A.P., T.K., A.M., J.A. and T.V. v. Finland

The authors of the communication are A.P., T.K., A.M., J.A. and T.V., nationals of Finland born in 1996, 1990, 1957, 1981 and 1945, respectively. They claim that, by rejecting their applications for inclusion in the electoral roll of the Sami Parliament, the State Party violated their rights under articles 1, 25, 26 and 27 of Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 23 March 1976. The authors are represented by counsel.

On 27 April 2020, pursuant to rule 93 (1) of its rules of procedure, the Committee, acting through its Special Rapporteurs on new communications and interim measures, denied the State Party’s request that the admissibility of the communication be examined separately from the merits.

The authors state that they identify as Sami, having descended from the original Sami population who lived in northern Finland. The authors all live in Lapland, in northern Finland, and engage in traditional Sami livelihoods, such as hunting, fishing, reindeer husbandry, foraging and making traditional Sami handicrafts.

Under section 17 (3) of the Constitution of the State Party, the Sami are recognized as an Indigenous People. Persons who consider themselves Sami and who meet at least one of the three criteria listed in section 3 of the Act on the Sami Parliament can apply to be entered in the electoral roll of the Sami Parliament. Under the State Party’s legislation, only persons listed in the electoral roll are considered to be Sami, and only they have the right to vote in Sami Parliament elections. Applications to be included in the electoral roll are processed, in the first instance, by the Sami Parliament Election Committee. Decisions by the Sami Parliament Election Committee can be appealed to the Sami Parliament Board and, in the final instance, the Supreme Administrative Court.

In 2015, the authors applied for inclusion in the electoral roll of the Sami Parliament. The Sami Parliament Election Committee and the Sami Parliament Board rejected the authors’ applications. The authors were subsequently among 182 individuals who filed appeals to the Supreme Administrative Court, contesting the rejection of their applications. In decisions issued on 30 September 2015, the Court granted the appeals of 93 individuals and ordered their inclusion in the electoral roll. However, the Court rejected the remaining 89 appeals, including those filed by the authors. As a result, the authors were unable to vote in the Sami Parliament elections. The authors claim that their applications were rejected on the basis of an “overall consideration” of their case, despite them meeting the criteria for eligibility under section 3 (2) of the Act on the Sami Parliament. They argue that the Court based its decision on the ground that their ancestors were recorded in registers that were insufficiently recent, as they dated back to the eighteenth century. They note that, in practice, almost every one of those listed in the 2015 electoral roll had been enrolled under section 3 (1) or (3) of the Act on the Sami Parliament, while applications under section 3 (2) had been rejected. In this connection, the authors note that inclusion in the electoral roll under section 3 (1) of the Act was based on an interview survey conducted in 1962, which, they argue, was conducted in an inadequate manner. The authors further contend that many of the people included in the current Sami electoral roll do not live in the northern parts of Finland and do not practise a traditional Sami lifestyle. They state that about 70 per cent of the electoral roll is made up of persons living in the south of Finland and that only 2 to 3 per cent of those listed in the electoral roll derive their livelihood from reindeer husbandry.

The authors refer to the Committee’s Views in Sanila-Aikio v. Finland and Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland.³ They argue that the Committee’s findings in those communications are problematic because the 97 individuals whose inclusion in the electoral roll was the subject matter of the communications were neither consulted nor given the opportunity to set forth arguments that may have had an impact on the outcome of the Committee’s consideration of the communications. The authors argue that these individuals met the criteria to qualify as an Indigenous person under article 1 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), and the State Party’s legislation, while those who advocated for their removal from the electoral roll did not themselves necessarily meet those criteria. The authors further argue that Sami Parliament members who decide whether to accept or reject applications to be included in the electoral roll are not impartial, as it is in their interest that the electoral roll does not include persons who are likely to vote for competing candidates or opinions.

3. CCPR/C/124/D/2668/2015; and CCPR/C/124/D/2950/2017 and CCPR/C/124/D/2950/2017/Corr.1. ↩

The authors claim that, by rejecting their applications for inclusion in the electoral roll of the Sami Parliament, the State Party violated their rights under articles 1, 25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant. They argue that the decisions adopted in 2015 by the Supreme Administrative Court, which rejected their applications, contradict the provisions of domestic legislation and the Covenant, as, they argue, they met the criteria under the Act on the Sami Parliament for inclusion in the electoral roll.

On 9 March 2020, the State Party submitted its observations on the admissibility of the communication. It submits that the authors’ claims should be found to be inadmissible for lack of victim status, as an abuse of the right of submission and as being insufficiently substantiated for the purpose of admissibility.

The State Party submits that, in accordance with the Committee’s jurisprudence, the authors’ claims under article 1 of the Covenant should be found inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol.⁴

4. The State Party refers to Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland, para. 8.6. ↩

The State Party provides information on further developments relating to the authors’ complaint. It notes that, under section 19 of the Act on the Sami Parliament, elections are held every four years. The time limit for requesting inclusion in the electoral roll for the 2019 election expired on 31 December 2018. Two of the authors, T.K. and T.V., requested inclusion within the deadline. The requests were rejected by the Sami Parliament Election Committee on 15 February and 7 June 2019, respectively, and upheld by the Sami Parliament Board on 27 August 2019, with appeals pending before the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of the State Party’s submission of its observations.

The State Party notes that the final domestic decisions on the authors’ applications to be included in the Sami Parliament electoral roll were rendered on 30 September 2015. It notes, however, that the authors did not submit their complaint before the Committee until 28 July 2019, that is, almost four years after the domestic decisions, and with no explanation provided as to why they had decided to wait so long before doing so. The State Party states that it leaves it for the Committee to consider whether, in the particular circumstances of the present communication, the unexplained delay in submitting the communication could be considered to constitute an abuse of the right of submission under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

The State Party further submits that the authors’ claims should be found inadmissible for lack of substantiation. It argues that the authors have failed to specify in what way their individual rights under the articles invoked have been violated. It observes that the core of the communication appears to be the authors’ dissatisfaction with the outcome of the domestic proceedings relating to their applications for inclusion in the 2015 Sami Parliament electoral roll. It emphasizes that it is not the Committee’s role to act as a fourth instance to domestic courts.

On 27 October 2020, the State Party submitted its observations on the merits of communication. It notes that, at the time of the submission of its observations, T.K.’s and T.V.’s applications for inclusion in the 2019 electoral roll were still pending before the Supreme Administrative Court, and it argues that the remaining three authors could likewise have submitted applications for inclusion in the 2019 electoral roll. It submits that the complaint should therefore be found inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

The State Party provides information on domestic legislation. It notes that, under article 17 of the Constitution, the Sami as an Indigenous People have the right to maintain and develop their own language and culture. The Act on the Sami Parliament⁵ contains detailed provisions on the linguistic and cultural autonomy of the Sami. According to section 1 of the Act as in force at the time of the State Party’s submission, the Sami elect among themselves a Sami Parliament for tasks relating to self-government in matters concerning culture. The right to vote in the Sami Parliament elections and other electoral rights, such as the right to stand as a candidate in these elections, are linked to the definition of a Sami.⁶ Section 3 of the Act contains a definition of who is a Sami, which includes both subjective and objective criteria. For the purpose of the Act, a Sami means a person who considers himself or herself a Sami, provided that: (a) he or she or at least one of his or her parents or grandparents learned Sami as a first language; (b) he or she is a descendant of a person who was entered in a land, taxation or population register as a mountain, forest or fishing Lapp; or (c) at least one of his or her parents was or could have been registered as an elector for an election to the Sami Delegation or the Sami Parliament. With regard to section 3 (2) of the Act, the Government proposed that the registers of 1875 should be the oldest official registers to be taken into account and that more detailed provisions should be laid down by decree. The reasoning was that going further back in time might make it unreasonably difficult to provide evidence and might render the applicant’s connection with the Sami questionable. However, the Constitutional Law Committee considered that the matter could not be regulated by decree, and no time limit was prescribed in the Act.

5. In its additional observations of 2 July 2021 and further information submitted on 21 February 2024, the State Party noted that reforms of the Act on the Sami Parliament, especially section 3 thereof, were ongoing and would take into account international treaties, with the participation and influence of the Sami Parliament. It noted that, in December 2023, the Government had submitted a proposal for amendments to the Act. As one of the key amendments, the requirements for inclusion in the electoral roll were to be revised, and the roll was to determine only the right to vote and stand as a candidate in the Sami Parliament; it was not to determine the question of who could be considered a Sami. Section 3 (2) of the Act was to be removed. In that connection, the State Party noted that section 3 (2) of the Act could be considered problematic, especially insofar as it concerned the right to be entered into the electoral roll as a descendant of a person who had been entered into a land, taxation or population register as a mountain, forest or fishing Lapp. It noted that, in old documents, the expression “Lapp” had referred to livelihood, that is, to payers of Lapp tax, and not to ethnicity. Those documents also included entries on people other than the Sami who had in the past lived in the present Sami homeland. The State Party noted, therefore, that an entry in the register did not as such prove that the person concerned had been a Sami. The State Party further reported that the proposed amendments included the establishment of an autonomous and independent board of review that would be the review body of first instance in matters concerning the electoral roll, instead of the Sami Parliament Board. ↩
6. The State Party referred to sections 21, 23 and 23 a of the Act on the Sami Parliament. Section 21 of the text in force at the time of the State Party’s submission provided that, in elections to the Sami Parliament, every Sami who had reached the age of 18 years by the last day of the election had the right to vote, regardless of place of residence, provided that he or she was a Finnish citizen or a foreign citizen domiciled in Finland on the last date on which a request for inclusion in the electoral roll could have been made. Section 23 (1) provided that the Sami Parliament Election Committee was to draw up an electoral roll of persons with the right to vote, based on the previous electoral roll and information from the Population Information System. Section 23 a (1) provided that a Sami with the right to vote who had not been entered into the electoral roll was to be entered into it upon request. ↩

The State Party provides information on the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court concerning Sami Parliament elections. It notes that the Sami Parliament Election Committee prepared an electoral roll for the first time for the election in 1999, on the basis of the electoral roll for the elections to the Sami Delegation. The decision to prepare an electoral roll on that basis was appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court by a total of 656 persons. The Court admitted seven appeals and ordered the inclusion of four of the persons who had appealed in the electoral roll. In a case decided in 2011, the Court held that, although the complainant self-identified as Sami, had submitted a certificate from an archival authority attesting to descendance from a person entered as a mountain Lapp in the 1825 land and taxation registers, and had presented evidence of a grandparent having learned Sami, the complainant was not a Sami under section 3 of the Act on the Sami Parliament on the basis of those grounds alone.⁷ However, taking into account the “overall consideration” of the situation of the person, who lived in Inari, Lapland, with a Sami identity and a Sami way of life, the person was considered a Sami and included in the electoral roll. On the basis of this “overall consideration”, four applicants were accepted for inclusion in the 2011 electoral roll by the Court. In the decision, the Court held that no grounds existed for interpreting section 3 (2) of the Act as allowing only register entries from 1875 or subsequent years. The Court held that, instead, the interpretation of section 3 of the Act must be based on an assessment of whether the person considered himself or herself to be a Sami and whether the selfidentification was based on objective criteria. The Court held that even old register entries may have relevance to self-identification and an “overall consideration”, although entries concerning a person’s ancestors dating further back than 1875 did not automatically fulfil the requirements that the person was Sami within the meaning of the Act. The interpretation of “overall consideration” made by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2011 extended the definition of a Sami to some extent and, in 2015, the Court accepted the inclusion of 93 applicants in the electoral roll. Inclusion was based on the new interpretation in 53 of those cases.

7. KHO 2011:81. ↩

The State Party provides information on the authors’ applications for inclusion in the 2015 Sami Parliament electoral roll. It notes that four of the authors invoked section 3 (1) of the Act on the Sami Parliament, each submitting that a grandparent had knowledge of the Sami language. However, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the evidence presented by the authors in this regard did not suffice to meet the criteria under section 3 (1) of the Act. All five authors also invoked section 3 (2) of the Act, presenting certificates from archival authorities in which reference was made to land registers from 1739, 1762 or 1862 and in which it was stated that the authors were descendants of persons entered in a land, taxation or population register as a mountain, forest or fishing Lapp. The Court, however, found that the authors could be considered Sami neither within the meaning of section 3 (2) of the Act on that ground alone nor within the meaning of section 3 on the basis of an overall consideration.

The State Party notes that the authors question the composition of the Sami Parliament electoral roll. In this connection, it notes that the Sami traditionally lived in an area, Sapmi, that now falls within the territories of Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation and Sweden. Closures of, and changes to, State borders, as well as regulations by States of, for instance, livelihoods, have affected Sami communities in a significant manner and have also led to migration between the territories of States. History and its consequences have been complex. The autonomy of the Sami concerns their own language and culture. The scope of legislation on the Sami as an Indigenous People is not limited to Sami persons with ancestry in Finland, and such delimitation cannot be considered justified in the light of history. The Act on the Sami Parliament, in Finland, and the corresponding legislation in Norway and Sweden establish an ancestral connection with the Sami language as the main objective criterion for considering a person Sami. The choice of the language criterion is justified by the content and purpose of Sami autonomy. While traditional livelihoods are particularly important for maintaining Sami language and culture, electoral rights are not connected with particular trades or livelihoods or geographical residence.

On 13 April 2020, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility. They maintain that the communication is admissible and submit that, by appealing the rejection of their applications to be included in the 2015 electoral roll to the Supreme Administrative Court, they have exhausted all available domestic remedies.

The authors note the State Party’s submission that their communication was submitted with an extensive delay following the domestic decisions. They argue that they were unaware of the possibility of submitting a complaint to the Committee at the time when the domestic decisions were rendered in their cases. In addition, they note that the Committee’s Views in Sanila-Aikio v. Finland and Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland were made public in 2019, and it was only at that point that it became clear to them that those communications were also partially relevant to their rights and legal status, which led them to bring their complaint before the Committee.

The authors contend that they have substantiated their claims for the purpose of admissibility. They note that only persons entered in the Sami Parliament electoral roll are considered to be Sami. As the authors are not included in the electoral roll, they are not considered to be Sami. They cannot influence decision-making in the Sami Parliament or participate in Sami culture. They note that all funds used to support Sami culture in the State Party are paid to the Sami Parliament. In turn, the Sami Parliament provides funding only for the projects of persons listed in the Sami Parliament electoral roll. The authors note, in addition, that their families have worn the traditional Sami clothing, gákti, for generations. However, due to them not being included in the Sami Parliament electoral roll, their right to wear traditional Sami clothing is being questioned.

On 2 March 2021, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s observations on the merits. They reiterate their claim that, by not including them in the electoral roll, the State Party violated their rights under articles 1, 25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant.

On 2 July 2021, the State Party submitted additional observations on the communication. It reports that, on 23 April 2021, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled on the pending applications by authors T.K. and T.V. for inclusion in the 2019 electoral roll. It notes that one of the authors submitted that his grandfather had learned Sami as a first language. The Court, however, held that the evidence provided was inconsistent and that the author in question was not to be considered a Sami under section 3 (1) of the Act on the Sami Parliament. He also presented a certificate from archival authorities stating that he was a descendant of a person entered as a Lapp in the 1739 land register. The Court held that he could not be considered a Sami under section 3 (2) of the Act either, taking into account that the entry in the land register dated back to the distant past. Another of the authors submitted that his grandmother had learned Sami as one of her two first languages. The author in question did not, however, present evidence that would justify considering him a Sami under section 3 (1) of the Act on the Sami Parliament. He also presented a certificate from archival authorities stating that he was a descendant of a person entered as a Lapp in the 1825 land register. The Court again held that the entry was too old to fulfil the requirements of section 3 (2) of the Act. The State Party states that, in the reasoning for its decisions of 2019, the Court discussed the development of international law and limited its assessment more strictly than before to the fulfilment of the objective criteria laid down in law.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

The Committee notes the State Party’s submission that the communication should be found inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as, at the time of the submission of the complaint, two of the authors had pending appeals on their applications for inclusion in the 2019 electoral roll before the Supreme Administrative Court, and the remaining three authors could also have submitted such applications. The Committee, however, notes that all five authors submitted applications for inclusion in the Sami Parliament electoral roll of 2015 and appealed the rejection of their applications to the Supreme Administrative Court, which dismissed their appeals by final decision on 30 September 2015. The Committee therefore considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering the present complaint.

The Committee further notes the State Party’s submission that the communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission under article 3 of the Optional Protocol, as it was submitted almost four years after the final domestic decisions had been rendered concerning the authors’ applications to be included in the 2015 Sami Parliament electoral roll. The Committee recalls that, according to rule 99 (c) of its rules of procedure, a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it is submitted five years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication, or, where applicable, three years from the conclusion of another procedure of international investigation or settlement, unless there are reasons justifying the delay, taking into account all the circumstances of the communication. In the present case, the Committee notes that the authors submitted the communication on 28 July 2019, that is, three years and 10 months after the exhaustion of domestic remedies on 30 September 2015. Consequently, the Committee finds that it is not precluded by article 3 of the Optional Protocol from considering the present communication.

Regarding the authors’ claim under article 1 of the Covenant, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that an author, as an individual, cannot claim under the Optional Protocol to be a victim of a violation of the right of self-determination enshrined in article 1 of the Covenant, which deals with rights conferred to peoples as such.⁸ Accordingly, the Committee considers that the authors’ claim regarding violations of article 1 of the Covenant is inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol. The Committee, however, recalls that, although it does not have the competence under the Optional Protocol to consider a communication alleging a violation of the right of self-determination protected under article 1 of the Covenant, it may interpret article 1, when this is relevant, in determining whether rights protected in parts II and III of the Covenant have been violated.⁹

8. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984), para. 13.3. ↩
9. Gillot et al. v. France (CCPR/C/75/D/932/2000), para. 13.4; Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993), para. 9.2; Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland, para 8.6; and Roy et al. v. Australia (CCPR/C/137/D/3585/2019), para. 7.3. ↩

The Committee notes the authors’ claim that, by rejecting their applications for inclusion in the electoral roll of the Sami Parliament in 2015, the State Party violated their rights under articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant. It notes the State Party’s submission that the authors’ claims should be found inadmissible for lack of substantiation, as the authors have failed to specify in what way their individual rights under the articles invoked have been violated, and its argument that the complaint appears merely to express the authors’ dissatisfaction with the outcome of the domestic proceedings. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence in which it has repeatedly held that it is incumbent on the courts of States Parties to evaluate the facts and evidence in each specific case, as well as the application of domestic legislation, unless it can be ascertained that such evaluation or application was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.¹⁰

10. For example, Manzano et al. v. Colombia (CCPR/C/98/D/1616/2007), para. 6.4; L.D.L.P. v. Spain (CCPR/C/102/D/1622/2007), para. 6.3; and B and C v. Czech Republic (CCPR/C/113/D/1967/2010 and CCPR/C/113/D/1967/2010/Corr.1), para. 6.5. ↩

The Committee recalls that the protection of the rights enshrined in article 27 is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural identity of the minority concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole.¹¹ The Committee, in addition, recalls that article 27 of the Covenant, interpreted in the light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and article 1 of the Covenant, enshrines an inalienable right of Indigenous Peoples to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.¹² Article 1 of the Covenant and the corresponding obligations concerning its implementation are thus interrelated with other provisions of the Covenant and rules of international law.¹³ In the context of Indigenous Peoples’ rights, articles 25 and 27 of the Covenant have a collective dimension, and some of those rights can be enjoyed only in community with others.¹⁴

11. General comment No. 23 (1994), paras. 6.1 and 9; Poma Poma v. Peru (CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006), para. 7.2; and Roy et al. v. Australia, paras. 8.2 and 8.3. ↩
12. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 3. See also art. 4 of the Declaration. See further general comment No. 12 (1984), para. 2; Sanila-Aikio v. Finland, para. 6.8; and Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland, para. 9.8. ↩
13. General comment No. 12 (1984), para. 2; Sanila-Aikio v. Finland, para. 6.8; and Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland, para. 9.8. ↩
14. Sanila-Aikio v. Finland, para. 6.9; and Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland, para. 9.9. ↩

The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence that the category of persons belonging to an Indigenous People may thus in some instances need to be defined to protect the viability and welfare of a minority as a whole.¹⁵ It observes that, under article 33 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions, and the right to determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures. Article 9 of the Declaration provides that Indigenous Peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an Indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned, and that no discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right. In accordance with article 8 (1) of the Declaration, Indigenous Peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. As a consequence, States must provide effective mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for, any action that has the aim or effect of depriving Indigenous communities of their integrity as distinct peoples or of their cultural values or ethnic identities.¹⁶ In this connection, the Committee notes the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, according to which the identification of an Indigenous community, from its name to its membership, is a social and historical fact that is part of its autonomy, and therefore States must restrict themselves to respecting the corresponding decision made by the community, that is, the way in which it identifies itself.¹⁷ The Committee thus observes that, when adjudicating on the rights of Indigenous Peoples and, in particular, on the criteria for membership, as well as on the membership of individual persons, domestic courts must pay due regard to the right to selfdetermination of Indigenous communities, in particular when courts deviate from generally established criteria for membership and from the assessment of representative bodies of the community in this regard.¹⁸

15. Lovelace v. Canada, Views, communication No. 24/1977, para. 15. ↩
16. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Matson et al. v. Canada (CEDAW/C/81/D/68/2014), para 18.4. ↩
17. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment, 24 August 2010, para. 37. See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, 28 November 2007, para. 164; and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Matson et al. v. Canada, para. 18.4. ↩
18. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Nuorgam et al. v. Finland (CERD/C/106/D/59/2016), para. 9.12. ↩

The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence in Sanila-Aikio v. Finland and Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland. These communications concerned the inclusion by the Supreme Administrative Court of 97 applicants in the 2011 and 2015 electoral rolls of the Sami Parliament; their applications had been rejected by the Sami Parliament Election Committee and the Sami Parliament Board. The present case thus concerns the same subject matter as those communications, the difference being that, in the present case, the authors’ applications for inclusion in the electoral roll were rejected by both the Sami Parliament Election Committee and the Sami Parliament Board, as well as by the Supreme Administrative Court, for not meeting the criteria for enrolment under the Act on the Sami Parliament.

The Committee recalls that, in its Views in Sanila-Aikio v. Finland and Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland, it found that the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court from 2011 onward had departed from the previous interpretation of section 3 of the Act on the Sami Parliament as shared by the Supreme Administrative Court and the Sami Parliament representative bodies, thus infringing the capacity of the Sami people to exercise, through the Sami Parliament, a key dimension of Sami self-determination in determining who is a member of their community. The Committee found that the facts of these complaints thus amounted to a violation of article 25, read alone and in conjunction with article 27, of the Covenant, as interpreted in the light of article 1 of the Covenant.¹⁹

19. Sanila-Aikio v. Finland, para. 6.11; and Näkkäläjärvi et al. v. Finland, para. 9.11. ↩

The Committee, however, observes that, in the present case, the authors’ applications for inclusion in the Sami Parliament electoral roll were rejected by the Sami Parliament Election Committee and the Sami Parliament Board. These decisions were upheld on appeal by the Supreme Administrative Court. While the Committee notes that the authors disagree with the outcome of the domestic proceedings, it finds that they have failed to substantiate that the domestic authorities’ application and interpretation of domestic law in their cases was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. In this consideration, the Committee takes note especially of the fact that the authors’ applications were rejected by the Sami Parliament Election Committee and the Sami Parliament Board, in their function of exercising internal self-determination, that is, determining membership of the Sami community in accordance with its customs and traditions. The Committee thus finds the authors’ claims under articles 25 and 27 of the Covenant to be insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and thus inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The Committee further notes that the authors have also invoked claims under article 26 of the Covenant, but it finds that they have not provided any information or argumentation as to how they consider that their rights under that article have been violated. The Committee therefore finds the authors’ claims under article 26 to be insufficiently substantiated and inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol;