The author of the communication (initial letter dated 5 July 1985 and further lattera dated 24 f.bruary 1986 and 19 ~anuary 1988) is Csrl Henrit 8lom, a Swedish citi.en, born in 1964. H~ is repres.nte~ by l~qal counsel. ne claims to be a victim of violations by the Swedish authorities ot article 2, paragraph 3, and article 26 of the International Cov.nant on Civil and Political Riqhta in conjunction with ~rticle 3 (c) and article 5, paragraph (b), ot the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education ot 1960. Article 13 of the International Covenant vn Economic, Social and Cultural Right. ia also invoked.
The author .tate. that the Rudolf Steiner School 8ubmitted an application on 15 October 1981 to be placed under State 8upervision with respect to grade 10 and above (lhe lower grade. were already in that category). After the loc~l schocl authorities and tbe National Board gave a favourable opinion, the decisIon to place grade 10 and above under Statti lupervision wae taken on 17 Jur.e 1982, eftective as of 1 July 1982, that ie for the echool yeur 1982/83 onwards, and not from autumn 1981, aB the Ichool had requelted.
On 6 June 1984, the author applied for public financial aid in the amount of SKr 2,250, in rftlp~ct of the Ichool year 1981/82. By a decision of 5 November 1984, hi. application was rejected by the Mational Board for Educatiol~~l As,ietancft on the groundl that the school had not been under State .upervislon dudng the echool ye,u In que.tion. The author a:"18qe. that this decision was in violation of the provisions of the international treaties invoked by him. He states that an appeal against the decillion "waB not allowed". Believing, however, that the decilion of the National Board for Educational Assistance violeted his rights under the 1960 UNESCO Convention, the 6uthor submitted, at the beginning of 1~85, a claim for compeneation to the ChanceUor of Justice \\Iul.ti-e.1ulwilQ.I..u). By a dec11ion of 14 February 1~85 the Ch~ncellor of Justice declared that the dt~i.ioD of tho National Hoard for Educational Assistance was in accordance with domestic law in force and could not give ris.., lo State liability. It was .also pointed out that the Decree on Study Aid was a gover~ent decision, in respact. of which an action for compensation could not be permitte~ under' the relevant provleions of the Damages ~ct. The Chancellor finally mentioned that Mr. Dlom would be tree to pursue the m/ltter beforq the courts. The Chancellor pointed out, ho""vpr, that the courts would be duty bound, U._Q.{IJ..l.:Ml, to apply Swedish law, including the relevant provisions of the Damages Act to which he h~d referred.
From the ~eci.ion of the Chancellor of Justice, t.he author ~raws the conclusion that Jt would be ot no avail to initi~~~ court proceedings against the State. Consequently, ~e maintains, there are no turther dOlne&tic remedied to e.haust. Thi••itllation, he claims, constitutes, in it.elf, a violation of acticln 2, parngr~ph 3, of tha Covenant. l. The author'. allegation, that the decisinn not to grant him public assistance was ill violation of article 26 of the Covenant, is baRed on the argument thal he was MUhjected to di.~rimination as a pupil of a private school. Pupilo of public schools are said to have received p~blic assistance fOl· the school yanr 1981/82. This discriminatory treatment alleqddl y CClnllavene8 t.he basl c idea of equali ty [or all in education and it a180 allegedly int8rferes with the parenls' right t.o choo"e independent private schools provided for in article 1_ of the International Covenant on Economic and Social RightF' an" alticle 5, paragraph 1 (b), of the UNESCO Co~ventlon against Diocrlmination in Education of 1960 to which Sweden Is ft State palty. The author also claimo ~v be a victim of ft violation of artic18 J (c) of t:bat same Convention. pra~tic•• balod on the 1073 Study hid Act. Furthermore, he a.k. the Committee to urgo the Swedilh Government to pay him and hi. cla••-mate. .he amount of public as.i,tance due tor the _chool year 1981/82 with accrued interest according to Swedish law al well a. hi_ e.pense. for legal ~dvice.
By its decision of 15 October 1985, the Working Group of the Human iUghta Committee transmitted the communication under rule 91 of the provisional rules of procedure to the State party concerned, reque.ting information and ob.ervations relevant to the queation of the admissibility of the communication. The Working Group also requested the State party to explain, in 10 far aa such explanation might be relevant to the question of admissibility, why grade la of the Rudolf Steinor School in Goteborg waa pIa. ld under State supervision only aa of ] July 1982 but not for the preceding Ichool year, as reque.ted.
In its submission dated 8 January 1986, the State party indicates that the ]962 Act on Schools recogni.es the exiatence of private .chool. independent of the public .ector school Iystem. Tha Frivate achools are, in princiyle, financ!al1y sulficient, and there is no legal obligation for the State or local government to provide any financial contributio.l. However, there are no legal impediments excluding varIous form. of public support, and in practice mo.t of the private schools are in one way or another supporced by local government and, in a~dition, approximal tly half of them, including the Rudo1f Steiner School, receive State eontributionr:.
The Slate party indicatea further that, in accordance with regulations .et forth in the 1973 Act on StUdy Aid (Ihudle.tOd.lag 19131349) and the 1913 Decree o~ Study Aid (studi"ltodskungorel.e 19731418), pupils attending schools, whether public or private, may be eligible for various forms of public financial .upport. AS far as is relevant for the consideration of the present case, chapter 1, leetion 1, of th~ Decre~ provide£ that financial support may h6 granted to pupils attending public schools or schools subject to State supervision. Consequently, for pupils attending a private school ~o be eligiblp for public tinancial support, the school has to be placed under State sup~rvision. Decl.ion on such aupervlsion is taken by the Government upon applieat ion submitted by the school. In the present ~a8e, the Rudolt Steiner SChOOl applied in October 1981 to have the part of its educational proqranwne corresponding to the gymnol.iwn, that is grad.s 10 to 12, placed un6er State supervision. Education on this higher level had not previously been oftered by tile school. After having considered the application, as well as observations on the application submit.ted by the Municipal School Adminiatratlon, the Educat.ion Committee of the County of Ooteborg and Bohu8, and the National Board ot Education, the Government on 11 June 1982 qranted the application as of I July 1982.
On ~ November 1984, the National Board for Educational Assistance informed the author that financial lupport for his stUdies could not be granted on the ground that the school was not at that time subject to State 8upervision with respect to the educational progrftmme of grade 10.
A~ t.o the alleged violntion& of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, th" St~ate party submits t.he followinql
The State party further argues that: "As regards schools, like any other institution or activity in society, it is naturally legitimate for the State, before granting public financial support to the school or its pupils, to consider whether the school meets reasonable standards of quality and whether it fulfils a need of society or the presumptive pupils. It is equally justified if financial support is provided, that the State take the necessary measures in order to assure itself that the facts and circumstances underlying the decision are not subsequently changed. These are - and on this point no othe~ view has been expressed by Blom - the motives for the requirement that a private schocl be State-supervised in order for its pupils to be eligible for public financial support. The Government submits that this does not constitute discrimi~~tion within the meaning of article 26."
The State party adds: "In view of the aforesaid, and for the following reasons, the Government further maintains that Blom's communication as regards this point should be declared inadmissible in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the Optional Protocol. Blom contends, as the sole 'discriminatory basis' for the alleged violation of article 26, that he chose to attend the Rudolf Steiner School because of his, and his parents', 'religion, political or other opinion', and that the different treatment regarding public financial support was a direct result of this choice. In tne opinion of the Government, this obviously does not amount to saying that the State's policy of different treatment of public and private schools is based on such grounds as religion or political or other opinion ••• What Blom appears to be arguing is that, because he chose the school for religious and political rea~ons, and because the State, although not for religious or political reasons, treated this private school differently from public schools, he has been treated in a discriminatory way on the ground of his religion and his political opinion. The lack of merits in this line of arguing must in the Government's opinion be considered so obvious as to make the communication inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol."
The State party further submits: -214-
A. regard. the que.tion po.ed in the duel.ion ot the Committ~e'. ~orking Group al to the rea.on. why the IchoQl was plac~d under State supervimion only al of 1 July 1982, the State party e.plainl "that the application tor State .upervision was made very late - three and a half months from the outlet of the fi.cal year 1081/82 and a long time atter the education of that .choal year had begun - and that ths deci.ion, which d.pended on various opinion. from other authoritie., could not be made until a couple of ..eeks before the end of the laid fi.cal }'ear. It .eem. a. if the .ole rea.on for the present ca.e is that those re.ponlible for the Rudolt Steiner School ~id not act f,ith sufficient promptne.s in applying for State luplrvilion."
rinally, the State pbrty mention. that two othe~ applications concerning related iSlues with re~pect to pupils of the Rudolf Steiner School of Norrkoping have been declared in"~lllible by the European Commilsion of Human Rightl in Stralbourg (applicationl 10476/83 and 10542/83).
In hi. comments, dated 24 February 1986, the author stresles that the retu.al to grant him fluancial s'lpport "wal in tact directed against him as belonging to a dl~t\nct 9rou~", thil group being com~o.ed of himlelf and hil clas.-mates, . COMpared with pupils attending ,ublic schools or private schools already subject to State lupervision. He further state. that at the time of application in OCtober hel the Rudolf Steiner School waa already complying with the five administralive requirement. imposed on private schools subject to Stat9 supervision. 6,2 The author challenge. the State party's arguments for considering the communicat.ion inadmi.sible under arrticle 3 of the Optional Protocol by strelling that he wal invoking "the grounds enumeralad in article 26 of the Covenant referring to the palsage 'di.cri~ination on any ground', which include. a reference to 'oth8r .tatuI'. AccQrdingly, for whatever reasonl [he] and hi. clasl-mates cho.e to attend the Ru~olf Steiner School, they all belong, because of this choicft, to the di.tinct 9~ouP ••. [an~] this 'othe~ statu~' ••• is obviously the ground for the different treatment imposed on him resulting from the State's deliberate policy."
With respect to the State party's statement that two other applications by other authors have been declared inadmiYlible by the European Commission of Huma.. Right', the aut~~r e.plains that the applicants there had cc~plaine~ of dilcrimination baled upon the fBet that aome municipalities in Sweden do not grant fr.e te.tbooks to pupils attending private schools, as do most other municipalities. Ac~ording to the author, these decisions have no relevancy whatever to the question of financial support under the Act on Study Aid.
With reqard to article 5, paraqraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, the Committee obael'ved that the matter complained of by Carl Henrik Dlom was not beIng examined and had not been examined under another procedure of international inve.tiqation or .ettlement. The Commit~ee noted that consid.ration by the European Commiaaion of Human Rlqhta of applications .ubmitted by other students at the aame Ichool relatlnq to other or ~imilar facts ~id not, within the meftning of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional ProtocoJ, constitute an examinaUon of tbe aame matter. As aet forth in the Committee's prior decIsions, the conc~pt of the ""ame matter" within the meaning of article 5, para9rJ)ph l (a), of the Optional Protocol muat be underatood a. including "the aame claim concerning the sam~ individual, aubmitted by him or someone el.e who haa thti standing to act on ~i8 b.half before the other international body". ~/ The r~.ervation of the State party in respect of matters already e.amined under another procedure of internation"l inve.tiqation or settlement, therefore, did not apply.
With regard to article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, the Committee waa unable to conclude, on the ba.is of the information before it, that there were available remedies in the circumatances of the case which could or should have been pursued. The Committee noted in that connection that the State party did not conteat the author's claim that dom~stic remedie. had bern exhausted.
With regard to the State party'a submis.ion that the "lack of merit" in ttu, author'. argumec,ts ahould render the conununlcation "inadmissible under;: article 3 of the Optional PrtJtocol", the Committee noted that article 3 of the Optional Protocol provided that communications should be ~eclared inadmissible if they WGre (a) anonymous, (b) ~onstituted an abuse oi the right of submission or (c) Voere incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant. The Committee observed that th~ author had made a reasonable 6ffort to substantiate his allegations and that he tl(ld invoked specific provisions of the Covenant. Therefore, the Committee decided that the issue. before it, in particular the scope of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil an~ Political Riqhts. should be examined with the merits of the case.
The Humftn Rights Committee noted that it could only consider a communicfttion in 80 tar as it concerned an alleged breach of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil an~ Political Ri9ht8.
The Committee observed that both the author and the State party had already made extensive submissions with re9ard to the merits of the case. However, the Committee dwemed it appropriate at that j'lncture to lh.it itself to the procedural requirement of d.c1ding on the adm1asibiL ty of the communication. It noted that, if th, State party should wi8h to add to its earlier submission within six months of the transmittal to it of the decision on admissibility, the author of tra communication woul~ be ghen the opportunit.y to comment thereon. If no further lYubmiuious were received from the State party under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol, the Committee would proceed to adopt its final views in the light of the written informalion already sub«,ltted by the parties.
The State party, on 23 October 1987, and the author, on 19 January 1988, ir.formed the Committee that they were prepared to let the Committee consider the case nn the merits as it then ~tood.
The Human Rights Committee has considered the merits of the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article ~, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. The facts of the case are not in dispute.
The main issue b~fore the Committee is whether the author of the communication is a victim of a violation of article 26 of the Covenant because of the alleged incompatibility of the Swedish regulations on education ftllowances with that provisiun. In decidin~ whether or not the State party violated article 26 by refusing to grant the author, a~ a pupil of a private school, an education all~wance for the school year 1~91/8], whereas pupils of public schools were entitled to education allowances for that period, the Committee bases its findings on the following observations.
The State party's educational system provides for both private and public education. The State party cannot be deemed to act in a discriminatory fashion if it doos not provide the some level ot subsidy for the two types of establishments, when the plivate system i. not subject to State supervision. As to the author's claim that the failure of the State party to grant an education allowance for the school year 1981/82 constituted discriminatory treatment, because the State party did not apply retroactively its decision of 17 June 1982 ~o place grades 10 and above under State supervision, the Committee notes that the granting of an allowance depended on actual e.ercise of State supervision since State supervision could not be e.ercised pricr to 1 JUly 1982 (see para. 2.2 above), the Committee finds that consequently it could not be e.pect~d that the State party would grant an allowance for any prior period and that the question of discriminat~on does not arise. On the other hand, the que.tion doe. ari.e whether the processing of the appli~ation vf the Rudolf Steiner School to be placed under State supervision was unduly prolon~ed and whether this violate~ any of the author's rights under the Covenant. In this connection, the Committee notes that the evaluation of a school's curricula necessarily entails a certain period of time, as a result of ~ host of factore and imponderables, including the necessit} of seekin~ advice from various governmental agencies. In the instant ca.e the school's application was made in October 1981 and the decision was rendered eight months later, in June 1982. This lapse of time cannot be deemed to be discriminatory, as such. Nor has the Huthor claimed that this lapse of time was attributable to discrimination.
The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, para9raph ... , of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts as submitted do not sustain the author's claim that he is a victim of a violation of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the light of the above, the Committee does not have tu make a finding in respect of the author's claim of a violation of article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.