October – 3 November 2006
Author’s comments
The author presented his comments on 16 May 2006. He reiterated, in detail, his previous allegations and dismissed the State party’s observations as superficial. He contended that the State party limited itself to confirming the grounds for his conviction on a murder charge, and pointed out that no documentary evidence has been adduced by the State party in substantiation of its observations.
The author commented on the State party’s observations on 31 August 2006. He notes that the State party still has not adduced documentary evidence in support of its arguments, but limited itself in confirming in general terms the grounds for his conviction.
The author confirms that after his arrest, he was informed of his right not to testify against himself, but claims that when he was interrogated as a witness, he was warned that his criminal liability could be engaged in case of false testimony.
Finally, he recalls his allegations under article 14, paragraph 3 (e), about the failure of the court, despite its obligation to do so, to call and interrogate three witnesses (S., K., and G.) because their depositions during the preliminary investigation contradicted the prosecution’s version.
Admissibility considerations
The author claims that contrary to article 14, paragraph 1, his trial was not fair, because the court was partial and took into consideration only the victim’s description of the crime but rejected his own version. The State party argues that its Supreme Court and its General Prosecutor’s Office examined the author’s communication and concluded that his allegations of Covenant violations during the preliminary investigation and the court trial are unfounded. It added that the trial court established the author’s guilt after having fully evaluated all the available evidence during the trial. In substance, theses allegations relate to the evaluation of facts and evidence, and the Committee recalls that it is generally for the courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, unless it can be ascertained that it was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. In the absence of other pertinent information that would show that this is the situation in the present case, the Committee considers that this part of the communication is also inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The author has claimed a violation of his right to defence as protected by article 14, paragraph 3 (d), since after being placed under administrative arrest by a court order, from 14 February to 20 February 1995, his privately retained lawyer was not allowed to see him until 20 February. The State party argues that the author was arrested as a suspect on 20 February 1995, and charged with murder on 22 February, and that, in any event, on 17 February, he had refused, in writing, to be legally represented. This was not refuted by the author. In the circumstances of the present case, and in absence of any further relevant information in this relation, the Committee considers that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate his allegations, for purposes of admissibility. This part of the communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2, of the Optional Protocol. The author claims a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (e), as three witnesses called on his behalf – S., K., and G., - whose testimonies allegedly would have contradicted the prosecution’s version, were not summoned by the court. The State party objects that the list of witnesses to summon in the case file does not mention the names of S., K., and G., and that, in court, neither the author nor counsel requested to call these individuals as witnesses; this was uncontested by the author. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that the author has failed sufficiently to substantiate this allegation, for purposes of admissibility, and it is accordingly inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The author has also claimed that contrary to article 14, paragraph 3 (g), he was forced by the investigators to confess his guilt. The State party has replied that both during the preliminary investigation and in court, he was informed about his procedural rights as a suspect, and in particular his right not to testify against himself. The Mityshchinsk City Prosecotor’s Office investigated the author’s and his co-defendant’s allegations that moral and physical pressure were used by the investigators to force them admit guilt, and concluded that these allegations were unfounded. The Committee notes that the author did not refute the State party’s affirmations: he acknowledges that he was informed of his right not to testify against himself, but claims that at the same time he was informed of his criminal liability if he gave false testimony. In the circumstances, and in the absence of any other pertinent information in this connection, the Committee considers that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate his allegations, for purposes of admissibility. This part of the communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
The Human Rights Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol;