called to the hospital to ensure that Norma received better care.

The birth was a traumatic experience for Norma. After being threatened that treatment would be withdrawn because she was “not cooperating” with the medical team, she underwent an emergency caesarean section on 9 September 2013.

On 10 September 2013, the hospital psychologist reported that Norma’s plans for her future had been affected and decided to work on establishing a bond between mother and child. Norma was forced to express milk and was pressured by the nurses to see her son and to breastfeed him. On the third day, Norma agreed to see the child. She fainted at the sight of him. Her aunt promised her that she would help her if she kept the baby. As she had been given false information about adoption (see paragraph 2.14 below), she agreed to her aunt’s proposal.

On 12 September 2013, Norma requested help from a hospital social worker to protect her younger sister, who was still living with her mother and stepfather. Health workers did not report her concerns, and in 2017 her younger sister became pregnant as a result of sexual violence.

On 13 September 2013, just before Norma was discharged, doctors fitted her with a contraceptive implant without informing her what it was.

On 9 June 2013, after the medical visit that confirmed the pregnancy (see paragraph 2.6 above), Norma filed a criminal complaint against her father for rape. At the Calacali Police Community Unit, Norma was revictimized by a police officer who asked her how she had felt while being raped and whether she had enjoyed it.

At the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Norma reiterated that she did not want to be a mother and reported that a family member had expressed interest in adopting the baby, which would have been an alternative to her being forced into motherhood at a young age. Despite the fact that the Code on Children and Adolescents states that adoption by a family member is the preferred form of adoption, she was told that if she gave up the child for adoption it would have to be to a person outside the family.

On 17 June 2013, the Metropolitan Board for the Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents issued protective measures in respect of Norma. Her father, who had assaulted her, was banned from approaching her or threatening her, and Norma was granted a protection order. The Board summoned her father to a hearing on 18 September 2013, at which he would have the opportunity to give his account of events, and ordered the hospital director to appoint a psychologist to assess Norma’s emotional problems.

In early July 2013, the Public Prosecutor’s Office referred Norma for a psychological evaluation. The doctor found that Norma did not want to be a mother and offered to pay for any pregnancy-related costs and delivery in a private clinic and to “keep” the child himself. This illegal proposal was rejected by the author and her aunt.

On 9 August 2013, the hospital director arranged for Norma to be seen by a psychologist.

On 12 August 2013, two months after the complaint was filed, a police officer telephoned the author’s aunt, who reported that Norma’s father had left home and that his whereabouts were unknown. The officer asked the aunt to go to the National Directorate of the Special Police for Children and Adolescents to give her account of the facts.

On 20 August 2013, the Special Police for Children and Adolescents sent their report to the Protection Board, in which they stated that police officers had gone to arrest Norma’s father but that he had fled.

On an unknown date, Norma’s aunt recognized Norma’s father in the town of San Antonio. She informed nearby police officers, who refused to take any action.

Norma’s father died in 2015. The authorities became aware of his death in 2017 when officers from the Special Police for Children and Adolescents went to Norma’s home to inform her that, as she was about to turn 18, the investigation would no longer fall under their jurisdiction. As of the date of submission of the communication, Norma has not been notified of the closure of the criminal investigation.

Taking care of a child born of rape has pushed the author further into poverty. Although she submitted the required documentation to receive the Human Development Bond Cash Transfer, the Administration told her that the Bond was only available in cases of illness or disability. Those restrictions are not listed in the regulations pertaining to the Bond.

From 2013 to 2015, Norma lived with her aunt and stayed at home caring for her son. She did not study or work. At the age of 15 years, she felt like a “burden” and decided to leave her aunt’s house and enrol in night school. In September 2016, at the age of 16, she started working half-days as a domestic worker, earning US$ 200 per month. In 2017, she had to drop out of school again because her salary was not enough to cover the cost of food, shelter and childcare. She moved to full-time work, earning $375 per month. The author then began to study on Sundays.

Norma is distressed not only because of the sexual violence she was subjected to by her father and because she was forced into motherhood, but because she has no time for anything other than caring for her son. She asserts that she had only three sessions with a psychologist, the details of which she does not even remember, which shows that they were insufficient for her recovery and rehabilitation.

The author alleges that the criminal proceedings were inefficient. The authorities went to look for her assailant on only one occasion, two months after the complaint was filed, and between 2013 and 2017 no action was taken.

The author also claims that no remedy was available to help her avoid being forced into motherhood. In particular, despite the fact that the pregnancy constituted a risk to her life and health given her young age, there was no mechanism to enable her to obtain an abortion on the basis of the legal framework that allows therapeutic abortion on those grounds. Despite her emphasizing to State representatives that she did not want to become a mother, she was never given advice about the possibility of requesting and obtaining an abortion and was not informed about how she could file an appeal to challenge the denial of her request for an abortion. She states that the only available remedy, of which she was unaware at the time of the facts, was the protection remedy provided for in article 88 of the Constitution, which is not an effective remedy. In this regard, a study entitled “The protection remedy as a mechanism for guaranteeing rights: institutional arrangements, practice and outcomes”⁶ and conducted in the city of Quito found that, out of 1,775 protection remedies filed between November 2008 and June 2014, less than 7 per cent were resolved within the established time frame. Specifically, in 2013, such remedies took an average of 133 days to be resolved, meaning that the author would not have been able to access the required medical service in a timely manner.

