R.P. and S.Y. (not represented by counsel) v. Russian Federation

The authors of the communications are R.P. (communication No. 3136/2018) and S.Y. (communication No. 3138/2018), nationals of the Russian Federation born in 1981 and 1973, respectively. R.P. claims that the State Party has violated his rights under articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant. S.Y. claims that the State Party has violated his rights under article 14 (1) of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 1 January 1992. R.P. is represented by counsel. S.Y. is not represented by counsel.

On 17 July 2025, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the Committee decided to join communications No. 3136/2018 and No. 3138/2018, which had been submitted by two different authors, for a joint decision, in view of the substantial factual and legal similarity.

Both communications deal with the legality of appointment of the lay judges in the authors’ trial proceedings. The facts relevant to each communication are summarized below.

By a judgment of the Vologda Regional Court dated 12 February 2001, the author was sentenced to life imprisonment under articles 105 (2) (murder), 158 (2) (theft by a group of persons by prior agreement) and 167 (1) and (2) (arson) of the Criminal Code. The trial court was composed of one professional judge and two lay judges, N and G. By a cassation ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 1 November 2001, part of the author’s conviction under article 167 (2) was quashed and remitted for a new trial before the same court with a different judicial panel. The rest of the ruling became final and enforceable on the same date.

On 22 January 2002 the Vologda Regional Court sentenced the author to four years in prison under article 167 (2) of the Criminal Code. Having aggregated the sentences, the court sentenced the author to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, acting as a court of cassation, upheld the ruling of the Vologda Regional Court on 1 July 2002. On the same date, the ruling became final and enforceable.

On 22 December 2014, the author submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General’s Office, raising the issue of the unlawful composition of the court that had rendered the judgment of 12 February 2001. He claimed that the lay judge G had been appointed unlawfully, since her mandate had expired. On 27 April 2015, the Vologda City Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint under article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 22 April 2015, the Vologda Regional Prosecutor’s Office, to which the complaint had been transmitted, rejected the author’s complaint. In 2015, the author also submitted complaints to the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsperson for Human Rights. Both institutions informed him that they were not competent to review his complaints.

On 19 June 2016, the author appealed to the Supreme Court against the judgment of 12 February 2001. On 19 July 2016, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. By a decision dated 10 November 2016, a Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court also rejected the author’s appeal.

On 7 February 2017, the author again submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General’s Office challenging the judgment of the Vologda Regional Court dated 12 February 2001. On 24 March 2017, the Prosecutor General’s Office rejected the author’s complaint.³

3. The Prosecutor’s Office and the courts concluded that the judicial panel that had rendered the judgment of 12 February 2001 had been composed in accordance with the legislation in force at the time of the trial. According to the Supreme Court decision of 10 November 2016, the lay judge G was entitled to participate in the trial. Her legal term of office, which had started on 31 March 1990, had been extended by presidential decrees No. 2289 of 25 December 1993, No. 41 of 23 January 1997 and No. 103 of 25 January 2000. ↩

On 4 November 2000, the author was sentenced to life in prison for murder (art. 105 (2) and (3) of the Criminal Code) and armed robbery (art. 162), among other charges by the Perm Regional Court, with the judicial panel being composed of one professional judge and two lay judges, K and P. According to national law, lay judges can participate in one criminal trial per year.⁴ Meanwhile, in 2000, K participated as a lay judge in 13 criminal cases and P in the consideration of 8 criminal cases. The author’s sentence was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, acting as a court of cassation, on 25 June 2001.

4. Federal law No. 37-FZ of 2 January 2000 on lay judges of federal courts of general jurisdiction in the Russian Federation. ↩

The author, with the help of his lawyer, learned about the procedural violation in the appointment of lay judges only during his trial in 2012. On 13 May 2014, he raised a claim about the unlawful composition of his trial court before the Supreme Court in a supervisory review appeal. On 1 September 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the mere fact that lay judges participated in more than one criminal trial in one year did not render their appointment illegitimate.

On 3 June 2015, the author filed a request with the Perm Territory Prosecutor’s Office for the reopening of criminal proceedings on the basis of new or newly discovered circumstances. His request was rejected on 22 July 2015. The author contested the Prosecutor’s Office decision, submitting it to a higher-ranking prosecutor on 1 October 2015. On 9 October 2015, his appeal was rejected. On 13 October 2015, the author complained to the Lenin District Court in Perm, under article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging lack of action by the Prosecutor’s Office. The Court rejected the author’s complaint on 16 November 2015, explaining, inter alia, that his claims did not constitute new or newly discovered circumstances. On 28 January 2016, the author’s appeal was rejected by the Perm Territory Court. The author’s supervisory review appeals were rejected by the Supreme Court on 29 July 2016 and by the Prosecutor General’s Office on 12 March 2017.

The author complained to the European Court of Human Rights on 29 February 2016. On 19 May 2016, by the decision of a single judge, his complaint was found inadmissible as not fulfilling the criteria set out in articles 34 and 35 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights).

The author of communication No. 3136/2018 claims that the judgment of 12 February 2001, rendered with the participation of the lay judge G, was unlawful, as the court had not been established in accordance with the law. He claims violations of his rights under articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.

The author of communication No. 3138/2018 alleges a violation of his right to fair trial under article 14 (1) of the Covenant on account of the unlawful appointment of two lay judges in his trial proceedings.

In notes verbales dated 2 October 2018, the State Party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of both communications.

Regarding communication No. 3136/2018, the State Party notes that the author submitted a supervisory review appeal to the Supreme Court, alleging a violation of his right to fair trial, on 19 June 2016, that is, more than 14 years after the adoption of the judgment by the trial court (22 January 2002) and 13 years from the adoption of the cassation judgment (1 July 2002). The author complained to the Committee more than 15 years later.

As to communication No. 3138/2018, the State Party notes that the author submitted a supervisory review appeal to the Supreme Court, alleging a violation of his right to fair trial, on 13 May 2014, that is, more than 13 years after the adoption of the judgment by the trial court (4 November 2000) and 12 years from the adoption of the cassation judgment (25 June 2001). The author complained to the Committee more than 16 years later.

The State Party notes that the authors did not raise allegations of unlawful composition of the trial court in their cassation appeals. The State Party concludes that both communications constitute an abuse of the right of submission and should be declared inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

In both cases, the State Party submits that the lay judges were appointed in accordance with the procedure established by law and that there was no violation of the authors’ rights. Regarding communication No. 3136/2018, the State Party clarifies that lay judge G was included by the Vologda Council of Peoples’ Deputies on the list of lay judges on 31 March 1990. Her statutory term of office had been extended by presidential decrees of 25 December 1993, 23 January 1997 and 25 January 2000. According to the latest decree, the term of office of lay judges was extended until approval of the new list of lay judges. The new list was approved and submitted to the Vologda Regional Court on 1 November 2002. Until that date, lay judge G was competent to participate in trial proceedings. With regard to communication No. 3138/2018, the State Party submits that the mere fact that the lay judges participated in more than one trial in one year does not render the trial proceedings unlawful if the lay judges were appointed in accordance with the law, which was the case for both lay judges K and P in the author’s case.

In submissions dated 1 January 2019 (communication No. 3136/2018) and 24 January 2019 (communication No. 3138/2018), the authors provided the following comments on the State Party’s observations.

The author refutes the State Party’s argument that his communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission. He states that he could not raise before the cassation courts the allegations of unlawful composition of his trial court because he only learned in 2014 that the participation of lay judge G had been unlawful. From that moment, he submitted his complaint to the Committee within a five-year period. The author notes that he did not have a State-appointed lawyer in the courts of cassation, despite the legal obligation of the State Party to provide him with one. Nor did he have the financial means to hire a lawyer. The author claims that a lack of legal knowledge placed him at a disadvantage to other parties in the court proceedings.

The author reiterates his claims on the merits and requests the Committee to recommend that the State Party quash the judgment adopted on 12 February 2001 by the Vologda Regional Court, hold a new hearing and provide him with compensation in the amount of €1,000.

The author disagrees with the State Party’s argument on the inadmissibility of his communication under article 3 of the Optional Protocol and states that he submitted supervisory appeals, given that all available domestic remedies should be exhausted under rule 99 (f) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. He adds that he found out about the unlawful appointment of lay judges only at his trial in 2012. He claims that his submission does not constitute an abuse and insists on its admissibility. The author reiterates his claims on the merits.

On 3 February 2020, the State Party submitted additional observations in response to the author’s comments in communication No. 3138/2018. The State Party submits that the author’s lack of knowledge of an alleged violation cannot be considered a valid reason for the Committee admitting his communication. The State Party adds that the federal law on lay judges of federal courts of general jurisdiction establishes the right of persons to participate in the administration of justice in the courts. It does not establish procedural rules. The criminal procedure legislation, as confirmed by ruling No. 208-P06 of the Presidium of the Supreme Court, dated 31 May 2006, does not provide that a sentence rendered with the participation of lay judges who served more than once a year is considered unlawful and subject to cancellation or amendment.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee takes note of the State Party’s argument that both communications should be considered inadmissible for abuse of the right of submission under article 3 of the Optional Protocol owing to the long delays between the alleged violations and the submission of the communications to the Committee. The Committee also takes note of the arguments provided by the authors to justify those delays, including their lack of awareness of the violation at the time of their appeals (both authors), legal illiteracy and a lack of means to hire a professional counsel (author of communication No. 3136/2018) and the attempt to exhaust all available domestic remedies (author of communication No. 3138/2018).

The Committee notes that there are no fixed time limits for the submission of communications under the Optional Protocol and that a mere delay in submission does not of itself involve abuse of the right to submit a communication.⁵ However, in certain circumstances, the Committee expects a reasonable explanation justifying a delay.⁶ In addition, according to rule 99 (c) of its rules of procedure,⁷ a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it is submitted five years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication or, where applicable, three years after the conclusion of another procedure of international investigation or settlement, unless there are reasons justifying the delay, taking into account all the circumstances of the communication.

5. Polacková and Polacek v. Czech Republic (CCPR/C/90/D/1445/2006), para. 6.3; D.S. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/120/D/2705/2015), para. 6.4; and A.K. and M.K. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/138/D/2895/2016-CCPR/C/138/D/2896/2016), para. 6.6. ↩
6. Gobin v. Mauritius (CCPR/C/72/D/787/1997), para. 6.3; and A.K. and M.K. v. Russian Federation, para. 6.6. ↩
7. At the time of submission of the communications, the same rule was enshrined in rule 96 (c) of the rules of procedure. ↩

At the same time, the Committee notes that, especially where time is of the essence in resolving a case, the author generally bears the burden in ensuring that his or her claims are raised with the expedition necessary to ensure that they may be properly and fairly resolved. The Committee also notes that it is best for authors if their claims are filed with the national authorities for consideration as soon as possible, so as to enable the authorities to respond in a timely manner to any alleged human rights violations. While it is essential for the efficacy of the protection system under the Covenant that a State Party meet its international legal obligations in good faith, demonstration by authors of due diligence and initiative in the protection of their rights generally contributes to avoiding excessive or unexplained delays in the administration of justice and the enforcement of the rights protected under the Covenant.⁸

8. M.R. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/129/D/2427/2014), para. 8.6; and A.K. and M.K. v. Russian Federation, para. 6.7. ↩

In the present case, the Committee observes that the communications were submitted some 15 years (communication No. 3136/2018) and 16 years (communication No. 3138/2018) after the authors’ final convictions by the courts of cassation. While noting that the authors justify those delays with references to the supervisory review appeals that they lodged with the Supreme Court, prosecutorial authorities and, in communication No. 3136/2018, with the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsperson for Human Rights, the Committee does not consider the pursuit of such extraordinary review proceedings to be in itself a convincing justification for the delay in submitting the communications, given that the authors’ sentences had become final and executable on 1 November 2001 (communication No. 3136/2018) and 25 June 2001 (communication No. 3138/2018). The Committee notes in that regard that the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsperson for Human Rights have no competence to review sentences or any other court decisions adopted in criminal cases.⁹

9. O.D. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/131/D/2578/2015), para. 10.4; and A.K. and M.K. v. Russian Federation, para. 6.8. ↩

There is nothing in the submissions to suggest that the authors – who waited for some 13 (see para. 2.4 above) and 12 years (see para. 2.8 above) to challenge the alleged violations at the national level – demonstrated due diligence and initiative in pursuing their claims regarding the protection of their human rights. The Committee observes that the authors provide no persuasive explanation as to why they were unable to bring their claims before the domestic authorities during those lengthy periods. The claims about legal illiteracy or a lack of awareness of their rights remain vague and general in nature. In that connection, the Committee observes that the author of communication No. 3136/2018 was able to prepare, without a lawyer, a cassation appeal and a supervisory review appeal to the Supreme Court and to submit numerous complaints to various institutions. The author of communication No. 3138/2018 was represented by counsel at each stage of the proceedings.

The Committee thus considers that the authors have failed to provide convincing reasons to justify the lengthy delays in raising the alleged violations before the national authorities and in the submission of their communications to the Committee. In the absence of any other information or explanation of pertinence in both files, the Committee considers that the two communications constitute an abuse of the right of submission and declares them inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communications are inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol;