P v. Sweden

The author of the communication is P, a national of Afghanistan born in 1995. He claims that by deporting him to Afghanistan, the State Party would violate his rights under articles 6, 7 and 18 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 23 March 1976. The author is represented by counsel.

On 17 January 2020, the Committee, acting through its Special Rapporteurs on new communications and interim measures, requested the State Party to refrain from deporting the author to Afghanistan while his case was under consideration by the Committee. On the same date, the State Party suspended the author’s deportation and released the author from detention, considering that it would be disproportionate to keep him in detention while the communication was pending.

On 30 March 2023, the State Party requested discontinuance of the communication because the removal order concerning the author had become statute-barred and was therefore unenforceable. On 22 May 2023, the author informed the Committee that he wished to pursue the communication. On 22 August 2025, the author informed that his third asylum application had been denied with finality.

The author is of Hazara ethnicity and was born in Ghazni Province in Afghanistan. He lived there with his father, who had problems with local members of the Taliban. The Taliban also tried to recruit the author to be a child soldier or a suicide bomber.

After the author’s mother passed away from illness, the author and his father fled to Herat, where the Taliban took photos of the author. In Herat, the author’s father died in a suicide bombing and the author was left to be taken care of by family friends. Because members of the family mistreated him, he left Afghanistan after some time and travelled to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thereafter, he travelled to Sweden. 2.3 On 26 May 2014, the author applied for asylum in Sweden. On 28 August 2014, the Migration Agency dismissed his application and decided to transfer him to Bulgaria under the Dublin Regulation III. On 26 September 2014, the Migration Court rejected the author’s appeal concerning the transfer.

On 21 October 2014, the Migration Agency decided to hand over the author’s transfer case under the Dublin Regulation III to the police for enforcement, because the author had absconded.

On 6 August 2015, the author was baptized and officially converted to Christianity.³ In 2016, a church publication featured the author in an article describing his conversion.⁴

3. The author provided photographs of his baptism ceremony and his baptism certificate. He also provided a letter of 29 June 2017 from a priest who stated that the author had joined his church in the fall of 2014 and had been an active congregant. ↩
4. The author provided a copy of the Swedish-language magazine article of 2016 and a translation. ↩

The procedure for the author’s removal under the Dublin Regulation III expired in accordance with a time limit. Thereafter, on 6 April 2016, the author applied for asylum in Sweden again. He alleged, inter alia, that he would face a risk of irreparable harm in Afghanistan because of his conversion to Christianity. On 4 May 2018, the Migration Agency rejected his application. On 24 October 2018, the Migration Court rejected his appeal against the decision of the Migration Agency. On 16 November 2018, the Migration Court of Appeal rejected his request for leave to appeal against the decision of the Migration Court.

On 9 September 2019, the author applied for a residence permit based on impediments to enforcement of the expulsion order. On 4 October 2019, the Migration Agency denied his request.

On 28 October 2019, the Migration Court denied the author’s appeal against the latter decision. On 4 December 2019, the Migration Court of Appeal denied his request for leave to appeal against the decision of the Migration Court.

On 28 November 2019, the police detained the author based on the risk that he would abscond. On 17 January 2020, he was released from detention.

The author publicized his conversion on his social media account. In December 2019, he received threats, including death threats, through that account from individuals who objected to his conversion. On an unspecified date, he received through his social media account a letter from a Taliban leader in Afghanistan who threatened to arrest and punish the author’s family because of his apostasy.⁵

5. The author provided screenshots of the account and translations of the alleged threats. ↩

The author states that he has exhausted all domestic remedies and has not submitted the same matter to another body of international investigation or settlement.

The author claims that by deporting him to Afghanistan, the State Party would violate his rights under articles 6, 7 and 18 of the Covenant. He would face a real, imminent and substantial risk of being irreparably harmed or killed in Afghanistan because of his conversion to Christianity, his Hazara ethnicity, and his Westernized identity.

Leaving the Islamic faith is considered apostasy and is punishable by death under Islamic law.⁶ The author has already received death threats from individuals in Kabul because of his openly Christian lifestyle and beliefs. The author could be deported with other Muslim Afghans who know about his faith. The author lived openly as a Christian while he was in a detention centre in Sweden. The Embassy of Afghanistan in Sweden knows that he is Christian. Because of the author’s posts on social media and other media exposure, his conversion is widely known both in Sweden and Afghanistan. He would be unable to live openly as a Christian in Afghanistan. The author should not have to hide his faith.

6. UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, 30 August 2018, p. 63. ↩

The State Party’s migration authorities unrealistically expected the author to prove what would happen to him in the future. It is highly probable and likely that he will face treatment contrary to the Covenant in Afghanistan. It is unreasonable to disregard his need for protection.

In its submission of 17 September 2020, the State Party contends that the author’s claim under article 18 of the Covenant is inadmissible ratione materiae because the deportation of the author does not engage the State Party’s responsibility under that provision. Insofar as any alleged consequence in Afghanistan of the author’s claimed conversion attains the level of treatment prohibited in articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, it must be addressed under those provisions.

In addition, the communication is inadmissible and without merit because it is manifestly unfounded. There must be substantial grounds for believing that there is a real, personal and foreseeable risk of a violation of articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant in the case of a forced return. That threshold is high. Assessments of the States parties’ authorities should receive considerable weight. The Committee is not a court of fourth instance and should not reevaluate facts and evidence de novo. The State Party is well aware of the human rights situation in Afghanistan, which may give rise to legitimate concerns. Nonetheless, that situation does not alone suffice to establish that the author’s deportation would violate articles 6 (1) or 7 of the Covenant. The Swedish Aliens Act incorporates the principles of those articles. The Migration Agency and Migration Court, which are both specialized bodies with particular expertise in asylum law and practice, applied those principles when thoroughly examining the author’s case.

On 6 April 2016, the Migration Agency conducted an initial interview with the author. On 4 July 2017, it conducted an extensive asylum interview with him over approximately two hours. On 19 October 2017 and 6 April 2018, it conducted additional interviews with him; they lasted approximately three and a half hours and three hours, respectively. The interviews all took place in the presence of the author’s public counsel. The minutes from the interviews were subsequently transmitted to the author’s counsel. During the appeal procedure, the Migration Court held an oral hearing with the author on 10 October 2018, in the presence of his counsel. Both the interviews and the appeal hearing were conducted with the assistance of interpreters, whom the author confirmed that he had understood well.

Through his public counsel, the author has been invited to scrutinize and submit written observations on the minutes from the interviews, and to file appeals. Thus, he has had opportunities to explain the relevant facts and argue his claims, orally as well as in writing, before the Migration Agency and the Migration Court. In the light of the above, they had a solid basis for making a well-informed, transparent and reasonable risk assessment of the author’s need for protection in Sweden. There is no reason to conclude that the domestic decisions were inadequate, arbitrary or unjust.

During the domestic proceedings, the Migration Agency accepted that the author was from Afghanistan but considered that he had not demonstrated his identity.⁷ His need for protection was assessed in relation to the prevailing conditions in Afghanistan, rather than in Herat specifically. The migration authorities considered that the author had not plausibly demonstrated that he had converted to Christianity out of a genuine and personal religious conviction, or that he intended to live as a Christian convert upon return to Afghanistan. They based their assessments on relevant background reports and on the UNHCR Handbook and the Guidelines on International Protection regarding Religion-Based Refugee Claims. They held oral interviews to assess the author’s newly acquired faith.

7. According to the decision of the Migration Agency, the author had used two aliases with different birthdates (1 January 1996 and 25 February 1998). He stated to the Migration Agency that his parents had told him that he was born in 1995. ↩

The Migration Agency gave the author an opportunity to explain his faith. Despite repeated questions, he could not explain his thoughts and feelings about converting from Islam to Christianity. His replies were very general and were not connected to his personal circumstances or his religious beliefs. He spoke about violence in Islam and criticized Islam but could not elaborate. With respect to his knowledge of Christianity, the Migration Agency found that he had correctly responded to several general knowledge questions of a simple nature but had fallen short in presenting theological knowledge and discussions of any depth. He had only been able to provide limited reflections on his conversion. The Migration Agency also considered that the author attached great weight to the behaviour of various people whom he had met and his feelings concerning those people, rather than to religious messages. The Migration Agency considered that according to the author’s statements, his presence in church was attributable more to having a social network and community and was not attributable, in the way required for a genuine religious conviction, to religious matters and the Christian faith. In sum, the Migration Agency did not consider his account of conversion to be credible.

The Migration Agency further considered that there was no indication that the author had faced problems or threats from the Taliban in Herat. The Agency considered that he had not plausibly demonstrated that he would be of particular interest to the Taliban upon his return to Afghanistan. In his asylum appeal to the Migration Court, the author stated that before his family’s departure from Ghazni province, when he was around five years old, the Taliban had attempted to forcibly recruit him. The Court affirmed the assessment of the Migration Agency concerning the threat.

The Migration Court held an oral hearing to allow the author to further elaborate on his claim of conversion. The Court did not question the fact that the author had been baptised, nor the general risk of persecution and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of converts in Afghanistan. The Court based its assessment on the genuineness of the author’s conversion and further assessed whether Christian beliefs could be imputed to the author upon his return to Afghanistan.

The Migration Court, like the Migration Agency, considered that the author had not plausibly demonstrated that he had converted to Christianity out of a genuine and personal religious conviction, or that he intended to live as a Christian convert upon return to Afghanistan. It found that the author’s account was vague and lacking in detail, and that he had superficial knowledge of Christianity. He had difficulty describing his thoughts and reflections before his conversion. Instead, he provided general and non-specific information. He also provided contradictory information on the issue of when he had abandoned Islam. The Court found it remarkable that during the oral hearing, the author had been unable to discuss in depth any risks he must have feared when choosing to convert to Christianity without knowing whether he could remain in Sweden.

Regarding the risk that the author would face in Afghanistan because of his imputed religious beliefs, the Migration Court noted his statement that friends whom he had met in Sweden and who had subsequently returned to Afghanistan were aware of his conversion and had threatened him. However, the Migration Court noted that the author had been unable to indicate the identity of those friends or where they resided in Afghanistan.

In his subsequent application for a residence permit, the author alleged that the security situation in Afghanistan and Kabul had worsened in the previous months. He alleged that he could be attacked without provocation because of his Hazara ethnicity, was illiterate, and would face persecution and punishment because of his conversion and active participation in church services and activities. The Migration Agency considered that no new circumstances had been shown that would constitute a lasting impediment to enforcement of the expulsion order.

During the related appeal procedure, the Migration Court considered that the author’s claims that he risked ill-treatment in Afghanistan based on his conversion, his Hazara ethnicity, and his illiteracy had already been previously examined. Moreover, the security situation in Herat had not changed in a crucial way.

In a submission of 18 February 2021, the author reiterates his arguments regarding the personal, real and imminent risk that he faces in Afghanistan and maintains that the communication is well-founded. The author’s conversion is genuine and his lifestyle as an outspoken Christian has resulted in threats against him.

In its further observations of 5 April 2023, the State Party maintains that the communication is inadmissible because the author has not exhausted domestic remedies. On 16 November 2022, the removal order against the author became statute-barred and unenforceable. He may therefore apply for asylum in Sweden again.

On 15 June 2023, the author filed a third asylum application in Sweden. He maintained his previous claims to the migration authorities.

In a decision of 15 November 2023, the Migration Agency rejected the application and made the following findings. The author had not made his identity credible, despite having submitted a passport issued by the authorities of Afghanistan. According to the Migration Agency, it was unlikely that proper identity verification had been conducted, especially since the fictitious date of birth that it had previously assigned to the author matched the date of birth in the author’s passport. Therefore, the author’s identity remained unconfirmed, although his Afghan citizenship and residence in Herat were accepted.

The Migration Agency also considered that the author had not cooperated with efforts to enforce a previous removal order against him, including because he had absconded, had failed to respond to a summons, and had delayed submitting a passport for a few years after being requested to do so. As such, the statute-barring of the previous removal order was not deemed to be through no fault of his own and did not in and of itself entitle him to a residence permit. The author’s conversion to Christianity was not based on genuine religious conviction. Although his baptism and church attendance were acknowledged, his statements about Christianity had been superficial and lacking in depth. He had been unable to articulate specific aspects of the religion that were meaningful to him, and his knowledge of the Bible was vague. That raised doubts about the sincerity of his conversion.

