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CCPR/C/41/D/304/1988

D. S. (name deleted) v. Jamaica

CCPR · 06 May 1991 · State party: Jamaica · Outcome: inadmissible · 11 paragraphs

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¶1.

The author of the communication (initial submission dated 15 June 1988 and subsequent submissions) is D.S., a Jamaican citizen currently awaiting execution at St. Catherine District Prison, Jamaica. He claims to be the victim of a violation of his human rights by Jamaica. .

Facts

¶2.1.

The author was arrested on 19 July 1985. In police custody, he was informed by an arresting officer that he and his common-law wife were charged with the murder, on 16 July 1985, of his father. He claims to be innocent of the charge. While his wife was subsequently granted bail, the author remained in custody until the beginning of the trial on 13 October 1986 in the Home Circuit Court, Kingston. During the trial he was represented by a legal aid attorney. On 16 October 1986, D.S. was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death: his wife was sentenced to life imprisonment. On 22 July 1981, the Court of Appeal dismissed the author's appeal. A subsequent petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was dismissed on 20 February 1991.

¶2.2.

The author alleges that his eight-year-old son, Andrew, was forced to give false evidence against his parents. He contends that his son was not at home on 16 July 1985 but was about three-and-a-half miles away from the place where the crime occurred. This was apparently corroborated by the author's 11-year-old daughter, Ann Marie her brother had left home. , who testified that, on the day in question, She apparently had gone to her grandfather's home, which was within earshot of the premises occupied by the author and his wife. The author purportedly heard her shout that her grandfather was lying on the floor of the house. a/ -281-

¶3.2.

The author alleges general prejudice and bias of the trial court. In particular, he claims that the judge misdirected the jury by failing to point out:. inter alia, that: (a) the prosecution had failed to prove the blood group of the deceased; (b) there was no evidence of bloodstain6 on the author's clothes: and (c) there were inconsistencies in Andrew's testimony, in particular with respect to the exact place of the crime, the window from which he claimed to have witnessed the murder, the crime weapon and the clothe6 and bandage the author was wearing at the time. In this context, the author add6 that no fingerprints were ever taken from him, to match those on the crime weapon. He further claims that there was evidence that Andrew was on bad terms with his parents, and that the trial judge failed to put this to the jury. It is submitted that in the circumstance6 and especially bearing in mind Andrew'6 age, it was incumbent on the trial judge to direct the jury with particular care on Andrew's evidence: it is conceded, however, that the judge did point out to the jury that caution was required in accepting this evidence, unless sufficiently corroborated.

¶3.3.

The author further submit6 that no witnesses were sov.ght to testify on his behalf, and that his legal aid attorney did not make any effort to contact witnesses who might have corroborated his.own version. State nartv's observation6

¶4.

In its submission, made on 17 November 1988, the State party argued that the communication was inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since Jamaica's highest judicial instance, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, had not yet entertained an appeal in the case, Limes before the Co-

¶5.1.

Before considering any claims contained in a ,?ommunication, the Humax Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.

¶5.2.

With respect to the author'6 claims of unfair trial, the Committee observe6 that it is generally for the appellate courts of States parties to the Covenant and not for the Committee to evaluate the facts and evidence placed before domestic court6 and to review the interpretation of domestic law by national courts. Similarly, it is for the appellate courts and not for th6 Committee to review specific instructions to the jury by the judge, unless it is apparent from the author'6 submission that the instructions to the jury were clearly arbitrary or tantamount to a denial of justice, or that the judge manifestly violated hi6 obligation of impartiality. The author'6 allegation6 do not show that the judge'6 inotructions or conduct of the trial Suffered from such defects in the present case. In this respect, therefore, the -282-

¶5.3.

As to the claim that the author could not obtain the attendance and the testimony of witnesses on his behalf, the Committee notes that the author has failed to substantiate this allegation sufficiently, for purposes of admissibility. In particular, it is not explained why his attorney did not call any defence witness. In this respect, accordingly, the author has no claim under the Covenant within the meaning of article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

¶6.

The Human Rights Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 3 of the optional Protocol in respect of the author’s claim under article

¶14.

paragraph 1, of the Covenant, and under article 2 of the Optional Protocol in respect of his claim under article 14, paragraph 3 (e), of the Covenanta (b) That this decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the author. a/ No other details are provided on the facts of the case. -283-