6. José Luis Castro-Montero et al., La acción de protección como mecanismo de garantía de los derechos: configuración institucional, práctica y resultados (The protection remedy as a mechanism for guaranteeing rights: institutional arrangements, practice and outcomes), Ius Humani, Revista de Derecho, vol. 5 (2016), pp. 9–43. Available at www.iushumani.org/index.php/iushumani/issue/view/5. ↩

The author alleges a violation of her right to an effective remedy under article 2 (3) of the Covenant, read in conjunction with articles 3, 6, 7, 9, 17, 19, 24 (1) and 26, in relation to both the criminal proceedings and forced motherhood.

With regard to the criminal proceedings, the author argues that the Public Prosecutor’s Office did not act with the required enhanced due diligence because for four years after the preliminary proceedings were launched, no steps were taken to make progress in the investigation – an investigation that did not take into account her status as a minor or as a victim of sexual violence and in which she was blamed and revictimized – or to arrest, try and punish her attacker or to ensure that she had access to reparations.

The author recalls that the procedural component of the right to an effective remedy means that States Parties have an obligation to take appropriate measures to investigate the facts, even when the perpetrators of violations are private persons. She further recalls that the absence of an investigation can, in itself, be a violation of the Covenant and that remedies must be tailored to the particular vulnerability of children.

The author also recalls that the substantive component of the right to an effective remedy entails access to an appropriate remedy and reparation, including restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition and that special measures must also be guaranteed to ensure recovery, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the child “taking into account [his or her] right to survival and integral development”.⁷

7. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, V.R.P., V.P.C. et al. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, 8 March 2018, paras. 170 and 171. ↩

In relation to her forced motherhood, the author alleges a violation of her right to an effective remedy because, at the time of the facts, there was no mechanism that would have enabled her to obtain a legal abortion, because she did not have access to a mechanism to challenge the actions of State agents who behaved as if abortion was not an option and because the protection remedy is an inefficient procedure.

The author also argues that the State Party violated her right to life by failing to ensure that she could obtain sexual and reproductive health services, resulting in: (a) a risk of maternal mortality, given her age; (b) an impact on her mental health; and (c) an impact on her right to a dignified life.

She recalls that article 6 of the Covenant is violated when the authorities fail to take measures to mitigate reasonably foreseeable threats that can result in loss of life.⁸ She argues that failure to provide healthcare can violate article 6 of the Covenant specifically. In particular, the Committee has not only requested States Parties to abolish restrictive abortion regulations or practices that put women’s lives at risk, but has also recognized the risks of maternal mortality inherent in pregnancy. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also recognized that those risks are higher for pregnant girls below the age of 15 years and has urged States to guarantee them access to abortion to protect their lives.⁹

8. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018), para. 7. ↩
9. General comment No. 20 (2016) on the implementation of the rights of the child during adolescence. See also Latin American Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Societies, Factores relacionados con el embarazo y la maternidad en menores de 15 años en América Latina y el Caribe (Factors related to pregnancy and motherhood in girls under 15 years of age in Latin America and the Caribbean), Lima, January 2011; and International Planned Parenthood Federation and Women’s Link Worldwide, Pautas para la toma de decisiones clínicas cuando el embarazo pone en riesgo la vida de la mujer (Guidelines for clinical decision-making when pregnancy puts a woman’s life at risk), 2018. ↩

With regard to the right to a dignified life, the author recalls that this means that States Parties must take measures to ensure the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.¹⁰ They should not interfere with a child’s life goals, but should nurture and encourage them.¹¹ The author maintains that the State Party not only failed to provide her with access to abortion after preventable rape, resulting in pregnancy and forced motherhood without the necessary psychological support, but also failed to provide her with support following the change in her life circumstances as a consequence of her forced motherhood, which further worsened her precarious socioeconomic situation.

10. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018), para. 7. ↩
11. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment, 19 November 1999, paras. 144 and 191; Case of the Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Judgment, 8 July 2004, para. 128; and Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment, 27 November 2003, para. 152. ↩

Lastly, the author alleges a violation of the right to life, as protected by article 6 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 24 (1), because, as a child victim of rape living in poverty in a dysfunctional family situation, the State Party should have taken special measures to protect her.

The author also claims that the State Party violated her right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. She claims that such treatment was caused by sexual violence, as a result of which she suffered severe physical and mental suffering that gave rise to suicidal ideation, and which, although committed by a private individual, went unpunished.¹² She recalls that, in the case of child victims, the impact of sexual violence “can be exacerbated and they may suffer emotional trauma that differs from that suffered by an adult, with extremely profound effects, in particular when the victim’s relationship with the perpetrator is based on trust and authority”.¹³ She also recalls that article 7 is violated when the authorities fail to investigate effectively, thus depriving victims of their right to reparation, and that when the victim is a minor, the obligation of due diligence is enhanced.¹⁴ The author recalls that, in her case, not only is the State Party responsible for the violence by omission, in that it did not prevent the situation despite knowing that her assailant was dangerous and had a record of sexually assaulting girls, but also because it failed to investigate the case.

12. Committee against Torture, general comment No. 2 (2007), para. 22; V.L. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/37/D/262/2005); Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004), para. 8; A/HRC/31/57; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment, 25 November 2006, paras. 306 and 311; and Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Judgment, 30 August 2010, para. 119. ↩
13. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, V.R.P., V.P.C. et al. v. Nicaragua, para. 163. ↩
14. Purna v. Nepal (CCPR/C/119/D/2245/2013); X. v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/120/D/2256/2013); and InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, V.R.P., V.P.C. et al. v. Nicaragua, para. 156. ↩

The author argues that her treatment also resulted from the lack of access to abortion, which led to pregnancy and forced motherhood. She recalls that the treaty bodies have already found that the denial of access to abortion constitutes a violation of article 7 when a woman’s health is at risk. The author recalls that when she discovered she was pregnant and that there was no possibility of obtaining an abortion, she wanted to die and entered into a state of denial about the pregnancy. As a result of her physical dissociation from her body, and in the absence of psychological care, the birth was particularly traumatic. She fainted when she saw the child for the first time because it felt like a “short circuit” and represented the culmination of the physical and psychological torture she had experienced along the way. Her reaction also reduced the risk of filicide, which is often present in such cases.¹⁵

15. Forensic psychiatric report. ↩

The author argues that such treatment was also caused by revictimization (see paragraphs 2.8 and 2.13 above).

Lastly, the author argues that the treatment was also caused by the lack of comprehensive care and recalls that, according to the Special Rapporteur on torture, women need special psychological support when they have children as a result of rape. In particular, as a child victim of sexual violence, the author also claims that article 24 (1) was violated through the failure to provide her with age-appropriate medical and psychological care.

The author also alleges that being forced into motherhood through incest seriously affected her physical, mental and social integrity. She claims that there was also a violation of article 9, recalling that the concept of security of person concerns freedom from injury to the body and the mind, or bodily and mental integrity, and applies to all persons whether or not they are deprived of liberty.¹⁶

16. General comment No. 35 (2014), para. 4. ↩

The author also maintains that the lack of access to abortion represented arbitrary interference in her private life. The decision to terminate a pregnancy is a decision related to reproductive autonomy, which is a component of the right to privacy. This interference in her private life was also unlawful as therapeutic abortion would have been permitted in her case because pregnancy and childbirth in the body of a 13-year-old girl constitute a risk to her life or health.

The author also alleges a violation of article 19 of the Covenant because she did not receive: (a) education on sexual and reproductive health, which would have been crucial in enabling her to identify sexual violence and realize earlier that she was pregnant; (b) information on pregnancy and childbirth; (c) information on the possibility of choosing to have a legal abortion; (d) accurate information about adoption; or (e) information about the contraceptive implant that was fitted without her consent.

The author recalls that the right of access to information includes the right to receive quality and evidence-based information and education on sexual and reproductive health.¹⁷

17. General comment No. 36 (2018), para. 8. ↩

The Committee on the Rights of the Child had already recommended to the State Party that the national policy to tackle adolescent pregnancies should take into account access to information, and that adolescents should receive sexual and reproductive health education as part of their regular school education and through the media.¹⁸

18. CRC/C/ECU/CO/5-6, paras. 35 (b) and (d). ↩

The author alleges violations of articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant, recalling that a State Party’s refusal to provide certain reproductive health services for women is discriminatory,¹⁹ and claims that her assailant had discriminatory motives, given his position of patriarchal power and dominance over her.

19. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 24 (1999), para. 11; and L.C. v. Peru (CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009), para. 8.15. ↩

The author asks the Committee for: (a) rehabilitation measures, in the form of access to comprehensive health services; (b) restitution measures, in the form of access to primary and secondary education for the author, access to education at all levels for her son and the provision of the necessary resources to develop a work venture according to her wishes; (c) redress for the moral harm suffered; (d) compensation for the cost of healthcare, the upkeep of her child and the legal proceedings; and (e) non-repetition measures, in the form of guaranteeing access to abortion for girls who are victims of sexual violence; developing appropriate adoption and separation policies; strengthening the comprehensive protection system; training health and justice professionals on comprehensive care in cases of sexual violence; and implementing a comprehensive policy for the prevention of sexual violence and direct cash transfer policies for adolescent mothers to improve the education and health of both them and their children.

On 4 January 2020, the State Party argued that the communication was inadmissible owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies because the author had not filed a protection remedy, which is aimed at providing direct and effective protection of rights recognized in the Constitution, such as the right to health, and which can be filed directly and orally.

The State Party further argued that the communication is inadmissible owing to nonsubstantiation of a violation of the right to an effective remedy. It claims that, with the criminal complaint, both the investigation conducted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office – which could not be concluded due to the death of the suspect – and the administrative proceedings conducted by the Metropolitan Board for the Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents were immediately initiated (see below paras. 4.4 et seq.).

The State Party also argues that the communication is inadmissible for lack of competence ratione materiae, as the right to health and to access to reproductive health services are not protected by the Covenant.

On the merits, the State Party argues that on the same day that the criminal complaint was filed, the police officer contacted the Special Police for Children and Adolescents to report it. He also met with the author’s aunt and brother and took them to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, where the author underwent a gynaecological examination, and drew up an order placing Norma in the care of her aunt. The Special Police for Children and Adolescents forwarded the police report to the Public Prosecutor’s Office on 11 June and to the Protection Board on 12 June 2013.

On 17 June 2013, as part of the administrative proceedings, the Protection Board banned Norma’s father from approaching her or threatening her; ordered him to leave his home immediately because he was a danger to Norma; granted Norma a protection order; ordered that Norma should give her account in private; and instructed the hospital to arrange a psychotherapy assessment and issue an initial report on the findings immediately and progress reports twice a month.

In relation to the investigation, on 13 June 2013, the Pichincha Public Prosecutor’s Office opened a file against Norma’s father as a suspect and assigned it to Prosecutor’s Office No. 1, specializing in sexual and domestic violence, which received the file on 18 June 2013. On 21 June 2013, the preliminary investigation was launched and a psychological assessment and a social assessment were scheduled for 8 July and 17 July 2013, respectively. Arrangements were made for Norma to give a statement on 14 August 2013. On 5 July 2013, the investigating officer from the Special Police for Children and Adolescents conducted an inspection of the location. The social assessment conducted on 17 July 2013 noted “the teenager’s poor emotional state” and recorded that she had “thought about giving up for adoption the child she is expecting”. On 14 August 2013, the report from the psychological assessment conducted on 8 July 2013 was issued. In it, the psychologist noted that the teenager showed “signs consistent with depression” and was “very conflicted about becoming a mother and mainly feels that she does not want to keep the baby”. The psychologist also noted that her prognosis was “uncertain” and that she required “specialized psychological care in the medium to long term to achieve a favourable outcome”.

On 5 November 2013, the Public Prosecutor’s Office made arrangements to take a voluntary statement from Norma’s father on 15 November. On 12 November, an officer from the Special Police for Children and Adolescents went to the area to notify the suspect. However, he was unfamiliar with the area and was told by the parish authorities that the suspect lived six hours away on foot. On 13 December 2013, the Public Prosecutor’s Office again made arrangements to take a voluntary statement from Norma’s father, this time on 23 December 2013. The officer from the Special Police for Children and Adolescents requested a vehicle to travel to the area.

The State Party also indicates that, in 2017, the officer interviewed Norma and her aunt and uncle, who told him that the suspect had died in 2015. On 20 April 2018, the Public Prosecutor’s Office asked the Director of the Civil Registry to forward the death certificate and, having determined that there was an insurmountable legal obstacle to the initiation of proceedings, requested that the case be closed because the suspect had died. The presiding judge at the judicial unit dealing with violence against women and domestic violence ordered the closure of the criminal investigation on 30 September 2019.

The State Party concludes that, by launching administrative and criminal proceedings, it complied with its duty to protect the integrity of the author and to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation.

Lastly, the State Party argues that the author received medical care during her pregnancy and the birth and that no remedy has been filed in relation to the care she received.

On 19 April 2021, the Committee received a third-party submission from the Centre for International Human Rights of the Pritzker School of Law at Northwestern University and from Anand Grover, former Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. In the submission, it is argued that forced motherhood constitutes a violation of the right to a dignified life.²⁰

20. A summary of the submission can be found in annex I of document CCPR/C/142/D/3627/2019. ↩

On 26 April 2021, the Committee received a third-party submission from students at the Paris Human Rights Centre and Assas International Law Clinic at the Panthéon-Assas University. The submission deals with the violation of the right to privacy through forced pregnancy.²¹

21. A summary of the submission can be found in annex II of document CCPR/C/142/D/3627/2019. ↩

On 7 May 2021, the author argued that the protection remedy was not only de facto unavailable to her, given her condition and situation, but also that it was not an effective remedy through which to obtain an abortion. The State Party has not demonstrated that such a remedy was de facto available to her nor that it had a reasonable prospect of being effective. It has not provided information on how many appeals have been filed in relation to access to therapeutic abortion or how many of them have received approval in a timely manner. The author states that all of the 32 protection remedies filed without legal representation were found inadmissible or were denied in the first instance.²²

22. Castro-Montero et al., La acción de protección como mecanismo de garantía de los derechos: configuración institucional, práctica y resultados (The protection remedy as a mechanism for guaranteeing rights: institutional arrangements, practice and outcomes), p. 31. ↩

The author also contends that she had sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, the allegation of a violation of the right to an effective remedy. No immediate steps were taken to arrest her attacker, the public prosecutor did not issue summonses for him to make a voluntary statement until five and six months after the complaint had been filed, the request to close the investigation was submitted after the registration of the communication, and the author was not notified of that decision.

The author also argues that the Committee has competence ratione materiae, the lack of access to legal abortion having already been found to amount to a violation of several articles of the Covenant.

In relation to the violation of article 2 (3), read in conjunction with the other articles invoked, the author argues that the death of the perpetrator does not address or absolve the State Party’s breach of the obligation to provide her with an effective remedy and full reparation.

The author reiterates that the State Party was fully aware of the sexual violence in her family, previous complaints having been made against the perpetrator and the author having been placed under the supervision of the National Institute for Children and the Family, yet it failed in its duty to prevent sexual violence and to protect her from it. She alleges that without the protection of the State, it was impossible for her to escape the sexual violence to which she was ultimately subjected.

Lastly, the author reports that on 28 April 2021, the Constitutional Court issued ruling of unconstitutionality No. 34-19-IN/21, by which it decriminalized abortion with consent in cases of rape for all women and girls. The Court found that the phrase “for women with a mental impairment”, previously included in article 150 (2) of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code and which limited access to abortion in cases of rape to women with disabilities, was unconstitutional because it violated the right to equality and nondiscrimination. However, the ruling imposes limitations that impede effective access to abortion in cases of rape, namely the need to file a criminal complaint and undergo a medical examination, a limit on the number of weeks of gestation at which an abortion can be performed, and, in the case of children and adolescents, the need for permission from the legal representative or, in the absence of the latter, from the competent State authorities.

On 28 January 2022, the State Party stated that, at the time of the facts, the following public policies were in place to provide comprehensive healthcare services to victims of violence: an inter-institutional cooperation agreement signed between the Ministry of Health and the Attorney General’s Office to design and implement joint actions to protect the rights of persons involved in acts of gender-based violence; the regulations on access to and availability of contraceptive methods in the National Health System; the standards for essential obstetric and neonatal care, which are aimed at implementing a national plan designed to rapidly decrease the number of maternal and neonatal deaths; and the technical standard for comprehensive care in gender-based violence.

The State Party also specifies that: (a) on 31 May 2018, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education signed an inter-institutional cooperation agreement establishing cooperation links to strengthen the model for the management of comprehensive healthcare for children and adolescent victims of gender-based violence, with priority given to cases of sexual violence and situations of pregnancy, maternity and paternity; and (b) on 14 September 2018, the Ministry of Health introduced a primary care service for cases of alleged violence.

With specific regard to the allegations of a violation of article 7 of the Covenant, the State Party argues that the facts fail to reach the legal threshold for torture and that it cannot be claimed to have failed to protect the author from physical and psychological suffering, since it took legal, criminal and physical and emotional health measures in a timely manner.

On 29 April 2022, the author stressed that her experience of forced motherhood, as well as that of her two sisters and her cousin, is an accurate reflection of a systemic problem of State inaction in preventing and investigating cases of sexual violence against girls. She emphasizes that, following a visit to the State Party in 2019, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health recommended that, as a matter of priority, Ecuador should enhance its efforts to address gender-based violence and child and adolescent pregnancy as a matter of priority.²³ She also notes that, according to a study conducted by Human Rights Watch, between 2015 and 2019, only 3 per cent of the cases reported reached trial.²⁴

23. A/HRC/44/48/Add.1. ↩
24. Human Rights Watch, “It’s a Constant Fight”: School-Related Sexual Violence and Young Survivors’ Struggle for Justice in Ecuador, 2020, p. 56. ↩

The author notes that the public policies mentioned by the State Party still do not provide for the delivery of comprehensive sexual education. She recalls that in a recent report submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for the public hearing on the situation of access to sexual and reproductive education for children and adolescents in Ecuador in 2022, girls reported that they had no access to information or education about sex.

The author also notes that these public policies still do not include a regulatory framework that guarantees access to abortion as a reproductive health service and that none of them set out the right to termination of pregnancy in cases of sexual violence or when there is a risk to the woman’s life or health. Although the Constitutional Court decriminalized abortion in cases of rape, the organic bill guaranteeing the right to voluntary termination of pregnancy in cases of rape includes stringent barriers to access to abortion. It was also partially vetoed by the President of the Republic, establishing further obstructions.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible insofar as domestic remedies have not been exhausted because the author had not filed a protection remedy in order to exercise her right to an abortion. The Committee also notes the author’s argument that not only was such a remedy not de facto available to her, but that it would not have been effective because it would not have been resolved with the necessary speed.

The Committee recalls that the purpose of requiring that domestic remedies be exhausted is to give States Parties the opportunity to perform their duty to protect and guarantee Covenant rights.²⁵ The Committee also recalls that authors need only exhaust remedies that offer them a reasonable prospect of redress.²⁶ In the present case, with regard to access to voluntary termination of pregnancy, the Committee notes that the State Party has not responded to the author’s argument that protection remedies are not resolved with the necessary speed required in the context of termination of pregnancy and has not provided information showing that the remedy has been successful in similar cases. In the absence of specific information on the effectiveness of the remedy in question in the context of the present case, the Committee considers that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol does not preclude it from considering the communication. With regard to the criminal investigation into the acts of sexual violence, the Committee notes that the authorities took no action between 2013 and 2017 and that the State Party has provided no explanation in that regard. It therefore also concludes that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol does not preclude it from considering the communication.

25. Committee’s established jurisprudence since T.K. v. France (CCPR/C/37/D/220/1987), para. 8.3. ↩
26. Human Rights Committee, Colamarco Patiño v. Panama, communication No. 437/1990, para. 5.2. ↩

The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione materiae, as the right to health and to access to reproductive health services are not protected by the Covenant. However, the Committee notes that the author alleges a violation of her rights to an effective remedy, to life, to integrity of the person, to liberty and security of person, to private and family life, to information, to special protection measures for children, and to equality and non-discrimination, all of which are recognized in the Covenant, on the grounds that the State Party failed to comply with its positive obligation to protect these rights, which, in her particular circumstances, entailed access to reproductive health services.²⁷ The Committee also recalls that guaranteed access to abortion has already been examined in the framework of the rights protected by the Covenant.²⁸ The Committee concludes that it is not precluded from considering the present communication.

27. Toussaint v. Canada (CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014), para. 10.9. ↩
28. L.M.R. v. Argentina (CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007); Mellet v. Ireland (CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013); and Whelan v. Ireland (CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014). ↩

Lastly, the Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible for failure to substantiate the violation of the right to an effective remedy (article 2 (3), read in conjunction with articles 3, 6 (1), 7, 9, 17, 19, 24 (1) and 26), given that a criminal investigation and administrative proceedings were both initiated immediately after the submission of the complaint. The Committee also notes the author’s argument that the authorities’ preliminary actions were ineffective.

The Committee considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated her claim under article 2 (3) of the Covenant for the purposes of admissibility, recalling its jurisprudence according to which this article lays down general obligations for States and is of an ancillary nature, and that in most cases its examination under the Optional Protocol is thus incidental to the examination of other substantive articles of the Covenant.²⁹

29. Balekelayi Nyengele et al v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (CCPR/C/139/D/3658/2019), para. 5.4; Llantoy Huamán v. Peru (CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003), para. 5.4; and L.M.R. v. Argentina, para. 8.4. ↩

The Committee notes the author’s claims under article 9 (1) of the Covenant and considers that she has not provided sufficient information to explain how the facts as set out in the present communication could have undermined the enjoyment of her rights under that article. Accordingly, the Committee considers that these claims have not been sufficiently substantiated and are therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee also takes note of the claim of an autonomous violation of articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant. The Committee considers that this claim is closely related to the claims made under other articles of the Covenant and that it should therefore consider them together.³⁰

30. L.M.R. v. Argentina, para. 8.5. ↩

The Committee considers that the claims under articles 6, 7, 17 and 19 of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 2 (3), 3, 24 (1) and 26, have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and proceeds to its consideration of the merits of the communication.

The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information submitted to it, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee notes the author’s claim that the facts of the present case constitute a violation of her rights under article 6 (1) of the Covenant because the State Party failed to provide her with access to sexual and reproductive health services, thereby exposing her to the risk of maternal mortality inherent in pregnancy and childbirth at a young age and causing her to suffer depression and consider suicide as a means of avoiding forced motherhood, and that her right to a dignified life was affected because, by not providing her with access to abortion or accurate information about her right to give up her child to a family member for adoption, the State Party forced her to become a mother and did not provide her with any support in attaining her life goals, which were altered due to forced motherhood. The Committee also notes that the author also alleges a violation of article 6 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 24 (1), because, as a child, the State Party should have taken special measures to protect her. Lastly, the Committee notes that the author links the foregoing to a violation of article 2 (3) of the Covenant on the basis of a lack of due diligence in the criminal investigation and the lack of access to an effective remedy in relation to her forced motherhood, in the absence of a mechanism for access to a legal abortion, which she had a right to obtain, and of access to a mechanism through which to challenge the actions of State agents who refused her an abortion.

The Committee also notes that the State Party alleges that the death of the author’s father prevented the continuation of the criminal proceedings and that there were public policies in place aimed at providing comprehensive healthcare services to victims of genderbased violence.

The Committee recalls that the right to life cannot be properly understood if it is interpreted in a restrictive manner; the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures.³¹ The Committee considers, first, that the State Party’s failure to protect³² the author – the authorities having received previous complaints against her father for similar acts and the author having been placed under the protection of the National Institute for Children and the Family – allowed the rapes to begin and to continue.

31. Toussaint v. Canada, para. 11.3. ↩
32. Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay (CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016), para. 7.8. See also Lugumire and Barhatulirwa v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (CCPR/C/137/D/2790/2016), para. 6.3, and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 22 (2016), para. 59. ↩

The Committee notes, second, that, after becoming pregnant as a result of a rape that was foreseeable – the authorities having been informed of her father’s repeated criminal behaviour – the author expressed her wish to terminate her pregnancy but was not listened to. The Committee notes that, pursuant to article 150 of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code, a pregnancy could legally be terminated if it posed a risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman. Specifically, experts recognize that pregnancy and childbirth at the age of 13 years constitute a risk of maternal mortality.³³ The same risk was expressly recognized by the State Party itself in 2018 when it adopted the Comprehensive Organic Act on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women, which authorizes the termination of pregnancy in minors under 15 years of age because it is considered high-risk (see paragraph 2.1 above). However, the State Party did not take any steps to enable the effective application of this provision in the author’s case.

33. The Committee on the Rights of the Child stresses that adolescent girls are the group most at risk of dying or suffering lifelong injuries in pregnancy and childbirth and that lack of access to sexual and reproductive health services makes them even more vulnerable (Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 20 (2016), para. 59). ↩

In this connection, the Committee notes that violations through acts of omission include the failure to take appropriate steps towards the full realization of everyone’s right to sexual and reproductive health and the failure to enact and enforce relevant laws.³⁴ The State Party also did not refute the author’s claims regarding the risk of maternal mortality. The Committee recalls that States Parties must provide safe, legal and effective access to abortion where the life and health of the pregnant woman or girl is at risk, or where carrying a pregnancy to term would cause the pregnant woman or girl substantial pain or suffering, most notably where the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, and should remove existing barriers to effective access by women and girls to safe and legal abortion.³⁵ The Committee also notes that the Committee on the Rights of the Child had considered that, in the case of pregnant girls, consideration should be given to the particularly high risk to their lives because of possible complications during pregnancy and childbirth.³⁶

34. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 22 (2016), para. 55. ↩
35. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018), para. 8. ↩
36. Camila v. Peru (CRC/C/93/D/136/2021), para. 8.5. ↩

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 36 (2018), in which it established that the right to life also concerns the right to enjoy a dignified life, meaning that States Parties should take all appropriate measures to address the general societal conditions that may give rise to threats to the right to life or prevent individuals from enjoying their right to a dignified life. Moreover, States Parties may be in violation of article 6 of the Covenant even when such threats and situations have not resulted in loss of life.³⁷ The Committee also notes that every child has the right to plan his or her life in a way that is supported and encouraged by the public authorities so that it provides personal benefits for the child, as well as benefits for the society to which he or she belongs.³⁸ In particular, the Committee welcomes the position set out in the first third-party intervention, according to which forced motherhood interrupts and hinders the personal, family, educational and professional goals of girls who are mothers and severely restricts their life plans and their right to a dignified life, and the position of the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, which considers that forced motherhood is a violation of physical, psychological, moral and sexual integrity.³⁹ The Committee further notes the view of the Committee on the Rights of the Child that, regarding the situation of pregnant girls, consideration should be given to the potentially serious impact that it can have on their development and their life goals.⁴⁰

37. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018), paras. 3, 7 and 26. See also Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay, para. 7.3. ↩
38. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, para. 191. ↩
39. Constitutional Court, ruling of unconstitutionality No. 34-19-IN/21, 28 April 2021, paras. 134, 135 and 189. ↩
40. Camila v. Peru, para. 8.5. ↩

In this respect, the Committee notes that the State Party does not dispute that the author had to leave school as a result of the rapes and that she was subsequently unable to return to stable education because she had been forced to become a mother, having been denied access to an abortion and, later, against her wishes, having been refused the opportunity to give up her child to a family member for adoption. The Committee also notes that the State Party also does not dispute that while she was a teenager, the author had to undertake unskilled work with minimal prospects for professional growth in order to cover basic living expenses for her child, who was born as a result of rape by her father. The State Party also does not dispute that despite being entitled to the Human Development Bond Cash Transfer, the author was not granted it.

In the light of the foregoing, the Committee is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 6 (1) of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 2 (3) and 24 (1).

The Committee notes that the author alleges that the facts of the present case constitute a violation of article 7 of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with article 24 (1) for the following reasons: (a) failure to prevent sexual violence despite knowing that the perpetrator had a history of similar behaviour; (b) the sexual violence and forced pregnancy that caused her severe suffering, resulting in thoughts of suicide; (c) the lack of access to abortion, which led to forced pregnancy and forced motherhood, even though she was still a child; (d) the absence of an effective investigation in the context of the criminal complaint, depriving her of her right to redress; (e) revictimization; and (f) the lack of comprehensive care she required, delivered in an appropriate manner given her status as a minor.

The Committee also notes the State Party’s claim that it complied with its duty to protect the author’s integrity by acting in a timely manner to provide emotional health measures. The State Party also argues that the facts fail to amount to the legal concept of torture.

The Committee recalls that the right protected by article 7 of the Covenant relates not only to physical pain but also to mental suffering and that this protection is particularly important in the case of children.⁴¹ In particular, the Committee notes the view of the Committee on the Rights of the Child that, in the case of pregnant girls, consideration should be given to the special and differential physical and mental health impacts of child pregnancy, whose effect on each girl will depend on her age and physical and psychological maturity, her family and community support systems and other factors that can have a bearing on mental health, including a history of rape or incest and socioeconomic or cultural factors that increase vulnerability.⁴² The Constitutional Court of the State Party considers that “the criminalization of abortion in cases of rape and the refusal to provide assistance to girls, adolescents and women who have suffered rape can constitute a form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.⁴³ Similarly, in the case of child victims, the impact “can be exacerbated and they may suffer emotional trauma that differs from that suffered by an adult, with extremely profound effects, in particular when the victim’s relationship with the perpetrator is based on trust and authority”.⁴⁴ Lastly, the Committee also recalls that, when the victim is a minor, the obligation of due diligence is enhanced and impunity constitutes an aggravating circumstance.⁴⁵

41. General comment No. 20 (1992), paras. 2 and 5. ↩
42. Camila v. Peru, para. 8.5. ↩
43. Constitutional Court, ruling of unconstitutionality No. 34-19-IN/21, para. 131. ↩
44. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, V.R.P., V.P.C. et al. v. Nicaragua, para. 163. ↩
45. See Purna v. Nepal; X v. Sri Lanka; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, V.R.P., V.P.C. et al. v. Nicaragua, paras. 158 and 171. ↩

The Committee considers that the author suffered a high level of distress caused by a combination of acts and omissions attributable to the State Party. The Committee recalls its conclusion on the State Party’s failure to protect the author from a foreseeable violation (see paragraphs 11.4 and 11.5 above). The Committee also notes that the State Party did not ensure the author’s right to termination of pregnancy as provided for in article 150 of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code. In that regard, the Committee recalls that denial of access to abortion constitutes a violation of article 7 of the Covenant when the physical or mental health of the woman is at risk, with the age of the victim influencing the degree of suffering, and, even more seriously, when the victim is a minor who has been sexually abused.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the State Party did not refute the claim that childbirth was a traumatic experience for the author as she did not understand what was happening, nor the claim that she had no choice but to take care of a child born of rape as she was not afforded the opportunity to give up her child to a family member for adoption, as permitted by law. The Committee also notes that the author did not receive any psychological support after being forced to become a mother, even though the authorities noted that she required “specialized psychological care in the medium to long term to achieve a favourable outcome”.

46. Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, para. 6.3; Mellet v. Ireland (CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013), para. 7.4; Whelan v. Ireland; and L.M.R. v. Argentina. ↩

In the light of the foregoing, the Committee is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 7 of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 2 (3) and 24 (1).

The Committee notes the author’s claim that the facts also constitute a violation of article 17 of the Covenant because the lack of access to abortion represented arbitrary interference with her reproductive autonomy, which is a component of the right to privacy. It also notes her claim that the interference in her private life was also unlawful because therapeutic abortion is permitted in cases where the life or health of the pregnant person is at risk and, for the body of a 13-year-old girl, pregnancy and delivery constitute just such a risk to life or health. The Committee notes that the State Party failed to provide specific observations in this regard.

The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which the scope of article 17 encompasses a woman’s decision to request termination of pregnancy.⁴⁷ The Committee extends this conclusion to preventing a girl or woman from deciding that placing a child for adoption is the only possible option, having been forced to continue with her pregnancy.

47. Whelan v. Ireland, para. 7.8; Mellet v. Ireland, para. 7.7; Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, para. 6.4; and L.M.R. v. Argentina, para. 9.3. ↩

In the circumstances of the case, the Committee considers that the State Party’s refusal to act on the author’s decision to terminate her pregnancy – bearing in mind that the State Party did not dispute the author’s claim that, under the legal framework in place, an abortion would have been permitted in her particular case – and to place her child for adoption discloses a violation of article 17 of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with article 24 (1).⁴⁸

48. Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, para. 6.4. ↩

The Committee notes the author’s claim that the facts also constitute a violation of article 19 of the Covenant, as she did not receive the sexual and reproductive health education that would have enabled her to identify sexual violence and realize that she was pregnant, nor did she receive accurate information about her right to an abortion or her right to give up her child to a family member for adoption or about the contraceptive implant that was fitted without her consent. The Committee notes that the State Party failed to provide observations in this regard.

The Committee recalls that the right of access to information includes the right to receive quality and evidence-based information and education on sexual and reproductive health.⁴⁹ The Committee notes that the lack of information about the possibility of terminating her pregnancy or placing her child for adoption prevented the author from making informed decisions about her sexual and reproductive health and resulted in forced pregnancy and forced motherhood.

49. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018), para. 8. See also joint general recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women/general comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2019), para. 68; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 22 (2016), paras. 9, 18 and 19; Camila v. Peru, para. 8.14; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Guzmán Albarracín et al. v. Ecuador, Judgment, 24 June 2020. ↩

In the light of the foregoing, the Committee is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 19 of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 2 (3) and 24 (1).

Lastly, the Committee takes note of the author’s allegation that the facts also constitute a violation of articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant as a result of the lack of provision of certain reproductive health services, the author’s forced pregnancy and forced motherhood, the power dynamic between the author and her father and his patriarchal domination of her. The Committee decided to examine this allegation in relation to the other articles for which it has already found a violation (see paragraph 10.8 above).

The Committee notes the vexatious comments made by the State Party’s authorities, both in the health and police sectors (see paragraphs 2.8 and 2.13 above), which have not been disputed by the State Party and which indicate discriminatory treatment by the police and health authorities aimed at questioning the author’s morals.⁵⁰ The Committee also notes the State Party’s refusal to provide the author with the reproductive health services she needed and to which she was entitled under domestic law (see paras. 2.2 and 2.14 above), which amounts to gender-based stereotyping in terms of the reproductive role of women. The Committee notes that both the sexual violence and the lack of access to women’s healthcare services constitute forms of gender-based violence against women⁵¹ and gender discrimination. The Committee therefore considers that the facts of the present communication also disclose a form of intersectional discrimination based on the author’s gender and age.⁵²

50. L.N.P. v. Argentina (CCPR/C/102/D/1610/2007), para. 13.3. ↩
51. Chakupewa et al. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (CCPR/C/131/D/2835/2016). See also Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35 (2017) on gender-based violence against women, para. 18. ↩
52. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Guzmán Albarracín et al. v. Ecuador, paras. 113 and 141. ↩

In the light of the foregoing, the Committee concludes that the facts before it reveal a violation of articles 6 (1), 7, 17 and 19 of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 3 and 26.

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State Party of articles 6 (1), 7, 17 and 19 of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 2 (3), 3, 24 (1) and 26.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State Party is under an obligation to provide an effective remedy. Accordingly, the State Party should: (a) provide the author with full reparation, including adequate compensation, for the harm she has suffered; (b) repair the harm caused in terms of her life goals, including by providing the necessary support to enable her to complete her high school studies and pursue higher education; (c) ensure that her child has access to education at all levels; (d) provide specialized psychological care to the author and her son, as a child born of sexual violence, for as long as the author and the specialist deem necessary; and (e) make a public acknowledgement of responsibility. The State Party is also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. In this regard, the Committee requests the State Party to: (a) make the necessary adjustments to its regulations to ensure effective access to pregnancy termination services for all women and girls who are victims of sexual violence, including incest or rape; (b) take action to combat sexual violence in all sectors, including by conducting education and awareness-raising campaigns for the general public and in the field of administration of justice; (c) train health and justice professionals on the provision of comprehensive care in cases of sexual violence and ensure effective action when danger is posed due to a history of similar assaults; and (d) develop adequate adoption policies.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a Party to the Optional Protocol, the State Party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State Party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State Party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the present Views. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them widely disseminated.

I very much appreciate the depth of analysis reflected in communication No. 3628/2019 and the suitability, in this case and for many other similar cases around the world, of the Views transmitted to the State Party. It is very important to monitor the followup given to these Views.

It is unacceptable to me that the violation of the human rights of victims in terrible cases such as this one is considered to represent a “widespread pattern” in a single region of the world, specifically Latin America. It is a pattern all over the world. Singling out one region not only stigmatizes the population of that part of the world, but also impedes awareness of the need to eradicate it in other parts of the world.