The Migration Agency further considered that the alleged threats against the author were not credible. The evidence submitted – consisting of social media posts, audio files, and a threatening letter – had low evidentiary value. Such content could be easily fabricated or manipulated, and there was no indication that it had reached individuals or groups in Afghanistan. The author’s claims that he had received threats at the Embassy of Afghanistan in Sweden were lacking in detail and unsupported by any report to the Swedish police.

The author did not meet the criteria for refugee status.⁸ His past experiences with the Taliban were acknowledged but did not indicate a current risk. His conversion was not considered to be genuine, and his public expressions of Christianity were not found to be of sufficient scope or visibility to attract attention from the authorities in Afghanistan. The Migration Agency concluded that the author did not face a well-founded fear of persecution.

8. The Migration Agency cited the following background information: European Union Agency for Asylum, Country Guidance: Afghanistan, 24 January 2023; European Union Agency for Asylum, Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Targeting of Individuals, 1 August 2022; Landinfo report Afghanistan: Departure and Return after the Taliban Takeover, 29 September 2022; and data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project regarding incidents in Herat from 27 October 2022 to 27 October 2023. ↩

In addition, the Migration Agency considered that the author did not qualify for subsidiary protection. Although Afghanistan remained affected by conflict, the level of indiscriminate violence in Herat was low. Flights to the author’s home region were available; thus, his travel route did not represent a ground for protection. The author’s Hazara ethnicity was noted but was not sufficient to establish a personal risk. Moreover, while the author could be assumed to have adopted certain Western values, country information did not support that that would subject him to persecution.

The Migration Agency further considered that the author’s circumstances did not meet the threshold for particularly or exceptionally distressing circumstances. His mental health condition was not sufficiently documented or severe enough to justify a residence permit. While he had formed social ties and lived in Sweden for nine years, much of that time was without legal status. In addition, the Migration Agency concluded that the state’s interest in regulating immigration outweighed the author’s right to private life.

The Migration Agency also considered that because, as described in paragraph 7.3, the author had previously failed to cooperate with law enforcement, he should not be granted a period for voluntary departure, and a new re-entry ban of three years was justified.

The author appealed against the latter decision to the Migration Court and made the following assertions. Because he had a passport, his identity should be considered established. He thinks like a Christian and helps others differently from before. After converting to Christianity, he has calmed down. When he receives communion, he feels as if all sins are removed. He informed staff at the detention centre where he resides that he had been threatened and pressured by other detainees, but nothing came of his claim. A three-year re-entry ban is unreasonable, given the author’s long stay in Sweden and his social network.

On 24 January 2025, the Migration Court denied the author’s appeal, making the following findings. The author had not made his identity credible, as the passport submitted contained a date of birth assigned by the State Party’s authorities and the author could not state his actual birth date. The assessment of protection needs was therefore based on his origin in Herat, Afghanistan. The author’s claims of threats from the Taliban, conversion to Christianity, Hazara ethnicity, and Westernization had already been assessed in previous asylum proceedings (see paragraphs 4.3 to 4.10 above). No new credible evidence had emerged to change those assessments. The author’s conversion was not based on genuine religious conviction, and his continued church attendance did not alter that conclusion. The author had not demonstrated a probability that his conversion or related activities (social media posts, media coverage, or interactions with Embassy staff, for example) had become sufficiently known in Afghanistan to pose a risk of persecution. Country information did not indicate that the Taliban regime systematically monitors such activities. While Hazaras face some local discrimination in Afghanistan, there is no targeted persecution by the de facto regime in Herat. The author’s ethnicity alone did not establish a credible risk of persecution. While the author had adopted some Western values, country information did not support that that would lead to persecution. The enforcement of social norms by the Taliban, while restrictive, did not amount to persecution for adult males. The general security situation in Herat and along the travel route did not constitute grounds for protection, as the level of conflict and indiscriminate violence was low. The expiration of the previous deportation order was due to the appellant’s own lack of cooperation and thus did not prevent his deportation. The author’s health condition, as documented, did not meet the threshold for a residence permit under particularly distressing circumstances. His long stay in Sweden was largely without legal status and did not establish him as a settled migrant under domestic law. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, while difficult, was not severe enough to prevent enforcement of his removal. His deportation did not constitute a disproportionate interference with his right to private life. His previous absconding and non-cooperation justified the denial of a voluntary departure period and the imposition of a three-year re-entry ban.

Subsequently, the Migration Court of Appeal denied the author’s request for leave to appeal against the latter decision. The third asylum procedure has thus concluded.

In his further comments of 29 September 2025, the author maintains that the third asylum procedure was flawed. Certain statements that the author made when interviewed by the Migration Agency were not included in the interview transcript. That indicates that the asylum procedure was not thorough, regardless of the type of information that was omitted from the transcript. In addition, the Migration Court took its decision based solely on the documentation in the case; it did not hold an oral hearing.

The author strongly fears being returned to Afghanistan. He has been in Sweden for approximately 11 years. As a result of dangerous living conditions in both Afghanistan and Sweden, he has many psychological problems. He feels that it would be better to end his life in Sweden rather than face a risk of being killed in Afghanistan. He is sustained by his faith. Although years have elapsed since he submitted the communication, he continues to face an imminent risk of harm as an ethnic Hazara who was threatened by the Taliban at a young age and is now Westernized and Christian. The Taliban is now in power in Afghanistan, and freedom of thought and belief is limited. The author has been threatened, both before and since he submitted his previous comments to the Committee. Because those threats were verbal, the author cannot provide documentation to substantiate them.

In its submission of 1 December 2025, the State Party maintains that the author’s new claim relating to the failure of the Migration Court, during the third asylum procedure, to hold an oral hearing is insufficiently substantiated and does not fall within the scope of the initial communication. The Migration Court did not hold an oral hearing because it had already held one during the previous procedure to assess the same claim (risk associated with religious conversion). Moreover, during the third asylum procedure, the migration authorities thoroughly examined the author’s circumstances anew and considered updated information concerning the situation in Afghanistan since the Taliban came to power in 2021. The Migration Agency conducted an asylum investigation that lasted three hours in total. It took place in the presence of the author’s public counsel and an interpreter, whom the author confirmed that he had understood well.

The migration authorities made careful, detailed and satisfactory assessments of the author’s conversion, in accordance with the standards in the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on International Protection regarding Religion-Based Refugee Claims. The risk alleged by the author is not real, personal and foreseeable.

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol and the State Party’s reservation thereto, that the same matter is not presently being examined and has not been examined under any other procedure of international investigation or settlement.

In accordance with article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that the author filed, inter alia, three unsuccessful asylum applications in Sweden, all of which were rejected with finality. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have been met.

Regarding the State Party’s argument that the communication is inadmissible because it is manifestly unfounded, the Committee observes that the author has invoked articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant and asserts that he would face a real, personal and imminent risk of being killed or subjected to ill-treatment in Afghanistan because of his Hazara ethnicity, conversion to Christianity, and Westernized characteristics. The Committee notes the author’s assertion that he has publicized his conversion in social and other media, has received threats from individuals in Afghanistan because of his conversion, and was told by staff of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Sweden that they would be unable to protect him if he returned to his country. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that he would be unable to practice his faith in Afghanistan, in violation of article 18 of the Covenant.

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it referred to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant (para. 12). The risk must be personal, and there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish the existence of a real risk of irreparable harm.⁹ In making such an assessment, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the country to which the author faces removal. Considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State Party, and it is generally for the organs of States parties to the Covenant to review or evaluate the facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or erroneous or amounted to a denial of justice.¹⁰

9. For example, J and others v. Sweden (CCPR/C/140/DR/2936/2017), para. 7.5; K.Q. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/144/D/4296/2023), para. 6.4; and G.Z. v. Canada (CCPR/C/143/D/3253/2018), para. 6.2. ↩
10. For example, N v. Canada (CCPR/C/143/D/4367/2023), para. 7.2; C and others v. Sweden (CCPR/C/141/D/3307/2019), para. 8.6; and Z v. Denmark (CCPR/C/137/D/2795/2016), paras. 6.5 and 6.8. ↩

The Committee takes note of the procedural avenues through which the author has raised claims for protection in Sweden. His first asylum application of 2014 was dismissed in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation and was therefore not examined on its merits. After the conclusion of the first asylum procedure in 2014, the author remained in Sweden, began attending church, and converted to Christianity sur place in 2015. He was able to raise claims relating to his conversion during the second asylum procedure, which began in 2016 and concerned a removal order that is no longer enforceable. After that procedure concluded in 2018, the author filed in 2019 an application for a residence permit based on impediments to his expulsion. Shortly after the conclusion of that procedure in 2019, the author alleged to have received threats on social media because of his conversion to Christianity. He was able to raise that claim during the third asylum procedure, which began in 2023 and concluded in 2025.

The Committee observes that the author was represented by a public counsel during both the second and third asylum procedures. He was interviewed by the Migration Agency three times during the second procedure, was heard by the Migration Court on appeal during the second procedure and was again interviewed at length by the Migration Agency during the third asylum procedure. All interviews and the oral hearing took place with interpretation services. The author argues that during the third asylum procedure, certain statements that he had made to the Migration Agency were not included in the interview transcript. However, he did not provide further details, indicate if he timely raised those concerns to the Migration Agency, or explain how the alleged omission prejudiced the substantive findings of the Migration Agency. Moreover, while the author asserts that the Migration Court did not hold a hearing during the third asylum procedure, the Committee notes that such hearings are not required under domestic law, and the author does not clearly indicate whether he had requested a hearing, and if so, on which basis. In view of the foregoing, the Committee considers that the author had an opportunity to explain in detail his stated grounds for asylum and received reasoned decisions on his asylum application and related appeals.

The Committee observes that the State Party’s authorities examined the various elements of the author’s claim that he faces a risk in Afghanistan owing to his conversion. The migration authorities did not dispute that the author had been baptised in 2015 or had been an active congregant in his church. Rather, they considered that his account of his conversion was vague and lacking in detail and that he had superficial knowledge of Christianity. The migration authorities considered that the author had also provided contradictory information as to when he had decided to abandon his Islamic faith. The migration authorities further considered that his statements gave reason to believe that his reasons for converting were based more on personal relationships than on religious belief (paragraph 4.6). The authorities thus considered that he had not plausibly demonstrated that he had converted to Christianity out of a genuine and personal religious conviction, or that he intended to live as a Christian convert upon return to Afghanistan. They also considered that the publication of information about his conversion and church activities was unlikely to attract attention from the authorities in Afghanistan. During the third asylum procedure, the migration authorities considered that the evidence regarding the threats that the author had allegedly received in December 2019, while he was in detention for the purpose of his removal, was of low probative value.

The Committee also observes that the migration authorities addressed the other risk factors alleged by the author, including the security situation in Herat, and his Hazara ethnicity and Westernized characteristics. They considered that the author’s claim that the Taliban had attempted to recruit him did not indicate a current risk for him in Afghanistan, given that the attempt had allegedly taken place when he was five years old. With respect to the author’s assertion that he suffers from psychological problems and suicidal thoughts, the Committee notes the finding of the Migration Agency, during the third asylum procedure, that the author’s mental health condition was not sufficiently documented or severe enough to form the basis of a claim for protection.

Based on the material made available to it, the Committee finds that, while the author disagrees with the conclusions of the State Party’s migration authorities, he has not provided sufficient elements to indicate that their assessment of the facts and the credibility of his claims was clearly arbitrary or erroneous or amounted to a denial of justice. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the author has not sufficiently substantiated, for the purpose of admissibility, that he would face, upon return to Afghanistan, a personal and real risk of treatment contrary to articles 6 (1) or 7 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore declares those claims inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

Regarding article 18 of the Covenant, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that the obligation of non-refoulement does not have extraterritorial application unless the alleged risk/violation would represent irreparable harm such as that contemplated in articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, in the country to which removal is to be effected.¹¹ However, for the reasons stated in paragraphs 8.8-8.10, the Committee does not consider that the author has sufficiently substantiated his claims in relation to a risk of irreparable harm within the meaning of articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, and thus declares his claim under article 18 of the Covenant inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

11. For example, K.Q. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/144/D/4296/2023), para. 6.10; M.N. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/133/D/2458/2014), para. 8.8; Khan v. Canada (CCPR/C/87/D/1302/2004), para. 6.10; see also Ch.H.O. v. Canada (CCPR/C/118/D/2159/2012), para. 9.5; I.K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/125/D/2373/2014), para. 8.5; and C.L. and Z.L. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/122/D/2753/2016), para. 7.4. ↩

In the light of its findings, the Committee does not deem it necessary to examine other grounds of inadmissibility.

The Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol;